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To Torben and Stefan
Remarking upon injustice is like having an eye gouged 
out, looking away is losing both eyes.
Russian proverb
We can readily find both states and scholars who accept 
the differentiation o f State Responsibility and yet reject 
the concept o f Crimes o f State.
Joseph H. H. Weiler, “On Prophets and Judges”
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ABSTRACT
Fifty years after the Nuremberg trials, Europe is challenged once again with a question: 
Who is responsible for state-sponsored violations of human rights? This time, those put 
on trial or ostracised from power are elements of the Communist structures of control. 
Some observers have criticised these measures of political justice, comparing them to a 
‘witch hunt,’ and accusing the courts and legislature of often engendering an unjustifiable 
collective guilt. In contrast, others have claimed that not enough is being done; that the 
people of Eastern Europe “have asked for justice, and got the rule of law.”
In this thesis, the author proposes an assessment of the process of political justice taking 
place in post-Communist Eastern Europe. The approach taken is from the perspective of 
the role played in this process by the concept of collective responsibility of political 
organisations for violations of human rights. While concentrating on the way collective 
responsibility appears in the criminal law measures taken in Hungary, and in the 
administrative procedures of screening used in the Czech Republic, the thesis also aims 
to offer a comprehensive picture of the general debate on accountability for past human 
rights violations which takes place in post-Communist Eastern Europe.
The thesis underlines the complexity of the political reality in which the expectations for 
accountability for state-sponsored violations of human rights are answered. It also 
emphasises the importance for this answer to acknowledge the nature of the Communist 
regime, and of its representative structure known under the name of Nomenklatura. Based 
on these elements, the author argues for the necessity of combining individual and 
collective responsibility for human rights violations. A reconstructed concept of 
collective agency and collective responsibility appears to be the solution to the 
inconsistencies otherwise manifested in a process of political justice. Such concepts, the 
author argues, should allow for the acknowledgement - through commissions of truth, as 
well as through prosecution and screening - of the role played by the Communist 
structure of power in the violations of human rights which took place under its regime.
5
CONTENTS
Chapter One:
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY AS A
DIMENSION OF POLITICAL JUSTICE .............................................................. 9
1.1 The “Alternative” Fuller Never Wrote A bou t............................................. 9
1.2 The Definition and Terminology of Political Justice................................. 16
1.2.1 The Definition of Political Justice............................................................. 16
1.2.2 The Terminology of Justice....................................................................... 24
1.3 Approaches to Political Justice in Eastern Europe .........................................27
1.3.1 The Case for Prosecutions......................................................................... 29
1.3.2 The Case Against Prosecutions................................................................. 31
1.3.3 Screening and Cleansing................................................................................. 34
1.3.4 Procedural Concerns ....................................................................................... 36
1.4 The Object of Political Justice................................................................... 42
1.5 The Right to Revolution............................................................................. 47
1.6 Preliminary Conclusions ................................................................................. 56
Chapter Two:
ON PROSECUTING: POLITICAL JUSTICE
THROUGH CRIMINAL LAW MEASURES........................................................ 59
2.1 Introducing Case Studies to Political Justice................................................... 59
2.2 The Criminal Law Approach to Political Justice in Hungary:
Historical Background.................................................................................... 61
2.2.1 Amending the Statute of Limitations: Context and Content
of the Zetenyi-Takacs Law.............................................................................. 66
2.2.2 The Constitutional Court Decision on the Zetenyi-Takacs L a w .....................75
2.2.3 Legal Security v. “Exceptional Circumstances” .............................................82
2.2.4 Formal v. Substantive in the Constitutional Discourse...................................86
2.2.5 The Law No. 53/1993 on the Statute of Limitations:
Context and Content ...................................................................................... 91
2.2.6 The Revolution of the Rule of Law: The Constitutional
Court’s Decision on the Law No. 53/1993 ..................................................  96
2.2.7 Collective Political Agency and Responsibility............................................. 106
2.3 Formal v. Substantive: Aspects of the German Border Guards Trials 112
2.4 Preliminary Conclusions ............................................................................... 121
6
Chapter Three:
ON SCREENING: POLITICAL JUSTICE THROUGH
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES AND NON-CRIMINAL LAW  124
3.1 The Non-Criminal Law Approach to Political Justice in
the Czech Republic: Historical Background ................................................ 124
3.2 The Czechoslovak Revolution: From Velvet to the Shirt of Penitence . . . .  127
3.3 The Use and Abuse of Secret Police Files in
the Process of Political Justice.......................................................................137
3.4 The Screening Process in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia........................150
3.4.1 The First Round of Screening in Czechoslovakia........................................150
3.4.2 The Second Round of Screening in Czechoslovakia....................................155
3.4.3 The Helsinki Proposal..................................................................................161
3.4.4 The Lustration Law: The Main Provisions ..................................................164
3.4.5 Procedural Aspects of the Lustration L aw ....................................................169
3.4.6 Punishing and Discriminating: In Search of a Rationale..............................171
3.4.7 The Constitutional Court Decision on the Lustration L a w ..........................184
3.5 The Czech Act on the Illegality of the Communist Regime ........................190
3.6 Preliminary Conclusions..............................................................................195
Chapter Four:
THEORIES OF COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY:
THE POLITICAL ORGANISATION AS A LEGAL ACTOR ........................202
4.1 Looking Beyond Individual Responsibility................................................. 202
4.2 Political Bureaucracies as Formal Organisations:
From Morality to Metaphysics, and B ack .................................................... 203
4.3 Theories on Collective Agency: Implications for the
Concept ofCollective Political Responsibility.............................................. 216
4.3.1 Methodological Individualism or the Theory of the Scapegoat................... 217
4.3.2 Structural Restraint View or the Theory of the Virtuous Circle ................. 229
4.3.3 Structural Pragmatism: Taking the R is k ..................................................... 239
4.3.4 Functional Structuralism: Taking the Blam e............................................... 247
4.4 Preliminary Conclusions............................................................................. 256
Chapter Five:
NOMENKLATURA AS A POLITICAL AND LEGAL ACTOR........................ 261
5.1 The Search for a Collective Agent............................................................... 261
5.2 A Hybrid: The State - Party Bureaucracy..................................................... 269
5.3 Beyond the List: The Communist Nomenklatura ....................................... 277
5.4 The Nomenklatura's Sources of Collective Identity ................................... 287
5.5 The Conglomerate Identity: The Knots and Bolts of Real P ow er............... 295
5.6 Preliminary Conclusions: Structure, Control, and Responsibility............... 313
7
Chapter Six:
COLLECTIVE POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY: QUO VADIS? 318
6.1 Acknowledging the Nomenklatura ............................................................... 318
6.2 The Rule of Law in Post-Communist Eastern European Context................. 326
6.2.1 The Nomenklatura, Collective Responsibility,
and the Values of the Rule of L aw ................................................................ 328
6.3 Justice by Truth: The Truth Commission and the
Acknowledgement of Collective Responsibility.......................................... 347
6.3.1 Collective Responsibility and the Functions of the Truth Commission . . .  356
6.3.2 Collective Responsibility and the Mandate of the Truth Commission . . . .  360
6.3.3 The Commission and the Commissioners:
Setting Up a Truth Commission .................................................................. 368
6.4 Building on the Truth: Prosecuting and Screening Revisited....................... 378
6.5 Conclusions: Beyond the Truth Commission’s Report................................. 386
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................ 405
A. Books and Articles......................................................................................... 405
B. Official Documents ....................................................................................... 429
8
Chapter One: Collective Responsibility
Chapter One
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY AS A DIMENSION OF 
POLITICAL JUSTICE
Abstract
The introductory chapter focuses on defining the concept o f political justice, and on establishing its 
connections with the concept o f collective responsibility. After the analysis o f the definition o f the concept 
of political justice and terminological clarifications, the different approaches taken to political justice in 
Eastern Europe are presented. This analysis reveals the systematic violations o f human rights as central 
to the debate on political justice. This fact brings the accountability o f  the power structures o f the 
communist regime into discussion, establishing undeniable connections with the concept o f collective 
responsibility. The acknowledgement o f human rights as the legitimate objective o f  a process o f political 
justice brings under analysis the right to revolution as the right implying a retroactive assessment of a 
repressive regime. The analysis o f this right reinforces collective governmental accountability among the 
dimensions proposed in a process o f political justice. This dimension remains to be identified in the 
Eastern European case studies analysed in Chapter Two and Chapter Three.
1.1 The “Alternative” Fuller Never Wrote About
In 1969 Fuller added to his previously published book The Morality of Law an appendix 
entitled “The Problem of the Grudge Informer.”1 In the appendix, which, as it happens, 
was published almost half way between the fall of the Nazi regime and the fall of 
Communism in the Soviet bloc, Fuller wrote about an imaginary society confronted with 
the difficulties of transition from a repressive regime. Through his essay, Fuller tried to
]Lon L. Fuller, The Morality o f Law, rev. ed. 1964 (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1969), pp. 245-253.
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revive the debate surrounding the issue of political justice. His original approach appears
to be inspired by practical legal experience and expectations for justice which arose after
the Second World War. At the same time, Fuller built a visionary bridge to the future by
calling the main political actors of his imaginary society “the Purple Shirts.”
Fuller’s story goes as follows: The Purple Shirts arrived in power during a deep economic 
and political crisis. Their victory at the polls was preceded by an election campaign that 
was marked by reckless promises, ingenious falsifications and systematic physical 
intimidation of opponents. Once in power, apparently nothing changed in the 
constitutional and legal framework of the country: there were no steps taken to repeal the 
ancient Constitution or any of its provisions; the Civil, Criminal and Procedural Codes 
remained the same; no official or civil servant was dismissed and no judge was removed 
from the bench. Meanwhile, elections continued to be held regularly. As a matter of 
deliberate policy, the Purple Shirts once in power preserved an element of flexibility in 
their operations. At times they were acting through “the party in the streets,” whilst at 
other times they were implementing their policies through the state apparatus which they 
controlled entirely.
Although apparently not much had changed, the country started to sink “under a reign of 
terror.”2 Judges who followed the law rather than the Party’s directives were beaten and 
even murdered. The meaning of the Criminal Code was perverted and used to imprison 
political opponents, or even to sentence them to death. Secret statutes known only to the
2Fuller, p. 247.
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Party hierarchy were passed. Slowly but surely, using invented motives, the Purple Shirt 
Party disbanded all opposing political parties. In this legal context saturated with political 
discretion, informers who tried to resolve personal grudges found a fertile ground. The 
activities usually reported by informers were apparently minor: expressing personal views 
critical to the government, listening to foreign radio broadcasts, failing to report the loss 
of identification papers within five days, etc. The punishment for these acts, if proven 
true, could be the death penalty, as all these acts were seen as endangering the security 
of the state. Given the harshness of these consequences, the overthrow of the Purple 
Shirts regime brought with it a strong public demand for the grudge informers to be 
punished.
The main actor of Fuller’s story is neither the Purple Shirt Party who established the 
repressive rule, nor the “grudge informer” who took advantage of the discretionary and 
totalitarian nature of the regime. The “hero” (and the victim, one could say) of the story 
is the reader, who is asked to take the place of an imaginary Minister of Justice, in an 
imaginary democratic post-Purple Shirt regime, and who is asked to chose between five 
alternative solutions to these demands for justice concerning the grudge informers. In 
Fuller’s story, the five solutions are offered not by those thirsty for revenge, or by 
politicians seeking political capital, but by five imaginary Deputies concerned, 
presumably, with the preservation of legality and democratic government.
The problem of the grudge informers that the reader as Minister of Justice has to solve 
is a limited one, compared to the legacy of legal problems a repressive regime leaves
11
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behind. Generalisations, however, are easily made by the reader. We are advised by the 
first of Fuller’s Deputies that one cannot judge acts from the past if in the past those very 
acts were considered lawful: “The difference between ourselves and the Purple Shirts is 
not that theirs was an unlawful government - a contradiction in terms - but lies rather in 
the field of ideology.”3 The second Deputy offers the same solution of impossibility of 
legal action against the grudge informers, although this time the solution is based on a 
totally different argument. We are told that the Purple Shirt Party established a lawless 
power, and that one cannot conclude that a system of law existed in a repressive regime. 
Thus, to judge an act committed in such a period as being unlawful would be a nonsense: 
“What they did do was neither lawful nor contrary to law, for they lived, not under a 
regime of law, but under one of anarchy and terror.”4 The third Deputy suggests that in 
order to answer the expectations of justice, through the courts there should be 
“discrimination” between the different domains of the Purple Shirt rule. Only those acts 
where “the Purple Shirt philosophy intruded itself and perverted the administration of 
justice from its normal aims and uses”5 should be prosecuted. The fourth Deputy finds 
the third Deputy’s pick-and-choose attitude objectionable. He proposes to enact a 
“designer law” which would cover only carefully selected acts.6 As an experienced 
lawyer, the fifth Deputy feels dismayed by this suggestion for an ex post facto criminal 
statute. Caring about the consistency of the legal discourse, he suggests that the law
3Fuller, p. 248.
4Fuller, p. 250.
5Fuller, p. 251.
6Fuller, p. 252.
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should abstain from answering the expectations for political justice. According to the fifth
Deputy, there is good evidence that, before long, the population would solve the problem
of grudge informers outside the law. Therefore, since using any of the previous solutions
would violate some or all fundamental legal principles, he proposes to let the people take
the law into their own hands.7
It would be quite normal to hesitate when choosing between the five alternatives. In the 
end, when one opts for one or another alternative, one always remains with a feeling of 
compromise, with the feeling of having sacrificed either substantive justice or the rule of 
law. Fuller himself hesitates to openly test his ideas on the formal morality of law against 
the hard case of political justice. In fact, Fuller only exemplifies the dilemmas that arise 
from certain expectations for justice, he does not solve them; he leaves the reader to make 
the choice between the five alternatives.8
The dilemma of the grudge informers can easily be transferred to the vast injustice 
inherited in 1989 from the repressive Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. 
Nevertheless, when one is confronted with the paradigm of the grudge informers, the
7Fuller, p. 253.
o
In the introduction to his book, Fuller does recommend chapter two as being instrumental to 
solving the dilemma o f the Minister o f Justice. Fuller, 1969, p. vii and pp. 33-94. Fuller’s “procedural 
natural law” does not seem though to meet the challenge o f a totalitarian regime, and many critics 
emphasise the fact that a regime could follow Fuller’s procedural requirements and still enact “wicked 
laws.” See Michael D. A. Freeman, Lloyd's Introduction to Jurisprudence. 6th ed. (London : Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1994), p. 723 ff. Speaking about the legacy of Purple Shirtism in Eastern Europe, Los states that 
none o f the solutions offered by Fuller’s deputies - now echoed in post-Communist parliaments - seem 
adequate. Maria Los, “In the Shadow o f Totalitarian Law: Law-Making in Post-Communist Poland,” in 
Totalitarian and Post-Totalitarian Law, eds. Adam Podgorecki and Vittorio Olgiati (Dartmouth: Oflati 
I.I.S.L., 1996), p. 276.
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question of which of the five solutions to choose from Fuller’s account is not necessarily
the first question that should be asked. The question that should be asked first is whether
there are only five alternatives for justice. Concerning these alternatives, there are
“rumours” - confirmed somehow by the recent post-Communist Eastern European
experience with similar problems - that there might have been a sixth Deputy advising
the Minister of Justice of the post-Purple Shirt regime. For unknown reasons, the opinion
of this sixth Deputy does not appear in Fuller’s account. Thus, one can only imagine what
the sixth Deputy’s advice to a post-Purple Shirt regime might be.
Were a sixth Deputy to exist, he would not contradict directly any of the other Deputies 
in their opinions about the way of dealing with the grudge informers. He would even 
praise the five Deputies’ tendency to base each of their solutions within an evaluation of 
the nature of the Purple Shirt regime. However, the sixth Deputy would find that these 
evaluations lack legal depth. Indeed, he would argue that an answer to particular issues 
of justice derived from the fall of a repressive regime, such as the Purple Shirt regime, 
could not be found without addressing, within the law, the nature of these demands for 
justice. The nature of a process of justice such as the one generating the problem of the 
grudge informers is always the same, he would say: it basically proposes a “backward- 
looking” assessment of the ousted political regime. Therefore, addressing the aspects of 
an “institutional” responsibility of a repressive totalitarian regime would become central 
to any such process of political justice. In other words, the sixth Deputy would argue that 
in order for the legal discourse to be able to answer the problem of the grudge informer 
appropriately, it would have first to address the Purple Shirt regime itself.
14
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Is there a way to address a past regime as a whole, as the sixth Deputy would advise? 
Who would be responsible for the regime? Could we conceive, in law, a collective 
political responsibility which would match up to the crimes of the regime? And, could 
this be done without endangering the fragile democracy? These are all questions which 
indeed, should be answered before being able to decide about the grudge informers. In 
fact, only by answering these questions can we establish the basis for a more just solution 
to the problem of the grudge informers.
This thesis is seeking to provide for this basis for justice in the context of the post- 
Communist Eastern Europe. Following this objective, the thesis will analyse the main 
dimensions of the processes of political justice initiated in the Eastern European 
countries, focusing on the role played by the concept of collective responsibility.
The inquiry into the relationship between political justice and the concept of collective 
responsibility will be pursued as follows. In this introductory chapter the concept of 
political justice, its main objective, and its potential social agents, are defined. The 
second and third chapter will be dedicated to the analysis of the two main approaches to 
political justice in Eastern Europe: the criminal law approach, and the non-criminal or 
administrative procedures respectively. The analysis of these two fundamentally different 
legal approaches to political justice is meant to underline the difficulties and 
inconsistencies encountered in the process of political justice in the absence of a coherent 
position towards the concept of collective responsibility. In Chapter Four the source of 
these difficulties and inconsistencies, and their potential solution, will be identified. This
15
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will be done through an analysis of the concept of collective responsibility as it is 
conceived by the legal doctrine and jurisprudence, as well as by the sociology of 
organisations. In Chapter Five, the concept of collective agency will be applied to the 
realities of Eastern European Communist societies. Those governmental or political 
organisations which can prove the credentials of agenthood will be identified from the 
multitude of collective social entities. These agencies will be proposed as able to 
participate in the “division of responsibility” for the human rights violations which 
occurred under the totalitarian Communist regime. The sixth and final chapter will spell 
out the implications brought about by the acknowledgment of a collective agent for the 
process of political justice.
1.2 The Definition and Terminology of Political Justice
1.2.1 The Definition of Political Justice
Political justice is one of the most controversial concepts within the legal discourse. One 
could even disagree that such a concept belongs to the legal domain at all, given the way 
in which basic legal principles are questioned and even ignored in such a process.9 It 
would be more appropriate perhaps to view it as an aspect close to the constitutional 
discourse, where ontologically law and politics meet and tolerate each other more often.
9J. Colwill, “From Nuremberg to Bosnia: War Crimes Trials in the Modem Era,” Social Justice 
22, no.3 (Fall 1995): 111-128. G. Werle, “’We asked for Justice and Got the Rule o f Law:’ German 
Courts and the Totalitarian Past,” South African Journal on Human Rights 11, no. 1 (1995): 70-83.
16
Chapter One: Collective Responsibility 
This tolerance, however, does not make political justice a less controversial issue.10
The evident entanglement of law and politics is generally the reason why the concept of 
political justice is a controversial concept, and why it comes associated with rather 
negative connotations and definitions. Initially the term political justice suggested the 
search for an ideal order in which all members of society communicate and interact with 
the body politic to assure its highest perfection.11 However, what one generally 
understands now by the term political justice is the way political interests contaminate 
the legal means employed to achieve legitimate social expectations. This understanding 
makes political justice become an almost pejorative term. Otto Kirchheimer analysed the 
concept of political justice mainly from this perspective. In his view the process of 
political justice appears as “the most dubious segment of the administration of justice.”12 
This segment, constituted by the use of devices of justice, bolsters or creates new power 
positions. Therefore, the aim of this segment appears to be purely political; politics 
merely manipulating the devices of justice.13 According to Kirchheimer, “circumstantial
10Public international law is sometimes subject to the same controversy. David Hutchinson, 
“Positivism and International Law,” in Positivism Today, ed. Stephen Guest (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996), 
pp. 46-64. Also, Charalambos Apostolidis, Doctrines Juridiques et Droit International (Paris: Eyrolles, 
1991), pp. 114-122 and 444 ff.
u Otfried Hoffe, Political Justice: Foundations for a Critical Philosophy o f Law and the State 
(Cambridge, UK; Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 27-33. Peter J Steinberger, The Concept of 
Political Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 3 ff. J.A. Caporaso, Theories of 
Political Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 197. R. Richie and S. Hill, 
“Proportional Representation,” Social Policy, vol. 26, no. 4 (Summer 1996): 25-37. Milton Fisk, The State 
and Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 65 ff.
12Otto Kirchheimer, Political Justice (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1980),
p. vii.
13Ibid.
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and contradictory, the linkage of politics and justice is characterized by both promise and 
blasphemy.”14
The contradiction inherent in political justice derives mainly from a kind of short-circuit 
between the activity of the law and the acts to which the law is, or tries to be, applied.15 
The coincidence in time which should usually exist between the activity of a legal norm 
and the acts to which the law applies can - due to political pressures - be altered to 
different degrees. Usually this alteration arises out of a radical change in the political 
regime along with a radically different view about justice, than the preceding regime. 
This non-coincidence, however, could take place without such a radical change, when - 
again because of political reasons - the legal discourse is reactivated in areas in which it 
used to be kept dormant.16
However, it would be a mistake to consider that the term “political justice” applies only 
to those situations in which there is this type of short-circuit in the application of the 
laws. Evidently, the scope of political justice encompasses purely retroactive laws, re-
14Ibid.
15Joseph Raz, “On the Functions o f Law,” in Oxford Essavs in Jurisprudence. Second Series, ed. 
A.W.B. Simpson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 281 f.
16An extra-judicial “de-activation” o f legal norms occurs when specific laws are left to fall totally 
in desuetude, or are not applied to certain categories of perscons, or in certain circumstances which are 
defined politically. On the fundamental problem o f  the tacit assumption o f an essential continuity o f the 
law and legal culture between the Communist and the post-Communist reality see Maria Los, “In the 
Shadow o f Totalitarian Law,” pp. 286-292.
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interpretations of old laws,17 as well as extreme analogical legal thinking.18 Nevertheless, 
the concept of political justice often applies to situations in which there is no real conflict 
of activity between the acts and the legal norms, the conflict being purely political, 
derived from a change of commitment to the application of the law.19 Thus, the term of 
political justice applies also to situations to which the short-circuit in the application of 
the law is itself a pure political creation.
The change of commitment to the enforcement of the law is also associated with a change 
of government, or with another equivalent radical change within the political system, 
such as the changes of policy determined by international pressure applied to an 
undemocratic government. A recent example of a political justice conflict where the 
conflict originates completely outside the law but tends to affect the way in which the law 
is applied, is the Rwandan genocide trials.20 In cases like this not all of Fuller’s 
alternatives are available. The debate, however, develops around the same parameters of 
justice, deterrence and need for reconciliation as in Fuller’s paradigmatic story. In fact, 
this debate might only mimic the legal argumentation, while remaining purely political. 
The result is a debate about law, or more precisely about the commitment to law, which
17On the “so-called methods of interpretation” see Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems o f  
Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 77-89.
18Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr., “Legislative Intent,” in Legislative Intent and Other Essavs on Law. 
Politics and Morality, eds. Marcus G. Singer and Rex Martin (Wisconsin: The University o f  Wisconsin 
Press, 1993), pp. 3-35.
19Los, Maria, “In the Shadow o f Totalitarian Law,” p. 296 ff.
20African Rights (Organisation), “Rwanda: Who is Killing, Who is Dying, What is To Be Done?” 
Discussion paper, African Rights (London: African Rights, May 1994).
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takes place outside the legal discourse. In situations in which the crimes (and guilt) are
so obvious that not even the perpetrators can deny them, the process of justice is branded
as “political” in order to highlight the strength, importance and maybe even legitimacy
of other political objectives ( other than formal legal justice). Non-legal matters for
instance, come up often in such a debate on justice. Among the relevant aspects there is
the need for reconciliation and prevention of future waves of atrocities.21
It is important to acknowledge that the concept of political justice is applied in a more 
complex and contradictory way than it was perceived by Kirchheimer.22 The concept of 
political justice envelopes both situations in which there is a legal potential for inhibiting 
the political predisposition to penalise, and situations in which the legal potential for 
penalising is itself hindered by strong political demands. Both these types of conflict 
relate to the search for political legitimacy, although not all the instances of political 
justice can be reduced to the expression of a crisis of legitimacy.23 Nevertheless, in both
21 There is also the fear that, procedurally, the process o f political justice will not reach up to the 
highest standards o f due process required by the criminal law. Ethan Klingsberg, “The Triumph o f the 
Therapeutic: The Quest to Cure Eastern Europe Through Secret Police Files,” in Truth and Justice: The 
Delicate Balance. Budapest: Central European University, Institute for Constitutional and Legislative 
Policy, Working Paper no.l (1993), p. 11-12.
22Reflecting somewhat the Kirchheimerian perspective, Bankowski and Mungham write that “the 
traditional way o f getting over [the acknowledgement o f political trials in the legal order] and giving the 
term ‘political trial’ a specific meaning has been to see it as a prosecution launched with a political (in a 
narrow sense) purpose.” Bankowski and Mungham, however, offer a wider meaning to the term “political 
trial” (which is one o f the legal measures that can be identified in a process o f political justice), inquiring 
into “what happens when defendants take their politics into the courtroom.” Zenon Bankowski and Geoff 
Mungham, “Political Trials in Contemporary Wales: Cases, Causes and Methods,” in Essavs in Law and 
Society, ed. Zenon Bankowski and Geoff Mungham (London, Boston, Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1980), p. 53.
23Aryeh Neier, “What Should be Done about the Guilty?” The New York Review o f Books 37. 
no. 1 (1 February 1990): 34-35.
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circumstances the process of justice is always politically charged, though not always in 
an “illegitimate” way.24 This unavoidable contamination between law and politics 
explains Kirchheimer’s perspective on the issue of political justice.
More importantly, regardless of its concrete manifestation, the process of political justice 
always suggests a normative evaluation of the “political foe.”25 This evaluation takes 
place even in those circumstances in which the legal discourse, far from being forced 
upon, is actually deflected from being applied to certain acts which could be linked to a 
certain political actor. A process of political justice does not, for example, materialise 
only in the form of screening procedures, and other similar measures; it can just as well 
materialise in an amnesty law. Even if individually applied, such a law intimates an act 
which gives up legitimate legal claims over a collective political actor, or a political 
regime. An amnesty concerning the crimes of a political regime is still an implicit 
declaration about the nature of the acts of that regime. Had the amnesty law not been 
enacted, these acts would normally be under the scope of the criminal law. Hence, the 
presence of a political dimension of the legal action in a variety of forms, should lead any 
real Minister of Justice - just like Fuller’s imaginary one - to be cautious.
24Guillermo O’Donnell and Phillippe C. Schmitter, Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore. London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 
pp. 28-36.
Kirchheimer, Political Justice, p. 7 ff. This “evaluation” could be seen as what Bankowski and 
Mungham, referring to political trials, call “a transmutation of political activity into legal processes.” This 
transmutation would be done, according to Bankowski and Mungham, “not only by translating these 
activities into legal language but also, through this, by making the defendants symbolically act out their 
activities in a legal way in the trial.” Bankowski and Mungham, p. 53.
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Another important aspect, which should be retained for the purpose of a definition of 
political justice, is the fact that the process of justice initiated by the fall of a repressive 
regime can be best defined as blending into a legal equation the goal of political 
legitimacy with the aims of moral justice. This understanding of the definition of political 
justice does not imply, or preclude, the possibility of this equation being, entirely or 
partly, a fraudulent one. In other words, moral ideals can be used as tools of political 
manipulation.26 It is just as likely, however, that the aim of political legitimacy intimately 
coincides with that of moral justice. The possibility of manipulating the equation arises 
out of the difficulty in finding a yardstick which could be instrumental in comparing and 
assessing the performance of governments or other political actors.27 However, the main 
conceptual point that makes Kirchheimer’s definition of political justice restrictive and 
unilateral resides precisely in overrating the difficulty of finding a standard normative 
measure for political conduct.
The unilateral nature of Kirchheimer’s definition of political justice is compatible with 
a certain combination of modem moral relativism and the formal conception of the mle 
of law.28 This combination makes it impossible to acknowledge in the legal discourse
26Leslie Holmes, “The Democratic State or State Democracy? Problems o f Post-Communist 
Transition,” European University Institute, Jean Monnet Chair Paper RSC No. 97/48. “Hungarian 
Screening Committee Chairman Refuses to Resign,” Daily Digest. 18 January 1995. “Screening Law in 
Poland.” Daily Digest. 2 February 1996.
27For general aspects on these issues see Peter Morton, An Institutional Theory o f Law: Keeping 
Law in Its Place (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 163 & 194 ff.
28David Lyons, Ethics and the Rule o f Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp.
11- 35 .
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whether a regime which killed millions of its own citizens is a criminal regime or not.
Thus, Kirchheimer’s rather procedural analysis of the concept of political justice appears 
lopsided. On the one hand, the imbalance of his definition originates from the fact that 
it takes into account only that part of the concept which reflects the pressure applied by 
the political discourse on the legal process, with the aim of hyper-activating the latter. On 
the other hand, Kirchheimer’s approach neglects to a very large extent those situations 
in which moral and legal expectations coincide in their legitimacy, but are denied 
realisation through (pertinent, or less pertinent) political interventions.29
In order to compensate for this neglect manifested in Kirchheimer’s approach, the 
definition of political justice should not go further than a mere acknowledgement of the 
presence of competing discourses of justice.30 In this sense, political justice appears as 
that part of the realisation of social (not necessarily legal) justice, in which the political, 
moral and legal discourses become acutely equal and thus, competing. This definition is 
more enhancing in its simplicity and therefore, with a greater potential for adaptability 
to a variety of complex situations which, in practice, are defined as processes of political 
justice but could not fit into the narrow mould of Kirchheimer’s definition.
29In the conclusions to his book on political justice, Kirchheimer acknowledges, although only 
en passant, this type of competing expectations. Kirchheimer neglects, however, to elaborate over this very 
important and controversial side of the concept o f political justice. Kirchheimer, Political Justice, p. 423.
Authors such as Joseph Raz and Peter Craig have acknowledged the existence o f competing 
values requiring the protection o f the law in their analysis o f the concept o f the rule o f law. Joseph Raz, 
“The Rule o f Law and Its Virtue,” The Law Quarterly Review 93 (April 1977): 206-207. Paul P. Craig, 
“Formal and Substantive Conceptions o f  the Rule o f Law,” Diritto Publico. (Saggi, 1995), pp. 35-55.
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1.2.2 The Terminology of Justice
The “coexistence” in the conflict of political justice of two, often competing, normative 
discourses (the moral and the legal one) combined with the inherent tendency of a third 
discourse, the political one, to colonise the other two discourses involved, means that, 
aside from a prejudiced attitude towards pursuing justice in such a context, there is a 
certain reluctance in using the term of political justice itself. Various authors have 
attempted to replace it with other, more neutral or more specific terms.31 A short review 
of this terminology used alongside or instead of the term political justice is not only 
helpful in understanding some of the authors who analysed the process of justice in 
revolutionary contexts, but it can also reveal some of the characteristics of this particular 
process of justice. Among the terms used more or less synonymously with the one of 
political justice one could mention “backward-looking” or “retrospective justice,” 
“retroactive” or “ex post facto justice,” “retributive justice,” “post-authoritarian justice,” 
“transitional justice” and “historical justice.”
Terms such as “backward looking” and “retrospective justice” appear as tautological, 
since a process of criminal justice is always, to a certain extent, backward-looking. 
Therefore, these terms do not include anything of the specificity of the phenomena being
31L u c  Huyse, “Justice after Transition: On the Choices Successor Elites Make in Dealing with 
the Past,” Law & Social Inquiry 20, no. 1 (Winter 1995), reproduced in Transitional Justice: How 
Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, vol. 1. General Considerations, ed. Neil J. Kritz 
(Washington D.C.: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 1995), p. 339.
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analysed. As to the terms of “retroactive” or “ex post facto justice,” they are too limiting;
as we have seen, not all cases of political justice imply a challenge to the ban on 
retroactivity. In this sense, the post-Communist Eastern Europe presents a whole 
spectrum of legal measures, with different degrees of conflict regarding the ban on legal 
retroactivity, or, in some cases, in no conflict with this ban at all. As to the terms “post­
authoritarian” and “post-totalitarian justice,” these appear restrictive, covering only part 
of the processes of justice in which politics and law come into conflict. These last two 
expressions, however, do emphasize valid dimensions of the process of justice taking 
place in post-Communist Eastern Europe.
With all the negative connotations underlined by Kirchheimer's definition, the term 
political justice seems also preferable to the one of “historical” or “post-transitional 
justice.” This is the case because the term of political justice suggests, more than the 
others, a chronic entanglement of the legal and political discourses, and because it 
expresses more than the other terms, the perplexity of law in front of a past to which are 
attached very complex and peremptory social expectations. The term political justice also 
has a wider applicability, including situations in which the lapse of time to which the 
term applies does not necessarily have any significance, as the term “historical” would 
suggest. Nevertheless, in the specific case of the post-Communist Eastern Europe, the 
expression of “historical justice” does evoke an important dimension of the process of 
justice. As to the term of “post-transitional justice,” it seems inappropriate exactly 
because the process of justice is part of the process of political transition, and not post- 
transition.
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All these terminological nuances may well be appropriate in a process of great
complexity involving different social discourses. They also make evident that in a highly
politicised context “justice” cannot stay on its own, but it needs a denominator, a
“justification.” However, aside from all these differences, it should also be noted that the
distinction between the different terms is often only at the linguistic level. Among the
analysts of the Eastern European transitions to democracy, the terms of “historical” or
“post- transitional justice,” as well as the other terms, are often used with the same
Kirchheimerian connotations. Considering, for instance, “the problem of ‘historical
justice,’” a Polish analyst remarks that the term is a vague expression used as a
convenient label for the different attempts that have been made in Poland to use
legislation and the law to satisfy the demand for moral justice made by the “victims of
real socialism,” and to provide Poland’s new political class “a moral mandate to rule.”32
This abundance of terminology reflects in a way the complexity of the process of justice 
in the context of competing discourses. In particular, it reflects the way in which societies 
have often questioned both moral relativism and the rule of law, in the search for 
substantive justice.33 In this sense, post-Communist Eastern Europe made no exception. 
Even the countries most committed to the values of democracy and legality have, in their 
process of transition, considered measures of political justice. The consideration given
32Andrzej S. Walicki, “Transitional Justice and the Political Struggles o f Post-Communist 
Poland,” in Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law in New Democracies, ed. James A. McAdams (Notre 
Dame & London: University o f Notre Dame Press, 1997), pp. 185-237.
Lyons. Ethics and the Rule of Law, pp. 11-35. Will Kvmlicka. Justice in Political Philosophy. 
An Elgar Reference Collection (England: Aldershot, 1992).
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to the expectations and demands for political justice in Eastern Europe went far beyond 
the issue of the grudge informer, and beyond the limits of the criminal law. These steps 
were taken in spite of the almost inevitably politicised definition usually given to the 
concept of political justice.
The nature of the Eastern European Communist regimes undeniably determined the need 
to consider the legitimacy of the expectations for substantive justice, overriding the 
perspective according to which the process of political justice appears only as means of 
acquiring political legitimacy.34 In this sense, the broad definition of political justice 
formulated earlier is able to grasp the complexity of the process of justice in post- 
Communist Eastern Europe. This definition stresses more the coexistence of different 
competing social discourses than the direction in which the balance is tipped in this 
competition. This enlarged and “neutralised” definition of political justice corresponds 
more closely to the need to consider this process of justice in all its complexity. This 
complexity will be made evident in the following section where the legal and non-legal 
parameters of the Eastern European debate on political justice will be outlined.
1.3 Approaches to Political Justice in Eastern Europe
As in Fuller’s story, the criminal law is one of the chief paths taken by the process of 
political justice in Eastern Europe. All the post-Communist governments in Eastern
34Neier, p. 34. O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transition from Authoritarian Rule, pp. 31-33.
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Europe have been confronted with the question of whether to prosecute the leaders of the 
Communist regime, or their subordinates, for the abuses they have committed.35 
Prosecution, however, is not the only way in which post-Communist Eastern Europe has 
tried to deal with the Communist past. In circumstances where the application of criminal 
law is impossible, the introduction of administrative or non-criminal measures have also 
been envisaged by the post-Communist governments.36
As described above, the problem with Kirchheimer’s vision of political justice as merely 
a device for creating new power positions is that it might ignore and discourage anyone 
from reacting to cases of systematic violations of rights and liberties perpetrated by 
governments. Without excluding completely the possibility of political manipulation in 
the discourse of justice, the irrefutable reality of the crimes of the Communist regimes, 
makes the debate on political justice more complex and more difficult to dismiss as 
irrelevant for the legal discourse. This often irrefutable reality of the political crime is 
rather an incentive for rethinking the way in which the checks and balances of the law are 
applied to the potentially legitimate (legal and non-legal) expectations for justice.
Although sometimes coming from outside the formal legal domain, these expectations 
for justice address directly the legal discourse for an answer, and can be hard to ignore
35James A. McAdams, “The Honecker Trial: The East German Past and the German Future,” The 
Review o f Politics 58. no.l (Winter 1996): 53 ff.
Jamal Benomar, “Confronting the Past: Justice After Transition,” Journal o f Democracy 4. no.
1 (January 1993): 3-14. Luc Huyse, “A Devil’s Choice: Dilemmas o f Backward-Looking Justice,” 
European Journal o f Crime. Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 2. no.2, (1994): 132. Also, Huyse, “Justice 
after Transition,” p. 105 ff.
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or dismiss. Consequently, it is important to analyse in this section the way in which 
different arguments for and against political justice actually relate to the legal discourse. 
We shall then identify the answers given within the legal discourse to the questions of 
political justice, the consistency of these answers, and their implications for the 
dimension of collective political responsibility.
1.3.1 The Case for Prosecutions
The debate on both criminal and non-criminal measures of political justice involves legal 
as well as moral, political and even economic arguments.37 One argument brought in 
favour of prosecution refers to the fact that using the criminal law is essential for 
achieving a minimal degree of justice and deterrence. It is argued that the minimal justice 
brought by the prosecution of abuses and violations represents a symbolic reparation for 
the victims of the Communist regimes. This reparation, it is argued, is owed as a moral 
obligation by the post-Communist governments to the victims of Communism.38 
According to the supporters of criminal prosecutions, the country in which such measures
37Los classifies all these arguments as dystopic arguments, which deny that any benefit could be 
brought by measures o f political justice, and affirmative arguments, which support in various degrees such 
measures. Maria Los, “Lustration and Truth Claims: Unfinished Revolutions in Central Europe,” Law and 
Social Inquiry 20, no. 1 (Winter 1995). Also Mary Albon, “Project on Justice in Times o f Transition,” The 
Charter Seventy Seven Foundation. New York. Report o f the Project Inaugural Meeting (Salzburg, 7-10 
March 1992), pp. 9-11.
38Huyse, “A Devil's Choice,” pp. 138-139.
29
Chapter One: Collective Responsibility
are ignored will end up being haunted by its past.39
A second important argument invoked in favour of prosecutions against the Communist 
regime is that a fragile democracy would be strengthened by them.40 The potential of the 
exponents of the Communist regime for sabotaging the new democratic governments is 
an idea which appears often as a justification and incentive towards dealing swiftly and 
firmly with the crimes as well as with the old political loyalties of the past regime. It is 
also argued that to neglect the real crimes might prove an incentive towards less 
temperate legal measures of purging and screening indiscriminately all the persons who 
had anything to do with the Communist regime.
The contribution brought by the criminal prosecutions towards the strengthening of the 
fragile democracies relates very much to the legitimating functions which these 
prosecutions would fulfill.41 The post-Communist governments came to power by 
strongly denunciating the crimes and abuses of the Communist regime. Therefore, these
-IQ
A good example in this respect is the recent trials which took place in France related to the 
Vichy regime, more than half a decade after the Vichy regime ended. See Amo Klarsfeld, Papon: un 
verdict francais (Paris: Ramsay, 1998), p. 17. Eric Conan and Henry Rousso, Vichv. un pass6 qui ne passe 
pas (Paris: Fayard, 1994), p. 5 ff.
40Mary Albon, “Truth and Justice: The Delicate Balance. Rapporteur's Report,” in Truth and 
Justice: The Delicate Balance. Central European University, Institute for Constitutional and Legislative 
Policy, Working Paper no.l (1993), pp. 34-66.
4Sam uel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. 
(University o f Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 46-58. Huyes, “A Devil's Choice,” p. 131. Also Kirchheimer, 
Political Justice, pp. 4-6. In this respect, Tocqueville wrote very suggestively: “C’est une chose surprenante 
que la puissance d’opinion accord£e en g£n6ral par les hommes, & 1’intervention des tribunaux. Cette 
puissance est si grande, qu’elle s’attache encore k la forme judiciaire quand la substance n’existe plus, elle 
donne un corps k l’ombre.” Alexis de Tocqueville, De la dfonocratie en Amgrique (Paris : Gallimard, 
1951), p. 8.
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governments’ legitimacy and political capital could be very much diminished if, once in 
power, this denunciation was not concretised in appropriate legal measures. Also, as it 
was proven in some of the Eastern European countries, a lack of sufficient political 
enthusiasm towards dealing with the criminal past of the Communist regime can make 
the population cynical and distrust the new political class.42 It is argued that this cynicism 
and distrust could be very counter productive for a government which would need all the 
support it could get for the difficult process of reconstructing the society economically 
and socially. Apart from these short-term benefits of political justice through criminal 
prosecutions, it is also considered that prosecution could advance an even long-term 
democratic consolidation by professing equality in front of the criminal law. Prosecution 
is also called upon as the most potent deterrent measure against future crimes and abuses 
perpetrated by governments.43
1.3.2 The Case Against Prosecutions
The arguments put forward against prosecution do not appear less compelling. Since the 
arguments in favour of the process do not remain on mere legal grounds - professing
42”Even the most brilliant economic policy will fail, under conditions o f electoral democracy, if  
it does not gain support o f the public.” Stephen Holmes, “The Challenge o f Post-Communist State 
Building: The Politics o f Economics in the Czech Republic,” Eastern European Constitutional Review 4. 
no. 2 (Fall 1995): 53. On the transformation o f the “red” political class into a “pink” political class, and 
the “harmful post-totalitarian side-effects” see Adam Podgorecki, “Polish Communist and Post-Communist 
Nomenklaturas,” in Totalitarian and Post-Totalitarian Law, eds. Adam Podgorecki and Vittorio Olgiati 
(Dartmouth: Oflati I.I.S.L., 1996), pp. 324-326, 328-329 and 332-333.
43L uc  Huyes, “Justice after Transition,” p. 341.
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more than legality and equality in front of the criminal law - the opponents of the criminal 
law approach to political justice argue that prosecution does not necessarily mean 
benefits for democracy.44 The complexity of the Communist legacy makes the application 
of criminal law a less straightforward matter than sometimes believed. In the pursuit of 
the crimes of the Communist regime, the new democracies might themselves have to 
bend the very legal principles they try to protect. This can weaken, it is said, the 
legitimacy of the new regime and hence the chances of democracy. Suspending the statute 
of limitation for the Communist crimes is considered to be an example of a weakened 
legality, and hence a weakened democracy. Through retroactive alterations of this statute, 
basic principles of legal justice, e.g. the universality and prospectivity of legal norms, 
might be sacrificed for the pursuit of a higher sense of justice. Ironically though, these 
measures would be undertaken against a political regime accused precisely of not having 
respected the principles of legality.
A similar de-legitimising effect, it is argued, can be brought by certain legal attempts 
towards a “soft criminalisation” of the acts of collaboration with the Communist Secret 
Police, or by screening laws banning Communist officials from certain public or private 
office, or from both. From a similar perspective of hidden criminalisation it is considered 
the tendency to re-interpret the criminal law in such a way that acts of a purely political 
nature receive connotations which place them under the jurisdiction of the criminal law.
44”Dilemmas o f Justice: How Can Democratic Governments Deal With the Injustices o f  their 
Predecessors Without Sacrificing the Rule o f Law? A Forum on the Recent Hungarian Constitutional 
Court Decision Upholding Statutes of Limitation,” East European Constitutional Review 1, no. 2 (Summer 
1992): 17-21.
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It is argued that there is a considerable danger that the impartiality of the judiciary might 
be damaged by political pressure being put on the latter to make the norms fit the alleged 
crimes, or simply by a natural inclination of the judiciary towards activism.45
An even more direct danger to the fragile Eastern European democracies is, according to 
some authors, the possibility of destabilising backlashes between the post-Communist 
governments and the still active forces of the Communist regime46 Threatened by 
criminal prosecutions and purges, these forces could coagulate as in the presence of a 
catalyst, and destabilise the political scene in order to deviate the attention from 
themselves. In a hostile political and legal environment, they could also generate 
subcultures and networks which, in turn, can become hostile to democracy. Finally, it is 
argued that the criminal prosecutions could prevent a much needed reconciliation to take 
place between the forces of the past and the rest of the population. This reconciliation 
would be needed to enable the society to look forward and to move on.
45Kenneth M. Holland, ed., Judicial Activism in Comparative Perspective (London: Macmillan,
1991), p. vii. Wrdblewski speaks about a “judicial evaluative attitude” as the “psychological disposition 
o f the judge to take into account specified sets o f values and their preference - a disposition to a particular 
kind o f evaluation.” Jerzy Wrdblewski, The Judicial Application o f Law , Law and Philosophy Library 
Series, vol. 15, eds. Zenon Bankowski and Neil MacCormick (Dordrecht, London: Kluwer Academic,
1992), p. 322.
460 n  creating semiloyal or even disloyal opposition by alienating the former political bureaucracy 
through measures o f political justice see Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown o f Democratic Regimes: Crisis. 
Breakdown. & Reequilibration (Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 34-35.
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1.3.3 Screening and Cleansing
The non-criminal path to political justice, including administrative procedures of 
screening and banning from office, shares many of the pros and cons of criminal 
prosecution of the Communist crimes. The administrative “penalties,” such as screening 
from public office and even screening from certain important positions in the private 
sector of those who actively served or took advantage of the Communist regime, 
represent a constant issue in some of the post-Communist governments even now. The 
extent to which such a process has been implemented varies from country to country.47 
The Czech Republic undertook one of the most extensive screening processes, while 
Germany followed a more limited path of protecting public office and important public 
services, such as education, from the influence of persons attached to the former regime. 
Bulgaria limited its purges to important economic positions like banking, while Lithuania 
curtailed the right to vote and be elected in the first general elections of its entire Russian 
minority. In Poland a screening process has failed to materialise in spite of several rounds 
of talks and proposals being passed through the legislative body, whilst in Romania the 
issue of screening has arisen belatedly on the political agenda. This delay was mainly due 
to the “confiscation” of the democratic movement in the first seven years by the “second- 
guard” of the old Communist regime. As to Russia, the entire Communist party was 
banned, although only temporarily.
47L uc  Huyse, “Justice after Transition,” pp. 105-134.
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Aside from arguments shared with the debate on criminal prosecution of the Communist 
crimes - arguments in favour, as much as against political justice - the screening 
processes have been supported or opposed by some specific arguments as well. In favour 
of screening it was often claimed, for instance, that keeping the old Communist guard 
away from important government positions would be the only way to restore public 
confidence in governmental agencies. Incorporating such compromised persons in the 
new government structures would offer these persons the opportunity to sabotage the 
democratic reconstruction of the post-Communist societies. It would also generate 
dysfunctional structures because of the inevitable difficulties derived from working with 
personnel indoctrinated with the mentality and ideology of an undemocratic repressive
• 4 f tregime.
These type of arguments in favour of administrative measures taken against the exponents 
of the Communist regime are considered by some as going against the very democratic 
principles the new regime is supposed to support. The right to run for office, the right to 
vote, the freedom of association, it is said, are fundamental principles of democracy, and 
they should not be too easily forfeited for, ultimately, mere political rationale. The 
expedient procedures through which these processes are generally introduced could also 
create even more injustice than they would repair. The old Communist governments 
would in fact be accused of the same type of discretionary sanctions as the ones 
undertaken by the new democratic regimes against undesirable influences of the 
Communist regimes. In this sense, it is claimed that the screening procedures disregard
48Podgorecki, “Polish N om en k la tu rap. 327.
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the protection the rule of law contains against collective responsibility and discrimination 
on the basis of political affiliation.
i
1.3.4 Procedural Concerns
The use of procedural impediments plays an important part in the critique of the 
screening processes. The due process requirements, for instance, usually present when 
following the criminal law path to political justice, are unlikely to be met by screening 
processes. The extent of the purges makes it very difficult, if not impossible, for the post- 
Communist societies to provide the necessary independent judiciary. This fact usually 
leads to the creation of special non-judiciary commissions charged with managing the 
screening process. Moreover, the right to defence is often altered and the burden of proof 
tends usually to lie with the defendant.
All these procedural shortcuts make the administrative purges easily open to abuse for 
purely political or even personal motives. Furthermore, public opinion may also become 
inclined to approve such measures for reasons other than those of justice, and the political 
class may answer such inclinations from mere populist motivations. This appeared to be 
the case in Poland, for instance, where the screening of the Communist officials seemed 
to be prompted to a large extent by extra-legal motives. Economic frustrations related to 
the process of privatisation and redistribution of wealth, which transformed the
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Communist partocracy into a crypto-Communist kleptocracy,49 made the population
favour the screening processes as a way of keeping the old guard of the Communist
regime out of the economically influential positions.50 The case of Bulgaria might appear
to be similar.51
Related to economic issues there are also utilitarian arguments. These arguments are 
invoked against prosecution, and more especially against screening processes. The need 
for post-Communist countries to have specialists and managers forms the basis of these 
arguments. According to some opinions, these specialists cannot be found outside the 
circles of power of the old regime; giving up these invaluable specialists would mean an 
important sacrifice of experienced persons. Such a sacrifice could prove difficult to 
undertake in the struggling post-central planing economies.52
Even when all the criticism of political justice has been overcome, both criminal and 
administrative approaches to political justice have to produce a balanced answer to many 
other practical details. These details could decisively influence the perception of the 
process of justice as a whole, although they appear minor compared to the fundamental 
questions such as “to prosecute or not to prosecute,” “to screen or not to screen.” There
49Domenico Mario Nuti, “Post-kommunistiske mutationer,” Samfundsokonomen 8 (1996): 17.
50”Poland: Constitution Watch,” East European Constitutional Review 2. no. 3 (Summer 1993):
12-14.
51”Bulgaria: Constitution Watch,” East European Constitutional Review 2. no. 1 (Winter 1993): 
2-3. “Bulgaria: Constitution Watch,” East European Constitutional Review 4. no. 2 (Spring 1995): 5-7.
52Victor Yasmann, “Legislation on Screening and State Security in Russia,” RFE/RL Research 
Report 2, no. 32 (1993): 13.
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are a series of “quantitative” aspects, for instance, which have to be addressed, including: 
the extent of prosecution or the administrative screening; the type of acts to be scrutinised 
(only the gross violations of human rights or also the widespread corruption and 
economic mismanagement); how high in the hierarchy should the strict responsibility be 
imposed upon officials for violations perpetrated by their subordinates, and how far down 
the “superior order defence” should be found to be inapplicable, etc. Depending upon the 
way these “quantitative questions” are answered, the whole process of dealing with the 
Communist past can be perceived as just, balanced and in agreement with the 
fundamental dimensions of the rule of law, or it can be seen as a mere political 
manipulation of the moral and legal discourses for an easier ride over the difficulties of 
the post-totalitarian transition.53
Other procedural issues also come to question the processes of political justice. The 
judicial or non-judicial character of the agencies in charge of the process of political 
justice can have a direct impact upon the perception of the process. The same stays true 
with respect to the procedures used for establishing the authoritative truth about certain 
landmark events during the Communist repression. An important question also, which 
inevitably appears whenever details such as the “the problem of the grudge informer” are 
attempted to be solved, is whether it is necessary to demonstrate that the violations and 
abuses committed by individual persons have been “systematic” violations, “designed at 
the top” as a matter of policy, rather than mere random, unrelated events.
53Creating scapegoats, it is said, distracts from the eventual policy failures. Andras Sajo, “On Old 
and New Battles: Obstacles to the Rule o f Law in Eastern Europe,” Journal o f Law and Society 22. no.l 
(Mar 1995): 97-104.
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Though it might appear as additional to the fundamental questions of whether to 
undertake active measures of political justice, the question of the responsibility of the 
Communist governments is neither a question of detail, nor a “quantitative” question. In 
a way, all the other fundamental issues acquire substance only when considering - 
favourably or not - the question of the role of the repressive government in the 
perpetration of certain crimes and abuses. As it appeared from Fuller’s open-ended story, 
the answer (or the perception of the answer) given to almost any aspect of a process of 
political justice depends on the answer given to the question of the role of the regime.
From this dependence one should not understand that prosecution of individual criminal 
acts committed during a repressive regime should necessarily be designed as part of a 
political justice process. In the next chapter however, it will be shown in detail how this 
prosecution is part of the political justice process independently of its outcome, by the 
mere fact that it is projected upon its background. Therefore, a certain tuning of the 
different types of responsibility involved - collective and individual, legal and political - 
is required. Obviously, this tuning does not take place exclusively within the legal 
discourse. Within the legal discourse the coordination of different aspects of 
responsibility is meant to avoid discrepancies in the legal process of the realisation of 
justice in revolutionary contexts. In the specific case of the Eastern European 
revolutionary changes, these discrepancies originate in the complexity of the totalitarian 
legacy - marked by an entanglement of individual and collective responsibilities - and in 
the reluctance and unreadiness of the legal discourse to deal with this legacy.
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From the review of all the arguments for and against a political justice process one could 
only guess the real complexity of the legal challenge in the Eastern European countries. 
As a general idea it could be noted that both criminal law and administrative approaches 
always implicate not only the legal and political discourse but also the moral one, with 
all its demanding authority, as well as the economic one, with all its utilitarian weight.54 
Although in essence similar to other processes of political justice undertaken in societies 
in transition to democracy, the discourse of political justice in post-Communist Eastern 
Europe has acquired an increased complexity.55 This complexity is mainly due to the 
totalitarian nature of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe,56 to the extended period 
over which societies have been exposed to it and, not least, due to its internationalisation 
(or Sovietisation) and “ghettoisation” taking place both at the same time.
The complexity of the Eastern European process of post-Communist justice is sometimes 
manifested in two types of contradictory situations. On the one hand there are situations 
in which compelling legal evidence leads to the prosecution of certain crimes of the 
previous regime, but the prosecution fails to act upon this evidence because the political 
context hinders the legal process.57 On the other hand, there are also situations in which
54Neier, p. 33. Jon Elster, “On Doing What One Can: An Argument Against Post-Communist 
Restitution and Retribution,” East European Constitutional Review 1, no. 2 (1992): 23-26.
55David Olson, “Organizational Dilemmas o f Post-Communist Assemblies: Parliament by 
Design,” East European Constitutional Review. 4, no. 2 (1995), pp. 59-60.
56Adam Podgorecki and Vittorio Olgiati, eds., Totalitarian and Post-Totalitarian Law (Dartmouth: 
Oflati I.I.S.L., 1996), p. ix.
57Carlos S. Nino, “When Just Punishment is Impossible,” in Truth and Justice: The Delicate 
Balance. Central European University, Institute for Constitutional and Legislative Policy, Working Paper 
no.l (1993), pp. 67-74.
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the political incentives to punish and deter exist, but - for purely formal legal rationale -
the legal discourse finds it difficult to offer a viable solution, e.g. a solution which would
be both legally consistent and ultimately politically constructive towards social
reconciliation and democratic consolidation of the new regime.58
From this complexity it should be noted that, in the post-Communist context, the decision 
not to prosecute and not to screen appears as much of a political justice decision as the 
opposite decision, to prosecute and screen, would be. In this highly politicised context, 
the arguments both in favour and against criminal prosecution or administrative screening 
will always go beyond mere legal motivations. The acknowledgement of this dead-end 
situation59 leads towards the path of balancing the advantages and disadvantages of a 
political justice process, trying to reach a workable compromise which would enhance 
and not impoverish democracy, legality and justice.
Reconciling ethical imperatives and political constraints, however, is not an easy 
enterprise; the arguments in the debate over the political justice process are often quite 
contradictory. The much needed reconciliation for instance, considered a prerequisite of 
democratic consolidation of the post-totalitarian societies, is seen by some as conditioned
58”Dilemmas o f Justice: How Can Democratic Governments Deal With the Injustices o f their 
Predecessors Without Sacrificing the Rule of Law? A Forum on the Recent Hungarian Constitutional 
Court Decision Upholding Statutes o f Limitation.” East European Constitutional Review 1. no. 2 (Spring
1992): 26-34.
59O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transition from Authoritarian Rule, pp. 28-36. Also Jose Zallaquett, 
“Why Deal with the Past,” contribution in Dealing with the Past: Truth and Reconciliation in South 
Africa, eds. Alex Boraine, Janet Levy, and Ronel Scheffer (Cape Town: IDASA, 1994), pp. 8-15. Samuel 
Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 211-232.
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by the successor elites refraining from prosecuting and screening the officials of the
Communist regime. At the same time, others consider the impunity of the same officials
as an obstacle to any hope for reconciliation.60 Similar controversies, with pertinent
arguments on both sides, surround almost all the other possible points of negotiation in
a process of political justice, making the justification of the process rather complex and
difficult.
1.4 The Object of Political Justice
The above-mentioned controversies in the debate on justice in the post-Communist 
Eastern Europe brings us back to Kirchheimer’s analysis of the concept of political 
justice. One of his arguments against political justice was the impossibility for the legal 
discourse to offer, or to accommodate, a yardstick which could be instrumental in 
evaluating a regime. This yardstick would be expected to solve what according to him is 
the main dilemma of political justice: who decides what is acceptable and what is 
unacceptable, e.g. punishable, political conduct?61 Developing a consensus over how to 
measure the record of the Communist regime and of those who operated in its name 
becomes therefore one of the important issues in a process of political justice.
60Tina Rosenberg, “Reconciliation and Amnesty,” contribution in Dealing with the Past: Truth 
and Reconciliation in South Africa, eds. Alex Boraine, Janet Levy, and Ronel Scheffer, (Cape Town: 
IDASA, 1994), p. 66.
61Kirchheimer, Political Justice, p. 34 ff.
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Defining “inadmissible political conduct” is, evidently, controversial and highly 
ideologized. Nevertheless, it appears that there is one aspect which can help with this 
definition, and over which the majority of scholars, lawyers and politicians converge. 
This convergence is supported by the general evolution of public international law. In the 
past decades, the general consensus has been coagulating around the idea of the duty of 
a new government to address past human rights violations.62 From a constitutional 
perspective, it is possible to identify a continuity in the obligations of the state with 
respect to the protection of human rights. In the case of a radical or revolutionary change 
of regime such as was the case in Eastern Europe, this aspect of continuity functions 
despite the unconstitutional paths some, although not all Eastern European countries,63 
had to follow in changing the government.64 One can speak therefore about the 
responsibility of a post-Communist government to promote justice and reparation for the 
past acts of a Communist government to which it claims no political or constitutional 
continuity.65 The same obligation exists, of course, in the case of a government, such as 
was the case in Hungary for example, which is attached to the replaced regime by the 
legal belt of constitutional succession.
fODiane F. Orentlicher, “Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of 
a Prior Regime,” Yale Law Journal 100, no. 8 (June 1991): 2539-2615.
63Timothy Garton Ash, We the People: The Revolution o f ‘89 Witnessed in Warsaw. Budapest. 
Berlin and Prague ^Cambridge: Granta Books, 1990).
^Robert K. Goldman, “International Law and Amnesty Laws,” Human Rights Internet Reporter 
12, no. 2 (Winter 1988): 9-11.
65Hans Kelsen, The General Theory o f Law and State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1945), p. 36.
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This constitutional state of affairs is supported by provisions in public international law. 
The duty imposed on a government to punish human rights violations refers to those acts 
which international law defines as criminal.66 Of course, the human rights doctrine does 
not offer a clear cut solution for dealing with revolutionary changes. Governments are left 
with a certain degree of discretion in balancing the expectations of justice for past human 
rights violations and the need to achieve other legitimate goals, such as the strengthening 
of the new democratic system through social reconciliation67 This discretion in choosing 
between different legitimate goals is important since the forces unleashed by the human 
rights prosecutions might represent a real or a potential threat for a fragile democratic 
political arrangement.68 Therefore, international law could not put an imperative demand 
on the new governments to punish the violations of human rights.69 However, the need 
to put the duty to punish and repair past human rights violations uppermost is 
undoubtedly recognised, and the reasons for not addressing the human rights violations
660rentlicher specifies that the international law requires states to punish serious violations of  
physical integrity. Orentlicher, “Settling Accounts,” p. 2543.
As it was shown when analysing the arguments for and against political justice, some argue that 
it is not possible to strengthen a fragile democracy by leaving human rights violations unpunished. Jaime 
Malamud-Goti, “Transitional Governments in the Breach: Why Punish State Criminals?” Human Rights 
Quarterly 12, no. 1 (1990): 1-16.
68“ A s an affirmative obligation on the part o f states to redress wrongs inflicted by human rights 
violations, accountability has legal, ethical, and political dimensions. It is fair to say that no single one o f  
these aspects should be allowed to overshadow the other two. Therefore, just as it makes no sense to 
exaggerate the political obstacles, it is equally wrong to postulate an obligation to punish the perpetrators 
o f  past offenses without regard to the potential consequences for the future enjoyment o f rights by all 
others. The lack o f adequate regard for this need to address all aspects o f the problem has sometimes made 
the victims o f abuse sound shrill to their critics, making it that much easier to dismiss their demands. Yet, 
these demands for accountability have firm legal, ethical, and even political foundation.” Juan E. M6ndez, 
“In Defence o f Transitional Justice,” in Transitional Justice and the Rule o f Law in New Democracies, ed. 
James A. McAdams, (Notre Dame & London: University o f Notre Dame Press, 1997), p. 4.
69Jo s6 Zallaquett, “Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former Governments: 
Principles Applicable and Political Constraints,” State Crimes: Punishment or Pardon (Aspen Institute, 
1989), p. 26.
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Although human rights expectations cannot be translated imperatively into a duty to 
prosecute and deter, it can be argued that the development of the doctrine of the 
government’s responsibility to punish human rights violations which occurred under a 
previous regime provides a much needed normative foundation for a process of justice 
addressing the crimes of the old regime. This foundation offers a big step forward from 
the Kirchheimerian position on political justice. The yardstick searched for measuring the 
“political deviation”71 could find its guiding elements in phrases which have been 
formalised in public international law practice, such as “serious violations of physical 
integrity,”72 or “gross abuses of human rights.” 73 Following these elements which are 
already acknowledged in public international law it would reduce considerably the 
“historical risk” a government would run, according to Kirchheimer, while engaging in 
an over-politicised process of political justice.74 Accordingly, in order to avoid the over-
70The very plausible threat of a military dictatorship for instance should have more weight than 
the threat o f sabotage from a bureaucratic political elite. Juan E. Mendez, “Acknowledgement, Truth, and 
Justice: Argentina,” in Dealing with the Past: Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa, eds. Alex Boraine, 
Janet Levy, and Ronel Scheffer (Cape Town: IDASA, 1994), p. 40.
7kirchheimer, Political Justice, p. 197 and 304 ff.
720rentlicher, “Settling Accounts,” pp. 2539-2545.
73The formula “gross abuses of human rights,” as it is used by the Human Rights Watch, applies 
to: genocide, arbitrary, summary or extrajudicial executions; forced or involuntary disappearances; torture 
or other gross physical abuses; prolonged arbitrary deprivation o f liberty. Human Rights Watch, “Special 
Issue: Accountability for Past Human Rights Abuses,” Human Rights Watch, no. 4 (New York, December 
1989): 1-2.
74“Future generations, judging with more precise knowledge o f the motivations, expectations, 
risks, and dangers o f all the participants, may not be very charitable when assessing the motivations of 
those ordering political prosecutions.” Kirchheimer, Political Justice, p. 199.
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politicisation of the process of justice, a post-Communist government has to limit the 
process of political justice to basically two objectives only: deterrence from future 
violations of human rights, and reparation of the violations already occurred.75
If a government remains responsible for promoting justice and providing reparation for 
actions belonging to a previous regime with which it does not claim continuity, then this 
responsibility should exist even more imperatively for actions taking place under the 
mandate of that same government. In other words, if the post-Communist governments 
are under the duty to punish the violations of human rights which occurred under the 
Communist regime, this duty should be just as valid for the violations occurred under the 
post-Communist regime itself. This type of duty, however, should be valid for any 
government, including the Communist governments themselves. Thus, the Communist 
governments are themselves responsible, in the same way as the post-Communist 
governments, for those violations of human rights which occurred under their 
leadership.76
This aspect of the Communist governments’ responsibility for the protection of the
75Zallaquett, “Confronting Human Rights Violations,” p.5.
nf\In this respect, in December 1989, the Human Rights Watch issued a statement on the duty o f  
the governments to punish gross abuses o f human rights. “Human Rights Watch holds that those who 
commit gross abuses o f human rights should be held accountable for their crimes. It is a responsibility of  
governments to seek accountability regardless o f whether the perpetrators o f such abuses are officials o f  
the government itself and its armed forces, or officials o f a predecessor government, or members o f anti- 
government forces, or others. We oppose laws and practices that purport to immunize those who have 
committed gross abuses from the exposure o f their crimes, from civil suits for damages for those crimes, 
or from criminal investigation, prosecution and punishment.” Human Rights Watch, “Special Issue,” p. 
1.
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citizens’ rights, not only as alleged perpetrators of systematic human rights violations, but 
also as entities placed under the constitutional duty to defend and promote those rights, 
creates a new dimension concerning the legitimate foundation of a process of justice 
addressing the crimes which occurred under a previous regime. In this dimension, a new 
government addresses not only the individual violations of human rights, but also the old 
regime itself, for not having fulfilled its duty to protect human rights. Therefore, in 
fulfilling his duty to protect human rights,77 the post-Communist governments are kept 
responsible not only for punishing individual perpetrators, but also for legally evaluating 
the past regime under which those crimes remained unpunished. Hence, the qualified way 
of designing the object of a process of political justice, based on human rights violations, 
includes necessarily an unavoidable dimension of governmental responsibility with 
respect to the past regime.
1.5 The Right to Revolution
The core position of human rights violations as the object of a process of political justice, 
can be linked to a theoretically forgotten dimension of social justice: the right to 
revolution. Concentrating on the violations of human rights, as the object and the 
justification of the process of post-totalitarian justice, anchors such a process more stably
77About an absolute duty to prosecute human rights violations see Orentlicher and Nino debate. 
Carlos S. Nino, “The Duty to Punish Abuses of Human Rights Put Into Context: The Case o f Argentina,” 
Yale Law Journal 100, no. 8 (June 1991): 2619-2640. Diane F. Orentlicher, “A Reply to Professor Nino,” 
Yale Law Journal 100, no. 8 (June 1991): 2641-2643.
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within the realm of legality. At the same time, this choice of the object of a process of 
political justice tolerates a positive discrimination towards those aspects of the competing 
discourses which are in favour of justice through an assessment of the past regime. 
Logically, this choice is detrimental with respect to other potentially valid arguments put 
forward against measures of political justice.
Ironically, it is the development of the very concept of legality which, alongside the 
protection offered implicitly to basic human rights, has also curtailed the path (and one 
could even say the right) to political justice based on what we have just identified as the 
duty of any government to protect and promote human rights.78 This curtailment is not 
due to the usual restrictions entailed by the formal principle of the rule of law, but 
through an implicit weakening of the natural right to an “ultimate protection” against the 
state. Such a protection was, and still is necessary in those realms where the positive law 
might be structurally unable to offer a real shield against discretion and abuse.
The rule of law offered, in its emergence as a fundamental principle of the modem state, 
a list of tools and principles for the protection of the individual against abuse. At the same 
time, this development brought in practice an end to an important meta-legal right of the 
individual: the right to resistance and to revolution. This right was based on the notion 
that when the state puts itself in “a state of war with the People,” the People “have the
78Herman Klenner, “On the Right to Revolution: A German Dilemma,” in Enlightenment. Rights 
and Revolution, eds. Neil McCormick and Zenon Bankowski (Aberdeen : Aberdeen University Press, 
1989), pp. 287-296.
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right to resume their original Liberty.”79 This restoration allowed, of course, for 
institutional changes in society, but it also implied an inevitable normative retroactive 
assessment of the way the political power was exercised. This implication represents in 
fact one of the important ways in which societies could “provide for their own Safety and 
Security.”80
Given the very wide mandate society gives its government, changing mechanically the 
nature of the political institutions and making these function under the formal 
prescriptions of the rule of law, is not always sufficient to provide safety and security. 
Society needs the practical means to send a clearer message: that there is retribution 
where the political mandate and the state institutions are diverted from their agreed-upon 
functions.81 Of course, it is not possible to transform this unwritten mandate, or the 
originating “social contract” into the yardstick we need for measuring political conduct 
and for assessing the extent to which the Government is “in breach of contract.” 
Nevertheless, as it was shown earlier, the human rights discourse offers a solid core to 
this mandate which cannot be dismissed: no society can give its government a mandate 
which would allow the disposal of society’s most fundamental rights, such as the right
79John Locke, Two Treaties o f Government. 2nd ed., vol. 2, ed. Peter Laslett (London : 
Cambridge U.P., 1967), 168-69. Also, Robert C. Grady, “Obligation, Consent, and Locke’s Right to 
Revolution: ‘Who Is to Judge?”’ Canadian Journal o f Political Science ix. no. 2 (June 1976): 277-292.
80John Locke, “Two Treaties o f Government,” p. 227.
81Jaime Malamud-Goti, “Transitional Governments in the Breach: Why Punish State Criminals?” 
Human Rights Quarterly 12, no. 1 (1990): 1-16. Ruti Teitel, “How are the New Democracies o f  the 
Southern Cone Dealing with the Legacy o f Past Human Rights Abuses?” The Council on Foreign 
Relations Latin America Project Paper (New York, 17 May 1990): 146 ff. Also, Orentlicher, “Settling 
Accounts,” p. 2543.
Chapter One: Collective Responsibility 
to life, to freedom of movement and freedom of opinion, the right to privacy, the right not 
to be unjustly imprisoned.82 All these rights have been systematically violated by the 
Communist regimes without necessarily violating at the same time the formal principles 
of the rule of law.
If the right to resistance and revolution is so important for the protection of significant 
dimensions of citizens’ relationship with their government one could ask why this right 
has been neglected by the law. Ironically, the reason for the dilution of this important 
right to revolution was the emergence, within the law, of the discourse of constitutional 
rights. The “ultimate right,” the right to revolution, has not been included in the realm of 
rights protected by the rule of law partly because of “technical difficulties” in dealing 
with the “unintended indeterminacy”83 such a right would bring into a positive legal 
system, and partly because of an unjustified confidence in the potential of the rule of law 
to protect the lives and liberty of the citizens against the state.84 The maturing of this 
exclusive discourse of rights within the discourse of legality, which itself was founded 
upon the rule of law, implied that the right to revolution lost its ideological arguments
82Amnesty International, “Oral Statement by Amnesty International before the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Committee on Prevention o f Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities,” Amnesty International. International Secretariat (August 1991), pp. 1-4. Orentlicher, “Settling 
Accounts,” p. 2543.
83On the intended and unintended indeterminacy in law, see Kelsen, Problems o f Legal Theory.
pp. 78-80.
84 In a paper preceding his book on political justice, Kirchheimer him self acknowledged the 
“degradation” o f the right o f resistance into a catalogue o f constitutional rights o f freedom. Otto 
Kirchheimer, “Legality and Legitimacy,” reprinted in Social Democracy and the Rule o f Law: Otto 
Kirchheimer and Franz Neumann, transl. by L. Tanner and K. Tribe (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987), 
p. 132.
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and strength. This was very much due to the belief that the formal principle of legality is 
capable by itself to ensure justice regardless of the nature of, and the way in which, the 
political power is exercised.
Given the fact that the discourse of Constitutional rights is based on the formal rationality 
of law, it appears that the right to revolution against governmental oppression has been 
replaced by the rights and liberties protected by the rule of law. However, not all the 
functions of the right to revolution, nor its substantive sources85 have been passed on into 
the new Constitutional rights. The constitutional rights offer sufficient protection only for 
citizens living under a “responsible and responsive government.”86 The right to revolution 
though is an indispensable right to minimal justice for people living under “irresponsible” 
and “unresponsive” governments. “Responsible and responsive” versus “irresponsible 
and unresponsive” is the distinction between two fundamental types of the exercise of 
power which the rule of law in its formal spelling fails to address.87 This is the distinction 
upon which many of the claims for justice, in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, are based.
Excluded from “legality,” the protection offered to the right to revolution by its usual 
natural law sources was also weakened. Accordingly, the concept acquired a notoriously
85Kirchheimer places the “popular consciousness” among the substantive sources o f the right to 
revolution. Kirchheimer, “Legality and Legitimacy,” p. 143.
86Roger Cotterrell, “The Rule o f Law in Transition: Revisiting Franz Neumann’s Sociology o f  
Legality,” Social and Legal Studies 5, no. 4 (1996): 451-470.
on
Montesquieu distinguished between “moderate” and “immoderate” government. See, Judith N. 
Shklar, Montesquieu (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 85. Also, Judith N. Shklar, “Political 
Theory and the Rule o f Law,” in The Rule o f Law: Ideal or Ideology, eds. Allan Hutchinson and Patrick 
Monahan, (Toronto: Carswell, 1987), pp.1-16.
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controversial character in the legal discourse. Faced with the institutionalised protection
offered to the legal rights by the positive law, the importance of a right to resistance and 
revolution faded. In this way, the weakening of citizens’ protection - from the extreme 
point of view of a revolutionary context - occurred not through an active process of 
undermining of this right, but through a passive one; it occurred through completely 
being left out of the realm of the formal rule of law. In fact, what was left out was the 
right to re-assess a government, and eventually withdraw the delegated power of 
government. Implicitly, all the logical consequences of political justice that this re­
assessment would entail have become more difficult to argue for from the formal legal 
position.88
Among the clear implications a right to revolution would have for an oppressive regime 
is the governmental responsibility for the gross violations of human rights. Undeniably 
therefore, the right to revolution, just as the right to resistance, concerns directly the 
political power. The distinction between resistance and revolution emerges in relation to 
the political structures, reflecting the degree and quality of the impact upon the structures 
addressed and contested. The right to resistance is chronologically, as well as 
philosophically, linked to the right to revolution, the latter being, however, of a more 
direct concern for the process of political justice. From this point of view, the right to 
revolution expresses the more dynamic dimension, implying the taking over of the 
institutions of power, and a radical, often violent, change of constitutional structures. As
88Locke, “Two Treaties o f Government,” p. 222.
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to the right to resistance, it covers mostly (passive or active, non-violent or violent89) acts
of civil disobedience aimed at forcing the government agencies to implement changes in
line with the civil demands.90 The right to resistance aims to obtain a change which does
not necessarily affect the structures of the government but which affects its policies,
while the right to revolution is inevitably linked to radical institutional changes.91 The
two can sometimes overlap, and the result is a... “velvet revolution.”
Regardless of the style and depth of the changes, both resistance and revolution entail 
variable degrees of civil disobedience.92 Often, the radicalisation of the acts of civil 
disobedience depends upon the responses the structures of power have to social signals
89Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 266-275.
90Rawls defines civil disobedience as “a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act 
contrary to law usually done with the aim o f bringing about a change in the law or policies o f the 
government.” John Rawls, A Theory o f Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 364-365. 
Also, Hugo Adam Bedau, “On Civil Disobedience,” Journal o f Philosophy 58 (1961): 653-661. For 
“disobedience as a plea for reconsideration” see Peter Singer, Democracy and Disobedience (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 84-92. Hugo Adam Bedau (ed.) Civil Disobedience in Focus (London. 
New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 4 ff.
91“Revolution is the most extreme political option of a dissenting group, a course taken generally 
when more moderate and legal attempts to achieve recognition or reform have failed...” Microsoft Encarta 
97 Encyclopaedia, s.v. “Revolution.” For the radicalness o f the changes brought by a revolutionary 
movement see J. M. Finnis, “Revolutions and Continuity o f Law,” in Oxford Essavs in Jurisprudence, ed. 
A. W. B. Simpson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), pp. 44-76. Also in Kelsen, General Theory o f Law 
and State (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1945), pp. 368-369. and also Hans Kelsen, The Pure 
Theory o f Law, trans. from the 2nd (rev. and enl.) German ed. by Max Knight (Berkeley: University o f  
California Press, 1970). “‘Revolution,’ where rival claims to govern are made from within the group, is 
only one case, and though this will always involve a breach o f some o f the laws o f the existing system, it 
may entail only the legally unauthorized substitution of a new set o f individuals as officials, and not a new 
constitution or legal system...” H.L.A. Hart, The Concept o f Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), pp. 
114-115.
92Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously. 7th ed. (London : Duckworth , 1994), pp. 206-222. 
Henry David Thoreau, Civil disobedience (London]: Peace Pledge Union, 1940).
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of discontent.93 The fact that one government would be relatively open and “respectful”
when faced with citizens exercising their right to resistance, while another government 
might be repressive and motivate revolution, does not change the philosophical and legal 
dilemma hidden within the dichotomy between the right of states to legislate and to 
citizens’ obedience on the one hand, and the civil rights of the citizens - which might 
sometimes collide with the duty to obey - on the other hand.94 Only one set of actions can 
be legitimised, either the absolute claim put forward by the law of the state to respect its 
demands for conduct, or the actions inspired from the right to civil disobedience, and 
ultimately to revolution, in those cases in which the civil rights are threatened by the 
state.95 The act of legitimising either one is placed outside the legal discourse since, 
indirectly, it questions the very potential of formal legal rationality to convey 
legitimacy.96
A breakthrough out of this dilemma could be represented by a differentiated approach to 
the rule of law. A process of differentiation of this fundamental legal principle might be 
able to offer the constitutional rights the same formal protection, and at the same time, 
to acknowledge the right to revolution based upon the violation of the citizens’ basic 
rights. Within the revolutionary context, this differentiation of the principles of the rule
93Here again, Montesquieu’s distinction between moderate and immoderate governments seems
relevant.
94Klenner, pp. 288-290.
95Ibid.
96See Max Weber, “The Types o f Legitimate Domination,” in Economy and Society: An Outline 
o f  Interpretive Sociology, vol. 3, eds. Gunther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press, 
1968), pp. 212 ff.
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of law would have the role to “tame,” more than to exclude, those morally legitimate 
social expectations for justice. Klenner’s analysis of the 19th century German 
philosophers conveys such an idea. In a pure Alexandrian way, he cuts the Gordian knot 
of the dilemma of duty and rights by arguing for a normative bias towards the revolution.
The choice between the right to revolution and the duty to obey, argues Klenner, 
represents a decision to be taken “in intellectual terms.” This indicates a rational 
normative choice which cannot be made without proving a certain degree of bias.97 
Klenner argues that without this bias there is no escape from the theoretical paradox of 
rights and duties.98 The lack of bias towards the right to revolution transformed this right 
into a forgotten, but needed, path to post facto evaluation of an unequal power 
relationship between the state and its citizens. A fully fledged right to revolution should 
necessarily include a duty of the government agencies to recognise and acknowledge the 
social signals, emerging from the unbalanced power relationship, as valid statements of 
legitimate expectations. In this sense, one could bring in the legally daring idea that the 
expectations for justice brought by a revolution are never truly retroactive.
97Klenner, p. 289 ff.
n o
The zero position towards this paradox is found in J. Fries’s expression “The people have no 
right to insurrection, and the ruler has no right against it.” J. Fries, Philosophische Rechtslehre. quoted in 
Klenner, p. 292.
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1.6 Preliminary Conclusions
So far, it appears that focusing on the duty to protect fundamental human rights 
introduces into the discussion two of the most controversial issues entailed in the process 
of political justice in Eastern Europe. Firstly, the issue of collective responsibility 
revealed both in the duty of the post-Communist governments to address the totalitarian 
regimes as a whole, and in the implied duty of the Communist governments themselves 
to protect and promote human rights. The second important issue, through the emphasis 
on human rights as the main object of political justice, is the right to revolution, and 
hence the right to a retroactive assessment of the totalitarian regime and of its human 
rights record.
A process of political justice is largely presupposed by a revolutionary process. 
Associated to a revolution as inherently backward-looking process, the mechanism of 
political justice has also an inevitable retroactive dimension. The right to revolution is 
ultimately a right to a “controlled” retroactivity. This right will not be integrated under 
the rule of law, but rather circumscribed by it. The circumscription appears as essential 
for any process of justice in periods of transition, or in times of radical questioning of the 
political ruling class.
Therefore, creating a path for the process of political justice requires the creation of a 
path for the reintegration of this distinct right, meant for times of social hardship, into
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the discourse of recognised rights. This right implies, in its extreme application, an ex 
post facto assessment of the acts of government. Its source will go beyond legal statutes 
and, according to Kirchheimer, marked by an “absence of substantive boundaries,” its 
strength will lie only “in its embodiment in popular consciousness.”99 The way in which 
the right to resistance and revolution can re-enter the constitutional discourse is only 
through a “particularised” rule of law.100 The rule of law in itself will not be able to offer 
direct protection against certain types of systemic abuse calling for revolution.101 
However, it could allow for mechanisms of protection to evolve under specific 
limitations, within the concept of political justice, with the purpose of containing this 
very process of justice within the wider limits of the legal discourse.
As we have seen in the beginning of this chapter, Kirchheimer in his account does not 
provide for a process of benign political justice emerging from a revolution. The fact that 
this type of political justice is prompted by violations of universally recognised basic 
rights determines the need for the legal discourse to acknowledge undeniably legitimate 
expectations even when they concern a previous regime. In answering the duty to address 
the violations of human rights, a new government will inevitably have to address the past
9 9 Kirchheimer, Political Justice, p. 132.
100Cass R. Sunstein, “Problems with Rules,” California Law Review 83. no. 4 (1995): 1023-1024.
10'“The possibility o f abusing norms undoubtedly exists in the [parliamentary legislative] type 
o f state; to tiy to exclude this possibility for any form o f state, however, would really have to be called a 
‘normativistic illusion.’ The same is true - as also stated by Carl Schmitt - for a certain degree of normative 
indefiniteness, but it was exactly the typical normative structure o f historical realization o f this state system 
which aimed at reducing, if  possible, this degree o f indefiniteness.” Otto Kirchheimer and N. Leites, 
“Remarks on Carl Schmitt’s Legalitdt und Legitimitat,” in Social Democracy and the Rule o f Law, transl. 
L. Tanner and K. Tribe (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 168.
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political regime as a whole. In the context of a revolution, the duty to protect human 
rights acquires in this way not only an undeniable retroactive character, but also a 
collective dimension of responsibility, which the legal discourse has to deal with. In the 
next two chapters, in which the procedural paradigms of political justice will be 
presented, we shall see to what extent and how the debate on political justice has 
acknowledged both a dimension of collective responsibility attached to the past regime, 
and the inherent ex post facto character of this responsibility.
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Chapter Two
ON PROSECUTING: POLITICAL JUSTICE THROUGH 
CRIMINAL LAW MEASURES
Abstract
After establishing in Chapter One collective responsibility as one of the important dimensions o f a process 
o f political justice in Eastern Europe, Chapter Two and Chapter Three present the two main legal 
approaches to this process: the approach through criminal law and the approach through administrative 
measures. Political justice through criminal law is illustrated in this chapter through an analysis o f the 
Hungarian debate on the amendments to the statute o f limitations. This debate reveals both the challenge 
put to the principle o f the rule o f law in a process of political justice, and the limitations o f this principle 
in acknowledging a concept of collective responsibility and, implicitly in answering the social expectations 
for justice. As a different perspective within the criminal law approach to collective governmental 
accountability certain aspects o f the German border guards trials are also presented. Both these criminal 
law cases illustrate the pervasiveness o f the idea o f collective (political) responsibility, and the need for 
a coherent concept o f collective agency and collective responsibility.
2.1 Introducing Case Studies to Political Justice
The “presence” of Fuller’s sixth Deputy - advising that the perspective of a collective 
political responsibility be acknowledged in post-Communist Eastern Europe - is to be 
established by inquiring as to what extent the concept of collective responsibility is 
present in the debate on political justice after a revolution. As far as possible, this inquiry 
will consider directly the debate on collective responsibility of the Communist 
governments in Eastern Europe. However, an important part of this analysis will consist 
of an identification of the possible consequences different other elements of the issue of
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political justice in Eastern Europe have for the debate on collective responsibility. For 
this purpose we will look mainly at two case studies from the post-Communist Eastern 
Europe - Hungary and Czech Republic.
Each of the main cases of political justice included in this thesis cover specific areas of 
the debate on political justice. The present chapter concentrates on the criminal law 
approach taken by Hungary. In analysing this approach we shall look closely into the 
legislative process and the debate around it. This debate brought about the Hungarian law 
which resulted in the suspension of the statute of limitations for certain categories of 
crimes committed under the Hungarian Communist regime. Choosing Hungary as one of 
the case studies was determined by the amplitude the debate on the statute of limitations 
and more generally the debate on political justice took in Hungary. This analysis will be 
supplemented with details from the German criminal law approach to political justice. 
In this case, procedural and substantive aspects were combined, giving a totally different 
“texture” to the process of justice as a whole, and incorporating more openly the concept 
of collective responsibility.
In the next chapter, an analysis of the predominantly non-criminal approach taken in the 
Czech Republic will be undertaken. This analysis will consider the administrative and 
legislative measures of screening and purging undertaken in the Czech Republic. This 
case study was chosen, from among all the Eastern European cases of political screening, 
due to the far-reaching consequences these measures had at the legislative level. The two 
case studies also seem representative because they each concentrate basically on one of
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the fundamental approaches to political justice. Although the debate on administrative 
decommunisation was also present in Hungary, the adopted criminal law approach to the 
issue of post-Communist justice was for a very long time the only one which went 
beyond the stage of mere debate. Even later, when screening and purging were 
considered, they did not reach the same legislative climax as in the Czech approach.1 On 
the other hand, the Czech process of decommunisation as a whole appeared legally so 
much bolder in that it “annexed” any criminal law initiatives in the search for post- 
totalitarian justice.
2.2 The Criminal Law Approach to Political Justice in Hungary: 
Historical Background
As argued in Chapter One, assessing the human rights violations perpetrated under a past 
regime should represent the main goal of a process of political justice. Given this 
objective, it appears normal for a post-Communist government to examine the possibility 
of reaffirming justice for the violations of human rights through the mechanisms provided 
by the criminal law. Also, this legal path often appears as the most imperative, although 
not the only one capable of providing punishment, reparation and deterrence relative to 
human rights abuses.
!Gdbor Halmai and Kim Lane Scheppele, “Living Well is the Best Revenge: The Hungarian Approach 
to Judging the Past,” in Transitional Justice and the Rule o f Law in New Democracies, ed. James A. 
McAdams (Notre Dame & London: University o f Notre Dame Press, 1997), pp. 171-178.
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In spite of its immediacy, the criminal law approach also comes with inherent complex
mechanisms and limitations derived from the basic principles of the rule of law, which
make the applicability of the criminal law less obvious, less all-embracing, and more
cumbersome in a process of political justice. Besides these limitations always present in
a debate on political justice, the difficulties in applying the criminal law have proven
even greater in post-Communist countries such as Hungary, due to the specificity of the
Communist regime.
In all Eastern European countries, the initial Communist repression was followed by a 
long period of milder, if not peaceful, dominance. In this context, at an institutional level 
at least, the distinction between right and wrong was sometimes blurred to the extent that 
the two became almost confused.2 The relatively long duration of the Communist regimes 
in Eastern Europe is, of course, not without importance in this respect. The Communist 
governments took their time to build legal systems which, with some effort, just as in 
Fuller’s Purple Shirt regime, could mimic well the formal dimensions of the rule of law.3 
At a more concrete level, the same dimension of time determined also situations in 
which, given the statute of limitations rules, serious crimes and human rights violations 
occurring under the Communist regime, could not be pursued by the criminal courts in 
spite of the radical changes in political context, and in spite of a re-instated commitment 
to the consistent application of criminal law.
2Janos Kis, “Meditation On Time Before Firing Squad Trials,” (TD, 1994), p. 18 ff.
3Adam Podgorecki, “Totalitarian Law: Basic Concepts and Issues,” in Totalitarian and Post- 
Totalitarian Law, eds. Adam Podgorecki and Vittorio Olgiati (Dartmouth: Ofiati I.I.S.L., 1996), pp. 3-37, 
esp. pp. 19-21.
62
Chapter Two: On Prosecuting 
Hungary’s Communist history for instance, began violently. Occupied by the Soviet
troops in the end of the World War II, Hungary was soon “invaded” from within by the
Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSzMP). Benefiting from the Soviet support, this
party quickly and violently took control of the whole country. By 1947 extensive purges
of the judiciary, civil service and military, as well as the violent suppression of the
church, were undertaken. The Communist rule was enforced at all levels by the State
Security Department (AVO) which, copying the Stalinist methods, used force and terror
without any restraint.4
However, in 1953, after Stalin’s death, Imre Nagy who became the new Hungarian prime 
minister, tried to institute a “New Course” for the country, following a liberal reform 
programme which included a reduction in the use of repressive methods by the Security 
Department, the reduction in power of this latter department, the liberation of the political 
prisoners, and the abolition of the concentration camps. Moscow and the internal 
Communist hard-liners disapproved of this movement.5 As a consequence, in 1955 Nagy 
was ousted from office and from the Party leadership. The prospect of a return to a 
repressive regime was not well received by the Hungarian population, and, in October 
1956, when the police fired into a peaceful student demonstration, the population turned 
the peaceful march into a revolution. Although the army joined the revolutionaries and
4For details and data on the victims o f this stage o f the Communist regime in Hungary, see Stephane 
Courtois, et al., Le livre noir du communism: crimes, terreur et repression (Paris: Editions Robert Laffont, 
1997), pp. 429-496.
5Andrew Felkay, Hungary and the USSR. 1956-1988: Kadar’s Political Leadership (New York; 
London: Greenwood, 1989), p i7.
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Nagy was reinstated, the more rigid line of the Hungarian Communist leadership called 
upon the Soviet tanks which invaded Hungary and, on the 4th of November 1956, 
reinstated the rigid Communist control. Janos Kadar became the new head of state. The 
first decision taken by the new president once in power was to unleash a violent purge of 
the Party machine of Nagy’s followers. Repression was reinstated, and many of the 
revolutionaries were executed.6
In spite of this brutal reaction to the population’s peaceful calls for more openness and 
real democratisation of the party-state, repression began to ease during the 1960s.7 The 
Kadar regime began to apply less state interference and to allow a relatively greater 
freedom of expression. These concessions, of course, did not come for free; they were 
made under the tacit condition that the citizens were not to contest openly the authority 
of Communist rule. A “New Economic Mechanism” implemented by Kadar began also 
to bring about some results in the welfare of the population. However, the vivid memory 
of the 1956 repression, was kept fresher by the sight of the Soviet soldiers patrolling the 
country.
Given the Kadar reforms, Hungary became one of the most economically advanced 
Communist countries. Yet, the complacency in the regime, put forward by some authors
6Gyorgy Litvan, The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Reform. Revolution. Repression. 1953-1963
(Harlow: Longman, 1996), p. 93 ff.
7Felkay, p. 22.
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as a reason to halt any attempt of addressing the injustices of the Communist regime,8 
seems to have been only a submission in front of the threat of sheer force.9 In fact, the 
Hungarians seem never to have forgotten the original repression of the mid 1940s, and 
the repression of the 1950s even less. A proof that this element remained in the collective 
memory of the Hungarian population is the fact that, in the attempt to bring to justice the 
Communist past, the 1956 repression and the political decisions related to it were among 
the first to be addressed. The need for a solid legal basis, and the desire to distance itself 
from the illegalities and abuses which happened all too often during the Communist 
regime, prompted the Hungarian legislature to address the issue of justice for the past 
mainly through the “active” criminal law. This actually meant trying to bring to court 
those acts which constituted a criminal offence under the new legal regime, as well as 
under the Communist one.
8Kis, “The Firing Squad Trials,” p. 28 ff.
9Weber classified the legitimacy according to its source in “charismatic” legitimacy, based on the 
personal features o f the leader, “traditional” legitimacy, based on the master’s authority, and “legal- 
rational” legitimacy, based on the crucial feature of impersonality o f the legal norms. None o f  these faces 
o f legitimacy can truly cover the legitimacy claims o f a totalitarian repressive regime. Weber, pp. 212-233. 
Podgorecki proposes a new type o f legitimacy called the “dead-end legitimacy,” characterising a 
totalitarian system. This type o f legitimacy occurs when the population tolerates the power it does not 
respect, following for instance attempts to change the regime which ended in disaster, or when it is 
generally recognized that the superior power which had imposed the hated rules is more than a match for 
the forces o f the subjugated society. Podgorecki, “Totalitarian Law,” p. 21. Although trying to bring 
totalitarianism under a systematic view over the concept of legitimacy, the “dead-end legitimacy” seem to 
go against the common sense meaning o f the word “legitimate”: “lawful,” “regular,” “reasonable,” “that 
can be justified.” Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “legitimate,” London: Oxford University Press, 1963.
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2.2.1 Amending the Statute of Limitations: Context and Content of the 
Zetenyi-Takacs Law
On the 4th of November 1991, the Hungarian Parliament voted a law which was due to 
become a landmark for the Hungarian process of post-Communist political justice. This 
law called for the suspension of the statute of limitations prescribed by law for cases of 
treason, premeditated murder and aggravated assault leading to death, that had been 
committed between the 21st of December 1944 and the 2nd of May 1990 (the date of the 
first free post-Communist elections in Hungary).10 The new law applied to cases in which 
prosecution had not previously been possible due to political reasons (e.g. during the 
Communist regime).11 The law was introduced by Zsolt Zetenyi and Peter Takacs - two 
deputies of the governing party at the time12 who gave their name to the law - and it was 
supported by a large majority in parliament.13 In its formulation, the Zetenyi-Takacs law 
addressed the Communist regime’s crimes in two ways. Firstly, the law allowed the
10The Zetenyi-Takacs law, Art. 1. para (1): “On May 2,1990 the statute o f limitation recommences for 
the prosecutability o f criminal offences committed between December 21, 1944 and May 2, 1990 which, 
constituting offences by the Law in effect at their commission, are defined by the 1978 Law IV as treason 
(144 para. (2)), voluntary manslaughter (166 para. (1) and (2)), and infliction o f bodily harm resulting in 
death (170 para. (5)), provided that the State’s foregoing o f its claim to punish was based on political 
reasons. Art. 1. para (2) The punishment prescribed under Paragraph (1) can be mitigated without any 
restrictions.” (Unofficial translation).
11 Judith Pataki, “Dealing with Hungarian Communists’ Crimes,” RFE/RL Research Report 1. no. 28 
(1992): 21-24.
12The Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF).
11The votes were casted as following: 197 votes in favour, 50 votes against and 74 abstentions. The 
Independent. 11 November 1991, p. 14.
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prosecution of the mentioned serious offences for which the statute of limitations term 
had expired. Secondly, the prescribed period in the statute of limitations was renewed for 
crimes for which the limitation period had not yet fully expired.
Two aspects of the Zetenyi-Takacs law appear as very important for this criminal law 
approach to political justice. The first aspect refers to the fact that the categories of 
actions to be prosecuted were defined very precisely in the Zetenyi-Takacs proposal. 
Moreover, this precision was achieved by using legal definitions of crimes from the 
Hungarian Communist criminal code. The second aspect derives from the continuity of 
the post-Communist legislation with the Communist legal norms, and it consists of the 
fact that the law was clearly based on existing criminal norms, and it carried with it the 
necessity to conform to a whole range of cumulative procedural conditions dominant in 
the criminal law.14 This meant that the Zetenyi-Takacs law had - at least with respect to 
the substantive grounds of the case - the potential of safeguarding the principle of the 
security of law and the right to a fair warning of the persons concerned by the new law. 
Later on, when analysing the controversial issues accompanying the administrative way 
of dealing with the past (Chapter Three), we might consider these two aspects of the 
criminal law approach as virtues of a process of political justice in comparison with the 
shortcomings of the administrative approach.
Notwithstanding these procedural “facilities” offered by the criminal law, or maybe more
14Ruti Teitel, “How can democratic governments deal with the injustices o f their predecessors without 
sacrificing the rule o f law? A forum on the recent Hungarian Constitutional Court decision upholding 
statutes o f limitations.”East European Constitutional Review 1, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 18-19.
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correctly because of them, the criminal prosecution of the ex-Communist leaders 
appeared to be a very difficult enterprise, legally as well as politically. An exclusively 
criminal law approach towards political justice has necessarily not only positive 
protective implications, but also negative ones. For instance, it was generally agreed that 
the Hungarian society could not build a state based on the rule of law if the concept of 
justice was being corrupted by the fact that the perpetrators of serious crimes remained 
unpunished. Nevertheless, suspending the statute of limitations retroactively per se 
introduced an element of legal uncertainty. Some argued that this uncertainty has an 
equally negative effect on the system of justice as the fact of leaving some crimes 
unpunished. While the law in discussion would attempt to provide justice where this was 
made impossible by the past regime, the means used to do so could eventually be 
detrimental to the very concept of justice that the law tried to restore. For a fragile 
democracy, it was said, the Zetenyi-Takacs law was creating an unwelcome precedent.15
Different political factions and different voices in the Hungarian civil society were 
inclined towards different scenarios in assembling the moral, legal and political 
discourses involved in justifying or denying this law. Those rejecting the law 
characterised it as “backward-looking,” in order to underline its strongest contested 
parameter: its alleged non-conformity to the principle of non-retroactivity of the criminal
15Pataki, “Hungarian Communists’ Crimes,” p. 24. Michael Rosenfeld, “Dilemmas o f Justice: How 
Can Democratic Governments Deal with the Injustices o f their Predecessors without Sacrificing the Rule 
o f Law?” A forum on the recent Hungarian Constitutional Court decision upholding statutes o f limitations, 
East European Constitutional Review 1, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 17-18.
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law.16 Based on this critique, a legal dystopia,17 emphasising the negative scenarios, was 
opposed to the search for justice claimed by the Zetenyi-Takacs law. It was argued that 
the new democracy's commitment to the fundamental principles of the rule of law 
includes an absolute prohibition of ex post facto laws.18 Moreover, introducing a 
retroactive regulation in an area intricately associated with the field of substantive 
criminal law was said to destabilise the entire legal system. This negative projection of 
the law was further entrenched by moral arguments. These arguments were not 
necessarily looking for support in legal arguments. After more than forty years since some 
of the crimes have occurred, it was argued, the prosecution will have no other scope than 
revenge.19 This search for revenge, the critics were warning, was doomed to bring to 
society a climate of suspicion. This suspicion, it was claimed, would in the end be very 
damaging for the social and economic reconstruction of the country.20
The supporters of the Zetenyi-Takacs law also used moral as well as legal arguments to
16Halmai and Scheppele, “Living Well,” p. 157.
17Supra, Chapter One, note 37.
18Krisztina Morvai, “Retroactive Justice Based on International Law: A Recent Decision by the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court,” East European Constitutional Review 2. no.4 /  3, no.l (Fall 1993/Winter
1994): 32.
19This argument, together with the claim made sometimes that after such a long period o f time would 
be very difficult, if  not impossible, to gather evidence for the prosecution o f those crimes, is contradicted 
by the fact that several countries do not have a statute o f limitations for serious crimes. Schulhofer made
an analysis o f the American legislation in this sense. Stephen J. Schulhofer, “Dilemmas o f Justice: How 
Can Democratic Governments Deal with the Injustices of their Predecessors without Sacrificing the Rule 
o f Law?” A forum on the recent Hungarian Constitutional Court decision upholding statutes o f limitations. 
East European Constitutional Review 1, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 18-19.
20Jean-Marie Domenach, “Laisser les morts enterrer les morts,” Le Monde. 20 February 1990, p. 2.
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consider the positive protective implications of basing this measure on the criminal law. 
The affirmative moral argument for the adoption of the law was that not prosecuting 
those serious crimes placed under its jurisdiction would mean to do injustice a second 
time to the victims of the Communist regime.21 It was also pointed out, that the 
accusation of revenge or witch-hunt made by some of the critics, was not only unfair - 
given the sad reality of the Communist crimes - but also logically unsustainable.22 As 
long as the number of persons to whom the law refers would involve only about one 
hundred (most of the persons falling under its jurisdiction being dead, or very old), the 
trials which might have been conditioned by the suspension of the statute of limitations, 
would have acquired a symbolic nature, rather than one of revenge. The Zetenyi-Takacs 
law, it was said, was aiming to unmask rather than to punish.23 Along the same lines, it 
was argued that the law was providing for the possibility of lighter sentences than the 
ones prescribed by the criminal code. According to the Zetenyi-Takacs law, the courts 
had even the possibility to pass symbolic sentences, whilst suspending punishment.24
21Huyse, “Justice after Transition,” pp. 105-106.
22”Hungary: Constitution Watch,” East European Constitutional Review 1, no. 3 (Fall 1992): 6. Pataki, 
1992, p. 22.
23Edith Oltay, “Hungary Attempts to Deal With Its Past,” RFE/RL Research 2. no. 18 (30 April 1993):
8-9. Pataki, p. 23. With a deterrent potential o f knowledge agree even authors who, for procedural reasons, 
do not support the suspension o f the statute o f limitations in Hungary. Roger Errera, “Dilemmas o f Justice: 
How Can Democratic Governments Deal with the Injustices o f their Predecessors without Sacrificing the 
Rule o f  Law?” A forum on the recent Hungarian Constitutional Court decision upholding statutes of  
limitations, East European Constitutional Review 1, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 19.
24Z6t6nyi referred to an “indirect amnesty.” Pataki, p. 23. It appears that the courts could reach 
decisions which are both sentence and pardon in the same time. The courts have also been vested, in this 
respect, with the usually presidential prerogative o f forgiveness or pardon.
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As to the legal argument in favour of the Zetenyi-Takacs law, it started from the idea of 
a necessary separation of powers in the state, promoting a demand for the separation of 
actors in the legal arena.25 In this sense, it was argued that the legal institution of the 
statute of limitations presumes that the offenders and those in charge of law enforcement 
do not belong to the same interest group, e.g. the Government.26 From this assumption 
of institutional conflict flows the conclusion that the statute of limitations is inapplicable 
to those cases in which Communist officials committed crimes and then, abusing their 
positions, blocked the machinery of criminal justice.27 In order to support this argument, 
information was provided from the Hungarian Secret Police files, making publicly 
available a series of top secret orders from the Communist Hungarian chief prosecutor. 
These orders revealed that any arrest or prosecution of a Communist official was 
conditioned by the approval of the Communist Party hierarchy.28 This approval was not
25Edith Oltay, “Hungary’s Attempt to Deal With Its Past,” RFE/RL Research Report 2. no. 18 (1993):
9-10.
This reasoning is not unusual. From the American legal tradition, which was very much present m 
the Eastern European debate on political justice (through the participation in the legal reform o f many 
American legal scholars), and in particular in the discussions on the statute o f  limitations in Hungary and 
screening in the Czech and Slovak Republics, Schulhofer gives the example o f the states o f New York, 
Pennsylvania and Illinois where the statute o f limitations for charges involving misconduct by a public 
official is tolled for the period that the official remains in office. Schulhofer, p. 18.
7 7 The Hungarian Constitutional Court referred to these arguments in its decision on the Z&enyi-Takacs 
law. “Hungary: Constitutional Court Decision on the Statute o f Limitations. No. 2086/A/1991/14 (March 
5, 1992),” in Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, vol. 3, 
Laws. Rulings, and Reports, ed. Neil J. Kritz (Washington D.C.: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 
1995), pp. 639-640, hereafter “Hungary: Constitutional Court Decision No. 2086.”
28Pataki, pp. 22-23. This kind o f instructions were not unusual in the Communist Eastern Europe. In 
fact it is one o f the basic features identified by Podgorecki in the totalitarian legal systems. “[If] a 
Communist Party member (either Soviet or Polish) committed a crime, he or she could not be brought to 
court, even if his or her guilt was evident, without clearance from the relevant party organs, which might 
expel the subject from their ranks to enable the police to bring charges. But, according to secret 
instructions issued to state prosecutors and the police, no criminal charges could be brought against a 
person who remained a party member.” Podgorecki, “Totalitarian Law,” p. 13.
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prescribed by any constitutional provision, and therefore, was a constitutional abuse.
Given these revelations, the supporters of the Zetenyi-Takacs law claimed that in fact, the 
statute of limitations was not extended or abolished, but merely applied differently in 
exceptional circumstances.29 These exceptional circumstances had their origin in the 
Hungarian Communist regime itself. Since the political context created by the 
perpetrators themselves did not allow prosecution, it was argued that, in effect, the statute 
of limitations laid dormant, and the clock attached to it could not start ticking until the 
2nd of May 1990.
Along with the moral and legal arguments used in the Hungarian debate on the retroactive 
suspension of the statute of limitations, there is an important political argument as well. 
This argument leads back to the negotiations which took place in Hungary before the 
revolutionary changes. Specific to the Hungarian democratic changes was the fact that 
in July 1989 negotiations had been initiated between the non-governmental democratic 
forces and the more progressive wing of the Communist Party.30 It was, and is still 
maintained, that the peaceful character of the revolutionary change in Hungary was due 
to a large extent to the participation in those negotiations of the Communist 
“progressists,” and to their “collaboration” and positive consideration of the democratic
29Pataki, p. 23. To these “exceptional circumstance” the Constitutional Court will refer extensively in 
its decision over the Z6t6nyi-Takacs law. See “Hungary: Constitutional Court Decision on the Statute of 
Limitations. No. 2086/A/1991/14 ” pp. 629-640.
30Garton Ash, pp. 49-56.
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changes.31 Starting from this point, it was argued that the law on the statute of limitations 
would break the tacit or implicit promises made to the “reform Communists” by the 
political opposition during the round-table discussions in Summer 1989. The opponents 
to this claim conceded little place for this type of political concession. The supporters of 
the law argued that social justice could not be traded and, more especially, that it could 
not be traded by a self-appointed authority, a non-elected body, as was the case with the 
opposition present at the Summer 1989 negotiations. Besides, it was argued that the law 
in question was certainly not intended to punish the “reform Communists.”32
In the end, after a fierce debate, the Zetenyi-Takacs law actually received a very 
favourable vote. However, the arguments for and against the law did not only mark the 
parliamentary debate but they spread to the other levels of the constitutional law making 
process. Although successfully passed through the Parliament, the Zetenyi-Takacs law 
required for validity the signature of the President. Given the controversial character of 
the law, President Arpad Goncz33 declined to sign it automatically and asked for the 
opinion of the Constitutional Court.34
31Halmai and Scheppele, p. 157.
3 5 Yves-Michel Riols, “Les actions du regime Communiste pourront etre jugdes,” Le Monde. 20 
February 1993, p. 16.
33President Arp&d Goncz himself had been a victim o f the 1956 repression, being sentenced to life 
imprisonment for the part he played in the 1956 uprising. Garton Ash, p. 54.
34According to the Hungarian constitutional rules, the law should be signed by the President. The 
President however, has two possibilities when faced with a law approved by the Parliament. The first one 
would be simply to sign the law, in which case it will become applicable. The second possibility is that in 
case o f doubts concerning the constitutionality of the law, the President may ask before signing, the 
opinion o f the Constitutional Court. In case the Court answers affirmatively to the question of  
constitutionality o f the law the President may refute no more his signature and the law becomes valid. In
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The President’s concerns were mainly with respect to the likelihood that the law “would 
violate the principles of a rule-of-law state.”35 More precisely, he was concerned with the 
fact that the law might have been violating Articles 57(4) and 2(1) of the Hungarian 
Constitution.36 Article 57(4) stated that “no one shall be declared guilty and sentenced for 
an act which was not a criminal offense under Hungarian law at the time when it was 
committed,” and the article 2(1) proclaimed Hungary a “constitutional rule-of-law state.” 
In his petition to the Constitutional Court, the President also made reference to the 
“historically developed” legal doctrine of nullum crimen sine lege which was 
internationally promoted as one of the basic protectors of human rights, as well as to “the 
basic constitutional principle that every citizen can have faith in the trustworthiness of 
the law and the state.”37
Another significant aspect raised by President Goncz was the fact that the Zetenyi-Takacs 
law was making an “arbitrary and unreasonable distinction”38 among the perpetrators of 
the same criminal offence on the basis of the state’s reason for prosecution of such
case of a negative answer from the Constitutional Court the law will be either dropped or sent back to the 
Parliament for changes. Matthew Shugart, “O f Presidents and Parliaments: The Post-Communist 
Democracies Offer a Diversity o f Legislative-Executive Configurations,” East European Constitutional 
Review 2. no. 1 (Winter 1993): p. 32.
35Petition quoted in the Decision o f the Hungarian Constitutional Court, 11/1992 (III.5)AB h, 
translated and published in Journal o f Constitutional Law in Eastern and Central Europe 1, no. 1 (1994): 
131-132. Halmai and Scheppele, p. 160. Kritz, Neil J. (ed.), Transitional Justice: How Emerging 
Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, vol. 3, Laws. Rulings, and Reports (Washington D.C.: United 
States Institute o f Peace Press, 1995), pp. 629-640.
36The Constitution o f the Republic of Hungary. Article 2(1), and Article 57(4), (unofficial translation).
37Decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, 11/1992 (III.5)AB h, p. 132.
38Ibid.
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offences. The argument, however, is important for more than what the President meant 
to say. It is important not only because one cannot bluntly distinguish between the degree 
of criminality of different reasons for committing a crime, but also because, given the 
nature of the regime, crimes apparently without any direct political weight have enjoyed 
the same active or tacit protection as the ones with a clear political motivation. For 
example, it is a matter of common knowledge that in Eastern Europe in the early years 
of the Communist rule, although not only in those years, many violent crimes were 
committed in connection with private property. These crimes remained unpunished not 
because they were not protected by the criminal law, or because the perpetrators 
themselves belonged to the political hierarchy, but because, at the time, it was politically 
incorrect to defend private property and the lives “attached” to it.39
2.2.2 The Constitutional Court Decision on the Zetenyi-Takacs Law
Following President Goncz’ request, on the 5th of March 1992 the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court gave its decision on the controversial Zetenyi-Takacs law and 
rejected it as unconstitutional. The law received a very negative qualification from the 
Court because of its alleged retroactive dimension. The decision of unconstitutionality 
was based upon the fact that, in the Constitutional Court’s opinion, the proposed 
amendment of the statute of limitations did not comply “with the constitutional criminal
39Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivisation and the Terror-Famine (London: 
Hutchinson, 1986), p. 3 ff.
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law’s requisite of legitimacy.”40 In spite of the precision and non-retroactive manner in
which the crimes in the Zetenyi-Takacs law were defined, the law in its entirety was also
qualified by the Constitutional Court as “ambiguous,” “vague,” and “difficult to apply.”41
The Constitutional Court gave special attention to those provisions of the Zetenyi-Takacs 
law referring to the crime of treason. The Constitutional Court considered that the 
definition of treason was generally subject to a too broad interpretation to be useful in 
such a sensitive situation as the one concerning the prosecution of persons from the 
Communist hierarchy; what constitutes “political reasons” and the criteria to be applied 
in establishing the latter could not be determined without creating many ambiguities. In 
the Court’s view, treason is treated differently in different political systems, and 
therefore, it acquires different meanings.42 Accordingly, the danger would be that, in 
dealing with the crimes of treason, the courts would apply value judgements inspired by 
the post-Communist regime to acts committed under the Communist rule and ideology.
This difficulty in charging any former official with treason was demonstrated in the case 
of the Communist Party leader, Janos Kadar43 Kadar was accused of high treason on two 
counts: firstly, that Kadar betrayed Nagy's government in 1956, and secondly, that Kadar 
called upon a foreign government for military intervention. Regarding the first count,
40”Hungary: Constitutional Court Decision No. 2086,” p. 636.
4I“Hungary: Constitutional Court Decision No. 2086,” p. 636.
42”Hungary: Constitutional Court Decision No. 2086,” p. 639.
43Pataki, p. 24.
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Kadar's defence was that, at the time, the Constitution was declaring the social order of 
the country in terms of socialism. Consequently, according to Kadar’s defence, it was 
Nagy who betrayed the constitutional order of that time and not Kadar. Concerning the 
second count, it was pointed out that, again at the time, calling on a foreign government 
for help was not part of the legal definition for treason. Kadar was acquitted based on this 
defence, and the Hungarian Constitutional Court was trying to prevent trials similar to 
this from being encouraged by the Zetenyi-Takacs law.
The decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court on the Zetenyi-Takacs law was 
praised by some as an opportunity for the Constitutional Court to adopt “a vigorously 
independent role,”44 and by others as a proof of judicial activism.45 The Constitutional 
Court's activism, or independence, was measured against two points, identifiable in the 
arguments of the decision. The first point referred to an enlarged substantive due process. 
The Constitutional Court declared in this sense that the constitutionality of penal laws “is 
not to be evaluated merely by reference to the criminal law guarantees expressly detailed 
in the Constitution.”46 The second point in the arguments of the decision, consisted in the 
Court’s outward move from the mere constitutional principles, looking for transnational 
norms which would support and justify the decision taken in a practically domestic issue.
44Michel Rosenfeld, “Dilemmas o f Justice: How Can Democratic Governments Deal with the 
Injustices o f their Predecessors without Sacrificing the Rule o f Law?” A forum on the recent Hungarian 
Constitutional Court decision upholding statutes o f limitations, East European Constitutional Review 1, 
no. 2 (Summer 1992): 18. Errera, p. 19.
45SchuIhofer, p. 26.
46”Hungary: Constitutional Court Decision No. 2086,” p. 640.
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In this sense, the Constitutional Court drew upon prevailing international norms and 
made direct reference to its comparative study of the constitutions of other European 
states and the USA for the statutory law of crimes and criminal procedure, as well as for 
the details of police investigatory practices.47 The Constitutional Court also stated that 
“an evaluation of the State measures necessitated by the ‘change of system’ cannot be 
understood separately from the requirements of a State under the rule of law, as 
crystallized by the histories of constitutional democracies and also posited by the 1989 
Hungarian constitutional revision.”48
In the decision itself, the Hungarian Constitutional Court referred to two constitutional 
idioms. Firstly, it elaborated on the declaration that Hungary is a “state under the rule of 
law”49 and secondly, that Hungary recognises “inviolable and inalienable fundamental 
human rights.”50 From these two constitutional principles the Court creatively decanted 
two new constitutional axioms, the “security of the law” principle, and the principle of 
the “protection of the rights previously conferred.”
The extent to which these two new principles apply to a (potentially) amended statute of 
limitations was considered debatable, and it depended upon the view held on the nature
47Schulhofer, pp. 28-30.
48”Hungary: Constitutional Court Decision No. 2086,” p. 631.
49The Constitution o f the Republic o f Hungary. Art. no. 2(1) (unofficial translation).
50The Constitution o f the Republic o f Hungary. Art. no. 8(1) (unofficial translation).
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of the retroactivity ban.51 Indeed, this nature can be perceived as one of a universally 
applicable principle to any conceivable legal act, or on the contrary, as a principle 
dominating mainly within the substantive criminal law domain. Between these two 
extreme positions, there are, of course, various degrees of applicability of the ban on 
retroactivity. Taking into consideration the alterations and differentiations this ban has 
undergone in time,52 it is indeed controversial whether the security of law principle would 
have been damaged by the Zetenyi-Takacs law. The supporters of the law reminded the 
Parliament that premeditated murder, aggravated assault, and even treason, have all been 
part of the Penal Code both before and after 1989, and that the Zetenyi-Takacs law did 
not in any way change the definition of these categories of criminal acts.53 Therefore, it 
could be argued that the substantive dimension of the provisions on the statute of 
limitations introduced by the Zetenyi-Takacs law - the one most directly protected by the 
ban on retroactivity - is not contradicting fundamentally the security of law principle.54 
It is also debatable whether the benefit of the statute of limitation by a criminal can be
51Remo Caponi, “La nozione di retroattivitd della legge,” Giurisprudenza Costituzionale 35 (1990): 
1338-1339. T. Bonneau, La Court de Cassation et P application de la loi dans le temps fParis: Press 
Universitaires de France, 1990), pp. 36-37. L. H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law. (The Foundation 
Press, 1978), chapter 9 “The Model o f Settled Expectations,” and chapter 10 “The Model o f Governmental 
Regularity,” and also, pp. 477-478.
52L. C. Green, “The Maxime Nullum Crimen Sine Lege,” Harvard Law Review 38 (1962): 471.
53Teitel, “Dilemmas o f Justice,” p. 32. As to the question raised with respect to the crime o f treason, 
its defects were said to be rather a shortcoming inherited “mechanically,” with the definitions imported 
from the Communist legislation, than a weakness of the Z6t6nyi-Takacs law itself.
54Ginger G. Mayer, “Retroactive Application o f Constitutional Rules Regarding Criminal Procedure,” 
Cincinnati Law Review 56 H988J: 1099.
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characterised as a right, rather than a privilege.55
In spite of these distinctions, the Hungarian Constitutional Court’s opted for an over­
stretched retroactivity ban. “There is no constitutional basis” concluded the Constitutional 
Court in its justification, “for the selective application of the prohibition of retroactivity, 
or the retroactive imposition of a harsher sentence, onto specific elements of the criminal 
process. For this reason, the Constitutional Court examined the problem of the statute of 
limitations on the basis of the legality of the criminal law, without taking into 
consideration the theoretical disputes concerning the procedural nature of the statute of 
limitation or its status as a legal-subject right.”56
Accordingly, the court referred to the different aspects of the retroactivity ban as clearly 
covering any aspect of criminal law. Nullum crimem and nulla poena sine lege, argued 
the Constitutional Court, are basic constitutional principles whose legal content is 
determined by a number of criminal law provisions.57 The individual’s constitutional 
human rights and freedoms are affected not only by the select provisions and specific 
punitive sections of the criminal law, but especially by the interconnected and closed 
system of regulations of criminal liability, culpability and sentencing guidelines. The 
modification of every regulation of criminal liability would fundamentally and directly
55Schulhofer, p. 26. Matthew E. Van Tine, “Application o f the Federal Parole Guidelines to Certain 
Prisoners: An Ex Post Facto Violation,” Boston University Law Review, vol. 62 (1982): 543-546.
56”Hungary: Constitutional Court Decision No. 2086”, p. 637.
57”Hungary: Constitutional Court Decision No. 2086,” p. 636.
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impact the individual’s freedom and constitutional position. The Constitutional Court 
decided therefore that modifications of the statutes of limitations can proceed only if they 
remain consonant with the basic constitutional requirements of criminal liability.58
On this issue again, the Constitutional Court’s position did not remain unchallenged. 
Ruth Teitel for instance, contested the meaning given by the Court to the principles of 
nullum crimem and nulla poena, and argues that in the specific case of the Zetenyi- 
Takacs law amending the statute of limitations one did not deal either with nullum 
crimem or with nulla poena sine lege. The crimes addressed by the Zetenyi-Takacs law, 
Teitel argued, were already crimes at the time of the Communist regime.59
In spite of these arguments, the Court appeared concerned uniquely with the potential of 
legislative abuse of power through the proposal submitted to its scrutiny, than with the 
alleged human rights violations and executive abuses addressed by the law. This choice 
reflects the difficulty of the legal discourse, placed in a rigid formal position, to 
acknowledge the “exceptional circumstances” which disabled the laws themselves from 
being applied during the Communist regime. This higher, formalistic rationale has the 
important consequence of making the assessment of a totalitarian regime legally 
impossible.
58Ibid.
59Teitel embraces the distinction made by other authors as well, within the criminal law discourse, 
between substantive and procedural retroactive changes. On the theoretical level, this distinctions 
corresponds to the already institutionalised differentiation within the legal discourse, respectively within 
the criminal law discourse itself. Teitel, “Dilemmas o f Justice,” p. 32.
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2.2.3 Legal Security v. “Exceptional Circumstances”
“Exceptional circumstances” which have been used to refer to the Communist regime 
have been suggested and included in the Zetenyi-Takacs law through the idiom of 
“political reasons.”60 In spite of the basic individualism of the Zetenyi-Takacs law, the 
construction of the proposal around the notion of “political reasons,” which might have 
impeded the application of criminal law during the Communist rule in Hungary, appeared 
to suggest an implicit evaluation of the Communist regime itself. The Hungarian 
Constitutional Court found the invoked “political reasons,” which allegedly influenced 
decisively the expiry of the limitation period for numerous crimes of serious character, 
of indirect relevance for the process of legal justice. The Court declared these “political 
reasons” or “exceptional circumstances” as insufficient for justifying tampering with the 
sense of legal security, and therefore rejected the amendments to the statute of limitations 
based upon these circumstances.61
Therefore, the idea of political justice as a locus of competing legitimate expectations, 
originating inside but also outside the legal discourse, and addressing the legal discourse, 
was rejected by the Hungarian Constitutional Court for the sake of an absolute procedural
60Article (1), para (1) from Z£t6nyi-Takacs law, cited in the “Hungary: Constitutional Court Decision
No. 2086,” p. 630.
61”Hungary: Constitutional Court Decision No. 2086,” p. 634.
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sense of legal security.62 Given the undeniable constitutional link between a political 
regime and its legal and judicial system, this concentration of the Constitutional Court 
solely on a sense of absolute legal security excludes almost any chance of a normative 
evaluation of a totalitarian regime. According to the Constitutional Court, this evaluation 
would have to be performed strictly from within, by using exclusively the past regime’s 
legislation, as well as its way of applying and interpreting the norms.
This unnegotiable value of legal security appears to be enhanced by the “negotiated” 
nature of the Hungarian anti-Communist revolution. According to the Constitutional 
Court the constitutional changes brought by the 1989 revolution were secured without 
damaging the principle of legal security.63 The peaceful, “negotiated” character of the 
Hungarian revolution received the constitutional seal at the very beginning of the 
Constitutional Court’s activity. In its first resolution, in 1990, the Constitutional Court 
declared that no differentiation would be made in its constitutional reviews between pre- 
and post-constitutionally (Communist) enacted laws.64 Therefore, the process of political 
justice in Hungary excluded from the beginning any appeal to exceptional circumstances. 
The idea of a “revolutionary gap”65 in which - provided a degree of proportionality was
62Halmai and Scheppele, pp. 162-64. Schulhofer, p. 24.
63”Hungary: Constitutional Court Decision No. 2086,” p. 632; Halmai and Scheppele, p. 157. Kis, 
“The Firing Squad Trials,” p. 28 ff.
^ ’Hungary: Constitutional Court resolution No. 1/1990(11.12)AB,” reproduced in Transitional Justice: 
How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, vol. 3. Laws. Rulings, and Reports, ed. Neil 
J. Kritz (Washington D.C.: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 1995), p. 631.
65Teitel, “Dilemmas o f Justice”, p. 18.
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safeguarded - measures of substantive justice could be taken without being strictly bound 
by all the formal requirements of the rule of law, was also rejected.
By expressing the constitutional continuity of the Hungarian legal system, the 
Constitutional Court did not deny the reality of a genuine political revolution in Hungary, 
and it did not imply the absence of an essential degree of “conceptual” violence leading 
to a change of political regime. However, the absence of “constitutional violence” 
appears as essential for the Hungarian Constitutional Court, in evaluating and justifying 
the expectations for political justice. This conclusion is revealed by the Court’s decision 
of unconstitutionality of the Zetenyi-Takacs law. In the arguments underlying its decision 
the Court stated that “the politically revolutionary changes ushered in by the Constitution 
and the pivotal laws following on its heels were all effected in a procedurally impeccable 
manner, fully in accordance with the old legal system’s regulations of the power to 
legislate, thereby gaining their binding force. The old law retained its validity. With 
respect to its validity, there is no distinction between ‘pre-Constitution’ and ‘post- 
Constitution’ law. The legitimacy of the different (political) systems during the past half- 
century is a matter of indifference from this perspective, that is, from the viewpoint of the 
constitutionality of laws it does not comprise a meaningful category” (emphasis mine).66
These arguments of the Constitutional Court appeared to ignore two aspects. Firstly, that 
the Zetenyi-Takacs law, with all its possible defects of formulation, did not proceed from 
a distinction between the pre-Constitution and post-Constitution law, but rather from a
66“Hungary: Constitutional Court Decision No. 2086,” p. 632.
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re-affirmation of the commitment to the application of criminal norms valid under both 
political regimes.67 Secondly, the Constitutional Court’s position regarding the relation 
between law and revolution ignored the fact that constitutional correctness and 
“procedurally impeccable” constitutional changes fail to offer legal protection to citizens 
against not only the “unresponsive” and “irresponsible” governments,68 but also - as the 
Zetenyi-Takacs law implicitly claimed - against illegitimate and criminal governments.69
Without considering these two aspects, the Hungarian process of political justice - as 
accepted, or rather tolerated, by the Constitutional Court - started from a “retroactivation” 
of the rule of law. Indeed, the Constitutional Court suggestively characterised its position 
as “the revolution of the rule of law.”70 Asking the question as to whether the legal 
discourse should provide for the unique historical circumstances constituting “the change 
of system,” the Constitutional Court stated that this question too “must be answered in
67Teitel, “Dilemmas o f Justice,” pp. 31-32.
Cotterrell speaks about the rule o f law as “an ambitious programme for responsible and responsive 
government,” while also pointing out the failure o f the protective arrangements offered by the rule o f law 
“to safeguard citizens generally against arbitrary power.” Roger Cotterrell, “The Rule o f Law in 
Transition: Revisiting Franz Neumann’s Sociology of Legality,” Social and Legal Studies 5, no. 4 (1996): 
466 and 454. Analysing one o f the forms o f manifestation o f arbitrary power, despotism, Montesquieu 
came to a significant distinction between regimes: the moderate and the immoderate power. According to 
Shklar, by political moderation Montesquieu meant more than just the principle o f aristocratic republics, 
or the personal ability to inhibit, freely or under compulsion, the despotic impulses that afflict a society. 
Fully developed moderation for Montesquieu, sais Shklar, is “a political form o f intelligence,” the capacity 
to calculate correctly and to act accordingly. “Because political power offers every opportunity and 
temptation to cast off one’s inhibitions, moderation can be instilled only by rules and constraints. It is thus 
a public rather than a private virtue. . . Without institutionally enforced restraints, whether form al or 
informal, moderate politics are not even imaginable” (emphasis mine). Judith N. Shklar, Montesquieu 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p.85.
69Pataki, p. 23.
70’’Hungary: Constitutional Court Decision No. 2086,” p. 633. Halmai and Scheppele, pp. 161-164.
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a manner which comports with the requirement of the State under the rule of law,”71 
understanding by this the absolute principle of legal security. The question then, of how 
to answer the exceptional challenges put to the rule of law by history becomes mere 
rhetoric. From the Constitutional Court’s formalist position the answer to the question 
about exceptional circumstances becomes almost identical to: “according to the rule of 
law, there are no exceptional circumstances.” Therefore, any legal evaluation of the 
Communist regime based on these exceptional circumstances seems, yet again, excluded 
through the Court’s formal position.
2.2.4 Formal v. Substantive in the Constitutional Discourse
The Hungarian Constitutional Court’s formal stand, however, is not legally unusual. Its 
position on the issue of the statute of limitation should not be attributed automatically 
to the influence of the political context; not more than in any other constitutional 
decisions anyway. In fact this position reflects what is defined as the formal conception 
of the rule of law, and therefore, can be tracked down to the theoretical debate concerning 
the essence of the rule of law.72 The predominantly substantive essence of the right to 
revolution obviously contrasts with this formal conception. The contrast however, is 
relative, depending upon the “exceptional” character - or rather upon its basis in
71”Hungary: Constitutional Court Decision No. 2086,” pp. 633-634.
72Paul P. Craig, “Formal and Substantive Conceptions o f the Rule o f  Law,” Diritto Publico (Saggi.
1995).
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“exceptional circumstances” - of the revolution itself.73 In rejecting this character, the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court rejected the actual dependence of the formal parameters 
of justice upon “historical impediments.”74
The Court seemed to ignore however that in the absence of this recognition one might 
succeed to preserve the formal parameters but not the justice. Some would even contest 
that the true nature of the formal parameters is preserved. Weinrib for instance argues that 
a specific legal content is intelligible to the extent of its adequacy to the form of justice 
relevant to the category of interaction which the law is endeavouring to order.75 It 
becomes evident however that - from the Constitutional Court’s position - the way the 
law endeavours to order a legitimate revolutionary context is never going to yield more 
than a sterile intelligibility. This is due to the law’s inadequacy to deal with the very 
substantive expectations brought by a revolution.
In its argument, the Hungarian Constitutional Court chose to oppose “formal and 
objective” parameters of the rule of law, to the “partial and subjective” justice allegedly 
pursued by the Zetenyi-Takacs law. However, when examining closer the contrast
73J.M. Finnis, “Revolution and the Continuity o f Law,” in Oxford Essavs in Jurisprudence (Second 
Series), ed. A. W. B. Simpson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 65 ff. “By introducing the institution 
o f legal order, the society ... can restrict, yet not entirely eliminate the necessity o f weighing and 
balancing.” See also, Aleksander Peczenik, “Weighing Rights,” in Enlightenment. Rights and Revolution. 
eds. Neil MacCormick and Zenon Bankowski (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1989), p. 178.
74Finnis, p. 67.
75“A specific legal content is intelligible to the extent o f its adequacy to the form o f justice relevant 
to the category of interaction which the law is endeavouring to order.” Ernest Weinrib, “The Intelligibility 
o f the Rule o f Law,” in The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology, eds. Allan Hutchinson and Patrick Monahan 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1987), p 75.
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suggested by the Court between the nature of the rule of law and the process of 
substantive justice, one identifies a similar dichotomy present within the concept of the 
rule of law itself. An internal perspective opposes the formal and objective principles to 
the individualised and substantive justice as two sets of distinct and competing aims of 
the law itself.76 The internalisation of this dichotomy between formal and substantive 
objectives renders the choice between the two less obvious, and more in need of coherent 
argumentation. Within this argumentation one cannot actually avoid making a choice,77 
and hence being “biased” in spite of all the rationality involved in supporting this 
choice.78 This is the reason why, what one constitutional authority considers necessary 
to be “primarily evaluated with reference to the impact on the security of the law,”79 
another Constitutional Court considers it (as we shall see in the next chapter) necessary 
to be judged “in relation with the matter at issue.”80 Again, this does not relativise the 
legal character of both decisions, it only lifts the discussion on political justice from the 
domain of domestic constitutionalism and politics, to the one of legal theoretical debate 
about the nature of the rule of law and its constitutive elements.
76Craig, p. 35.
77Raz for instance, conceives the rule o f law in its formal conception as “just one o f  the virtues by 
which a legal system may be judged and by which it is to be judged,” by this suggesting the inescapable 
“virtue-judgement” which society might have to make sometimes. Joseph Raz, “The Rule o f  Law and Its 
Virtue,” pp. 195-196, and also 206-207.
78On the need for a “bias” in favour o f  substantive justice see Klenner’s analysis o f  the right to 
revolution in Section 1.5.
79Hungary: Constitutional Court Resolution o f 10/1992 (11.25.)AB referred to in the Constitutional 
Court Decision No. 2086. See Kritz, vol. 3, p. 632.
80“Czech Republic: Constitutional Court Decision, December 21, 1993, reproduced in Transitional 
Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes.” vol. 3, Laws. Rulings, and Reports. 
ed. Neil J. Kritz (Washington D.C.: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 1995), p. 626.
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The Constitutional Court attempted to externalise this dichotomy between formal and 
substantive values, creating the impression that the controversy was placed somehow 
outside the concept of the rule of law. In fact the controversy belongs to the very core of 
this principle.81 The Hungarian Constitutional Court induces terminologically the 
perception of the rule of law as an uncontroversial concept, opposing the principle of 
security of law to the pejoratively named “pursuit of some other constitutional task 
seeking the protection of the rights of others.” The Court found this pursuit “of no 
consideration in this matter [of the constitutionality of the Zetenyi-Takacs law].”82 
Through this formulation, the Court dismissed as irrelevant the exceptional historical 
context to which the gross violations of human rights related. Moreover, through its 
formal position, the Hungarian Constitutional Court also dismissed as irrelevant the issue 
of justice as a substantive dimension of the same principle of the rule of law. This 
dimension appears just as possible conceptually as the formal dimension of justice of the 
same principle of the rule of law.
The Hungarian Constitutional Court is right to put the principle of legal security upfront. 
In general, this is a legally and socially wise course of action83 In extreme circumstances 
however, this position brings the issues of legality and justice only half way towards a 
solution.84 Ultimately, the principle of security deserves safeguarding because it offers
81Sunstein, “Problems with Rules,” pp.956-958. See also, infra Section 6.2.
82”Hungary: Constitutional Court Decision No. 2086,” p. 633.
83Sunstein, “Problems with Rules,” p. 976.
84Craig, pp. 44-47.
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the best chance for justice. The reason why the issue of a right to revolution was raised 
in Chapter One is exactly because, in the very exceptional circumstances of a totalitarian 
regime, there is no way in which the very same principle of security could offer a single 
chance for legal, or any other kind of justice.85 Revolution - even when a “Velvet 
Revolution” - implies a retroactive evaluation of the political class of a past regime, and 
this evaluation cannot be measured solely against an absolute principle of security.86
It is evident that the main reason for qualifying the Zetenyi-Takacs law as 
unconstitutional was the position the Constitutional Court took over the essence of the 
rule of law and its intrinsic values.87 Applied rigidly, this position can bring two main 
shortcomings to a process of justice founded upon the right to revolution. These two 
shortcomings are actually two sides of the same coin often used by legal formalism. 
Firstly, an inflexible position about the rule of law and its intrinsic values inhibits the
Of
However, the rule o f law does not necessarily need “extreme circumstances” in order to become 
dysfunctional. “The rule o f law appears in one aspect as a weapon to ensure adequate control o f [the 
underclass]. While in theory in contemporary democracies they can appeal to its protection no less than 
can other citizens, in practice their appeal will often be weakened not only by the inadequacy o f the Rule 
o f Law protections in relation to the particular kinds o f regulation often used against them but by the 
assumption that these populations threaten the conditions o f general security, one o f  the central values 
associated with the Rule o f Law.” Cotterrell, “The Rule o f Law in Transition,” pp. 463-464.
Of
See supra Section 1.5.
8 7 The adherence o f the Hungarian Constitutional Court to the values intrenched in the doctrine o f legal 
formalism is clearly stated: “In the Constitutional Court’s opinion, in a constitutional State under the rule 
of law, the violation o f rights can only be responded to by upholding the rule o f the law. The legal system 
o f a State under the rule o f law, cannot deprive anyone o f legal guarantees. These guarantees are basic 
rights appertaining to all. Wherever the value o f the rule o f law is entrenched, not even a just demand can 
justify the disregard o f the State under the rule of law’s legal guarantees. Justice and moral argument may, 
o f course, motivate penal sanction but its legal foundation must be constitutional.” “Hungary: 
Constitutional Court Decision No. 2086,” p. 634. This choice however is not self-evident, it does not 
exclude the debate over the choice in itself between the values embedded in the rule o f law, and other 
possible values. Furthermore, it does not exclude the debate over the content o f the concept of the state 
under the rule o f law and its implications.
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socially and legally healthy view that the rule of law is only one of the values of a legal
system.88 Secondly, it exacerbates the sometimes socially counterproductive view89 that
a law must always be evaluated “primarily . . . with reference to the impact on the
security of the law.”90 Therefore, it is difficult from this position to envisage a meaningful
answer to the expectations for substantive justice, including an evaluation of the
Communist regime.
2.2.S The Law No. 53/1993 on the Statute of Limitations: Context and Content
Despite the rigid formal position of the Constitutional Court regarding the law 
suspending selectively the application of the statute of limitations, the initiators and 
supporters of the Zetenyi-Takacs law did not give up their hopes for justice to be restored. 
Whilst retaining the final goal of the Zetenyi-Takacs law, that of bringing to justice the 
individuals who took part in the long term political repression in Hungary, two additional 
legislative initiatives were taken in February 1993 before a second draft law also took 
shape.91 The first initiative attempted to address the Constitutional Court’s criticism about 
the eventually redundant provisions of the Zetenyi-Takacs law. This criticism pointed out
88Raz, “The Rule o f Law and Its Virtue,” pp. 195-196.
89Sunstein, “Problems with Rules,” p. 984.
QO
Hungary: Constitutional Court Resolution o f 10/1992 (11.25.)AB referred to in “Hungary: 
Constitutional Court Decision No. 2086,” p. 632.
91Yves-Michel Riols, “Les exactions du regime Communist.” Le Monde. 20 February 1993, p. 23.
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that if suspending the statute of limitations for the period of the Communist regime was 
constitutionally permissible, then there would be no need to pass new legislation 
regarding this statute of limitations, and consequently the matter should remain in the 
hands of the courts. The courts then could decide upon each individual case.92
Preempting this criticism, the Hungarian Parliament passed an “authoritative resolution” 
in February 1993. In the constitutional framework of Hungary this type of resolution 
offers an interpretative guideline for laws that are already in existence.93 Through this 
specific guideline, the courts were instructed to ignore the period from 1944 to 1989 
when calculating the statute of limitations.94 This legislative initiative was also used by 
the supporters of change in the statute of limitations to counter the accusations of 
applying inadmissible political criteria for discriminating between similar crimes. 
Consequently, unlike the Zetenyi-Takacs law, the authoritative resolution was applicable 
to any of the crimes of treason, premeditated murder and aggravated assault leading to 
death, if these failed to be prosecuted, or the prosecution was dropped for no obvious 
reasons, during the period from 1944 to 1989.
Although preventing the criticism from the point of view of the principle of equality in
9 9 ”If the statute had indeed been tolled by the law prevailing at the time o f  the commission o f the 
offence then declaration o f this fact in a new law is unnecessary. Determination o f whether or not the 
statute had run - by application o f the law pertaining to the specific offense - it is exclusively for the 
prosecutor and, in the last instance, to die courts. The legislature cannot retroactively decide this question.
. . What did not then constitute a legal fact warranting the tolling o f the statute cannot be so declared 
retroactively.” “Hungary: Constitutional Court Decision No. 2086,” p. 639.
93”Hungary: Constitution Watch.” East European Constitutional Review 2. no. 1 (Winter 1993): 9.
94Halmai and Scheppele, 164-165.
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front of the criminal law, the authoritative resolution still remained fragile from the 
perspective of the formal position embraced by the Constitutional Court when assessing 
the Zetenyi-Takacs law. In principle, the Court found that the authoritative resolution was 
meant to induce the same legally intolerable ex post facto consequences as the Zetenyi- 
Takacs law.95 This time however, these consequences were not even coming from a 
proper law, but from mere “instructions” given by the legislative body. Not surprisingly 
then, the Hungarian Constitutional Court declared this act unconstitutional as well.
The second initiative designed to avoid the statute of limitations took the form of a statute 
amending the Hungarian Criminal Procedure Act of 1973. The legal outcome of this 
amendment, which amounted to an order from the Parliament to the public prosecutor, 
would have been that the public prosecutors had to put forward indictments even for 
those cases for which the statute of limitations period had expired.96 However, the 
Constitutional Court refused, yet again, to allow retroactive justice from coming into the 
criminal law through the back door.97
From the failed authoritative resolution and amendment of the Criminal Procedure Act, 
in which any implication of an eventual assessment of the Hungarian Communist regime 
had been carefully excluded, it became obvious that the Constitutional Court’s position
95Hungary: Constitutional Court Decision 41/1993 (VI.30) AB h., cited in Halmai and Scheppele, p
165.
96Riols, p. 23.
97Hungary: Constitutional Court Decision 42/1993 (VI30) AB h., cited in Halmai and Scheppele, p.
165.
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on the statute of limitation would not be changed as long as the shadow of retroactivity 
was cast over any proposal trying to amend it. At this point, another legal proposal was 
put forward, based on rather different legal arguments. Since, according to the 
Constitutional Court at least, the domestic law was irreconcilable with the retroactive 
tendencies of the process of political justice, the promoters of the political justice process 
looked for a legal basis which would give an outside authoritative basis, and in the same 
time be coherent enough to dismantle the ban on retroactivity. Therefore, a second new 
law took shape by making use of public international law: The Law Concerning 
Procedures in the Matter of Certain Criminal Offenses During the 1956 October 
Revolution and Freedom Struggle, Law No. 53/1993.98
The basis for the Law No. 53/1993 was offered by two international treaties: The Geneva 
Conventions on the treatment of prisoners and the protection of civilians of 1949," and 
The New-York Convention on the non-applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes 
and crimes against humanity of 1968.100 The use of the Geneva Conventions for the 
prosecution of crimes from 1956 stood in its applicability to any case of armed conflict, 
and not just to declared wars between states: violence to life and person, together with
9 8 The Law Concerning Procedures in the Matter of Certain Criminal Offenses During the 1956 
October Revolution and Freedom Struggle. No. 53/1993 (February 1993), from now referred to as the Law 
No. 53/1993, reproduced in Halmai and Scheppele. Also, Morvai, “Retroactive Justice,” p. 32 ff.
" Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment o f Prisoners o f War. (1950) 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (Third 
Geneva Convention entered into force the 21st o f October 1950), and Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection o f  Civilian Persons in Time o f War. (1950) 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Fourth Geneva Convention 
entered into force the 21st o f October 1950).
100Convention on the Non-Applicability o f Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against 
Humanity. (1968) G.A. res. 2391 (XXIII), annex, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 40, U.N. Doc. A/7218.
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several other forms of wrongdoing, are prohibited also “in the case of armed conflict not
of an international character.”101 At the same time, the New-York Convention offered a
way to avoid the ban on retroactivity by stating that “no statutory limitation shall apply
to several categories of war crimes and crimes against humanity irrespective of the date
of their commission.”102
The Law No. 53/1993, which like the Zetenyi-Takacs law addressed the statute of 
limitations, combined the provisions of the international conventions, interpreting the 
most brutal episodes of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution as war crimes and/or crimes 
against humanity. The provisions of the international conventions were upheld on the 
basis of the interpretation of Article 7 of the Hungarian Constitution which states that 
“the legal system of Hungaiy shall respect the universally accepted rules of international 
law, and shall ensure furthermore the accord between the obligations assumed under 
international and domestic law.”103 Although the universally accepted rules from the 1949 
Geneva Conventions did not include the absence of a statute of limitation covering war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, Hungary undertook the obligation to prosecute those 
crimes retroactively, by ratifying the 1968 New-York Convention for the Non- 
Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity.
101 See Art. 3 o f the Third Geneva Convention and Art. 3 o f  the Fourth Geneva Convention. Also, 
International Committee o f the Red Cross, Basic Rules o f the Geneva Conventions and Their Additional 
Protocols (Geneva: International Committee o f the Red Cross, 1983), p. 52 ff.
102See Art. lo f  the Convention on the Non-Applicability o f Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity (1968), G.A. res. 2391 (XXIII), annex, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 40, 
U.N. Doc. A/7218.
103The Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, Art. 7(1), (unofficial translation).
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2.2.6 The Revolution of the Rule of Law: The Constitutional Court’s Decision 
on the Law No. 53/1993
The Hungarian Constitutional Court abstained from making any major criticisms against 
the new proposal, apart from one issue.104 The issue which the Court criticised was, yet 
again, the one concerning the alleged crimes of high treason committed especially in 1956 
by the Communist “hard-liners” who called in the Soviet troops. The attempt to 
criminalise and retroactively prosecute the acts of treason took as a basis the same 
international conventions as for the crimes of premeditated murder and aggravated assault 
leading to death. As a legal basis for the prosecution of the acts of treason, a domestic law 
from 1945 was also used.105 This law defined a war crime as any form of activity that 
could jeopardise the peace or the collaboration between people after the war, or as any 
form of activity that has the potential of causing international conflicts.106 Presuming that 
the calls upon the Soviet army could have caused such an international conflict, the Law 
No. 53/1993 succeeded to define these acts as war crimes. In this way, the acts related to 
the Soviet invasion were included under the jurisdiction of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
which protects civilians in armed conflicts even when not of an international character.
104Hungary: Constitutional Court Decision 53/1993 (X.13)AB h, cited in Halmai and Scheppele, p.
166.
105”Hungary: Constitution Watch,” East European Constitutional Review 1, no. 3 (Fall 1992): 7.
106Schulhofer, p. 26. The Constitutional Court’s attitude could be interpreted in to ways: that the Court 
(a) set an example of judicial activism and considered it unwise to punish such acts even if  legally possible, 
or (b) detained some information not yet made public, since it considered that the agreement given by the 
Communist leaders for the Soviet invasion in 1956 could in no way jeopardize the peace or the 
collaboration between people, and that it had no potential o f causing international conflicts.
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Also, the 1968 New York Convention which established the non-applicability of statutory 
limitations to war crimes and crimes against humanity became applicable to the alleged 
acts of treason. Despite this clear but elaborate legal construction combining valid 
domestic and public international norms, the Hungarian Constitutional Court declared 
that the acts of treason referred to in the Law No. 53/1993 belonged to the domestic 
domain and not to the public international law domain. Therefore, according to the Court, 
to apply an ex post facto statute of limitations was unconstitutional.107
In spite of the issue of treason during the 1956 events, the Constitutional Court’s ruling 
on the Law No. 53/1993 restored to a certain extent the Court's reputation among the 
more radical thinkers and among the adepts of a more substantive approach to justice.108 
Although this time the Court largely confirmed the implicit amendments to the statute of 
limitations brought by the Law No. 53/1993 on the basis of international law, the Court’s 
decision on this law was also seen as an exercise injudicial activism.109 The Hungarian 
Constitutional Court took a clear position in the theoretical debate over the scope of 
international (criminal) law, proclaiming the authority of the community of civilised 
nations over state sovereignty.110
This decision of the Constitutional Court came as even more of a surprise than the
107Huyse, “Justice after Transition,” p. 337.
108Morvai, p. 33.
109Morvai, p. 34.
110”Hungary: Constitutional Court Decision No. 2086,” p. 631.
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decision on the Zetenyi-Takacs law, especially taking into consideration the strong formal 
stand the Court took in its decision on the latter law.111 From this formal stand, the 
Constitutional Court was expected to use two sensitive aspects of the Law No. 53/1993 
in order to strike it down. Firstly, there was the dichotomy of domestic law versus 
international law. The Court used this dichotomy in order to reject only the applicability 
of public international law to certain acts of treason, but allowed the international 
conventions to be applied with respect to the other crimes addressed by the Law No. 
53/1993.112 Secondly, the Constitutional Court had in its legal arsenal the argument of the 
separation of powers. This argument was used by the Court in its decision on the 
Zetenyi-Takacs law, and basically it denied the legislature the competence of interpreting 
existing norms of criminal law, in favour of the judiciary. One could have therefore 
expected the same reasoning arguing that if certain crimes are crimes of war and crimes 
against humanity, it was for the judicial power and not for the legislature to establish it. 
The argument of “vagueness” - an argument often attached to a law based on 
international treaties - received no mention from the Court either. As we shall see 
however in the end of this section when looking into the implementation of the Law No. 
53/1993, the argument of the vagueness of this law will come inevitably into the 
Hungarian debate on the process of political justice.
The same legal reasoning, resting upon international law, failed to work with respect to
m Morvai, p. 33.
112”Hungary: Constitution Watch.” East European Constitutional Review 2. no. 4 (Fall 1993/Winter 
1994): 10.
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the crime of treason.113 Perhaps the Court’s position on this issue should not be so 
surprising, taking into account the more political nature of this crime. Similar to many 
other cases in Eastern Europe, it appeared easier to sentence the persons who executed 
the orders, rather than the officials whose orders and policy the former were carrying out. 
In the specific case of Hungary, however, there is an inevitable relationship between the 
crimes acknowledged by the law and the Constitutional Court, and an evaluation of the 
Communist regime. In this sense, the events surrounding the 1956 Soviet invasion can 
be perceived under two mutually exclusive perspectives: One perspective implies both 
individual and governmental responsibility for human rights violations in Eastern Europe, 
while the other perspective practically implies none of these.
From the first of these two perspectives, the violent acts committed could be seen as 
crimes against humanity and crimes of war as the Constitutional Court actually 
acknowledged. In this case, as it was shown in Chapter One, one cannot avoid having to 
evaluate the regime responsible for condoning, or even committing, those crimes.114 From 
this perspective, by way of inference, treason could be considered as one of the acts 
which directly contributed to the violations of the basic human rights of the Hungarian
113”Hungary: Constitution Watch.” East European Constitutional Review 2. no. 4 (Fall 1993/Winter 
1994): 11.
114Art. 2 of the 1968 New York Convention on the Non-Applicability o f Statutory Limitations to War 
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity is very clear in this respect: “If any o f the crimes mentioned in 
article I [crimes o f war and crimes against humanity] is committed, the provisions o f this Convention shall 
apply to representatives o f the State authority and private individuals who, as principals or accomplices, 
participate in or who directly incite others to the commission o f any o f  those crimes, or who conspire to 
commit them, irrespective o f the degree o f completion, and to representatives o f the State authority who 
tolerate their commission.” Convention on the Non-Applicability o f Statutory Limitations to War Crimes 
and Crimes Against Humanity. (1968) G.A. res. 2391 (XXIII), annex, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 
40, U.N. Doc. A/7218.
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population in the 1950s when a foreign army was called in by the Hungarian Communist 
government.
The alternative perspective is that the Hungarian Communist hierarchy is not “criminally 
responsible” for those crimes but only causally responsible. This alternative, however, 
is logically acceptable only if the aggressions and killings of the citizens during the events 
in 1950s could be said to amount to a legitimate use of force in defence of a legitimate 
order. As mentioned earlier, this argument was successfully used in court by the 
defendant Kadar.115 However, the Constitutional Court, in its decision on the Law No. 
53/1993, accepted that some of the events in 1950s were crimes against humanity and 
crimes of war, and that prosecution could be pursued on this ground. These facts mean 
that it is logically inconsistent to ignore the Communist power structures and their major 
role and responsibility for those crimes.
Therefore, in the context of the events from 1950s in Hungary, the crimes of treason are 
related to the crimes against humanity and the crimes of war which have already been 
acknowledged by the Constitutional Court. A certain parochialism of the national legal 
system could have prompted the Court to opt for the domestic arguments offered for these 
crimes by the law of 1945, rather than to rely entirely on international conventions; 
especially since the Hungarian legal system was procedurally unprepared for the 
application of these conventions.116 However, the crime of treason would have implicated
115Morvai, p. 33.
116Errera, p. 34.
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the highest ranks of the Party leadership and not only the mere rank and file of the Party,
or the army officers involved in the repression. Therefore, the political implications of
the Law No. 53/1993 - illustrated by what we have just seen to be logically inconsistent
perspectives over the events from the 1950s in Hungary - made the Constitutional Court
more cautious in allowing the lower courts to decide upon the legal meaning of the word
“treason.” Nevertheless, given the acknowledgement of the crimes against humanity and
crimes of war committed under the Hungarian Communist regime, the implication of the
Communist regime could come into play even without invoking the crime of treason.
It should also be noted that the Law No. 53/1993 and the Constitutional Court’s decision 
on it only apparently escaped the shadow of retroactivity being cast over it. In its 
decision, the Constitutional Court accepted two exceptions from the ban on the 
retroactivity, apparently based on formal aspects. The first aspect of retroactivity was that 
the Constitutional Court agreed that the ban on retroactive alterations of the statute of 
limitations did not apply if there was no statute of limitations in force in the domestic law 
at the time when the specific crimes were committed, even if, at a later date, under the 
Communist regime, a statute of limitations had been introduced. Accepting this argument 
however, still amounts to a violation of the principle of non-retroactivity, or more 
precisely to a violation of the exception to this principle. Since the Hungarian Criminal 
Procedure Code had later introduced a statute of limitations for those crimes, not taking 
this newly introduced statute of limitations into consideration amounts to withdrawing
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the benefit of the most favourable law from the persons concerned.117 Therefore, this 
benefit - a recognised exception to the ban on criminal law retroactivity - is actually 
withdrawn retroactively. The violation of the principle of applicability of the most 
favourable criminal provision appears just as difficult to fit into a formal interpretation 
of the rule of law, as would be the direct retroactive suspension of the statute of 
limitations.
The second aspect conveying retroactivity was the very reliance of the Law No. 53/1993 
upon the two international treaties.118 The crimes against humanity and the crimes of war 
have been exempt from the application of the statute of limitations through the New York 
Convention from 1968. Accordingly, if the Hungarian Constitutional Court aspired to 
consistency in its general formal approach to the rule of law - the very rational basis on 
which the Zetenyi-Takacs law was rejected - this second law, the Law No. 53/1993, 
should have appeared just as unconstitutional as the Zetenyi-Takacs law. Therefore, the 
Constitutional Court rejected the substantive reasons for retroactivity of a domestic law - 
the gravity of the human rights violations perpetrated - only in order to accept these 
reasons when they are promoted through international treaties. Although they are well 
founded reasons for this “discrimination,” they could never account for the disregard of 
what the Constitutional Court considered of paramount importance: the absolute security 
of the law.
117Anita L. Richardson & Leonard B. Mandell, “Fairness Over Fortuity: Retroactivity Revisited and 
Revised,” Utah Law Review 11, no. 1 (1989): 59-60.
118Errera, p. 34.
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Therefore, the right of any individual to receive a fair warning concerning the content of 
criminal norms is no better protected through retroactively applied international treaties, 
than through retroactive criminal procedure acts. The Communist bureaucracy’s 
awareness of the degree of political repression that was taking place in the society could 
appear as a far more consistent “fair notice” of legal actions which are going to come 
from the society, and therefore a far more consistent reason for suspending the statute of 
limitations. In a way, one could say that the right to revolution, which is the basis on 
which these measures of justice are initiated, existed before the New York Convention. 
The public international law practice allows, of course, for the international treaties to be 
applied in the retroactive manner sanctioned by the Hungarian Constitutional Court. 
Nevertheless, the issue at this stage is the consistency of the Constitutional Court in 
professing rigidly a formal understanding of the principles of the rule of law, and 
especially of the ban on retroactivity.119
Without a certain right to political (retroactive) justice being recognised, it could be 
concluded that crimes of governments amounting to what can now be characterised as 
crimes against humanity, could not have been the object of legitimate expectations for 
justice before the Geneva Conventions were signed. Now, of course, it is very handy to 
have international treaties covering these crimes. One should not forget however that 
sometimes serious crimes cannot fit the definitions given by the international treaties,
119In fact, the formal approach o f the Hungarian Constitutional Court - expressed in detail in its 
decision on the Zet6nyi-Takacs law - does not coincide with the very rationale based on exception, from 
which the two international treaties emerged, and which the international treaties tried to address and 
preempt. Orentlicher, p. 2539 ff.
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exactly because governments don’t easily sign treaties which involve issuing a blank
check to be used later on in assessing their performance.120 This aspect can in fact make
serious crimes of states practically unpunishable in spite of their seriousness.121
Apart from the inconsistencies stemming from these issues of retroactivity, there is also 
another issue worth considering. Being based on international treaties, the approved 
version of the Law No. 53/1993 which amended the statute of limitation would need - for 
a consistent application - a detailed set of procedural rules destined to integrate the 
international treaties, and to render their norms functional on the national level.122 Since 
these procedural rules were not detailed in the Law No. 53/1993, the actual provisions 
of this law which concerned the prosecution of crimes of war and crimes against 
humanity became very difficult to apply consistently. For example, in January 1995, two 
different chambers of the Budapest City Court passed two judgements on two instances 
from 1956 in which the Communist government forces shot unarmed crowds of
120Joseph H. H. Whiter, “On Prophets and Judges: Some Personal Reflections on State Responsibility 
and Crimes o f State” in International Crimes o f State: A Critical Analysis o f  the ILC’s Draft Article 19 
on State Responsibility, eds. Joseph H. H. Whiler, Antonio Cassese and Marina Spinedi (Berlin, New  
York: Walter de Gruyter, 1989), p. 319 ff.
121 Some Human Rights lawyers for instance would even disagree with the definition o f the crimes 
occurred in 1956 Hungary as crimes against humanity. In this sense, it is claimed that the inclusion o f these 
specific crimes under the definition o f crimes against humanity would mean in practical terms that the 
definition established for the crimes against humanity would be enlarged, a fact which would endanger the 
concept o f crimes against humanity itself and its applicability. Natalie Jean Ferringer, Crimes Against 
Humanity: A Legal Problem in War and Peace (Charlottesville, University o f  Virginia, PhD, 1980, Ann 
Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1991), p. 24.
122Halmai and Scheppele, 169 ff.
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demonstrators.123 Because the law on retroactive justice failed to specify the adequate 
system of criminal procedure, the two resulting sentences in these trials were - in spite 
of their similar facts - completely different.124 This situation prompted the Supreme 
Court, as the last instance of appeal in the Hungarian legal system, to petition the 
Constitutional Court for another constitutional revision of the already revised Law No. 
53/1993. This second revision made the Constitutional Court rule against the Law No. 
53/1993 on the basis that the parliament had failed to follow all the directives the Court 
had given when it first considered the constitutionality of this law.125 Since this ruling, 
the Parliament has undertaken the task of changing the Hungarian procedural code. These 
changes, however, still remain to be tested by the courts in the new cases of war crimes 
and crimes against humanity, before eventually being brought again to the attention of the 
Constitutional Court.
In conclusion, it could be said that the Hungarian constitutional debate on the process of 
political justice through criminal law left this process lessened, impoverished and - as it 
was revealed in the end - actually inapplicable. Firstly, the process of justice for the
123More than fifty such cases were investigated. “Hungary: Constitution Watch,” East European 
Constitutional Review 2. no. 4 (Fall 1993/Winter 1994): 10-11.
124In one o f the cases the shooting was accepted as crime against humanity, while in the other case it 
was decided that the shootings were not such prohibited acts within international law, and therefore the 
domestic statute o f limitations was applied to end the procedure. Halmai and Scheppele, p. 169.
125”Hungary: Constitution Watch.” East European Constitutional Review 3. no. 2 (Summer 1994): 8. 
Among the latest changes demanded by the Constitutional Court were establishing o f  the sort o f  
punishment which could legitimately meted out for crimes against humanity and crimes o f war, as well as 
providing for specific degrees of culpability in individual cases which should accompany the application 
of the norms o f the international treaties, etc. Hungary: Constitutional Court decision 36/1996 (IX.4) AB 
h. cited in Halmai and Scheppele, p. 170.
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Communist past appears lessened through the fact that only those expectations for justice 
closely related to the 1956 repression were acknowledged by the Constitutional Court. 
This approach excluded any other criminal acts which took place before, or even after 
1956. Secondly, the possibility for justice was made available through the Law No. 
53/1993 which amended the statute of limitations, but it was also impoverished by the 
fact that the Court refused to acknowledge the “political reasons,” and therefore the 
implicit political responsibility, for the acts of violence and/or for their cover up. Finally, 
preferring a law based on legal formalism combined with international treaties (with all 
the potential of vagueness this can sometimes entail), over a substantive but maybe 
clearer and more easily applicable law, the Constitutional Court made the expectations 
for justice impossible to meet. The way in which the prosecutions brought about by the 
Law No. 53/1993 have proceeded until now confirm this conclusion.
2.2.7 Collective Political Agency and Responsibility
The political reasons mentioned in the analysis of the Zetenyi-Takacs law represented 
not only the context in which the alleged crimes of treason, murder and aggravated 
assault have been committed and remained unprosecuted, but they referred also to the 
roots from which those crimes emerged. In its decisions on the Zetenyi-Takacs law the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court declined to address this political context. Nevertheless, 
looking beyond the direct outcome of the legislative process, that is, ignoring the fact that 
the first attempt - the Zetenyi-Takacs law - of political justice actually failed, and that the
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second one - the Law No. 53/1993 - was amended in ways which made it ineffective, 
elements appear which confirm the pervasive presence of the issues of responsibility of 
the governmental agencies.
Starting with the Zetenyi-Takacs law, the first element which demands attention in this 
respect, is the embedded controversial character upon which the search for justice was 
built. The controversial character of the search for justice stems from the fact that this 
proposal addressed actors in the political arena who were seen as inseparable parts of the 
Communist repressive machine. This latter machine cannot be conceived as functional 
by only relying on some individuals’ discretionary power. Solving the problem of the 
unprosecuted crimes because of “political reasons” appears to require the 
acknowledgement of something more than mere individual responsibility. It requires a 
legal assessment of the role played by the Communist governments in committing, as 
well as condoning, unlawful acts.126
The fact that a government endorses - formally or informally - politically convenient 
crimes brings another element to the fore. This element was suggested, although not 
directly addressed, by the Zetenyi-Takacs law. This second element, which can be 
deduced from the Zetenyi-Takacs law itself, is inseparably related to the problem of the 
statute of limitations. Since the argument on which the law was based was that for some 
crimes the time limit which permitted prosecution for certain crimes had already expired 
due to the “political context,” it becomes unavoidable to attribute the responsibility of
126Huyes, p. 114.
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this situation to the state, as the one who frustrated the course of justice by creating and 
actually being that political context.127 Indeed, even if one supports the position of the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court, that the rule of law opposes any change in the statute of 
limitations at this point, the responsibility for creating this legal vacuum, remains open 
to prosecution, even with respect to crimes committed half a century ago. This is so given 
the systematic official attitude towards politically motivated or tolerated crimes; an 
attitude which could be seen as a continuous breach of law, renewed with each 
deliberately unprosecuted crime, and consequently renewed with each day that passed.128 
Since the post-Communist Hungarian government claims constitutional continuity with 
the Communist government, it becomes its duty to inquire into the failures of the 
Communist government, in order to ensure the legality and justice of what is to be 
understood as a consistent constitutional framework linking the two otherwise completely 
opposed political regimes.129
The Hungarian Constitutional Court recognised this aspect of the issue of justice in times 
of transition: the implicit entanglement of individual and governmental responsibility for 
the crimes committed. Nevertheless, the Court used the argument of the old government’s 
responsibility in order to support its decision of rejecting retroactive amendments of the 
statute of limitations affecting the individual persons, rather than to combine individual
127Pataki, p. 21.
128Podgorecki, “Totalitarian Law,” p. 19 ff.
129Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, p. 368. Finnis, pp, 44-49. J. M. Eekelaar, “Principles of 
Revolutionary Legality,” in Oxford Essavs in Jurisprudence. Second Series, ed. A.W.B. Simpson (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1973), pp. 25 ff.
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criminal responsibility with the collective political responsibility for the politically 
sponsored crimes. The Court argued that “[it] is the old-Government responsibility of not 
having punished these acts. Only the state and not the individual persons can be 
considered as guilty” (emphasis mine),130 and also that, “the offender cannot be burdened 
by the State’s dereliction o f its duty” (emphasis mine).131 This statement of the 
Constitutional Court had no legal weight however, because the Court was only justifying 
its formal approach to the Zetenyi-Takacs law.
Nevertheless, the Hungarian Constitutional Court draws our attention, maybe 
involuntarily, to the fact that the Hungarian legislature, as well as the courts, forget that 
unfulfilled governmental duties, such as the duty to protect and promote human rights, 
carry themselves a responsibility. This is particularly true with respect to the duty to 
secure the protection of the basic rights of citizens and to ensure that (criminal) justice 
prevails.132 As mentioned before, this responsibility can be translated into legal terms. 
However, judging from the Court’s propensity towards a formalistic approach, it is 
unlikely that the latter would accept a legal initiative addressing directly the government 
responsibility for unprosecuted crimes. From the Constitutional Court’s perspective, such 
a case would appear as restricting the right to an absolute security of the persons involved 
in government.
130”Hungary: Constitutional Court Decision No. 2086,” p. 638.
131”Hungary: Constitutional Court Decision No. 2086,” p. 639.
132See Orentlicher on the duty to protect human rights violations o f a prior regime, in Chapter One, 
Section 1.4.
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Certain basic rights can sometimes be legitimately amended or restricted. By refusing to 
consider the historical context created by the Communist regime, the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court fails to consider properly those cumulative conditions under which 
one could legitimately consider restricting those rights, such as the right to an absolute 
security of law.133 If it was to alter any basic right, the laws reviewed by the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court should have been tested against the parameters of unavoidability, 
necessity and proportionality.134 Although mentioned by the Court,135 neither of these 
aspects has been given proper consideration. The consideration of these parameters 
requires placing the law in its proper historical context, acknowledging the need for 
justice and especially for deterrence from future abuses.
As examined in Chapter One, revolutions come exactly with this type of claim of 
necessity, unavoidability, and ultimately justice. Therefore, apart from the procedural 
weaknesses, underlined by some but minimised by others, the Hungarian approach to the 
statute of limitations suffers more than anything else from a lack of normative context. 
An approach outside such context risks to add to the injustice of the totalitarian regime. 
Searching for justice outside a contextual approach might result in punishing some who 
have as sole and feeble excuse the obedience of orders, while those who have given the
Erica-Irene A. Daes, Freedom o f the Individual Under Law: A Study on the Individuars Duties to 
the Community and the Limitations on Human Rights and Freedoms Under Article 29 o f the Universal 
Declaration o f Human Rights fNew York : United Nations, 1990), pp. 132-37 & 172-182.
1340n  the shadows of discrimination and justifiable distinctions see Janos Kis, What Shall We Do With
Former Agents? (TD), 1994, p. 6 ff.
’’Hungary: Constitutional Court Decision No. 2086,” p. 635.
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orders and fully participated in creating the favourable context for the crimes to go 
unpunished will still be eligible for positions of power.
Of course, by amending the statute of limitations, the Law No. 53/1993 will allow for 
some of the high ranking members of the Communist bureaucracy to be brought to Court. 
This might appease the social expectations for justice up to a certain extent. The real 
question however is whether this approach succeeds in exhausting both the legal need and 
potential for justice. There will always remain in law the question of who is responsible 
for creating the conditions for those crimes to be committed, and who left those crimes 
unpunished, especially when one is aware that leaving serious crimes unpunished in itself 
can represent a determinant cause for even more crimes.136
Thus, taking into account the complexity of the Communist power structures, and the 
extent of the crimes which accompanied it,137 even if the prosecuted persons belong to 
the highest levels of the Communist bureaucracy, would it be possible to say that 
responsibility belongs only to discrete individuals? Judging from the Hungarian 
experience, and especially from the elements underlined by the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court’s position, one could answer “yes” to this question. This would mean discarding
136Who could truthfully argue today for instance, that the Brazilian Government has no responsibility 
in the dispute between the tribal people and the white farmers and ranchers, when the Government 
deliberately supports legislation which gives the latter the right to “challenge” (outside the Court) the tribal 
people's use o f the land, and prevents the tribal people from owning the land they have used for 
generations. This legislation instigates the extinction o f the tribal people’s livelihood and, indeed leads to 
their genocide. Survival. October 1996.
137See Courtois, et al.
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Fuller’s “Sixth Deputy’s” suggestion that the repressive regime should be assessed not 
only from the perspective of individual responsibilities, but also directly, as a repressive 
system.
Nevertheless, as we have just seen, from the Hungarian experience there are contradictory 
signals emerging. One might arrive to believe that these contradictory signals, especially 
with respect to the concept of collective responsibility, happen because of the 
predominantly criminal law approach and its procedural constraints. Therefore, a look 
into the other major approach to political justice, the one taking place outside the 
boundaries and constrains of the criminal law, will only complete the picture of the 
process of political justice in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, before looking into this 
approach, the picture of the criminal law approach will be completed by discussing 
elements of a predominantly judicial criminal approach, as opposed to the predominantly 
legislative and procedural excursion offered by the Hungarian legal debate. These 
elements are rooted in the border guards trials which took place in Berlin, following the 
German re-unification. These trials bring into the discussion important aspects of the 
relation between individual and collective responsibility for the crimes of the Communist 
regime.
2.3 Formal v. Substantive: Aspects of the German Border Guards Trials
A preliminary point to note is that, in a criminal law context, the issue of a potential
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collective responsibility of the Communist government, like the issue of suspending the 
statute of limitations for certain crimes, would be a matter for the courts to decide upon, 
rather than for the legislator to draft. A special law should not be required in order that 
certain events under valid international treaties qualify as crimes against humanity and 
crimes of war. In general the legislator should not be required to decide whether an 
individual or an organisation counts as legal agent, that is who can stand in court and who 
cannot. It is true however that the controversial character of the issue of justice related 
to a revolution makes the intervention of the legislative body seem somehow more 
appropriate.138 At the same time, the results coming from a legislative approach can 
sometimes - by the mere fact that legislating is predominantly a creative matter - be more 
controversial and open to criticism relative to the abuse of the legal discourse for political 
aims, than an approach through the courts. The difference between the Hungarian and the 
German criminal law approach to political justice starts from here, from the different 
weight given to the courts in deciding politically controversial issues.
Initially, the unified Germany seemed to offer a double protection against almost any 
measures of political justice through criminal law. First of all, this protection was ensured 
through the notion of Rechtsstaat, or the state under the rule of law principle included in
1111
For example, it could be argued that the Z6t£nyi-Takacs law was pointless, if  it wasn’t for the need 
of uniformity of attitude in the action o f the criminal courts which were supposed to undertake the 
prosecution o f the crimes o f the past regime. This idea is addressed by the Constitutional Court itself when 
addressing the argument which states that one does not actually deal with a new statute o f limitations but 
with the original one which has been tolled by the historical circumstances. “If the statute had indeed been 
tolled by the law prevailing at the time o f the commission o f the offense then declaration o f this fact in a 
new law is unnecessary. Determination o f whether or not the statute had run - by application o f the law 
pertaining to the specific offense - is exclusively for the prosecutor and, ultimately, for the courts.” 
“Hungary: Constitutional Court Decision No. 2086,” p. 639.
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the Basic Law, and secondly through the provisions included in the Unification Treaty 
of 1990. This Treaty expressly stipulated that the citizens of the former GDR could be 
prosecuted for acts committed before the reunification, only according to the East 
German penal code.139 This double constitutional protection brought the challenge of 
bringing justice for the Communist crimes by following - just like in the Hungarian case - 
the legislation of the former Communist regime.140 In Hungary, the coagulating issue for 
the demands for political justice was represented by the repression from 1956; in 
Germany the demands for justice started primarily around the issue of the killings which 
took place along the Berlin wall.141 These demands for justice resulted in the trials of the 
border guards accused of having shot at innocent Germans trying to flee to West 
Germany with the intention of killing them.
Judging from the two elements of the constitutional framework of the German re­
unification, (as well as from the Hungarian constitutional experience with the issues of 
political justice through criminal law), it appears that the way in which the legal 
argumentation of the border guards trials evolved was rather unexpected. The sentence 
passed in the first border guards trial seems to have been based not so much on the
139Peter Quint, “The Constitutional Law o f German Unification,” Maryland Law Review 50, no.3 
(1991): 475-631. Paul Schwartz, “Constitutional Change and Constitutional Legitimation: The Example 
o f German Unification,” Huston Law Review 31, no.4 (Winter 1994): 1027-1104.
140John Bomeman, Settling Accounts: Violence. Justice and Accountability in Postsocialist Europe 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 52-56.
14’Besides these trials (“Mauershtttzenprozesse”), there have been important indictments and 
convictions entailing governmental criminality also with respect to judicial illegalities, Stasi illegalities, 
and economic crimes. Bomeman, p. 100.
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positive laws of former GDR as on a substantive view of the rule of law.142 The judge 
presiding at the first trial made a specific point in building his argumentation of guilt 
upon the natural law theory constructed by Gustav Radbruch.143 Recalling the solution 
offered by Fuller’s second Deputy to the problem of the grudge informer, the German 
judge denied any authority to the laws of a regime whose leaders “enjoyed no form of 
legitimation.”144 According to the judge, the legal standards of the GDR have been in 
“crass contradiction to the generally recognized foundations of the rule of law.”145
As it could be expected, this first sentence proved extremely controversial. Its 
argumentation was not followed in the subsequent border guard trials. On the contrary, 
in the second trial the judge made a special point of keeping strictly within the limits of 
the GDR laws,146 especially within the limits of the Border Law, a law dating from 1982. 
Notwithstanding this formal commitment, the second border guards trial delivered again 
the guilty verdict as in the first trial. However, between the two verdicts there was
142Judge Seidel’s ruling, Landgericht Berlin ([523] 2 Js 48/90 [9/91]) o f  January 20, 1992, pp. 136- 
MO, quoted in James A. McAdams, “The Honecker Trial: The East German Past and the German Future,” 
The Review o f Politics 58, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 62. In support o f this judgement it was asserted that the 
court’s decision avoided the retroactivity problem by applying the milder penalty, and relying on 
fundamental human rights and natural law rather than just positive law. Mary Albon, “Project on Justice 
in Times o f Transition,” The Charter Seventy Seven Foundation, New York. Report o f the Project 
Inaugural Meeting, Salzburg (7-10 March 1992): 5-18, reproduced in Transitional Justice: How Emerging 
Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, vol. 1. General Considerations, ed. Neil L. Kritz (Washington 
D.C.: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 1995), p. 49.
1430 n  the sentence passed by Judge Seidel in this first trial see in McAdams, “The Honecker Trial,” 
p. 61 ff.
144Judge Seidel quoted in McAdams, “The Honecker Trial,” p. 62.
145Ibid.
146Bomeman, p. 56.
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apparently a major difference of legal argumentation. While the first verdict was based 
on the principles of natural law, the second verdict was based on principles of the GDR’s 
legal system, such as the general requirement that the means employed for preventing a 
crime should be proportionate to the crime which is committed.147
A closer examination of the second verdict reveals, however, that the formal commitment 
of the court to the former GDR laws is inevitably altered by the rather subjective nature 
of the key concept upon which the verdict was built: the concept of “proportional means.” 
The problem with this concept is that what to an average person - in the context of the 
Communist regime, and under the tacit blessing of the hierarchy - appeared as 
“proportionate means,” could very well appear as “disproportionate” in the post- 
Communist context.148 In spite of this relative dimension, the second sentence was 
considered as being an important step towards the re-affirmation of the somewhat lost 
procedural safeguards for justice derived from the process of re-unification: the protection 
offered through the Basic Law, and the provisions of the Reunification Treaty 
establishing the GDR penal code as the only law applicable to the crimes committed 
before the re-unification.149
These cyclic returns to substantive evaluations in the border guards court cases are rather
147McAdams, “The Honecker Trial,” p. 64.
148A similar difficulty is underlined by Bomeman with respect to the notion o f “normal behaviour” 
which was one o f the key issues in the Wolfgang Vogel trial for extortion. Bomemann, pp. 81-86.
149McAdams, “The Honecker Trial,” p. 58 ff.
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suggestive of the debate on the political justice in general. Of an even greater importance, 
however, appears to be the basis upon which Judge Ingeborg Tepperwein decided, after 
sentencing the border guards in the second trial, to suspend the latter’s sentences. The 
judge argued that “not selfishness or criminal energy” had led them to crime, but 
“circumstances over which they had no influence, such as the political and military 
confrontation in divided Germany [and] the special conditions o f the former 
GZ)^”(emphasis mine).150 As one might realise, this argument sounds very similar to the 
one used by the Hungarian Constitutional Court in its decision of unconstitutionality of 
the Zetenyi-Takacs law.151
Through the suspension of the border guards’ sentences Judge Tepperwein succeeded to 
induce into the legal discourse what legal scholars like McAdams called a “tantalising 
question.” If the border guards could not invoke the superior order defence, and if at the 
same time they were not fully to blame for their actions, the immediate legal implication 
would be that some “residual responsibility,” which could not be attributed to the 
individual perpetrators, should legally be assigned to other actors. “Who then should also 
be held accountable?” asks McAdams.152
This dramatic question was already on the way to being answered at the time when the
150The ruling o f the Landgericht Berlin ([518] 2 Js 63/90 Kls [57/91]) o f February 5, 1992, pp. 50-52, 
quoted in McAdams, “The Honecker Trial,” p.64.
151 See also supra Section 2.2.7 for the position o f the Hungarian Constitutional Court on the “old- 
Govemment’s responsibility” for not having punished politically motivated crimes.
152McAdams, “The Honecker Trial,” p.64.
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second sentence was passed. On the 12th of May 1992, the Prosecutor General’s office 
in Berlin issued an indictment which charged the ex-President Erich Honecker, together 
with five other members of the GDR National Defence Council,153 with the crime of 
“collective manslaughter.”154 Through the meticulous research done in linking each of the 
defendants to the crimes, the indictment came close to the quality of a detailed “truth 
report” on at least part of the activities of the GDR’s repressive system. In the 
justification for the indictment the prosecution mentioned the “unlimited influence” the 
members of the Council had in determining how the border was run, as well as the 
defendants having been “key figures. . . in everything that happened.”155The charges 
brought against Honecker, Mielke and Stoph were later dropped for reasons of poor 
health, whilst on the 16th of September 1993 the remaining three defendants - Kessler, 
Streletz and Albrecht - were declared guilty of the crimes they were charged with: Kessler 
and Streletz as instigators in border deaths, and Albrecht as an accessory.156
The sentencing of the Communist GDR hierarchy for crimes already punished in 
individuals in which both mens rea and actus reus had been identified, represents an 
important step forward in the discourse of collective responsibility of a political 
bureaucracy. It is true that the focus of the criminal procedures still remain limited to
153The other codefendants were the former secret police chief Erich Mielke, minister-president Willi 
Stoph, defence minister Heinz Kessler, and his chief-of-staff Fritz Streletz, and Suhl district party secretary 
Hans Albrecht. McAdams, “The Honecker Trial,” p. 65.
154Bomeman, p. 68.
155McAdams, “The Honecker Trial,” p. 66.
156McAdams, “The Honecker Trial,” pp. 72-73.
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specific acts such as the shootings by the border guards (or the repression in 1950s in 
Hungary), and that the responsibility is still only cast over individual Communist 
officials, that is to say over a rather restricted circle of “privileged” persons. However, 
the references made to the Communist regime and its partocracy reveal as inescapable 
that tantalising question which the legal discourse finds so difficult to accommodate. Can 
an oppressive and criminal regime be equated to a multitude of individual criminal 
responsibilities? For the time being it seems that Hungary answered “yes” to this 
question, while Germany paused, before giving a more sophisticated, open-ended answer, 
a kind of “to be continued.”
And indeed, the casting of responsibility at the top of the former GDR partocracy 
continued with other cases which also brought new elements into the legal debate.157 
While the first trial of the Communist leadership was based upon the membership of the 
defendants in the GDR National Defence Council, in a follow-up trial which began on 
the 15th of January 1996, only four out of seven defendants were members of this 
body.158 Instead, a much broader criterion of Politburo membership was used. As to the 
legal argumentation of this indictment, there are at least two interesting aspects. Firstly, 
in this trial two out of seven defendants were charged with “active involvement” in the 
decisions related to the border regime, although they were directly responsible only for 
economic policy and cultural affairs. Secondly, the other five defendants were indicted
157The last to be convicted for the border killings was Egon Krenz and two o f his politburo associates. 
Heribert Prantle, “Writing on the Wall for Krenz,” The Guardian. 27 August 1997, p. 14.
l58McAdams (ed.), Transitional Justice and the Rule o f Law in New Democracies fNotre Dame & 
London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), p. 260.
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not for specific acts, but for “having the power to do more to secure the rights to life and 
freedom” of the GDR’s citizens and failing to use that power,159 and for “consciously 
failing to use the possibility to work to achieve a humanization of the border regime,and 
thereby prevent killings and wounding of escapees.”160
The broadening of the charges in order to include other members of the Communist Party 
(SED)161 regime represents a broadening of the notion of mens rea, and it inevitably 
suggests one’s membership in a collectivity as basis for assigning criminal responsibility. 
As to the actus reus, the indictment suggests that a person can be made responsible not 
only for specific violations of the law, but for failing to perform to higher (moral or 
professional) standards. Moreover, as it is understood that one Politburo member could 
not change the policy over the running of the borders only by his words and vote, without 
the agreement of at least the majority of the Politburo members, then the last court 
sentence also implies a collective criminal responsibility of the Politburo as a whole, for 
failing to initiate and agree on a more humane border policy.162
1 CQ
Quoted in McAdams, “Transitional Justice,” pp. 260-261.
160McAdams, “Transitional Justice,” p. 261. Bomeman, p. 68.
161Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands
169 See also infra Chapter Four, note 47 and discussion o f Virginia Held’s position on the responsibility 
of random organisations for ‘failing to organise’. Virginia Held, ‘Can a Random Collection o f Individuals 
Be Morally Responsible?’ In Collective Responsibility, eds. Larry May and Stacey Hoffmann (Savage, 
Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1991).
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2.4 Preliminary Conclusions
On the basis of the examination of these approaches to political justice within the 
criminal law discourse one could draw some preliminary conclusions. Unlike the 
Hungarian case, the German discourse of criminal responsibility made its way upwards, 
from a basic criminal individual responsibility, based on a classic mens rea and actus 
reus, towards a kind of composite - individual and collective - criminal responsibility. 
Therefore, it is possible to argue that the seed which was dropped (accidentally or not) 
by the Judge when suspending the sentence of the first border guards, has turned into a 
fruit which strives to be referred to as ‘legal’. Most probably however, this fruit is the 
result of some sort of cross-pollination between different social discourses: the political, 
moral and legal discourses.163 This fruit, however, should not be contested as long as it 
can still hang from the branch of the legal tree.164
The Hungarian legislative power, and the German judiciary had, of course, to deal with 
different legal problems, using different legal tools. For example, the German search for 
justice did not involve problems derived from the expiry of the period of limitation of the
163Bomeman, p. 139 ff.
164A negotiation between different social discourses is also envisaged by Sunstein when arguing for 
‘legitimate rule revision’ for the situations when, a dramatic change in the context in which the rule 
operates would make the rule-following senseless. “Legitimate rule revision make rules ‘on the books’ 
operate differently than from how they appear. Moreover, rule revision can help promote the democratic 
character of the law, by allowing constraints on the application o f rules to cases where they no longer fit 
with public convictions.” Sunstein, “Problems with Rules,” p. 1008. See also Mortimer R. Kadish, and 
Sanford H. Kadish, Discretion to Disobev: A Study o f Lawful Departures from Legal Rules (Stanford. 
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1973), p. 120.
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prosecuted crimes.165 Beyond these domestic differences it is possible to identify a more 
fundamental one: a difference of attitude and legal ethos of the process of political 
justice.166 The difference of legal ethos manifests in itself a readiness to assess the 
historical context and the parameters of a regime which are hard to ignore. The result is 
the acknowledgement of a certain pervasiveness of substantive aspects. The consideration 
of substantive aspects167 is precisely what a right to revolution demands.168 Acknowl­
edging some of these demands in the legal discourse - accompanied by an appropriate 
procedural framework - would correspond to a ‘legitimate revision of rules’ without 
which justice risks to remain neglected.169
Among the demands for justice through criminal law the presence of the discourse of 
collective responsibility is undeniable, although sometimes very feeble. Several aspects 
have been identified to suggest this: the ‘political reasons’ as the key argument used in 
the Zetenyi-Takacs law, the arguments of the Hungarian Constitutional Court even if not 
reflected in its actual decision, the implied government responsibility for crimes of war
165Starting with the amendment o f the Criminal Law in 1979, murder in Germany was not a subject 
to the statute of limitations. Germany: Act Repealing the Statute o f  Limitations for the Crimes o f Genocide 
and Murder. Sixteenth Act for the Amendment o f Criminal Law (July 16, 1979), Article 1. The statute of  
limitations for murder was originally 20 years. In the case o f Nazi crimes, this period was computed as 
starting from 1949. In the 1960s, the statute of limitations for murder was extended to 30 years. It was 
essential for the prosecution o f Nazi criminals to lift the statute for murder in general, since only a 
prosecution for murder does not present ex post facto  problems.
166Bomeman, p. 139 ff.
167Kadish and Kadish, pp. 219 & 120-127.
168See supra Section 1.5, and also infra Section 6.2.1.
169Sunstein, “Problems with Rules,” p. 1010 ff.
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and crimes against humanity, the pardon of guilty border guards, and the sentencing of 
Politburo members for ‘collective manslaughter’ and especially for ‘consciously failing’ 
to set up a more human policy. All these elements suggest an assessment of the 
Communist regime as a whole from the criminal law perspective. In both cases however, 
the legal discourse struggles, in different ways and with different results, to accommodate 
and ‘tame’ the implications of this perspective.
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, this perspective is not the only one. 
Assessing a repressive regime sometimes takes the legal discourse beyond the boundaries 
of the criminal law. In the following chapter we shall follow one of the representative 
cases - through its relative ‘legislative success’ and coherent debate - of political justice 
performed from outside the criminal law boundaries.
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Chapter Three 
ON SCREENING: POLITICAL JUSTICE THROUGH 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 
AND NON-CRIMINAL LAW
Abstract
The controversial character of a normative concept o f collective responsibility determines that sometimes 
collective responsibility is approached indirectly, through legal means other than the criminal law. One 
such case is debated in this third chapter o f the thesis. This chapter illustrates the non-criminal law 
approach to political justice taken in Eastern Europe. It concentrates on the debate which took place in the 
Czech Republic around the process of screening from office o f the collaborators o f the Secret Police and 
o f Party officials. The emphasis is placed both on the substantive and the procedural difficulties 
encountered when imposing disqualifying conditions from outside the legal discourse. In this respect, the 
chapter highlights the dangers o f contamination between the non-criminal and criminal legal discourse. 
The overall impression retained after looking into this debate, is first o f all o f the inevitability of an implied 
collective political responsibility accompanying a process o f screening, and secondly, o f inherent 
difficulties and inconsistencies accompanying such a process in the absence o f  a coherent, legally 
acknowledged concept o f collective responsibility.
3.1 The Non-Criminal Law Approach to Political Justice in 
the Czech Republic: Historical Background
Although the Czechoslovak1 process of political justice emerged from the same need to 
deal with the communist legacy as the Hungarian one, the former is radically different
1Until January 1993, when the Czech and Slovak Federation decided on devolution by 
referendum, the approach to political justice was common to the two federal republics. After the 
constitutional separation however, the two countries evolved differently with respect to their attitude 
towards the process o f  decommunisation. This paper will refer in detail only to the debate on political 
justice which took place in the Czech Republic, and contains elements stretching beyond the moment of  
secession o f the two republics.
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from the latter, both in terms of the path that led to justice, and in terms of the originality 
in identifying the political and legal actor. Historically, however, Communist 
Czechoslovakia had many points in common with Hungary, especially with regard to the 
way in which the Communist regime developed. The Czechoslovak Communists 
monopolised power in February 1948, after forcing the resignation of a coalition 
government. Many of the political leaders and other personalities in the country were 
arrested and sentenced to death, or to many years in prison. The political trials which 
were organised against the opposition followed the Soviet model. This type of action was 
even taken against the democrat and socialist allies, some of whom were genuinely 
interested in collaborating with the Communist party.2
Beyond this violent political process of cleansing, Czechoslovakia was marked by one 
of the most extended and cruel repressions against civil society as a whole.3 All the 
elements of civil society - cultural, religious and sport associations, boy scouts 
associations, etc. - were all practically annihilated by fierce judicial persecution, purges, 
occupation of premises and confiscation of property. The “arm” through which the 
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (PCT) accomplished this repression was the Secret
2The culmination of these trials was reached in 1950 with trials taking place in different provincial 
cities in order to mark the “national dimension” o f an alleged conspiracy. During 35 such trials, there were 
639 sentences, including 10 death sentences, 48 life sentences, and other prison sentences totalling 7,850 
years. Karel Bartosek, “L’autre Europe victime du communisme: Europe Centrale et du Sud-Est,” in Le 
livre noir du communism: crimes, terreur et repression, ed. St^phane Courtois, et al. (Paris: Editions Robert 
Laffont, 1997), p. 442.
3David Rodnik, The Strangled Democracy: Czechoslovakia 1948-1969 (Lubbock, Tex: Caprock 
Press 1970), pp. 47-58. Fran5ois Feito. Le coup de Prague 1948 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1976), p. 73 ff. 
From 1948 to 1956, over 100,000 political prisoners were sent to prison or labour camps, and thousands 
were killed by government forces.
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Police. The latter was acting under the cover of “action committees” created in February 
1948 after the coup, precisely with the scope of ensuring the PCT’s control over all 
domains of social life.4
In this way the Communists imposed a system of government based on single-party 
control of the entire State apparatus. Moreover, the Secret Police initiated its activity of 
monitoring the citizens in all aspects of life. Arbitrary arrests, especially of dissidents, 
became very common and persisted throughout almost the entire period of the 
Communist regime; the only difference being in the frequency and degree of violence of 
these arrests. As in the other countries in the Eastern bloc, foreign travel was tightly 
restricted and closely monitored. Through different repressive tactics the religion, the 
culture and the media were all politicised or reduced merely to empty institutions.5 From 
the 1960s onwards the tendency towards democracy was, as in the Hungarian case, 
brought to a halt by the hard-line Czechoslovak Communists, supported by the invasion 
of Soviet, East-German, Polish and Bulgarian troops. The military invasion was followed 
by a period of “normalisation,” actually characterised by the repression of the dissident 
movement.6
In the early 1980s though, due to political as well as economic factors, the Czechoslovak
4Bartosek, p. 444.
5Bartosek, pp. 429-436.
6John Francis Nejez Bradley, Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution: A Political Analysis (Boulder: 
East European Monographs. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 72 ff.
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society arrived at a forced compromise, not very different from the Hungarian one, in 
which the citizens benefited to some degree from economic and social freedom in 
exchange for silence regarding political matters.7 This limited change was accompanied 
by the inevitable coagulation of new independent groups campaigning for a wider range 
of economic reforms and democratisation of government. It culminated in November 
1989 with the “Velvet Revolution.” The term “velvet revolution” designated the peaceful 
manner in which the shift from the totalitarian Communist society to a society based on 
democratic principles was made.8
3.2 The Czechoslovak Revolution: From Velvet to the Shirt of Penitence
The population’s relation with the Czechoslovak Communist regime was characterised 
both by political ruthlessness and political sacrifice, fight and compromise, repression 
and buy-out. These extremes explain to a large extent, why the Velvet Revolution brought 
with it two opposing sets of expectations. On the one hand, the extent and the atrocity of 
the crimes committed by the regime, and the continuous and systematic nature of the 
violations of the basic human rights of the Czechoslovak citizens nourished the legitimate 
expectations for justice concerning the individuals who committed crimes, as well as the
7Jan Urban, “Keeping Silent about Silence,” in Truth and Justice: The Delicate Balance. Central 
European University, Institute for Constitutional and Legislative Policy, Working Paper no.l (1993), pp. 
86-87.
8Bemard Wheaton and Zdenek Kavan, The Velvet Revolution: Czechoslovakia. 1988-1991 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 12.
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system which demanded, ordered and facilitated those crimes. On the other hand, the 
compromise with the regime into which the Czechoslovak population was inevitably 
caught up, prompted part of the society to hold the view that the cohabitation with the 
totalitarian regime had, to a certain extent, tainted everyone. Because of this 
“contamination,” it was argued, the process of justice should not reach beyond the limits 
of a strictly contained use of the criminal law.9 In the debate on political justice, however, 
these limits of responsibility slowly eroded. As in the case of the German border killings, 
the question of responsibility and guilt pushed these limits of responsibility, forcing the 
legal reasoning to reach almost beyond its boundaries.
The expression of the generalised moral guilt was given by the President and former 
dissident Vaclav Havel, in a speech given on the New Year’s Day of 1990, in which he 
spoke about the “decayed moral environment” to which everyone had participated.10 Soon 
though it was discovered that the need for a distinction between this all-enhancing moral 
responsibility and a legal and political responsibility was far too great to ignore. President 
Havel himself soon reached a more balanced position between his personal views and 
inclinations towards forgiveness and reconciliation, and the society’s need for justice.11
9Urban, pp. 92-93.
10”When I speak about a decayed moral environment... I mean all o f us, because all o f us became 
accustomed to the totalitarian system, accepted it as an unalterable fact, and thereby kept it running... None 
o f us is merely a victim o f it, because all o f us helped to create it together... We cannot lay all the blame 
on those who ruled us before, not only because this would not be true but also because it could detract 
from the responsibility each o f us now faces - the responsibility to act on our own initiative, freely, 
sensibly, and quickly.” Lawrence Weschler, “The Velvet Purge: The Trials o f  Jan Kavan,” The New 
Yorker 68, no. 35 (19 October 1992): 78-79.
n ,Tt is important to find the right balance, the right approach, one that would be human and 
civilized, but would not try to escape from the past. We have to try to face our own past, to name it, to 
draw conclusions from it, and to bring it before the bar o f justice. Yet we must do this honestly, and with
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Along with a large part of the Czechoslovak society, President Havel seemed to realise 
that the magnanimous position on the issues of political justice did not actually address 
directly the abuses of power and the crimes inherited from the totalitarian regime.
By not addressing the abuses of power society could not solve them. Moreover, society 
could not avoid similar abuses, and it could not prevent their consequences from 
persisting in the emerging democratic societies. This failure to act is what the people of 
Czechoslovakia called the “unfinished revolution,” suggesting by this a logical link 
between the revolutionary process itself and the process of political justice. “I personally 
am inclined” says President Havel, “to let this matter rest. I have a considerable distance 
toward all this because I have come to know the machinery [of the police state] and how 
it can destroy people... I have no need to punish anyone for having acted badly. Yet as 
president, I must bear in mind that society needs some kind of public action in this regard 
because otherwise it would feel that the revolution remains unfinished.”12
The consequence of these strong sentiments, was that in spite of its velvet character the 
revolution must be finished with an attempt to reinstate social justice. This meant that the 
Czechoslovak society chose the bold path of combining criminal law justice with justice 
which could be brought by a systematic eradication of the formal and informal structures
caution, generosity, and imagination. There should be a place for forgiveness wherever there is confession 
o f guilt and repentance...Our society has a great need to face that past, to get rid o f  the people who had 
terrorized the nation and conspicuously violated human rights, to remove them from the positions that they 
are still holding.” Adam Michnik and Vaclav Havel, “Confronting the Past: Justice or Revenge?” Journal 
of Democracy 4, no. 1 (January 1993): 22.
12Michnik and Havel, pp. 21-22.
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of Communist power. Issues such as the legitimacy and the empty legality on which the 
Communist police state was based, were confronted and debated in order to search not 
for an alternative but for a complement to the hard way to justice through criminal law. 
In this search for social justice, it appeared necessary to establish a process of screening 
or purging of the most active actors of the Communist regime who had been employed 
in key state institutions. Along with the prosecution of the crimes and atrocities of the 
Communist regime, the screening of society’s structures of power was seen as an integral 
part of the process of decommunisation and was required for reinstating justice and 
democracy.13
A series of key questions need to be answered by a society which chooses to follow the 
path towards justice and democracy, and the Czechoslovak society was no exception to 
this.14 First, a valid purpose and justification for a process of revolutionary cleansing had 
to be established and agreed upon. These questions have not only moral or political 
implications, but also legal ones. As it was seen in the case of Hungary and Germany, the 
biggest difficulty of all in the debate on political justice is that in the complex historical 
circumstances following a totalitarian rule, the antagonism between moral justice and 
legality is so great that they both become “imperative.” From a formal position, strictly 
within the boundaries of the legal discourse, moral justice seems unattainable, and vice-
11On similar imperatives of justice and democracy after the Nazi regime in Germany see John H.
Hertz, “Denazification and Related Policies,” in From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coning with the 
Legacies o f Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism, ed. John H. Hertz (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982), 
p. 19.
14Herman Schwartz, “Lustration in Eastern Europe,” Parker School o f East European Law 1, no. 
2(1994): 141-171.
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versa, a moral position towards serious crimes and injustice of the Communist regime 
appears as irreconcilable with the (Communist) legality. Therefore, a “bias” towards one 
of the two - justice or legality - becomes inevitable whatever rational choice might be 
made.15
To justify a screening process, two key arguments are usually put forward, one is based 
on the idea of retribution, the other is developed from the need for protective measures 
for the emerging post-Communist democracies.16 Firstly, within the retributive discourse 
it is argued that the sense of justice should not be damaged by allowing the Communist 
abusers to retain positions of power and privilege while the victims of the regime have 
to struggle through the period of economic transition from an economy ruined by the 
Communist rule.17 This argument centres around the privileges of the Communist 
bureaucracy. The promoters of this argument argue that, due to the persistence of the old 
structures, it is the ordinary citizen who suffers political discrimination. A substantive 
principle of equal opportunity, it is argued, demands that Communist party bureaucrats, 
former agents of Secret Police, and the secret collaborators, be temporarily removed from 
their privileged positions, in order to gradually eliminate the long-standing discriminatory 
measures against the non-party masses. Secondly, some of the promoters of the screening
15For the necessity o f a bias in revolutionary circumstances see supra Section 1.5.
16Maria Los, “Lustration and Truth Claims: Unfinished Revolutions in Central Europe,” Law and 
Social Inquiry 20. no. 1 (Winter 1995): 143.
17Michael Kraus, “Settling Accounts: Post Communist Czechoslovakia,” Revised version o f paper 
delivered at 1992 Annual Meeting o f the American Political Science Association, The Palmer House 
Hilton (September 3-6, 1992), in Country Studies, vol. 2 o f Transitional Justice: How Emerging 
Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, ed. Neil J. Kritz (Washington D.C.: United States Institute 
o f Peace Press, 1995), pp. 548-549.
131
Chapter Three: On Screening 
process argue that the newly emerging democracies could be endangered by potential 
sabotage committed by persons loyal to the Communist regime, or by the possibility that 
persons linked to the Communist regime might be blackmailed into sabotage by those 
with knowledge about their tainted past.18
These justifications have been criticised, and strong arguments have been brought against 
the process of decommunisation. The danger of blackmail for instance, was used again 
as an argument, but this time against the decommunisation process. Since the main source 
of information for a process of decommunisation appeared to be the files of the 
Communist Secret Police, many of the opponents of the process of screening are usually 
concerned with leaks and misuse of those files.19 Another concern which appears often 
is that dealing with large numbers of persons by categories and not individually, and 
having as unique or at least main source of information the Secret Police archives, would 
inevitably bring unfair discrimination among those included in the same category but who 
might not be equally culpable or equally innocent.20 For instance, dealing collectively 
with categories such as collaborators with the Secret Police, or the Communist party 
hierarchy, cannot account for relevant differences among the members of those 
categories. Collaboration could have been agreed upon willingly or under pressure, or
18Klaus Offe, “Disqualification, Retribution, Restitution: Dilemmas o f Justice in Post-Communist 
Transitions,” Journal o f Political Philosophy 1, no. 1 (March 1993): 17. Andrzej Rzeplinski, “A Lesser 
Evil?” East European Constitutional Review 1, no. 3 (1992): 33-35.
19Ethan Klingsberg, “The Triumph o f the Therapeutic: The Quest to Cure Eastern Europe 
Through Secret Police Files,” in Truth and Justice: The Delicate Balance. Central European University, 
Institute for Constitutional and Legislative Policy, Working Paper no.l (1993), pp. 8-10.
20John Herz, ed., From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies o f Authoritarianism 
and Totalitarianism (Westport Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), pp. 17-20. Rzeplinski, p.34.
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even under duress. These differences in the reasons for collaborating, as well as 
differences in the level of commitment to the Communist regime, and in the actual harm 
which has been caused, would remain unaccounted for. Wherever responsibility is 
entailed - and, it is argued, being screened inevitably suggests that - mitigating 
circumstances have to be considered. This could not be done by dealing with people in 
categories.
Another argument used against screening belongs to the economic discourse. This 
argument expresses the concern that the economic and social resources of the societies 
in full economic transition would be affected by a screening process. A decommunisation 
process can prove to be demanding upon the financial resources of a country in economic 
transition. Besides, it is argued that a screening process would deplete the country of 
inherently scarce managerial, administrative, and professional talents.21
The chief argument against decommunisation, not least because it entailed important 
legal implications, was the collective dimension of such a process. Insofar as the 
screening process is based entirely on a person’s association with an at-the-time-legal 
political organisation, such as the Communist party, or with an equally legal state 
institution, such as the Communist Secret Police, the process of decommunisation, it was 
said, “smacks of collective responsibility and guilt by association.22 As we might
21Victor Yasmann, “Legislation on Screening and State Security in Russia,” RFE/RL Research 
Report 2, no. 32 (1993): 11-16.
22Herman Schwartz, “Lustration in Eastern Europe,” Parker School o f East European Law 1, no. 
2 (1994): 149.
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remember, a similar position made the first of Fuller’s Deputies advise against political 
justice actions, claiming that there were only ideological differences between the Purple 
Shirt regime and the following democratic regime.23
This latter argument against screening leads to another question which should be 
answered by a society willing to go ahead with a process of screening. This other question 
concerns the selection of offices and positions which are to be affected by screening.24 A 
process of screening could apply to a large number of offices and positions in both 
governmental and non-governmental bodies, or can apply to just a particular activity. Of 
course, in either case, the selection of offices and positions has to be coherent with the 
declared scope of the process of screening. For instance, if the declared scope of a 
screening process is the protection of the emerging democracy against corruptible ex- 
Communists, it would seem exaggerated to screen wide categories of Secret Police 
collaborators, or whoever was employed in the Communist institutions, regardless 
whether the person was a director or a mere secretary in that institution.
Another important aspect is that the wider the process of screening is, the more likely it 
is that the logistical difficulties in using the courts for such a process, and the general 
pressure on human and financial resources of the society, will incline the balance towards 
dealing with this issue at a collective level, rather than on an individual basis. This links 
up with the third question, the question concerning who is to be disqualified, and in what
23See supra Section 1.5.
24Schwartz, p. 153.
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manner. The answer to this question and to the issues implied by it - how long should the 
disqualification apply for, should there be any extenuating circumstances, etc. - has again 
to be coherent with the justification given for the screening process. Last but not least, 
the screening procedures should prove to be both efficient and fair.
In the screening attempts following the totalitarian Communist regime the answers to all 
these questions refer in one way or another to the most important instrument of a 
Communist state, the Secret Police. The justification of the screening processes always 
refers back to the repressive and undemocratic means this “arm” of the Communist state 
used against any democratic movement.25 Moreover, given the close relationship between 
the Communist regimes and their repressive machines, most of the offices and positions 
affected by screening are presumably related in some way to the Secret Policy. This 
aspect inevitably influences the procedures used in the process of screening, not least 
through the fact that, more often than not, Secret Police files are used as a primary, or 
even as a single source of information and evidence concerning the persons to be 
screened.26
Thus, the process of decommunisation inevitably introduced into the discussion the role 
of the Communist Secret Police and the legacy of its files as the main source of 
information on the Communist government’s activities, as well as information about its 
thousands of agents, informers, and collaborators. The archives of the Secret Police and
25Yasmann, pp. 13-14.
26Klingsberg, “The Triumph o f the Therapeutic,” p. 14.
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its activities became to a large extent part of the justification, and at the same time a 
source of information, for the process of screening. The Communist Secret Police as an 
institution, became both the expression of the repressive nature of the Communist regime, 
and the detainer of the archival legacy which was to be used for proving this repressive 
nature.
The debate on the use of the Communist secret archives took place, with differing 
intensity, in all post-Communist societies. Even in countries which, like Hungary, 
excluded the screening process from the spectrum of justice measures, the issue of the 
Secret Police archives had to be considered.27 Therefore, the debate on the Secret Police 
files became particularly important in shaping the process of political justice taking place 
inside, and more especially outside the criminal law discourse. The process of 
decommunisation being undeniably linked to the issue of Secret Police, it becomes 
necessary to look into this issue in order to acquire a better understanding of the screening 
process initiated in the Czechoslovak society.
77The Hungarian parliament did pass some screening legislation in 1994. Its application, however, 
was sparse. Edith Oltay, “Hungary's Screening Law.” RFE/RL Research Report 3. no. 15 (15 April 1994): 
13-15. Halmai and Scheppele, pp. 157-158. Also, “Hungary: Law on Background Checks To Be 
Conducted on Individuals Holding Certain Important Positions. Law No. 23 (March 8, 1994),” in Laws. 
Rulings, and Reports, vol. 3 o f Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former 
Regimes, ed. Neil J. Kritz (Washington D.C.: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 1995), pp. 418-425.
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3.3 The Use and Abuse of the Secret Police Files in the Process of 
Political Justice
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights states that “[no] one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to 
the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” Similar provisions are 
included in the European Convention on Human Rights,28 as well as in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.29 Either by ratifying these conventions, or by 
inescapable political awareness of the rights spelt out through these declarations, the 
Eastern European governments have, both before and after 1989, been under the duty to 
provide conditions for the fulfilment of these rights.
When the right to privacy and respect of dignity is mentioned, one almost automatically 
thinks of the all-encompassing Secret Police activities in Eastern Europe. The
28European Convention on Human Rights (1950). Article 8, para. (1) “Everyone has the right to 
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. (2) There shall be no interference 
by a public authority with the exercise o f this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society in the interest o f national security, public safety or the economic well­
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection o f health or morals, or for 
the protection o f the rights and freedoms o f others.” Convention for the Protection o f Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention). U.K.T.S. 71; 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Cmd.8969, E.T.S. 5, 
entered into force  the 3rd o f September 1953.
9QArticle 17, para. (1) o f the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights : “No one shall 
be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor 
to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.” Para. (2): “Everyone has the right to the protection of  
the law against such interference or attacks.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. (1976) 
G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 
171.
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implications of the human rights provisions, however, are far from being one-sided. On 
the one hand, these provisions are invoked for proving the injustice of a political regime 
which brought the activity of spying on its own citizens to the highest level. On the other 
hand though, due to the complexity of the situation, the same human rights provisions are 
also invoked while trying to prevent the use of the Secret Police files by the post- 
Communist regimes, in the process of political justice. The right of people who have been 
spied upon to have access to information gathered about them, and the right of informers 
to the protection of their private life which has been linked to Secret Police activities 
become sources of competing expectations in the process of justice.
The use of the Secret Police files, either as a source of information in criminal 
prosecutions, or as a starting point for identifying a political agent as the object of a 
collective political responsibility, is often seen as an integral part of the process of 
establishing an authoritative interpretation of history.30 This process though is more 
difficult than one might have thought when dreaming of justice and freedom of 
information while under the Communist regime, especially if one wants to achieve a 
(legal) consensus over the Communist past.
A general difficulty in this process of establishing an authoritative interpretation of 
history appears to be the fact that, in political matters, the recent past appears always 
more ambiguous and elusive to historical interpretation than the more remote past, in 
spite of an apparent availability of sources of documentation. Thinking back to
30Kis, “What Shall We Do,” p. 8 ff.
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Kirchheimer’s “historical risk” in undertaking a process of political justice,31 it could be 
argued that history becomes clearer when the dust lies thickly over the past. In Eastern 
Europe, a direct consequence of the apparent ambiguity and elusiveness of the recent 
Communist past is the fact that different sections of society arise with competing claims. 
This means that society as a whole is divided over the social and legal authoritative 
interpretation of the Communist period, and therefore over the usefulness and use of the 
Secret Police archives.
The controversy around the use of the Secret Police files for the purpose of justice could 
be polarised around two main lines of the debate, one dystopian and one affirmative.32 
The dystopian part of the debate points to the Communist archives as a source for 
creating even more injustice, while the affirmative arguments see the use of the archives 
as indispensable to a genuine approach to justice. On the one hand, the information 
detained in the files is presented as “knowledge that kills.” On the other hand, there is an 
emphasis on the “vital truth” about the Communist past which society should know 
about, and which lies hidden in the files.33 The argument of the “poisonous truth,” for 
instance, belongs to the first category, to the “knowledge that kills” type of argument. It 
starts from a rather paternalistic assumption that society may not be able to handle the 
truth about the extent and the depth of the infiltration by the Secret Police. In this sense,
31 See Kirchheimer, supra Chapter One, note 74.
32This terminology belongs to Maria Los. See Los, “Lustration and Truth Claims,” pp. 125 & 143.
33This classification follows Los’ discussion on the pros and cons o f a screening process based 
on information provided by the Secret Police archives. Many o f the arguments analysed by Los relate to 
the society’s (in)capacity to handle the truth. Los, “Lustration and Truth Claims,” pp. 125-154.
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some view the claims for using the Secret Police files in a screening process as part of the 
negative totalitarian legacy. If this legacy is not compounded in time, it is argued, it risks 
to perpetuate the deep social atomism so much encouraged by the Communist regimes 
themselves.34
Another position, similar to the latter one, conceives the information accumulated in the 
files as deadly poison for society. The eventual truth contained in the Secret Police files 
is presented sometimes as a “corrupted truth,” or more precisely a “corruptible” truth, 
easily manipulated for political purposes. Going almost to the extreme of its logical 
consistency, some critics have also put forward the idea of “fabricated truth” in which the 
files are presented as the ultimate revenge of the totalitarian regimes. From this 
perspective, the credibility of the files should be considered vitiated from the start, due 
to the essence of the system which created them: a system based on lies.35
The use of the Secret Police files has also been opposed from a strictly practical point of 
view. The overturning of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe was an incredibly
340n  the political enemy endlessly and artificially generated within the Communist societies see 
Claude Lefort, Un homme en trop: reflexions sur “L’archipel du Goulag” (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1986), 
p. 15.
35Arthur Eisenberg, “Truth and Justice: The Delicate Balance: Reflections on a Conference Held 
at the Central European University, Budapest, Hungary,” in Truth and Justice: The Delicate Balance. 
Central European University, Institute for Constitutional and Legislative Policy, Working Paper no.l 
(1993), pp. 148-149. Also, Andrzej Paczkowski, “Notes on the Problem o f Establishing the Material Truth 
about the Network o f Agents,” Truth and Justice: The Delicate Balance. Central European University, 
Institute for Constitutional and Legislative Policy, Working Paper no.l (1993), p. 98.
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rapid process which swept over half a continent.36 At the institutional level though, the 
whole process was much slower and eclectic. Many of the Communist intelligence 
agencies had enough warning or “premonitions” which allowed them to conceal the most 
compromising material. Secret Police files concerning important key events of 
Communist history, as well as the ones of the most important collaborators, have 
allegedly been destroyed or “sent into exile.”37 This tampering with the files is claimed 
to have left the dark map of collaboration incomplete and unusable for the process of 
political justice.38
As to the remaining files, many of them allegedly contained inaccurate information 
included in order to fulfill an imposed recruitment plan, or for special rewards.39 
Anecdotal stories exist where Secret Police officers were creating files of collaboration 
with names of persons collected from the city's graveyard.40 Though maybe true in some
36Recalling Marx’s image, Timothy Garton Ash suggests the rapidity o f the Eastern European 
changes by speaking about a sudden going into labour o f “an old world... pregnant with the new.” Timothy 
Garton Ash, We the People: The Revolution o f ‘89 Witnessed in Warsaw. Budapest. Berlin and Prague 
(Cambridge: Granta Books, 1990), p. 68.
37Dan De Luce, “Destroyed StB Files,” Prague Post. 31 March - 6 April 1992, p. 1.
38Ruti Teitel, “Documentation o f Prior Regimes and Individual Rights,” in Truth and Justice: The 
Delicate Balance. Central European University, Institute for Constitutional and Legislative Policy, 
Working Paper no.l (1993), p. 5 ff.
39Due to the economic aspect of supervising a whole nation, both the directing officers in charge 
o f  recruiting informers, and her/his direct superior were equally interested in the “doctoring o f the 
statistical records” so that they could receive greater operational funding. Paczkowski, p. 100. Rzeplinski, 
p. 33.
40The Secret Police archival inheritance could be compared with Chichikov’s wealth o f serfs, 
from Nikolay Gogol’s famous novel “Dead Souls.” Collegiate Councilor P&vel Ivanovich Chichikov, an 
ambitious, shrewd, and unscrupulous adventurer, goes from place to place, buying, stealing, and wheedling 
from their owners the titles to serfs whose names appeared on the preceding census lists but who had since 
died and were, accordingly, called “dead souls.” With this “property” as security Chichikov plans to raise 
loans with which to buy an estate with “live souls.”
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cases, the tendency to generalise these practices can also be an attempt to justify, without 
embarrassment, the high figures of collaboration.41 Due to these claims of tampering with 
the files, some put in question the latter’s reliability and usefulness for a legal approach 
to political justice. In this sense, the impossibility of constructing a coherent picture of 
the past by using only the Secret Police files is underlined. Related to the same point, the 
adepts of the “all or nothing” approach to justice underline the injustice of orientating the 
legislation on those agents who were unlucky enough to have their files preserved while 
the most important collaborators have cleared their tracks.
Last but not least, the attempt at using the Secret Police files as a source for a normative 
overview of the Communist past is hindered by the ambiguity of the act of collaboration 
itself.42 This is evident particularly when analysing exclusively the discrete instances of 
this process, ignoring the significance of the institutionalised mechanisms of 
collaboration. For instance, there have been cases in which the same person was, at 
different moments in time, a collaborator and then a dissident or vice-versa. When one 
also takes into consideration the high demand for compliance during at least some periods 
of the Communist regimes, the potential of the Secret Police files to offer legally and 
morally useful information becomes even more uncertain. Given the sheer extent of a 
process of decommunisation, an almost inevitable mechanical processing of the Secret
41Tina Rosenberg, The Haunted Land: Facing Europe’s Ghosts After Communism (London: 
Vintage, 1995), pp. 43-66. According to the StB register there are approximately 140,000 names o f so- 
called StB collaborators. Half o f these, 70,000, are registered as “candidates for collaboration.” Jirina 
Siklova, “Lustration or the Czech Way o f Screening,” East European Constitutional Review 5, no. 1 
(Winter 1996): 58.
42Klingsberg, “The Triumph of the Therapeutic,” p. 22.
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Police files in the process of screening makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to draw 
exculpating distinctions between “camouflage compliance” and compliance under a 
considerable threat on the one hand, and “wrongful collaboration” on the other hand.43
There have also been cases in which the Secret Police files identified persons, even 
dissidents, as collaborators, and these persons challenged the information contained in 
the files, and proved their innocence in court.44 Situations like this, it was said, showed 
the unreliability of the Secret Police archives in establishing responsibility at either 
individual or collective levels. Therefore, it is claimed that the information contained in 
the Communist archives would only offer society a “surrogate truth,” hiding the reality 
of the “tacit collaboration” of the entire society.45 This opinion throws a blanket of moral 
guilt over society in general, and uses the moral responsibility based on this guilt as an 
argument against the discussion of any other type of responsibility, including the one 
based on active collaboration with the Secret Police. From this perspective, a screening 
process aimed at the collaborators of the Communist regime appears as a mere search for 
a scape goat.46
43”To varying degrees, depending on the time period and the region, a Communist state demands 
of outward compliance were so great, that the only significant space left for subversion was in one's heart - 
a space not readily subject to documentation.” Klingsberg, “The Triumph o f the Therapeutic,” pp. 23-24.
44Jan Kavan, the Czech dissident in exile, is only one such example. For details, see Siklova, p. 
60. Lawrence Weschler, “The Velvet Purge,” pp. 78-79. Also, an important part o f Tina Rosenberg’s 
“Haunted Land” emphasises the ambiguity o f political moral attitudes. Rosenberg, The Haunted Land.
45Urban, pp. 86. Also, Siklova.
46”They [the politicians o f the first post-totalitarian generation]” writes the Czech dissident Jan 
Urban “seem more to be in need o f inexpensive substitutes and a sacrificial lamb for the public - not o f  
the harsh and untasty truth about all and for all. Because the truth about dictatorship always and inevitably 
stinks. We all got smelly - the victims in the same way as the rulers and the silent population. The 
dissidents in the same way as the ‘StBeasts.’” Urban, p. 87. This position resembles what Jaspers would
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So much for the “knowledge that kills” side of the debate on the Secret Police archives. 
On the other hand, the positive arguments, portraying these archives as the repository of 
a “vital truth,” tuned the process of political justice both prospectively and 
retrospectively.47 In this respect, the “historical truth” argument stresses the importance 
of an authoritative interpretation of the Communist past - sanctioned eventually by law - 
as the best way of avoiding the repetition of the same mistakes and injustices. According 
to this argument, the information gathered by the Secret Police is invaluable for 
establishing this authoritative historical truth. In spite of what is lacking in the files and 
the nature of the source of this information, it is claimed that it is still possible to extract 
from these files invaluable information about the violations of human rights which 
occurred under the Communist regime.
Another affirmative argument often found in the debate on political justice is the 
“minimal justice” argument. This opinion states that one should do what one can to bring 
justice to the victims of the Communist regime, without being too troubled by the thought 
that absolute justice is unattainable. According to this opinion, the important thing is not 
to reward “the villains” by wiping their records clean simply because they are difficult 
to read.48
call a “dodging into a generality.” Karl Jaspers, “Differentiation o f German Guilt,” in Guilt and Shame. 
ed. Herbert Morris (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1971), p. 53.
47L o s , “Lustration and Truth Claims,” p. 143 f f .
48Paczkowski, p. 96 ff.
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Last but not least, the opening of the Secret Police files and their use in the process of 
decanting off the “social impurities” is supported from a more practical position of “state 
security.” According to this argument, office holders with a past as collaborators could 
easily be blackmailed by forces following illegal private or political interests. Also, the 
collaborators could themselves represent a direct danger to a fragile democracy through 
their potential to reactivate repressive anti-democratic structures. These arguments of 
state security interests amount to little more than a blame-free conflict of interest. The 
only difference would be that while the traditional concept of the conflict of interest 
refers to two conflicting loyalties located within the same person, the screening based on 
“state security” arguments refers to two conflicting bodies of knowledge located in one 
person: the knowledge of totalitarian ruling and the knowledge of respect for human 
rights and democracy towards which the society would aim.49 In the discourse of “state 
security” this incompatibility is seen as creating a real danger for an emerging democracy. 
This danger, it is argued, justifies screening procedures as temporary administrative 
restrictions.
Looking at all the social factors implicated in the discourse on justice in post-Communist 
Eastern Europe, and considering both dystopian and affirmative arguments on the use of 
the Secret Police files, some authors concluded that procedural and legal-institutional 
issues occupy a marginal place in the debate.50 This is true only apparently though, and
49George Ross, “Crime and Punishment,” in Truth and Justice: The Delicate Balance. Central 
European University, Institute for Constitutional and Legislative Policy, Working Paper no.l (1993), p. 
120.
50L o s , “Lustration and Truth Claims,” pp. 154-155.
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only because the general discourse employed by the media and the political speeches 
often appear to ignore the legal nature of the very arguments they use. The arguments 
against application of sanctions based on people’s status (of Secret Police collaborator, 
for instance) and not on their actions, are of legal and not moral or political origin. The 
debate on the shift of the burden of proof onto the persons accused of collaboration, and 
the debate on the alteration of the presumption of innocence of the same persons, are 
based within the legal discourse as well. This is also true concerning the discussions on 
the concept of collective responsibility, retroactivity, extra-judicial procedures, which are 
all inherently legal in nature, and which dominate the debate on the process of justice in 
Eastern Europe. Taking into account all these legal issues, it appears difficult to argue 
consistently that procedural and legal-institutional issues occupy only a marginal place 
in the debate on post-Communist justice.
Besides these general legal aspects of a process of political justice, beginning at the end 
of 1989, the law has been confronted with an acute dilemma related directly to the 
regulative approach to the Secret Police files.51 Due to the lack of social and political 
consensus over the Communist past, the legislature was unable to provide a framework 
in which the Secret Police files could be used, both as a source for criminal prosecutions, 
and for a broader debate on the responsibility of the Communist regime.52 At the same 
time, it was too late to destroy or effectively seal the state security archives, as was
51 Edith Oltay, “Intelligence Services Burdened by Communist Legacy,” Radio Free Europe 
Report on Eastern Europe 2. no. 19 (10 May 1991): 14.
52Teitel, “Documentation o f Prior Regimes,” p. 6.
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proposed by some.53 A large amount of these archives were already in circulation through 
different informal channels.54 It is true that, from a legal point of view, and in accordance 
with the Communist regulations, the access to the Secret Police files might be restricted, 
or even totally denied. However, soon after the political changes had started in Eastern 
Europe, information contained in these files was leaked out and was used extensively in 
the process of settling political accounts.55 It was thus, a legal task to provide a structure 
through which this kind of misuse could be prevented, or at least limited. The use of the 
files also had to be regulated so that their use for purely political ends was prevented as 
much as possible.56
The question of the access to these Secret Police files had to be answered on a legal 
ground. At the same time, the regulator could not ignore totally the reality of the 
expectation for substantive justice in the post-Communist societies. When the 
Communist regimes in Eastern Europe were overthrown in the years 1989-1990, the 
tradition of total secrecy within those regimes was replaced by the highest social 
expectations for total openness and disclosure regarding these Secret Police files. On the
53Mary Albon, “Truth and Justice: The Delicate Balance. Raporteur's Report,” in Truth and 
Justice: The Delicate Balance. Central European University, Institute for Constitutional and Legislative 
Policy, Working Paper no.l (1993), pp. 34-35.
54Taken by the former security agents, as originals or photocopies; bought on the black market 
by the mass media; etc. In a now, market oriented society, it proves difficult, if  not impossible, to take out 
of the transactions a highly required commodity such as these files. Mihai Sturdza, “The Files o f the State 
Security Police.” RFE/RL Research Report 2. no. 37 (13 September 1991): 22-31.
55Dan Ionescu, “Romania’s Public War over Secret Police Files,” RFE/RL Research Report. 1,
no. 29 (17 July 1992): 9-15.
56Sturdza, pp. 26-27.
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one hand, in those cases in which attempts to impose restrictions have followed Western 
standards, they have been difficult to apply because of the high social expectations for 
absolute freedom and transparency in the public affairs. On the other hand, on political 
grounds, these expectations have been translated into ideological criticism. The 
legislature sometimes was accused of taking sides, of trying to hinder the dissemination 
of truth in society. This state of affairs as a whole, made it very difficult to achieve 
consistency and justice in dealing with the Communist archives, especially in the process 
of screening.
The expectations for disclosure and absolute transparency, together with the 
unavoidability of political criticism of whatever solution the legislator might find 
concerning the access and use of the Secret Police files, illustrate the controversial role 
played by these files not only in the quest for an authoritative interpretation of history, but 
also in the attempt to give a legal answer to the expectations for justice. Since the 
approach to justice has been largely via these contentious files, the failure to attain a 
consensus over the Communist history had severe implications for the successful 
emergence of an uncontroversial process of political justice. This failure to attain a 
consensus was to a large extent due to a unilateral approach to the Secret Police. An 
analysis of this institution, concentrating exclusively on individual aspects of 
collaboration, was bound, as mentioned earlier, to be controversial; not least because of 
the various factors which had to be considered concerning each individual collaborator.
On the contrary, an institutional approach to the Secret Police, and implicitly to its
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archives, emphasising the nature of the institution itself, would have revealed the nature 
of the regime, and the extent to which it contributed to the systematic violation of human 
rights. Acknowledging the institutionalisation of collaboration as a means of oppression 
constitutes an important condition for a meaningful process of political justice. 
Nonetheless, this perspective has generally been discarded, and preference has been given 
to the methodological analysis of the Secret Police operations, e.g. the intelligence 
gathering, and to the actual by-product of the Secret Police mechanism, the network of 
secret agents and collaborators.
The consequence of this methodological analysis was two-fold. On the one hand, this 
perspective justifiably discredited the blind trust in the accuracy of the files, preventing 
their mechanical use against discrete individuals through administrative screening 
procedures. On the other hand, the focus on the institutional methodology and the 
preoccupation with only individual cases, meant that the essence of the Secret Police as 
such, that is as a repressive institution, was forgotten or neglected. By failing to take into 
consideration the repressive nature of the Secret Police, an important element of the 
institutional evaluation of the Communist regime was lost.
This unilateral perspective also institutionalised the opinion that the Communist past was 
totally ambiguous, with everybody at least morally if not legally guilty. This approach 
risked blurring completely the distinction between correct and incorrect (or even 
criminal) political behaviour, and ignored the seriousness and the systematic character 
of the human rights violations in Eastern Europe. The systematic nature of the human
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rights violations and the extent to which these violations took place in all Communist
societies could put into question the attribution of responsibility to discrete individuals
alone.
From the point of view of the nature of the Secret Police, and implicitly of the 
Communist regime itself, the Czechoslovak process of political justice appears as one in 
which the Secret Police was at the same time both rejected and accepted as an important 
element in the evaluation of the Communist regime. As we shall see in the following 
pages, the Czechoslovak search for justice - through its different stages and approaches - 
will appear to combine the individualistic approach to the Communist archives with the 
institutional approach. This latter approach takes into consideration the nature of the 
pivotal institutions of a totalitarian regime. However, as it will become evident in the 
following pages, the Czechoslovak approach to decommunisation has been far from 
smooth and uncontroversial, in spite of all its aspirations of fairness and justice.
3.4 The Screening Process in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia
3.4.1 The First Round of Screening in Czechoslovakia
On the 9th of January 1991, the Federal Assembly of Czechoslovakia adopted the Bill of 
Fundamental Rights and Liberties (hereafter referred to as the Bill of Rights), an act 
which included the basic human, civil and political rights already affirmed in
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international conventions.57 The adoption of the Bill of Rights was seen as an important 
step towards the drafting of new federal and republican constitutions. Among the general 
provisions it was stated that all people are free and have equal rights and dignity; that all 
other constitutional laws, as well as regular laws and their interpretation, must not 
contravene the Bill.
As for human and political rights, the Bill of Rights reiterated provisions contained in 
international agreements already ratified by Czechoslovakia at that time, including the 
right of any person to have his name, honour and dignity protected, the right to found and 
be a member of political parties, the right to participate in government either directly or 
through being elected as a representative, and the right to equal application of the 
electoral law to all citizens.
Concerning the access to courts and legal protection, the bill included the right to ask the 
courts or some other state body to protect one's rights, the right to refuse giving self- 
incriminating evidence, and the right to legal assistance. Courts were declared the correct 
forum to decide whether somebody was guilty of an offence, and the courts could 
accordingly impose punishment. Furthermore, the Bill of Rights granted any accused the 
right to a defence attorney.58
57Jiri Pehe, “Bill o f Fundamental Rights and Liberties Adopted,” RFE/RL Research Report 2. no.
4 (27 January, 1991): 1-4.
58Pehe, “Bill of Rights,” p. 3.
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On the 11th of January 1991, only two days after passing the Bill of Rights, the same 
Federal Assembly voted for a resolution calling for the screening of all Members of the 
Parliament and Federal Government. The resolution will be referred to as the resolution 
of the 11th of January. The purpose of this screening procedure, called for by the 
resolution of the 11th of January, was to determine whether any of the representatives, 
ministers, their deputies, employees of the prime minister’s office or of the Federal 
Assembly were registered as collaborators in the Czechoslovak State Secret Police (StB) 
files.59 A parliamentary commission was responsible for vetting the deputies, and was in 
charge of the enquiries concerning the events of the November 1989 Velvet Revolution. 
After identifying the StB agents and collaborators, the commission also had to inform 
those who were positively identified as having been agents and collaborators of the StB, 
about the results of the investigation. If, within fifteen days of notification, the identified 
persons failed to voluntarily relinquish their posts, the resolution required the commission 
to make their names public.
Establishing a rather striking contrast to many of the provisions in the Bill of Rights 
enacted two days previously, the resolution of the 11th of January of the Federal 
Assembly was not an unprecedented legal event. Surrounded by fierce debates, this 
resolution was preceded by two other administrative screening waves. Also, in its turn, 
the 11th of January resolution became a step closer to the final Czechoslovak act of 
screening. It is on the analysis of this final act that we shall concentrate, as the act which
59Resolution 94 passed by the Federal Assembly on January 11 (1991), in Laws. Rulings, and 
Reports, vol. 3 o f  Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, ed. 
Neil J. Kritz (Washington D.C.: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 1995), p. 307.
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represented the peak point of the process of political justice in Czechoslovakia, and to a 
certain extent in the whole Eastern Europe.60 However, for a better understanding of the 
context from which this final law emerged, and of the debate which generated it, we 
should look to the process of screening in its entirety, considering all its stages - both 
before, and after the resolution of the 11th of January.
The debate on the necessity of screening the state apparatus of the Communist party 
bureaucracy and Secret collaborators began before the resolution of the 11th of January 
1991. In fact the debate began soon after the Velvet Revolution in November 1989.61 In 
May 1990, before the first free elections, President Vaclav Havel announced that in order 
to avoid possible scandals during and after the elections, all political parties should be 
entitled to request that the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs check the names of their 
candidates against the StB files. Regardless of the result of the inquiry, in each particular 
case, the parties were free to decide themselves whether a candidate was fit to run for 
office or not. All parties, except the Communist party - which preferred consistency to 
any other electoral qualities - submitted their candidates to the vetting procedure 
suggested by President Havel. In spite of the wide application of this first screening wave, 
the whole process was relatively unsystematic and unreliable, not least because the
60Halmai and Scheppele, p. 178 ff. Rosenberg, p. 108.
61Klingsberg appreciates that, according to different political circumstances, the process o f  
screening was used for specific political purposes. Klingsberg, “The Triumph o f the Therapeutic,” p. 14. 
Started initially as a process o f disempowering the ex-Communist political class, the screening process was 
occasionally used against Slovak politicians, or even to voice resentments against dissidents. Weschler, 
“The Velvet Purge,” pp. 69-70. The screening commission also appears to have functioned as “an 
instrument o f factional politics.” In most o f the countries the archival evidence has been used, officially 
or unofficially, in order to discredit the political careers o f former dissidents. Ibid.
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Ministry of Internal Affairs, the only one having at that time legal access to the relevant 
documents from the StB archives, was only able to consult a small number of files.
Though based on a shortage of resources, the procedure was not without consequences. 
In early May 1990, Oldrich Bursky (Minister of Agriculture) and Vladimir Prikozky 
(Minister without Portfolio) left their posts, allegedly due to their former collaboration 
with the StB.62 Josef Hramdka, minister and former dissident, refused to resign in front 
of similar allegations, but after the elections he was not reappointed to Government.63 
Other leading officials, in the state-run mass media, as well as other state-run institutions, 
were also vetted on the direct orders of the Federal and Republican Governments. In spite 
of this very wide scope of the first screening procedure, the purpose of this exercise was 
never fully explained officially, but left to mass media speculation.
The political scandals related to the screening process intensified around the June 1990 
general elections. On the 6th of June, two days before elections, Josef Bartoncik, the 
chairman of the People's Party, was accused by the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs 
of having collaborated with the StB. Though Bartoncik rejected the accusation, his party 
blamed this scandal for its unsatisfactory election results. After elections, Jan Budaj, 
another political leader, this time from Slovakia, was also accused of collaboration. He 
admitted to have signed a declaration of collaboration, in order to get a passport, but he
62Dan De Luce, “Alleged StB Collaborators Barred from Public Office,” Prague Post 1. no. 2, 
8-14 October 1991, p. 1.
63De Luce, “StB Collaborators,” p.l
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denied ever having fulfilled any task for the StB.64
The chain of political scandals in both republics of the Czechoslovak Federation resulted 
in the Federal Minister of Internal Affairs, together with his Czech and Slovak 
counterparts, publishing a statement warning of the possible difficulties and 
consequences of the vetting procedure.65 The statement pointed out that around fifteen 
thousands files on the most active agents had disappeared after 1989, that the most 
valuable informers had never been recorded, in order to protect their identity, and that it 
could be certified there was in existence a series of misleading files. These misleading 
files contained names of persons in which the Secret Police was interested, but who had 
never been contacted, or had been contacted without success. Based on these observations 
about the state of the StB files, the three Ministers called upon the Federal Government 
to address the sensitive problem of vetting as soon as possible, and to acknowledge its 
possible destabilising effects.
3.4.2 The Second Round of Screening in Czechoslovakia
In spite of the three Ministers' recommendation highlighting the problems associated with 
the vetting procedure, the Federal Assembly postponed taking a decision on this issue.
^For a case by case approach revealing the ambiguity o f the act o f collaboration, see Rosenberg,
pp. 3-66.
65Jan Obrman, “Laying the Ghosts o f the Past,” Report on Eastern Europe 2. no. 24 (14 June
1991): 5.
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Meanwhile, at the end of October 1990, the Czech National Council asked the Czech 
Electoral Commission (CEC) to order all parties to screen their candidates competing in 
the forthcoming Czech local elections.66 This second screening procedure turned out to 
he at least as unsystematic and as unsatisfactory as the first one. The CEC chose to ignore 
the order of the Czech National Council to investigate all fourteen thousand candidates, 
and only “recommended” that such screening should be done. Consequently, some parties 
simply ignored the CEC’s recommendation in spite of the fact that they were not obliged 
to withdraw a candidate from the election lists in case of positive identification. The 
result of this screening procedure on the local level has never been made public.
As expected, after the two unsuccessful administrative screening procedures both on the 
federal and the national level, the pressure mounted for legislative measures to be 
developed to substitute the administrative approach. A systematic and rapid investigation 
into the past activities of all members of the federal and republican parliaments and 
governments, as well as of a limited number of state institutions was also demanded. This 
was the state of affairs in January 1991 when the Federal Assembly approved the 
resolution of the 11th of January calling for the screening of all Federal Assembly 
deputies, federal ministers and their deputies, and all employees of the Prime Minister 
and Federal Assembly offices. According to the resolution of the 11th of January, the 
deputies identified as former informers of the StB were to resign voluntarily within 15 
days of notification. In case they failed to do so, their names were to be publicly disclosed
66The Slovak National Council did not ask for any such investigation. Obrman, “Laying the
Ghosts o f the Past,” p. 5.
156
Chapter Three: On Screening 
in the Federal Assembly. Due to parliamentary immunity, no other measures were 
proposed against the deputies identified as having originally collaborated with the StB. 
As to the employees of the governmental offices, they were either to leave voluntarily on 
notification, or to be dismissed.67
The resolution of the 11th of January set up an Investigative Commission in charge of the 
screening procedures. This commission was made up of fifteen members who were 
approved by the Federal Assembly and screened by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.68 All 
parties in the parliament were proportionally represented and the decisions had to be 
taken unanimously. The Commission first had to pass through a preliminary stage of 
learning how the filing system of the StB functioned. Then, the Commission had to 
establish a set of “unambiguous” criteria for determining what should be considered as 
“evidence of collaboration.”69 “Evidence of collaboration” had to satisfy three cumulative 
conditions: a name had to appear in more than one file; it had to be evident that the 
person was aware of his/her status as an informer; a signature or a binding agreement to
fnJan Obrman, “The Parliament Approves Screening o f Deputies,” Report on Eastern Europe 2. 
no. 5 (February 1,1991): 5-7.
£ 0
The Investigative Commission was formally the same as the one in charge o f inquiring about 
the November 1989 events. In fact, the members o f the Commission had been changed at the end o f 1990, 
when the poor results o f the Commission's activity were blamed on the fact that part o f its members were 
former collaborators. “Czech Republic: Constitutional Review,” East European Constitutional Review 1, 
no. 1 (Spring 1992): 3-5.
69It should be mentioned that some additional files had appeared. Three categories o f files were 
available for investigation, and not only one, as was previously the case. Besides, it was claimed that, due 
to methodological developments, even if  it was not possible to detect all collaborators at least one could 
be certain that those pointed out were real collaborators. Dan De Luce, “In the Eyes o f the Law: Prisoners 
o f Past and Present See Screenings in a New Light,” Prague Post 1. no. 3 ,22-28 October 1991, p. 3.
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collaborate, or a hand-written report had to be produced.70
After about two months of activity by the Investigative Commission, the result was that 
on the 22nd of March 1991, during a Federal Assembly broadcast live on television, Petr 
Toman, the Spokesman of the Commission, read a report about the commission's activity. 
After explaining the “archeology of collaboration,” Toman stated that the commission 
“considered the registry of files of the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs to be the 
fundamental evidence on which [the Commission] based [its] conclusions.”71 All 
members of the commission ruled out the possibility of falsification, that is, the 
possibility that falsification would not have been evident in the cases investigated. In 
conclusion, the commission considered the registry of files to be reliable. After these 
introductory remarks Petr Toman went on to name ten deputies72 who had been positively 
identified as StB collaborators.73
Four days after this session, through a resolution, the Federal Assembly called on those
70”Czech and Slovak Federal Republic: Report o f the Parliamentary Commission on StB 
Collaborators in Parliament” in Laws. Rulings, and Reports, vol. 3 o f Transitional Justice: How Emerging 
Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, ed. Neil J. Kritz (Washington D.C.: United States Institute 
of Peace Press, 1995), p. 307-311.
71Obrman, “Laying the Ghosts,” pp. 5-6.
7 7 The list included, among others, the name o f Jan Kavan, member o f the Civic Forum, an ex­
dissident and ex-responsible o f “Palach Press,” the press agency o f the Czech dissidence in London where 
he was exiled, who had allegedly collaborated from 1968 to 1970. A similar case which appeared few 
weeks later was the one o f Francisek Michalek o f the Christian Democratic Party who under great pressure 
had collaborated between 1963 and 1968, after having served 12 years in prison for political reasons. For 
aspects on the dichotomy “dissident - collaborator,” see Vojtech Cepl, “Ritual Sacrifices: The Mania for 
‘Lustration’ in Czechoslovakia,” East European Constitutional Review 1, no.l (Spring 1992): 24.
73”Czech and Slovak Federal Republic: Report o f  the Parliamentary Commission on StB 
Collaborators in Parliament,” in Kritz, ed., Laws. Rulings, and Reports, p. 307-311.
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who had been identified as collaborators to resign. Later on, fourteen more ministers and 
deputy-ministers were positively identified and had to resign, together with thirty-three 
employees of the Office of the Prime Minister and twenty-five employees of the Office 
of Federal Assembly, eleven of whom still held responsible positions.74
At the end of this screening process the Spokesman for the Commission made three 
proposals. Toman proposed the screening of the federal prosecutors, as well as the 
screening of the mass media personnel in both republics. At the same time, in order to 
avoid the use of the StB files for possible blackmailing of politicians, the spokesman 
proposed the ratification of a new Federal Assembly resolution calling for the publication 
of the names of all state security employees, agents, collaborators and informers.75
The reaction to these waves of screening varied from strong criticism to full support. 
Alexander Dubcek, the Chairman of the Federal Assembly claimed that the public 
identification of deputies had damaged the reputation of the Parliament,76 while President 
Havel declared himself to be uneasy about screening.77 However, Havel agreed that a 
certain amount of vetting was “painful but necessary.” In this sense, in order to prevent
740brman, “Laying the Ghosts,” p. 8.
75The StB register contained approximately 140,000 names o f  so-called StB collaborators. Half 
of these were registered as “candidates for collaboration.” Four thousands o f the alleged collaborators have 
asked their cases to be reviewed. Siklova, p. 58.
7 Confirming this position, an opinion poll showed that only one third o f  the respondents had 
confidence in the findings o f the Commission (20% in Slovakia and 40% in the Czech Republic). When 
asked whether the screening procedures had influenced their confidence in the parliament, 6% answered 
that their confidence had increased, 40% that their views had not changed and 30% that their faith in the 
highest legislative body had been shaken. De Luce, “StB Collaborators” p. 2.
77Ibid.
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the process of vetting to be continued on the basis of a mere Parliamentary resolution, as 
it had been done until then, the President urged the government to prepare a draft law in 
this respect which would be submitted to the legislature according to the requirements of 
the constitution.
The draft law prepared by the government acknowledged some of the expectations voiced 
by the supporters of the screening process.78 Nevertheless, although the proposal included 
banning the former Communist officials from holding government positions, it was a 
timid answer to the expectations for social justice. In dealing with the aspect of 
culpability for instance, the draft law stated that in order to ban someone from holding 
a senior-level government post, he or she had to be identified as an StB agent, an StB 
collaborator, or a former Communist official who had “participated in suppressing human 
rights between February 25,1948, and November 17,1989.”79 The argument against this 
draft law was that, given the complexity of the political and historical situation, in most 
of the cases it would have been virtually impossible to prove that someone had violated 
human rights. Instead, it was argued, mere membership in some of the agencies that had 
constituted “the backbone of the Communist system of oppression”80 should be reason 
enough to forbid certain categories of people from holding senior positions in the new 
democratic government. Following the debate of the government’s proposal, a number
78Ibid.
79Jiri Pehe “Parliament Passes Controversial Law on Vetting Officials,” Report on Eastern Europe 
2, no. 43 (25 October 1991): 5-9.
80Pehe, “Vetting Officials”, p. 6.
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of amendments were made, and the result was the enactment of a law which meant to 
bring to a close the Czech and Slovak screening adventure.
3.4.3 The Helsinki Proposal
In setting the scene for this final act of screening, the recommendations given by Human 
Rights organisations with respect to the attempts of political justice in Eastern Europe 
need to be taken into account. It has been already mentioned that the Czech and Slovak 
republics were not the only post-Communist societies in which an intense debate on the 
idea of screening took place. In Poland, the debate failed to transform into legal measures, 
although the debate stormed the political arena for a good while.81 The vehemence of the 
debate was such that the Helsinki Committee and the Helsinki Foundation for Human 
Rights, after analysing the different proposals put up by the political parties, came up 
with detailed guidelines for a process of political screening. The Helsinki Proposal was 
instigated by the debate which took place in the Polish Sejm, but it was meant and seen 
as an answer to all screening attempts in Eastern Europe.
The Helsinki Proposal aimed to channel the demands for screening into a coherent 
limitative legal format, and to voice substantive criticism towards certain tendencies in 
the Eastern European countries with respect to screening. The Helsinki Committee 
recommended first of all that any notion of collective responsibility should be carefully
81Halmai and Scheppele.
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rejected.82 Any attempt at decommunisation, understanding by this the mass deprivation
of political rights of the former Communist hierarchy, was also considered inappropriate.
Former party “apparatchiks” were to be held responsible for concrete actions only, and
only through normal civil and criminal procedures. The Helsinki Committee
recommended that the screening laws define very precisely the acts which were
considered reprehensible. In other words, this recommendation meant that retroactive
designation of new “reprehensible acts” was not completely excluded. In the case of the
screening of the collaborators of the StB, the Helsinki Committee recommended for
instance, that the law specifies what “collaboration with the secret services” really meant.
A series of other recommendations were also meant to ensure that all the safeguards 
usually present in a criminal adjudication would be present in the case of a screening 
process as well. It was recommended, for instance, to allow space in the law for 
mitigating circumstances such as causes that may have impelled an individual to become 
a collaborator or an informer, the duration of collaboration, the extent of damage caused 
by the informer, etc. Also, since the screening law is concerned with reprehensible acts, 
it was said, it should respect the principle of presumed innocence. Firmly rejecting the 
creation of special commissions in charge of the implementation of the screening 
procedures, the Helsinki Committee recommended that the courts should be in charge of 
the application of the screening law, since it was the most appropriate channel which 
would respect the rights of the defendants. In the Committee’s view, a screening law 
would also guarantee the defendant the right to defence, and adequate financial
82Based on a report by Andrzej Rzeplinski. Rzeplinski, pp. 34-35.
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compensation in case the accusation was unfounded. Moreover, addressing specifically 
the issue of evidence, the Helsinki Committee found it necessary for such a law to 
presume that the archival resources used to prove collaboration were not credible. 
Accordingly, it recommended that the data from the StB archives be necessarily 
corroborated by other evidence.
Since the Polish debate on screening did not consolidate into any legal act addressing the 
issue of decommunisation of the State apparatus, it could be implied that the Polish 
legislature and courts have not found the Helsinki Committee’s guidelines very easy to 
apply. It might also be that the results one would have achieved by following the strict 
procedural prescriptions of the Helsinki Committee were too demanding on both legal 
and non-legal resources to be worth following. It is certain though, that the first Czech 
and Slovak waves of screening have not attained such high procedural standards as 
recommended by the Helsinki Committee. At the same time, the pressure mounted in the 
Czechoslovak Federal Parliament to solve this Gordian knot of political screening by 
passing a proper legislative act.
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3.4.4 The Lustration Law: The Main Provisions
The long awaited screening law came into effect on the 4th of October 1991, the day of 
its promulgation,83 and it was to be valid, in both Czech and Slovak federal republics, 
until the 31st of December 1996. The full title of the law84 was shortened to “Lustration 
Law.”85 This suggestive name expressed in fact the expiatory and cathartic nature of the 
process of screening better than the supporters of the law were willing to recognise.
When accompanying a screening process there are four main questions which any 
Lustration Law inevitably has to answer. Firstly, it has to address the validity of the 
justification for the process of screening. Secondly, it has to state clearly the positions and 
offices within the scope of the screening process. Thirdly, it has to identify the general 
criteria on the basis of which it can be established who should be disqualified 
(individuals, groups, criteria for defining the groups, the temporal dimension for selecting 
the different agents to be disqualified, extenuating circumstances etc). Last but not least, 
it has to provide the procedures to be followed for achieving fairness and efficiency. For
In the Federal Assembly the law was passed with a vote o f 148 to 21, with 22 abstentions, and 
29 deputies boycotting the vote. All the deputies o f the right-of-centre Civic Democratic Party voted for 
the law, and all the deputies o f the Communist party voted, o f course, against it. See Pehe, “Vetting 
Officials,” pp. 5-9.
84Act Stipulating Certain Additional Requirements for the Holding o f Certain Offices m State 
Organs and Organizations of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, The Czech Republic and the Slovak 
Republic, Act No. 451/1991 Sb. Unofficial translation used at the Conference on Justice in Time of  
Transition, Prague, January 1992. Hereafter referred to as “Lustration Law.”
Of
Etymologically, the term “lustration” comes from the Latin word lustrare, and signifies 
purification by expiatory sacrifice and ceremonial washing. Concise Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. 
“lustration” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964).
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the purpose of the construction of the argument of this section, the first question 
regarding the justification of a process of screening will be addressed later in this chapter. 
The positions and offices included within the scope of the Lustration Law, the general 
criteria set for the purpose of screening, and the procedures to be followed within this 
process, will be established first within this section.
From the point of view of the positions and offices affected by the process of screening, 
the Lustration Law could be described as rather wide in scope. The law prescribed 
additional conditions of service for posts filled by election, nomination or appointment, 
at both federal and republican level. The range of institutions entering the scope of the 
law included bodies of the state administration, army, security information services, 
police force, castle police guards, Czech and Slovak National Councils Offices, 
Constitutional Court, Radio and Television, Press Agency (CTK), state firms, state 
railways, state banks, elected academic officials, posts approved by the academic senate, 
judge, prosecutor, state notary, etc.. The applicability of the Lustration Law was also 
expanded because the law allowed the chairpersons, representatives of political parties, 
political movements and associations, to request being vetted themselves, or a member 
of the leadership of their organisation.86
With respect to the general criteria on the basis of which the disqualification was to be 
based, the persons affected by the restrictions prescribed in Article 1 of the Lustration 
Law were identified through a negative prescription: the person filling a position or post
o /r
Lustration Law, Article 21.
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in the categories mentioned above should not have been, during the period 25th of 
February 1948 to 17th of November 1989: a) an officer of the National Security Corps 
engaged in the state Security Service; b) recorded in the materials of the State Security 
Service as a resident, agent, or occupier of an apartment lent to the State Security Service, 
or used as a place of conspiracy, an informer or an ideological collaborator of the State 
Security Police; c) a conscious collaborator of the state Security Service;87 d) the secretary 
of an organ/authority of the Communist party, a member of staff of these organs, or a 
member of a series of national or local Communist party organisations; e) a member of 
the People’s Militia or, f) a former student in the special schools for the members of the 
State Security Service in USSR.88
Shifting the burden of proof, the law prescribed that the citizen concerned was supposed 
to prove the fulfilment of these negative conditions with a “certificate” issued by the 
Federal Ministry of Interior. He or she was also obliged, before taking up a post in the 
categories mentioned above, to submit a declaration saying that he or she was not and is 
not a collaborator with any foreign intelligence or reconnaissance services.89
With respect to the Lustration Law’s potential for fairness and efficiency, defining the
87By “conscious collaborator o f the State Security Service” it was meant that “the citizen was 
recorded in the materials o f the state Security Service as a confident, candidate for secret service 
cooperation or a reliable secret service collaborator and who knew that he had contact with an officer o f  
the National Security Corps and that he submitted information to him in the form o f confidential dealings 
or carried out for him set tasks.” Lustration Law, Article 2, para. (2).
oo
The party officials who rose to power during the Prague Spring (between 1 January 1968, and 
1 May 1969) were not affected by the ban. Lustration Law, Article 2, para. (2d).
89Lustration Law, Article 4.
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conditions for office relative to the membership of a person in an organisation opened up 
the law to criticism from those who excluded any idea of a collective approach to 
screening as a valid path to justice following a totalitarian repressive regime.90 The 
accusation of swapping the presumption of innocence for the “presumption of guilt” was 
also often made.91 With respect to the procedures to be followed in the process of 
screening, the law inclined more towards efficient and expedient bureaucratic paper work 
than towards an adjudication process with all the necessary provisions for fairness. For 
most of the categories of posts listed for screening, the law provided no possibility for 
appeal, once a person had been positively identified.
The only exception to this lack of appropriate provisions for an appeal was the “category 
(c)” included in the law, which referred to the “conscious” or “knowing” collaborators.92 
In order to investigate the contestations coming from persons who claimed that the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs had wrongly certified them as conscientious collaborators of 
the StB, an independent commission was to be established which would be attached to 
the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs.93 The person to whom the commission’s 
proceedings referred was to be given the chance “to become acquainted with all the
on’’Czech Republic: Constitution Watch,” East European Constitutional Review 2/3. no. 4/1 (Fall 
1993/Winter 1994): 6.
91Urban, p. 85 ff.
92 According to the law, persons qualified as “knowing collaborators o f the Secret Police” are 
those who were registered with the Secret Police as “trustees” or “candidates for secret cooperation.” The 
criteria for qualifying as such was the proof that the person knew that he or she was in contact with a 
member of the Secret Police, was giving him information, or was performing tasks for him. See Lustration 
Law, and also the analysis o f the law in Pehe, “Vetting Officials,” pp. 6-7.
93 Lustration Law, Article 11.
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evidence,” including all relevant written working documents. During the proceedings the 
person was also to be given the possibility to express his opinion on all the evidence 
presented in the case. The proceedings of the independent commission were to be closed 
to the public.
The Lustration Law did not refer specifically to any crime already in existence in the 
Czechoslovak penal laws, nor did it create explicitly new crimes. However, it prescribed 
that the penal code was suitably valid with regard to the obligation to testify and to 
conclude, with respect to the ban on questioning, to the right to refuse to testify, and to 
the request for an expert and his obligations. No provision was made for the right to 
defence.94
Following the above-mentioned proceedings, the commission had to issue an adjudication 
which had to be substantiated. In case of non-fulfilment of the conditions of the 
Lustration Law for occupying one of the mentioned posts, the employment of the 
concerned person would terminate by means of a notice to quit given by the organisation 
within fifteen days at the latest from the date the organisation learned of the disqualifying 
adjudication. Finally, if the citizen insisted that details stated in the adjudication of the 
independent commission were false, he or she could request the court to revise the 
content of this adjudication.
94On the procedural flows o f the anti-agent legislation see Klingsberg, p. 10-11.
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3.4.5 Procedural Aspects of the Lustration Law
Leaving aside the accusation of “witch hunting,”95 the way in which the Lustration Law 
answered the questions raised by the process of screening and depolitisation, has been 
criticised under different more relevant headings. Although the discourse of 
decommunisation through screening is rather different from the criminal law approach, 
it is routinely assumed - as revealed by the Helsinki Proposal - that a process of screening 
should stay more or less within the confines of the criminal law. From this perspective 
the retroactivity ban appears as the criticism which requires a coherent answer.96 The 
reason why retroactivity came into play was obvious. The Lustration Law, critics said, 
and likewise any screening act and procedure which addressed the StB agents and 
collaborators, and/or the former Communist officials, was creating new reprehensible 
acts, criminalising in a hidden way the act of collaboration with the StB and the affiliation 
to the Communist hierarchy. Given this implicit criminalisation, the critics of the 
screening procedures argued that the ban on retroactive legislation should apply, and the 
Lustration Law should be declared unconstitutional.
A second strong criticism, this time of the procedural aspects of the screening process,
95Jeri Laber, “Witch Hunt in Prague,” The New York Review (23 April 1992): 5-6. This 
accusation o f witch hunting is still used by those opposing movements o f justice after a repressive regime. 
However, the expression has very little chance o f saying something meaningful about the process o f  
political justice in Eastern Europe. After readings Solzhenitsyn’s “Gulag,” or Courtois’ “Livre noir du 
communism,” there are only two alternatives left: either political justice processes taking place in Eastern 
Europe are not a witch hunt, or the witches do exist.
96Urban, pp. 90-91.
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refers to the distribution of competences in establishing the screening parameters. In all 
the proposals preceding the Lustration Law, as well as in the Lustration Law itself, these 
competences have been given to specially created commissions.97 Only as a final resort, 
did the Lustration Law provide the alleged conscious collaborators with the right of 
appeal to a court. The main reason for avoiding a general right of appeal to a court 
appeared to be the need for expediency.98 This need could not be satisfied through court 
proceedings, and therefore the right to appeal was included as an exception rather than 
the rule. Lengthy and costly trials could also be more demanding with respect to the 
safeguards of a proper due process. The reversal of the burden of proof and the 
emasculation of the right to defence - to mention only two of the often mentioned 
procedural weaknesses of the Lustration Law - could not be accepted by a court without 
weakening the power and authority of the judiciary. A judge’s duty to instruct a case 
would impose on that judge to search for the truth beyond the mere, allegedly unreliable, 
files of the StB. As we are already aware of the discussions surrounding the use of Secret 
Police files as evidence, it is easy to understand this criticism. The StB files have been 
instituted by the Lustration Law as the only source of evidence, and no judge could be 
bound by these limiting sources without considerably altering his or her judicial powers.
Not without importance for the discourse of historical justice, is the fear of political 
manipulation of the whole process. As one could see following the Odyssey of the
97Siklova, p. 59.
98Paulina Bren, “Lustration in the Czech and Slovak Republics,” RFE/RL Research Report 2. 
no. 29(16  July 1993): 20.
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Lustration Law, there were numerous occasions when political claims and gains have 
been made in the name of (political) justice. Nevertheless, this is not an element inherent 
to the screening process. The same political claims and gains could be harboured, in the 
absence of a law, through the political and moral discourse." Indeed, some claim it a 
virtue to have the screening process legislated upon, as this would actually diminish the 
possibility of political manipulation of the past by establishing the authoritative truth 
about the Communist regime.100
3.4.6 Punishing and Discriminating: In Search of a Rationale
For such an authoritative or official truth of the Communist past to indeed have 
“authority” though, the screening law has to contain a set of inner qualities. As stated 
earlier, these qualities should answer consistently the four essential questions to be 
addressed in a screening law. Until now we have approached and detailed only three of 
the four essential questions to be answered by a screening law: (1) the positions and the 
offices within the scope of the screening process; (2) who is to be disqualified, and (3) 
the procedures prescribed by the Lustration Law to be followed in the screening process. 
We have not yet approached that question which the legislator logically should answer 
first, but which from the angle of research can wait until one gets more acquainted with
99Ruti Teitel, “How are the New Democracies o f the Southern Cone Dealing with the Legacy o f  
Past Human Rights Abuses?” The Council on Foreign Relations Latin America Project Paper fNew York, 
17 May 1990).
100Eisenberg, pp. 148-149.
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the main parameters of the Lustration Law. This question refers to the valid justification 
of the screening process; it refers to the grounds - both legal and non-legal - on which a 
restrictive discriminatory measure can be imposed. And, in the end, the way one reads the 
other three questions addressing the Lustration Law depends upon the answer given to 
this question of the justification of the discriminatory measures.
In answering the question of the valid justification of a screening process it is necessary 
to address the basis and the nature of the discrimination brought by a screening law. In 
particular, the Lustration Law supporters have to address the very substantive criticism 
referring this time to the alleged punitive dimension of the discrimination established, and 
especially to its anti-agent and anti-collaborator provisions.101 The punitive character of 
the Lustration Law becomes an important issue from the moment one claims that such 
a legislative act would be needed in order to fill a gap in the Penal Code. Incriminating 
the different acts of collaboration with the Communist regime, could be seen as adding 
to the substantive criminal law, and therefore violating the imperative ban on retroactivity 
which applies to this domain of law.
Theoretically at least, the Lustration Law was not enacted as an amendment to the 
Czechoslovak Criminal Code.102 Notwithstanding this formal distinction, the critics of 
the screening process often claim that the Lustration Law actually represents a disguised
101 Arthur Bemey, “A Critique of Lustration,” in Truth and Justice: The Delicate Balance. Central 
European University, Institute for Constitutional and Legislative Policy, Working Paper no.l (1993), pp.
141-143.
102Schwartz, p. 149 ff.
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retroactive criminalisation of behaviour legally acceptable in the past.103 In this sense, it 
is argued that the penalising of the act of collaboration performed through the Lustration 
Law took the form of a mere administrative discrimination simply to avoid having to 
comply to the stricter due process rules specified by the criminal law. Related to this 
aspect it is also claimed that it actually does not matter whether a certain type of 
punishment is called criminal punishment or not. The only aspect that would matter for 
these critics is the individual perception of the consequences of the law; what is important 
from this perspective is the fact that there is something which appears as a punishment.104
The supporters of the Lustration Law argue that this law was passed by the Czechoslovak 
Parliament not in order to create retroactively a crime out of lawful behaviour, but in 
order to draw, along political lines, an “administrative discrimination” which would 
single out a certain group in society, helping to segregate the new democratic regime from 
the old totalitarian practices. The criterion used for this “administrative discrimination” 
was the act of collaborating with the Communist regime. Generally speaking, 
discriminating laws are not unconstitutional per se, and they do not necessarily disregard 
the rule of law. In democratic societies the positive discriminations are almost a matter 
of course, to such a point that we would not even notice them anymore if it was not for 
the attention given to them by some legal scholar who points out that, as positive as they
103Siklova, p. 59.
104Ibid.
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Nevertheless, a negative discrimination stays under stricter rules than the measures of 
positive action and, in general, it must be strictly prospective. Non-retroactivity though, 
is not sufficient to make it acceptable. In order to pass the test of the rule of law, the legal 
distinctions or discriminations have to meet three cumulative conditions: to serve a 
reasonable purpose, to be necessary and to qualify as proportionate when the 
consequences imposed upon the discriminated group are compared to the social benefit 
derived from that discrimination.106 In order to evaluate the fulfilment of these 
requirements, a clear and coherent statement would be needed reflecting the expectations 
the legislator has decided to uphold through the discriminating law.
Starting with the first of the cumulative conditions, it should be mentioned that most of 
the time it is unnecessary to include in the legal text the purpose for which it was enacted. 
We assume for instance, that all criminal restrictions are meant to further our 
understanding, as a community, of what is acceptable or unacceptable behaviour towards 
one another.107 Nevertheless, no one can know the purpose of a discriminatory measure 
which does not fit easily into any of the classical domains of the law. By not knowing the 
purpose of the norm, one could not possibly decide upon its reasonableness. Of course,
105J. Edwards, “The Moral Dilemmas o f Positive Discrimination,” Social Policy and 
Administration 22. no. 3 (December 1988): 210-221.
106Kis, “What Shall We Do?” p. 6 ff.
107Nicola Lacey and Celia Wells Reconstructing Criminal Law: Critical Perspective on Crime and 
the Criminal Process (London: Butterworths, 1998), p. 1 ff.
174
Chapter Three: On Screening 
one could argue that such a purpose can easily be isolated from the debate which takes 
place in the society which produced the law. However, unlike most other social issues, 
in the case of a process of justice emerging from a revolution, the social expectations are 
not clustered in easily identifiable and symmetric antinomies. For example, in the case 
of abortion, if an act criminalises abortion, one would understand - as a matter of 
common knowledge derived from the social debate - that the legislator has chosen to 
uphold expectations attached to the idea of the foetus as an individual, and to deny 
expectations attached to the right of a woman to decide with regard to her own body.108 
While the two competing positions appear together around the moral issue of abortion, 
regardless of which one of them is confirmed by the legal discourse, choosing one 
position implies that the reason for the normative intervention is the relative rejection of 
the other position, and vice-versa.
As we have seen earlier when analysing the debate on the use of the Secret Police 
archives,109 the affirmative discourses reclaiming the right or even the duty to take 
legislative action against the former collaborators or Communist party leaders offers too 
complex a network of reasons and counter-reasons. It is thus, impossible for anyone to 
identify and assess the legislative intent for which the legislator has decided to act in the 
form of the Lustration Law.110 It could be for the constitutional protection of the emerging
10SJenny Morgan, “A Woman’s Fight to Choose,” Fulcrum Production for Channel 4
(documentary transmission: 1 November 1997). Also, Susan Dwyer and Joel Feinberg, eds., The Problem
of Abortion (Belmont, CA : Wadsworth Pub., 1997).
109See supra Section 3.3.
110Los, “Lustration and Truth Claims,” p. 155.
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democracy, by preventing political sabotage. It could also be in order to enforce certain 
moral standards in the political life, by ensuring that a repressive political regime is 
assigned the responsibility for its crimes, and by not allowing members of the repressive 
regime to take part in the process of re-building the democratic institutions. Finally, 
legislative action could also be undertaken to prevent former agents being blackmailed 
while in office.111 These are all rather distinct reasons, and each of them would bring a 
different perspective to the fulfilment of the conditions of reasonableness, necessity and 
proportionality.
Indeed, the Lustration Law does not contain enough information to indicate its main 
purpose. On the one hand, banning an important part of the Communist party-state 
apparatus, including the former collaborators, from public office does not automatically 
offer the purpose intended by the legislature when imposing the discriminating conditions 
of employment contained in the Lustration Law. On the other hand, searching for an 
answer in the parliamentary and public debate or in the social expectations around the 
issue, is not likely either to shed more light on the issue. This is because the debate in this 
case offers a cluster of distinct purposes and justifications, which are all very different. 
These justifications appear to have influenced and shaped different parts of the Lustration 
Law. Nevertheless, these justifications are not necessarily cumulative aspects. The fact 
that the justifications are not cumulative creates incompatibilities within the law itself, 
and makes it appear inconsistent, thus unable to offer a clear and coherent answer to the 
question of reasonableness, necessity and proportionality of restrictions imposed
in Kis, “What Shall We Do?” p. 9.
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Let us take for instance, one of the arguments used most often in the parliamentary 
debate, that the law is supposed to prevent the Communist ex-officials, or the StB agents 
and collaborators from sabotaging the move that the society undertakes towards 
democracy and a free market economy.112 In order for this justification to be backed by 
the three conditions of reasonableness, necessity and proportionality, the law should 
concentrate on a narrower area of the Communist bureaucracy and security apparatus, 
limiting its scope to the governmental positions and office. However, if prevention of 
sabotage is the rationale of the Lustration Law, then it is rather difficult to argue under 
this latter justification why the screening law should include such a wide range of 
positions, some of which - such as elected academic posts, or leadership positions in any 
organisation to which the Lustration Law allowed the chairperson to ask for the screening 
- could hardly be seen as a credible target of sabotage.
Screening the elected members of the legislative body has also been seen by some critics 
as an over-reaction to the threat of sabotage, and in the end as an undemocratic measure. 
In this sense, the only type of measures seen possible by the critics of the anti-agent 
legislation is the creation of free access to vital information about the candidates in 
elections.113 The right to an informed decision for the voters is seen as the only reasonable
112Cepl, p. 26.
113Janos Lakos, “Some Remarks on the Access to the Archives o f the Former Regime,” in Truth 
and Justice: The Delicate Balance. Central European University, Institute for Constitutional and Legislative 
Policy, Working Paper no.l (1993), p. 75 ff.
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purpose for an anti-agent legislation. From this perspective the disclosure of the 
candidates' political past is considered both necessary and proportionate if the voters are 
to decide the political destiny of each specific candidate. In this way only, it is said, one 
would deal with a non-discriminatory law which would eventually affect only some 
former agents, through the voters' will.
In conclusion, it is difficult to see how an emerging democracy would be defended by 
such an overstretched political screening. Such an approach would only confirm 
Kirchheimer’s understanding of the political justice process as a manipulation of the legal 
discourse for pure political goals. If the protection against sabotage is indeed offered as 
the valid justification of the screening process brought by the Lustration Law, then this 
law presents an inconsistency between this justification and the actual range of 
“hazardous categories” which the law proposes to be screened.114 Consequently, this type 
of justification of the law does not allow one to assess whether the Lustration Law is 
necessary and proportionate.
Likewise, if one considers as a justification for the Lustration Law the fear of potential 
blackmail against the persons with a tainted past, the disqualification of many, if not all, 
of the persons concerned can appear as both unnecessary and disproportionate. The same 
otherwise reasonable purpose of preventing the blackmail of persons in positions of 
authority, could be achieved by less harsh means. Screening and exposing only the
114”Czech and Slovak Federal Republic: Constitutional Court Decision on the Screening Law,” 
in Laws. Rulings, and Reports, vol. 3 o f Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with 
Former Regimes, ed. Neil J. Kritz (Washington D.C.: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 1995), p. 358.
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candidates’ past, but without disqualifying the candidates from office because of their 
past, could be an alternative to screening and banning. By exposing in advance the tainted 
past of the candidates and officials, any attempt to blackmail a candidate or official which 
has already been exposed would become pointless: the public would already be aware of 
those persons’ political past.115
The conclusion one could draw from here is that, while protection from sabotage could 
seem a reasonable justification for screening (with the necessary reserve being made 
concerning the unnecessary and disproportionate measures taken), banning from positions 
of authority persons with a politically tainted past as a measure of protecting those 
persons, and thus their institutions, from blackmail appears clearly as an un-necessary and 
disproportionate measure. Consequently, under this justification of the protection against 
eventual blackmail, the Lustration Law appears even more inconsistent, promoting 
excessive and unfair restrictions on certain categories of persons.
If fear of sabotage or blackmail appear as inconsistent justifications of screening in the 
context of the Lustration Law, a punitive dimension of this law might appear even more 
difficult to argue for. To put to the test the consistency of this justification within the 
framework of the Lustration Law the legislator should have made clear a series of 
aspects.
First of all there is the aspect of retroactivity. A justification based on the idea of
115Bemey, pp. 140-141.
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punishment would attach the Lustration Law to the criminal law domain. Accordingly, 
the legislator should provide a clear explanation for retroactively criminalising the acts 
of collaboration with the StB, or of having been part of the Communist structures of 
power. This criminalisation would be very difficult to defend without invoking the 
“exceptional circumstances” of the Communist regime. Even so, we have seen that some 
similar attempts at having these “exceptional circumstances” acknowledged within the 
legal discourse failed in Hungary. Besides, while in the Hungarian case the proposed 
retroactive measure referred to a more procedural aspect where retroactivity might be 
sometimes tolerated, the Lustration Law would have to argue for a retroactive substantive 
criminal norm.
Admitting though that the “exceptional circumstances,” and especially the repressive 
nature of the Communist regime would be acknowledged legally, the Lustration Law 
would still remain inconsistent. The major inconsistency would manifest itself with 
respect to the way in which responsibility - since we are not dealing with “protective 
measures” like in the first two lines of justification anymore - is assigned. If responsibility 
is meant to be assigned individually, then the Lustration Law fails to provide all 
safeguards necessarily attached to this type of attribution of responsibility.116 Besides a 
forfeited right to defence and to appeal, and a questionable respect of the right to a fair 
trial in front of a proper court, the Lustration Law fails to provide for an individualised 
assessment of the persons concerned.
116Rosenberg, p. 43 ff. Siklova, pp. 59-60. Cepl, p. 25.
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It is largely agreed, for instance, that some of the informers and collaborators of the StB 
have been blackmailed into working for this organisation. The moral stand of the 
Lustration Law therefore, the only one on which the “exceptional circumstances” might 
be acknowledged legally, is weakened by the fact that the law does not provide space for 
considering the eventual extenuating circumstances. Without these provisions it is 
difficult to conceive of individual responsibility coherently implemented. Also, as it has 
already been mentioned, the Lustration Law failed to include a government proposal by 
which a former Communist official could have been banned from occupying certain 
positions of authority only after demonstrating in a court of law that he or she has been 
violating human rights.117 All these aspects make the provisions of the Lustration Law 
insufficient for providing a legitimate attribution of criminal responsibility.
On the other hand, one of the chief criticisms of the Lustration Law has always been the 
implied collective responsibility based upon mere membership to different Communist 
structures.118 The Lustration Law, however, fails to argue for a coherent concept of 
collective agency which might be made responsible for the human rights violations which 
took place during the Communist regime. It also does not provide for any appropriate 
legal structures through which such responsibility should be implemented. On the 
contrary, the promoters of the law tried hard to deny any implication with an attempt to 
implement measures of collective responsibility, and the usual justification offered for
117”Czech Republic: Constitution Watch,” East European Constitutional Review 2. no. 4 (Winter 
1993): 6. Siklova, p. 61.
118”Czech Republic: Constitution Watch,” (Winter 1993), p. 6. Siklova, p. 61.
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the screening law was, as it was shown in the previous section, the need for protection 
against sabotage or blackmail. Hence, even this last justification, based on punitive 
arguments, fails to offer a coherent image of the Lustration Law as a law based upon a 
reasonable purpose, necessity and proportionality.
As shown above, the Lustration Law can easily be criticised from all perspectives. None 
of the offered justifications can provide the Lustration Law with the necessary 
coherence.119 On the other hand though, none of the three lines of justification - sabotage, 
blackmail, or punishment - is mentioned in the Lustration Law itself: the law does not say 
directly for which of the analysed reasons it has been promulgated. Since one is dealing 
here with a law belonging to a political justice process, one would need to know which 
of the affirmative discourses was sanctioned: the need of protection against blackmail, 
against sabotage, or the need of deterrence through punishment. Only by knowing what 
this choice is, would one be able to assess the coherence of the Lustration Law.
A formal legal statement clarifying the purpose of the law is not usually an imperative 
requirement for a new law. In the specific situation of political justice though, it is 
necessary to fulfill this requirement because each of the three claims analysed so far 
carries with it different implications and degrees of responsibility and guilt. The argument 
claiming the need for the protection of the constitutional democracy against sabotage, for
119Referring to the same difficulties related to the ambiguity in the formal justification o f a legal 
(in this specific case, constitutional) provision, Sunstein writes that “sometimes the problematic origins 
o f a constitutional provision will give that provision dubious legitimacy. When leaders are aware o f those 
problematic origins, a constitutional provision may not mean much.” Cass R. Sunstein, “The Dubious 
Status o f the Charter o f Rights and Freedoms: A Constitutional Anomaly in the Czech Republic?” East 
European Constitutional Review 4. no. 2 (Summer 1995): 51.
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instance, projects the image of the Communist counter-revolutionary agent, eventually 
in the service of a foreign intelligence service, who is waiting, from his high, eventually 
elected post, to undermine the fragile democracy.120
As to the second argument, it presents the agent not as an active actor but as a passive 
one, an agent upon whom one risks to have exercised pressure and blackmail. A legal 
measure based on this argument could be seen simply as trying to protect the democratic 
institutions by protecting the agent or collaborator against his own potential weaknesses. 
From this position, the question of responsibility and guilt is indistinguishable; both 
collaborators and Communist officials are presented simply as persons trapped by 
circumstances over which they had no significant individual control. On the other hand, 
the question of responsibility and guilt would come up if the third type of justification, 
the one based on the need for deterrence through punishment, would be used.
Only after clarifying the purpose for which the Lustration Law was enacted, it is possible 
to consider the law’s constitutionality, its reasonableness, necessity and proportionality. 
Most importantly though, clarifying the question of the justification of the Lustration Law 
makes possible the decision upon the other point of criticism, the one referring to the 
collective punitive character of the Lustration Law.
120This is the affirmative or “revolutionary” argument. This argument is derived from the social 
scepticism considering the possibility o f an ideological rebirth o f the Communist elite. Kis, “What Shall 
We Do?” p. 9.
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3.4.7 The Constitutional Court Decision on the Lustration Law
The decision by the Constitutional Court on the Lustration Law added some 
“clarifications” to the debate on the intention of the legislator regarding the Czechoslovak 
screening law.121 The decision was made public on the 26th of November 1992, and it 
confirmed to a large extent that the content of the law was constitutional. The Court also 
acknowledged, however, that the StB files were unreliable, by removing “category (c)” 
of the law referring to the conscious collaborators. This “category (c),” referring to the 
persons “knowingly collaborating with the Secret Police,” included those persons 
registered with the Secret Police as “trustees’ or “candidates for secret cooperation.”122 
Unlike in the case of “informers” or “ideological collaborators,” or indeed party officials, 
there are no official documents, such as signed papers of collaboration, from which the 
status of “conscious collaborator” could formally be established. The affiliation of a 
person to the category of conscious collaborators had to be demonstrated by proving that 
the person was in contact with a member of the Secret Police, was aware of this fact, and 
was knowingly giving information, or performing tasks for an StB agent.123 The Court
121Czech and Slovak Federal Republic: Constitutional Court Decision on the Screening Law, PI. 
US 1/92, in Laws. Rulings, and Reports, vol. 3 o f Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies 
Reckon with Former Regimes, ed. Neil J. Kritz (Washington D.C.: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 
1995), pp. 361-363.
122Lustration Law, Article 2 and Article 3.
123Pehe, “Vetting Officials,” p. 8. For the criteria for determining who collaborated with the StB, 
see “Czech and Slovak Federal Republic: Report o f the Parliamentary Commission on StB Collaborators 
in Parliament,” in Laws. Rulings, and Reports, vol. 3 o f Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies 
Reckon with Former Regimes, ed. Neil J. Kritz (Washington D.C.: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 
1995), p. 308-310.
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found the procedural safeguards offered by the law to be insufficient in assessing 
whether persons fitted into the category (c). At the same time, by eliminating “category 
(c)” from the scope of the Lustration Law, the Constitutional Court made obsolete the 
Independent Commission of the Federal Ministry of the Interior which was supposed to 
deal with identifying persons falling into this category.124
Apart from this adjustment to the law, the decision of the Constitutional Court is very 
important as it attempts to offer a systematic justification of its decision, and implicitly 
a justification for the Lustration Law itself. In upholding the law, the Constitutional Court 
specified the right of the State to protect the constitutional democracy against potential 
disruptions caused by persons representing the previous regime.125 This position makes 
one believe that protection against sabotage, and/or supposed blackmail, is indeed the 
rationale behind the Lustration Law. In approving the law, the Constitutional Court 
emphasised in its decision one element pointing towards the same rationale.126 In the 
explanatory notes to its decision, the Court quoted lengthily from a number of classified 
documents. These documents revealed the StB machinery still to be a real threat to the
124For a analysis o f  the Commission see Bren, pp. 18-19.
125’’[The] State cannot be denied the right to specify certain requirements imposed on the persons 
employed in selected categories in the institutions, functions or activities significant for the protection of  
the democratic constitutional system, State security, its economic and political interests, protection o f State 
secrets or the persons who can significantly interfere with public affairs in the discharge o f  their 
functions.” Czech and Slovak Federal Republic: Constitutional Court Decision on the Screening Law, PI. 
US 1/92, in Laws. Rulings, and Reports, vol. 3 of Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies 
Reckon with Former Regimes, ed. Neil J. Kritz (Washington D.C.: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 
1995), p. 355.
126This proved once more that the protective measures against the legacy o f the Communist 
regime could not be reduced to a “witch-hunt” story, as some authors have claimed. Laber, pp. 5-6.
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new democratic political structures.127 Along the same lines promoting the idea of 
screening as protective and not punitive measures, the Court suggested that the Lustration 
Law had a “labour law character,” and not a criminal punitive one.128
Notwithstanding these claims, the Court seems in fact to endorse more the retributive 
rationale of the process of screening than the protective rationale since there are 
references in its decision to “the rule-of-law State’s openness to the discourse o f values”
127The Court quoted lengthily, for instance, from the Directive no. CB-002040/03-89 issued on 
the 28th o f November 1989, eleven days after the beginning o f  the Velvet Revolution. The Directive 
contain dispositions like: despite existing agency positions and official contacts in the respective bodies,
for future objectives, maintain the conditions for the possible transfer o f the State Security members into 
their structures...; - increase substantially the conspirative character o f operative activities in the whole 
scope of State Security; - reassess the network of agents, ensure its stabilization and gradual expansion to 
genuinely high-quality positions. Emphasize agency in influential and leading positions. Activate 
maximally the work of agents, particularly through the use o f influential agents; - aim active measures at 
the misinformation of the opponent by compromising the most confrontation-minded representatives of  
these structures in the eyes o f the public, and at the increase o f  ideological, personal and operational 
clashes; - with maximum speed, acquire high-quality influential agents in mass media and among the 
students of higher-grade schools, capable o f influencing the operative situation in these structures to the 
benefit o f the Communist Party o f Czechoslovakia.” Czech and Slovak Federal Republic: Constitutional 
Court Decision on the Screening Law (Ref. No. PI. US 1/92), in Laws. Rulings, and Reports, vol. 3 of 
Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, ed. Neil J. Kritz 
(Washington D.C.: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 1995), p. 349.
128’’The proposal [that the Lustration Law should be declared non-compliant with the Bill o f Basic 
Rights and Freedoms] does not respect the specific character o f the problems o f Act No. 451/1991 and 
confuses its labour law character with the concepts and qualifications o f criminal law (the introduction of  
responsibility, even collective responsibility, for unspecified ‘facts o f the case’, based on collective 
responsibility for membership in a vague, formally defined circle o f persons). The contested Act, however, 
is not o f criminal law character either in contents or in its meaning, nor does it formulate any type o f legal 
responsibility. Its substance is the adjustment, for a certain transition period, o f the conditions for the 
discharge o f certain closely defined functions or activities to the value criteria o f a democratic State.” 
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic: Constitutional Court Decision on the Screening Law, PI. US 1/92, 
in Laws. Rulings, and Reports, vol. 3 o f Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with 
Former Regimes, ed. Neil J. Kritz (Washington D.C.: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 1995), p. 352- 
353.
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(emphasis mine),129 to the discourse of natural rights,130 and to legal certainty as a legal 
principle dependent upon values and natural rights.131
Therefore, the Constitutional Court’s decision did not add much to the justification of the 
collective responsibility which appears to be imposed through the Lustration Law, and 
the confusion regarding the legislative intention remained. The screening undertaken in 
the Czech circles of power looks therefore more and more like “lustracims,” a mixed 
bread placed between the blame-loaded lustration and the blame-free ostracism.
The question stemming from here is whether a blame-free procedure would answer the 
expectations for justice of the societies in transition from repressive regimes. The concept 
of ostracism covered an antique Athenian political procedure providing for the temporary 
banishment, without punishment, of a citizen considered politically dangerous for the 
City’s welfare. This description is strikingly similar to the meaning one could put into the
129”A rule-of-law State connected with democratic principles, established after the fall o f the 
totalitarian system, cannot be considered amorphous with reference to values.” Ibid.
130”[E]ntirely new elements o f the renaissance o f natural human rights have been introduced into 
our legal system and a new basis o f constitutional law and the rule-of-law State has been created... The 
restoration o f the rule-of-law State cannot be considered a continuity o f the constitutional and legal 
consistency of the totalitarian regime; it must be understood as a transition from formally rational political 
legitimacy, the criterion of which was formal legality, to materially rational legitimacy. The previous legal 
positivism made it impossible to make any distinction between an unjust and a just law and to identify 
those political processes and legal norms the contents o f which threatened the very substance of 
democracy, since they formally remained within the procedures and framework o f  legality.” Ibid.
131”Even legal certainty cannot be considered in abstract terms; it must be measured by those 
values o f the constitutional and rule-of-law State which are o f system-constitutive character... Legal 
certainty in a rule-of-law State must be the security o f its intrinsic values o f its contents... Respecting the 
continuity o f the old system of values would not guarantee legal certainty, but rather would cast into doubt 
the new values and the trust o f the citizens in the credibility o f the new system and would threaten legal 
certainty in society.” Ibid.
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Lustration Law when interpreting the declarations given by both supporters of this law
and the Constitutional Court: in order to be ostracised, the citizen did not have to commit
a crime, nor any other vile act; it was enough to be considered by the majority of the
Athenians as somewhat dangerous to the City. To be screened through the application of
the Czechoslovak Lustration Law appears also as a blame-free conflict of interest
between “the City” and the citizen.
In the same way in which ostracism was an outwards exile, in Czechoslovakia the 
Lustration Law appears to regulate an inwards exile, an exile in which the person 
concerned does not need to leave the City, but the political arena. Similarly to ostracism, 
Lustration Law appears not to inflict any permanent stigma upon the targeted person; in 
both cases, neither property nor civil rights nor indeed dignity are lost. However, the term 
“lustration” is not as blame-free as the term “ostracism.” A screening law, as a real 
lustration law, is expected to bring about “purification” from “deadly political sins,” and 
unlike ostracism laws, should not be passed at the mere whim of the majority.
It was shown, however, that the Czech Lustration Law also includes many signs that the 
law was actually underlined by an un-confessed “lustration” justification, focusing on 
punishment and deterrence. It is likely that the sanitised justifications which made from 
the Lustration Law a “copycat” of the ostracism procedure, instead of a real “lustration” 
one, have been preferred only because of the controversies surrounding the concept of 
legal collective responsibility, a concept implied by the “lustration” type of justification. 
Nevertheless, all these hints to responsibility and blame are not sufficient for clarifying
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the nature of the legislative intervention; basically, the legal nature of the Lustration Law 
should not be guessed but clearly stated.
In fact, from the far-reaching character of the law, one gets the impression that the law 
has a collective retributive substance, which means that the legislature, as well as the 
Constitutional Court, would be indeed inclined towards formulating a kind of collective 
political responsibility of the Communist apparatus. At the same time, when one has to 
decide on the intention behind the Lustration Law, the legislator appears rather to argue 
not on the basis of collective responsibility but on the more convenient basis of 
administrative expediency in the labour law domain. The outcome of this inconsistency 
is that it makes the Lustration Law appear as a kind of legal mythological creature, with 
the upper body eagle and the lower body snake. No wonder therefore that, though the 
Lustration Law became the expression of the most far-reaching post-Communist process 
of political justice,132 the law itself was criticised both for being unjust,133 and for being 
too lenient and ambiguous about the nature of the acts and of the actors referred to in the 
law.134
132Schwartz, pp. 143-144.
133Rzeplinski, p. 34.
134Cepl, p. 26.
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3.5 The Czech Act on the Illegality of the Communist Regime
In order to silence those who found the Lustration Law too ambiguous, soon after the 
secession of the two federal republics, the Czech parliament passed another act. Although 
supported by arguments just as controversial as the ones offered for the Lustration Law, 
this act took the Czech political justice closer to the implication of a collective 
responsibility for the Communist regime. This act basically did not change anything with 
respect to the screening process itself, but it added something to the spectrum of the 
political justice legislation which seemed to answer strong social expectations.
The Act on the Illegality of the Communist Regime and Resistance to It (Act No. 
198/1993) was passed by the Czech Parliament almost three years after the Velvet 
Revolution.135 The act was characterised as being concise and strongly declarative, and 
at the same time “more of a proclamation than a piece of practical legislation.”136 Its 
significance was claimed to be more in its moral implications rather than in its impact on 
the way the Communist past was dealt with in courts.137 In spite of this view, taken not
135Czech Republic: Act on the Illegality of the Communist Regime and Resistance to It. Act No. 
198/1993 (9 July, 1993), in Laws. Rulings, and Reports, vol. 3 o f Transitional Justice: How Emerging 
Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, ed. Neil J. Kritz (Washington D.C.: United States Institute 
of Peace Press, 1995), pp. 366-368. Hereafter referred to as Act No. 198/1993 or the Act on the Illegality 
of the Communist Regime.
Jan Obrman, “Czech Parliament Declares Former Communist Regime Illegal,” RFE/RL 
Research Report 2. no. 32 (13 August 1993): 6-10.
137Article 1, para. (1) provides that “The Communist regime and its active supporters, (a) depnved 
citizens of any possibility o f freely expressing their political will, forced them to conceal their opinion on 
the situation in the country and society, and forced them openly to express their agreement even with what 
they considered lies or crimes, and that by means o f persecution or threats o f persecution against the
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only by some analysts but also by the supporters of the law, there is an undeniable link 
between this law and the Lustration Law, placing the screening law at least partially 
within a retributive discourse.138 Moreover, critics expressed fears that the law could have 
criminal implications, only part of which were openly acknowledged in the law itself.139
Indeed, although it was argued that the new Act No. 198/1993 was meant to have only 
moral implications, the Act on the Illegality of the Communist Regime stretched into the 
criminal discourse by allowing what the Hungarian Constitutional Court has denied: the 
lifting of the statute of limitations for crimes committed between the 25th of February
citizens themselves or their families and friends; (b) systematically and constantly violated human rights, 
while oppressing certain political, social, and religious groups in a particularly sinister manner; (c)violated 
the fundamental principles o f a democratic State based on the rule o f law, international treaties, and its own 
laws, in practice putting the will and interests o f the Communist Party and its representatives above the 
law; (d) use every means o f exerting power to persecute citizens, and in particular: - executed them, 
murdered them, and imprisoned them in penitentiaries and forced labour camps, used brutal methods 
against them and exposed them to inhuman suffering - including physical and psychological torture - 
during investigations and incarceration; - deliberately divested them o f their property and violated their 
rights o f ownership; - deprived them o f the opportunity to practice their professions or perform their duties, 
or attain higher education or specialized training; - restricted their freedom to travel freely abroad and 
return freely; - drafted them into Technical Support Battalions and Technical Battalions for unlimited 
periods o f time; (e) did not hesitate to commit crimes to reach its objectives, facilitated the execution o f  
these crimes with impunity, and provided unfair advantages for those who participated in these crimes and 
persecutions; (f) joined forces with a foreign power, and from 1968 maintained the aforementioned State 
by means of occupying troops.” Article 1, para. (2) provides that “Those who implemented the Communist 
regime as officials, organizers, and agitators in the political and ideological sphere, are fully responsible 
for the crimes specified in paragraph (1).” Act No. 198/1993, pp. 366-368.
138The Communist Party o f Bohemia and Moravia and the Left Bloc, o f which many former 
Communists are members, sent letters o f protest to the Council o f Europe, Amnesty International, and the 
Socialist International, arguing that the law is “discriminatory and based on the principle o f collective 
guilt.” Siklova, p. 59.
139Ibid. The preamble o f the law states that “Parliament declares that the Communist Party o f  
Czechoslovakia, its leadership and members, are responsible for the system o f government in this country 
in the years 1948-1989, and particularly for the systematic destruction o f  the traditional values o f European 
civilization, for the conscious violation o f human rights and freedoms, for the moral and economic ruin 
combined with judicial crimes and terror against advocates o f different opinions, the replacement o f a 
prospering market economy with command management, the destruction o f the traditional principles of 
ownership, the abuse of training, education, science and culture for political and ideological purposes, and 
the careless destruction of nature, and asserts that in its future work, it will use this Act as its point of  
departure.” Act No. 198/1993, p. 366.
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1948 and the 29th of December 1989 in cases in which, for political reasons, culprits 
were not sentenced140 or victims were not acquitted. Besides these openly stated criminal 
law implications, the critics of the Act No. 198/1993 also pointed to an “Explanatory 
Report.”141 This report, which accompanied the Act No. 198/1993 to the Parliament, 
mentioned an “interpretative function” for the Act “in relation to court decisions.” This 
function created the potential of the new act to have criminal law consequences. The 
provisions in Article 5 of the Act No. 198/1993, together with the arguments used in the 
Explanatory Report, are undeniably linked to the declarative provisions set out in the first 
articles of the Act. The critics argue therefore that the Act as a whole cannot be declared 
“innocent” from a criminal law perspective.
The criminal law implications from Article 5, together with the clear references the Act 
made to a kind of joint responsibility of the Communist regime,142 were the main issues 
which led Act No. 198/1993 to be assessed by the Constitutional Court. The 
Constitutional Court pronounced its decision on the 21st of December 1993. 
Notwithstanding the “joint responsibility” declared by the Act, and the “interpretative
140”The period o f time from 25 February 1948 until 29 December 1989 shall not be counted as 
part o f the limitation period for criminal acts if, due to political reasons incompatible with the basic 
principles o f the legal order o f a democratic State, [a person] was not finally and validly convicted or the 
charges [against that person] were dismissed.” Article 5, Act No. 198/1993, p. 368.
141”Czech Republic: Constitutional Court Decision on the Act on the Illegality of the Communist 
Regime (December 21, 1993),” p. 370 ff.
142See Article 1, para (2) supra note 137. Article 2, para. (1) o f  the Act No. 198/1993 provided: 
“It is particularly for the details specified in Art. 1, para. 1 o f this Act that the regime based on the 
Communist ideology, which decided on the government o f the State and the fate o f the citizens of 
Czechoslovakia from 25 February 1948 to 17 November 1989, was criminal, illegal, and contemptible.” 
Paragraph (2): “As with other organizations based on the Communist ideology, which oriented their 
operations toward the suppression o f human rights and the democratic system, the Communist Party of 
Czechoslovakia was a criminal and contemptible organization.” Act No. 198/1993, p. 367.
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functions” professed in the Explanatory Report, the Court upheld the law, denying 
especially its criminal implications.143 The Court’s argumentation came in a rather 
convoluted way, though. First of all, the critique that the Act No. 198/1993 was to serve 
“an interpretative function in relation to court decisions” was rejected by the Court on the 
basis that this intention has never been expressed in the text of the Act itself, but only in 
the Explanatory Report accompanying the Act.144 On the other hand, according to the 
Court, even the Report did not show “a clear intention” for giving the Act an 
interpretative function. Besides, it was added as a final argument that the wording of an 
Explanatory Report could not be the subject of a constitutional review. However, these 
arguments prove rather inconsistent, since the playing down of the Explanatory Report 
came in the Court’s decision only a few paragraphs after the Court had used the same 
Report as authoritative in interpreting the scope of the law, as intended by the 
legislature.145 In conclusion, in the search for a valid justification of an act of political 
justice which would reflect the intention of the legislature, it appears yet again difficult 
to find a solid ground.
143The Constitutional Court acknowledged the “joint responsibility” o f individuals on two levels: 
the joint responsibility of the members of the Communist Party o f  Czechoslovakia (KSC) for the manner 
o f rule in the years 1948-1989 (responsibility mentioned only in the Preamble o f the Act and seen by the 
Court as “an effort to instigate reflection”) and the joint responsibility o f those who “actively supported 
the regime” for the crimes committed by the regime. Czech Republic: Constitutional Court Decision on 
the Act on the Illegality o f the Communist Regime, 21 December, 1993, p. 371.
144Ibid, p. 370.
145”Contrary to the assertion o f the petitioners... neither the Act itself nor the Explanatory Report 
give any grounds at all for inferring that the first part of Act No. 198/199, regarding the Illegality o f the 
Communist Regime and Resistance to It, might have created, in the area o f substantive criminal law or in 
some other area o f the law, a legal duty or a statutory power o f the State to prosecute certain persons, or 
to inflict non-criminal sanctions upon them... The first part o f the Act represents the moral-political 
viewpoint of the Czech Parliament, the purpose o f and the grounds for which are explained in the above- 
mentioned quotation from the Explanatory Report.” Ibid.
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The last argument used by the Constitutional Court was one of legal terminology. As 
proof of the law’s genuinely non-normative character, the Court argued that - apart from 
Article 5, suspending the statute of limitations for criminal acts not prosecuted due to 
political reasons - the legislator “did not make use of customary legal terminology” in 
its declaratory statements.146 Nevertheless, looking into the text of the Act No. 198/1993, 
it appears that Article 1, paragraph (2)147 declares the Communist officials, organisers, 
and agitators in the political and ideological sphere, as fully responsible for the crimes 
specified in paragraph (l).148 This paragraph enumerates to a large extent acts which are 
easily “convertible” not only into human rights violations, but also in crimes specified 
even by the Communist criminal code. At the same time, Article 2 defines the 
Communist regime not only as “criminal” - a term sometimes used with moral 
connotations - but also as “illegal,”149 a fact which should leave no ambiguity about 
exactly what the scope of the Act is. The normative criminal potential of the Act is 
acknowledged also by scholars who remind us about similar pieces of legislation 
subsequently used as a legal starting basis for banning certain political organisations of 
similar inspiration.150
146”Czech Republic: Constitutional Court Decision on the Act on the Illegality o f the Communist 
Regime (21 December, 1993),” in Kritz 3: 371.
147See supra note 137.
148See supra note 137.
149See Article 2, para (1), supra note 142.
150Jan Obrman, “Czech Parliament Declares Former Communist Regime Illegal,” RFE/RL 
Research Report 2. no. 32 (13 August 1993): 8-9
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3.6 Preliminary Conclusions
Following this analysis one can understand how, although the Czech (initially 
Czechoslovak) process of screening is a bold and courageous approach to political 
justice, as with the criminal law path adopted in Hungary, it builds upon more than one 
inconsistent claim. In one way or another, each of the claims relates to the central notion 
of this thesis: the collective responsibility of the Communist structures of power. First of 
all, there is the claim that the Lustration Law has a “labour law character.” As we have 
just seen though, under this heading it was difficult to consistently justify the restrictions 
imposed, the wide range of positions affected, as well as the categories of persons 
concerned.
Secondly, being argued from the position of a need to protect the constitutional 
democratic order against sabotage or blackmail, the Lustration Law claims a blame-free, 
non-criminal character. Indirectly however, it outlaws activities which were previously 
lawful. By doing this, the screening law casts a shadow of blame over large categories of 
people, such as StB agents, informers and collaborators, and over part of the Communist 
bureaucracy. A striking contrast with this “blame-free” claim is also the fact that, as we 
have just seen, the restrictions imposed on these categories of people are justified by the 
Constitutional Court through an appeal to the discourse of values and natural rights.
Thirdly, in view of this blame cast - even if involuntarily - over large categories of
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persons, the claim that Lustration Law is not built upon the notion of collective
responsibility appears in sharp contrast with the fact that the screening law does deal with
people collectively, and it does fail to offer the traditional imperative safeguards specific
to any attribution of individual blame.
All these inconsistent claims brought the inescapable criticism that the screening law 
does convey, even if covert, criminal responsibility and collective blame. This became 
even more evident when another law was introduced into the picture: the Act on the 
Illegality of the Communist Regime. This law addressed specific categories of persons 
involved with the Communist regime, and declaratively assimilated those persons with 
clearly defined crimes. This new law, coming upon the background of a logical gap 
between the rationale offered for the screening process and the restrictions imposed 
through the screening do suggest an undeclared link between the Communist regime and 
the systematic crimes and abuses which occurred under its administration.
This kind of implication is clearly not the type of implication recommended by the 
Helsinki Committee for Human Rights. The Helsinki Proposal presented earlier, 
halfheartedly expressed the idea of the necessity of undertaking screening measures for 
the protection of the fragile post-Communist democracies. Nevertheless, the Helsinki 
Committee did not allow for any suggestion of blame which should be assigned to the 
screened Communist apparatus. Theoretically, the Lustration Law serves the same 
constitutional protective goals conceded by the Helsinki Committee. Yet, there are very 
few of the Committee’s recommendations which have not been practically disregarded
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by the Lustration Law. Extended use of StB files, no space for mitigating circumstances 
and no presumed innocence, the civil courts’ competence restricted to a minimum (on 
procedural matters), a severe restriction of the right to defence, etc., are the most obvious 
examples.
As to the main demand of the Helsinki Committee - the rejection of any suggestion of 
collective responsibility of the Communist regime, and of any attempt at 
decommunisation - it seems all but fulfilled. Although being strongly denied as the 
intention of the screening law, a decommunisation process, based on the idea of a 
relationship between the structures of the Communist regime and the crimes committed 
within these structures, appears as the only consistent explanation of the form taken by 
the Czech(oslovak) screening process. However, this perspective is seldom invoked in 
the debate on political justice. Indeed such a perspective was theoretically denied, by the 
legislative power and the Constitutional Court.
Practically, both institutions contributed to the string of inconsistencies within the 
Lustration Law which convey criminal responsibility and collective blame. Moreover, 
both the Czech parliament and the Czech Constitutional Court151 reinforced the 
discrepancy between the declared rationale of the Lustration Law and the law’s actual
151 After the constitutional separation o f the two federal republics in January 1993, the new Slovak 
Constitutional Court declared the Lustration Law unconstitutional. Even before this constitutional 
reassessment though, the screening prescribed by the Lustration Law was carried out half-heartedly. 
Siklova, p. 59.
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layout, five years later when the Lustration Law was due to cease its activity.152 Just 
before this was due to happen, the Czech parliament voted for another five years 
extension of the Lustration Law. Based on the declared rationale of the law - the need for 
protection of the democratic constitutional arrangements against sabotage or blackmail - 
President Havel vetoed the extension. His veto was based on the evidence that Czech 
society was a stable democracy, and thus no more in need of such protections as the ones 
offered by the Lustration Law.153 In the end, however, with the Constitutional Court 
backing the legislature and not the President, President Havel had no constitutional 
choice but to sign the extension.154
Following the analysis of all the inconsistencies which characterised the Czech approach 
to political justice, one question becomes inevitable. Should there be any preference 
between a criminal law approach and the administrative one in dealing with the 
Communist past? The analysis of the Czech process of screening understandably leaves 
one in deep confusion as to the true rationale of this process. This confusion is present 
here in no less a degree than it was present in the criminal law approach to political 
justice analysed in the previous chapter, and it is due to an overlapping of social 
discourses. In the previous chapter it was shown how, though solidly grounded in
152Article 23 of the Lustration Law stated that the law was to come into effect on the day it was 
declared - the 4th o f October 1991 - and was valid until the 31st o f  December 1996. Lustration Law, 
Article 23.
153Steve Kettle, “Czech President Vetoes Extension of Screening Law,” Daily Digest. 25 October
1995): 3.
154Ibid. “Czech Republic: Constitution Watch,” East European Constitutional Review 4. no. 4 
(Fall 1995): 9.
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criminal law regulations, the criminal law path taken to political justice still abounded in 
substantive reasoning. This type of reasoning was used both by the critics of the process 
of justice, through what it was called “constitutional activism,” and by its supporters 
through notions such as “political reasons” or even the “reasonable means” concept used 
in the border guards trials.155 One would perhaps expect that taking the path of an 
assumed substantive evaluation of a regime, outside the criminal law discourse, and with 
the declared scope of protecting an unconsolidated democracy, would prevent the 
“contamination” of this approach with the criminal law discourse. What one could notice 
from the Czech case, however, is that the screening process feeds upon the normative 
criminal discourse in more than one way.
First of all, the Lustration Law borrows to a large extent its scarce procedural protections 
from the procedural criminal law. Ironically however, this procedural transplant, together 
with an ambiguity concerning the legal nature of the acts and the (groups of) persons 
concerned by this law, creates also an ambiguous message about the relation of the 
process of screening itself with the notion of criminal responsibility. On the one hand, the 
use of the criminal procedural norms in the Lustration Law offers the safeguards one 
should find when one’s rights and liberties are affected. On the other hand though, these 
safeguards, coming from a highly normative and moralising part of the legal discourse, 
contaminate the whole process with a certain degree of blame. This blame is not always 
openly argued for, or at least not in the Lustration Law itself. The implied collective 
responsibility identified and contested in this law by some opponents, is “veiled” by the
155See supra Section 2.3.
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supporters of the law with justificatory arguments of administrative expediency 
addressing a kind of constitutional conflict of interests. On that subject, in the Czech 
process of political justice, the final word has not yet been said. Though strongly denied 
by the Czech Constitutional Court, the Act on the Illegality of the Communist Regime 
came to suggest exactly the denied link between a certain dimension of collective 
responsibility of a government bureaucracy and the criminal nature of the regime it 
represented.
These elements show that there are two fundamental similarities between the two 
analysed approaches to political justice, the criminal law approach and the administrative 
approach. On the one hand they both come in an amalgamation of procedural criminal 
norms and substantive normative reasoning. In this sense, in order to find a solution 
which answered - positively or negatively - the expectations for justice, the Hungarian 
criminal law approach inevitably included elements which came from outside its strict 
procedural boundaries. As to the screening process undertaken outside the criminal law, 
it attempted to draw legal legitimacy from picking and choosing from among the solid 
procedural structures of the criminal law. It has to be conceded, however, that the Czech 
process of post-Communist justice appears as a process in which, though hesitantly, and 
in places inconsistently, the repressive nature of the Communist regime - expressed to a 
large extent through the nature of the Secret Police as emblematic institution - has been 
acknowledged far more than in the Hungarian approach.
The Czech process of political justice created new liabilities and acknowledged new
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“constitutional” conflicts of interest. To a certain extent, even if symbolically, this 
process assigned legal responsibility to social actors who, although were polymorphic 
organisations, appeared as a unit in the social consciousness. On the other had though, 
and here we touch upon the second common point of the two approaches, beyond these 
achievements and the “legislative success” of the Czech approach, in various degrees, 
both Czech and Hungarian cases manifest hesitation in confronting directly the 
“tantalizing question,” as McAdams put it, of collective responsibility. The ever present 
issue of a real legal evaluation of the Communist regime remains openly unaddressed. 
The next chapter will address the conceptual roots of this failure.
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Chapter Four 
THEORIES OF COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY:
THE POLITICAL ORGANISATION AS A LEGAL ACTOR
Abstract
In the two previous chapters the main legal approaches to political justice were analysed together with their 
implications for the concept o f collective responsibility. With reference to the difficulty encountered by 
the two legal approaches in displaying legal consistency, and in offering a satisfactory solution to the 
legitimate expectations for justice, Chapter Four proposes an explanation based on the analysis o f the 
debate concerning the concept o f collective agency and collective responsibility. With this in mind, this 
chapter starts by looking into what are considered as the core principles o f the concept o f individual 
responsibility, and by identifying their metaphysical assumptions. These assumptions are then taken 
further, into the analysis o f various theories o f responsibility o f formal organisations, establishing the 
implications each o f them could bring to the concept o f collective political responsibility. Methodological 
individualism, structural restraint as well as structural pragmatism and the functional perspective, are 
examined, emphasising their drawbacks, as well as their merits, for the purpose o f the inquiry. In 
particular, the chapter emphasises the value of those theories which construe the concept o f  collective 
agency as a complement and not a replacement of the individual one. The concluding remarks summarise 
the implications of all these elements for the process of identification of a collective political actor capable 
of playing a role in Eastern Europe in the distribution o f legal responsibility for the violations of human 
rights.
4.1 Looking Beyond Individual Responsibility
The case studies in the previous chapters underlined the fact that the issue of collective 
responsibility is ever present in the process of post-totalitarian justice. If this is so, the 
question is then whether there is a concept of collective responsibility which, when 
spelled out, could help clarify those “tantalizing” questions and expectations which
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remain largely unanswered in Eastern Europe. A legally acknowledged concept of 
collective responsibility could undoubtedly influence Hungary’s criminal law approach 
to political justice. The Czechoslovak Lustration Law, the “declarative” Czech Act on the 
Illegality of the Communist Regime, as well as the German sentences passed on the GDR 
politburo members, would also acquire new dimensions. The possibility of shaping such 
a concept is therefore something which is worth looking into. Does collective 
responsibility exist? Is collective responsibility at all possible? We shall now hear the 
social scientists and philosophers replies.
4.2 Political Bureaucracies as Formal Organisations:
From Morality to Metaphysics, and Back
The discrete individual, seen as an autonomous and rational agent, is associated with a 
series of normative assumptions. These assumptions are incorporated into specific 
discourses, which then construct and present the individual as an agent (or actor) within 
those discourses. When asking whether a political organisation can be seen as a social 
agent, and whether it can act as a unit within the legal discourse, one might be tempted 
to apply the traditional moral theories and principles identifiable in the criminal law 
discourse. These theories and principles have been developed in order to create the 
discrete individual; as a responsible entity, the individual person is a social construction
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which is the result of the interaction of various elements.1
These elements which interact to construct the individual person might not be 
transferable to a collective entity. It is likely therefore that copying the constitutive 
elements of individual moral and criminal responsibility onto a collective structure would 
be of little help in evaluating the actions of collective entities such as business 
corporations, organised professional groups or political entities such as the ones which 
emerged under the Communist totalitarian regime. On the other hand, in order to be able 
to generate a credible alternative approach to the mere transposition of individual 
parameters of agenthood onto collective entities, the concept of collective political 
agency has first to be grounded in a metaphysical investigation of the issue. Before 
arriving at this investigation the moral aspects need also to be considered. Only after 
undertaking such an investigation, one can proceed to concede or to deny the possibility 
of an alternative approach to normative responsibility, suitable for the collective actor.
In order to proceed with this investigation, I will first start by identifying what are 
believed to be the core principles underlying the idea of legal, and especially criminal, 
individual responsibility. Based on this identification, I will argue for the possibility of 
a homologous set of ideas which could guide the assignment of collective responsibility 
in differentiated social systems, such as the political discourse. This set of ideas could 
eventually be instrumental in the acknowledgement of collective responsibility of a
'Alan Norrie, “A Critique o f Criminal Causation,” Modem Law Review 54 (September, 1991): 685- 
701.
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repressive regime, and thus contribute in evaluating the different approaches to political 
justice and collective responsibility taken in Eastern Europe. In the last part of this 
section I will argue for the possibility of differentiated principles of political 
accountability. This analysis will take us beyond the moral normative discourse and into 
the metaphysics of agenthood.
Looking for the core principles underlying the idea of responsibility attached to an 
agency, it should be said that there is a general tendency to attach the concept of agency 
exclusively to anthropocentric normative assumptions, and to indiscriminately test any 
social agent against the individual parameters of moral agenthood and responsibility. As 
we shall see in this chapter, these parameters can be undoubtedly misleading. How could 
morality prevent acknowledging a concept of collective responsibility when in Chapter 
Two and Chapter Three we have seen that, in fact, failing to acknowledge collective 
responsibility is considered by many Eastern Europeans as unjust and immoral?
The root of this problem of competing moralities is rather deep. The anthropocentric 
assumptions of social agenthood originate from within the moral discourse, but they have 
also been inherited and are now entrenched in the other fundamental normative discourse, 
the law. This migration has more than once led to confusion, especially with respect to 
the way both the legal agents are conceived and their accountability is enforced. It can be 
said, for instance, that even in the criminal law discourse there subsists a certain
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misunderstanding about the way in which law and morality relate to each other.2 Saying
that criminal law is based on individual moral principles does not imply that one should
confuse law and morality, or misunderstand the relationship between the two, since the
connection between the moral discourse and the legal discourse has become largely a
contingent one.3
Without necessarily denying this contingency, it has been claimed that there exists a set 
of doctrines of moral inspiration cutting across all crimes.4 The relationship between 
criminal law and these general ideas is, according to some authors, a logical one: the 
general principles could be revealed starting from a detailed analysis of the substantive 
criminal law.5 In order to emphasise the freedom of these general principles from 
controversial value-judgements, Moore called the former “topic-neutral moral 
principles.”6 The source of these principles - by which one should understand the set of 
non-legal ideas that in some sense can be said to underlie criminal law - can also be
2A s a typical example o f overlapping between these two domains, see P. Devlin, “The Enforcement 
o f Morals,” in Morality and the Law, eds. Robert M. Baird and Stuart E. Rosenbaum ( Buffalo, New York: 
Prometeus Books, 1988), pp. 15-35.
H. L. A. Hart, “The Legal Enforcement o f Morality,” in Morality and the Law, eds. Robert M. Baird 
and Stuart E. Rosenbaum (Buffalo, New York: Prometeus Books, 1988), p.38. Michael S. Moore, “The 
Moral and Metaphysical Sources o f the Criminal Law,” in Criminal Justice. Nomos 27, eds. J. Roland 
Pennock and John W. Chapman (New York: New York University Press, 1985), p. 14.
4Moore, p. 11.
5On the coherence o f the moral theory governing the attribution o f  liability in criminal law, see George
Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), p 393. Mark Kelman, “Interpretive 
Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law,” Stanford Law Review 33 (1981): pp. 591-673. Also, 
Moore, p. 12.
6Moore, p. 12.
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identified through a logical inquiry into the moral ideas subsistent in the criminal law.7
Undoubtedly, there are moral principles which, in one form or another, appear to be 
present in all positive criminal systems. The aspect which is of interest here is the way 
in which moral principles emerge at the foundations of the criminal law. In Moore’s 
view, the topic-neutral moral principles would not consist of saying what is good and 
what is bad, but of establishing the conditions in which what is good or bad can be 
decided upon.8 This idea, of rationally identifiable procedural principles to be followed 
whenever one is in doubt about what is acceptable or not, is promising for a process of 
justice which tries to establish the accountability of a totalitarian regime.
One such procedural, or topic-neutral, principle identified by Moore in the criminal law 
discourse is the principle of accountability. According to this principle, the moral agency 
would be identified with the personhood and thus, would exclude entities such as the 
formal organisation. Following this anthropocentric perspective one would be unable not 
only to make political structures accountable but also corporations, professional 
organisations, etc.. As we shall see later though, in many situations the law failed to 
embrace such a perspective, and sanctioned social expectations for justice which went 
beyond individual accountability. A second underlying moral principle would be, 
according to Moore, the fairness of the imposed obligation. As we could see from 
Chapter Two and Chapter Three, this principle appeared to have a great influence over
7Ibid.
8Moore, p. 21.
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the way a process of political justice is shaped. The third moral principle is what Moore 
calls the “answerability” principle. It includes three simultaneous requirements: the mens 
rea element, the actus reus element and the coincidence of the two in the same person. 
This again, is a principle with important consequences, especially if one is to address the 
concept of collective responsibility from an anthropocentric position. Last but not least, 
a fourth principle, a principle which could be called “the principle of mitigation,” would 
consist of justifications and excuses referring to the circumstances of both actus reus and 
mens rea involved in the production of harmful outcomes.
According to Moore, these topic-neutral moral principles underlie the notion of 
responsibility within the criminal law.9 This position is usually used to give theoretical 
depth to an individualistic perspective of the notion of responsibility. This perspective 
has usually been the basis for the legal criticism of the processes of political justice 
undertaken in societies coming out of repressive regimes when these processes have 
implied a dimension of collective accountability. It is argued that, using the standard set 
by these topic-neutral moral principles (individual accountability, fairness of the imposed 
obligation, answerability, and the principle of mitigation) the concept of responsibility 
is inapplicable to collective political bodies. This would be so mainly because of what 
one could consider as the “centre piece” of these principles, the principle of 
“answerability,” with the notions of mens rea and actus reus, and their coincidence in the 
same person.
9Moore, p. 12.
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If these topic-neutral moral principles seem difficult to accommodate to other social 
agencies than the individual one, it does not mean that a homologous set of ideas could 
not be identified for ensuring the accountability of collective social agencies. Indeed, a 
concept of collective responsibility of a political body would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to accommodate with the topic-neutral morality as identified by Moore. This 
does not mean though, that such a concept would be impossible to accommodate within 
any topic-neutral normative environment. One could imagine even the criminal law based 
on a different topic-neutral morality. In some traditional societies for instance, the 
customary rules which fulfilled the role that today is covered by the criminal law, pointed 
to the community as the primarily accountable agent, and only subsequently to the 
individual.10 Accordingly, the topic-neutral morality of these systems were based on other 
principles than the ones emphasised by Moore. However, it is not a return to this type of 
society that we are looking for.
At the same time, it is not totally against Moore’s line of thinking to consider that the 
identification of other sets of topic-neutral moral principles can follow similar deductive 
paths in other differentiated discourses, not least in the political one.11 Topic-neutral or 
procedural moral principles specific to the political discourse, and at the same time
10Leopold Pospisil, Anthropology of Law: A Comparative Theory (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1974), 
p. 117. Also, “Papua New Guinea: A Death to Pay For,” BBC2 documentary, The Learning Zone Series 
(7 December 1998).
11The term “morality” is unavoidable in this context, in spite o f the anthropomorphic imagery which 
it brings. This because the discrete individual is always taken as point o f reference, if  only contrastive, for 
the construction o f any type of concept of responsibility. The anthropomorphic background suits Moore's 
approach since he places his analysis within the criminal law discourse.
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legally enforceable, could be spelled out through the analysis of the substantive rules of 
public law as well as the customary rules of politics in action. In order to achieve this, one 
would have to go beyond the artificial boundaries between the written and the unwritten 
rules of political action, and look at what should stand as a “positive” rule within the 
political discourse. In those exceptional circumstances in which the citizens assume the 
right to revolution as their last resort, this assessment of the boundaries of political action 
might reveal a necessary bias towards enforcing certain general standards regardless of 
their informal status. In such situations, the acknowledgement of a topic-neutral political 
morality - centred around the recognition of basic human rights of every individual - goes 
beyond the political debate, and becomes (retroactively) enforceable.12
Therefore, in extreme cases such as a revolution, one tests the political institutions and 
their responsibility not only against formal constitutional rules, but also against the 
substantive principles derived from the role that a particular institution is called to fulfill 
in society. By combining formal rules and substantive principles it is possible to see 
whether a specific form of agency and type of responsibility, are compatible with the 
social role of the political actor.13 This is so because, in the case of an unresponsive
12For the definition o f “gross abuses o f human rights” see supra Chapter One, note 73.
1
For the benefits derived from the use of different perspectives in analysing a concept which operates 
in a specific environment, see the sociological study of the dynamics o f labour statutory law and informal 
disciplinary measures, at the working place by Stuart Henry. Stuart Henry, Private Justice: Towards 
Integrated Theorising in the Sociology o f Law (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), 1983. The value of  
combining various perspectives can also be seen in French’s approach to collective action. The concept 
of legitimacy, one o f the pillars o f the topic-neutral moral domain o f  corporate activity as well as politics, 
prompts French to look beyond the law. He sees law as a constraining factor, but not as a defining one. 
In shaping collective agencies such as corporations, he looks not only to the legal skeleton but also to the 
nature of the formal organisation, to its “raison d’etre.” His concept o f legitimacy rests on the law as well 
as on extra-legal elements such as general expectations, patterns o f action, standards for activity,
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regime, the formal rules promoted by the repressive regime itself, might offer no 
protection against government abuse. The repressive nature of a regime will also be 
oriented towards preventing those legal reforms which might bring formal constitutional 
checks upon the governmental power. Hence, relying exclusively upon a topic-neutral 
morality which promotes solely individual responsibility will not offer the chance of a 
more comprehensive approach to a totalitarian regime.
This being said, it is important to know that, logically there is the potential to identify 
some procedural principles specific to the collective political action, principles against 
which the political action could be legally assessed. The “bias” assumed in this process 
of assessment represents a conceptual choice of values to be pursued, rather than an 
ideological choice of the substance of those values. Accordingly, a bias towards certain 
values and principles of social action does not need to implicate the “normative” concepts 
of politics that are open-ended and controversial, but only the “descriptive” concepts of 
the social action, about which “intersubjective agreement can be attained.”14
These concepts, the concrete substance of which does not constitute the direct object of 
this chapter, will be at the foundation of the topic-neutral responsibility of a repressive 
regime. Earlier in this section, however, the idea of individual responsibility was
reasonableness. See Peter A. French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1984), p. 57.
14William E Connolly, The Terms o f Political Discourse (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1974), p. 11 ff. 
These descriptive concepts are operational, according to Connolly, enabling investigators with divergent 
ideologies to accept common definitions in determining states o f affairs. This makes such concepts 
pertinent to scientific investigation from outside the area o f politics and ideology.
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mentioned as a socially constructed concept15 resulting from the interaction of a variety 
of social factors, and therefore based upon topic-neutral moral principles which are a 
result of that interaction. Picking up on this idea, it can be imagined that the topic-neutral 
morality which would underlie a concept of collective responsibility would homologate - 
in a similarly constructed (and constructive) way - the principles of individual 
responsibility. As we shall see next, the possibility of attaining these “descriptive” 
concepts and differentiated topic-neutral procedural principles, is confirmed by an 
analysis which goes beyond the limits of the moral discourse, into the metaphysical 
ground of the concept of responsibility.
What would metaphysics have to do with the concept of collective responsibility? This 
question can be answered by looking at the underlying ideas of the moral principles on 
which the concept of (individual) responsibility is based. Moore’s four procedural moral 
principles16 presuppose another assumption which is not merely a moral one. Persona est 
naturae rationabilis individua substantial1 this is how the Roman philosopher Boethius, 
under the influence of the Roman legal tradition, expressed this assumption.18 Embraced
15Norrie, p. 691.
16Moore, p. 14.
17”A person is the individual substance o f a rational nature.” Anicius Boethius, Boecius de 
consolacione philosophie. trans. G. Chaucer (Amsterdam: Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, 1974), p. 217. It 
should be remembered though that in the Roman legal tradition being a legal person was as much a 
“fiction” or social construction as the collective actor would be today. Between the quality o f legal person 
and the one of autonomous and rational individual person there was no automatic link. Only the privileged 
had the right to this quality which allowed one to stand in court in ones own name. For the etymological 
origin o f the word “person,” see infra note 39.
1XFor details on tracing the metaphysical traits back to the individual person see Lucien L6vy-Bruhl, 
L'idSe de responsibility (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1884).
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also by Moore, this postulate suggests that as long as all the four underlying moral 
principles are based on concepts such as action, intention, causation, accountability, 
negligence, compulsion, and alike, persons are conceived as rational and autonomous 
agents.19
Moore has deduced the autonomy and rationality of the individual person starting from 
the topic-neutral moral principles that he had identified as being at the foundation of 
individual responsibility. Hence, he made a cognitive journey from topic-neutral morality 
to metaphysics. The ultimate importance of Moore's approach to individual responsibility 
for our search for collective agenthood lies though in what one could observe while 
following the path Moore has taken, but in the opposite sense, from metaphysics to 
morality. In this way, it can be observed that by doing this one cannot be sure to reach 
Moore’s starting point. More precisely, Moore’s starting point - a unique set of topic- 
neutral moral principles - does not appear as the only destination one can reach when 
starting from the metaphysical concept of autonomy and rationality.
In this sense, one can agree with Moore's excursion from moral to metaphysical sources 
of criminal responsibility. Nevertheless, within the same legal discourse, if the path to 
individual criminal responsibility goes necessarily through the metaphysics of autonomy 
and rationality, the reciprocal journey is not automatically true. It is not necessarily 
obvious that from the joined metaphysics of autonomy and rationality the only shore of 
responsibility one could reach is the one of the discrete individual. Moore’s conclusion
19Moore, p. 15.
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that criminal discourse, with its topic-neutral moral principles, presupposes the 
metaphysical ideas of autonomy and rationality, does not exclude autonomy and 
rationality at other “ontological levels.” The same metaphysics of autonomy and 
rationality might be the foundation for completely different topic-neutral “moralities,” 
with differently shaped concepts of agent and action, intention and compulsion, causation 
and accountability.20
This possibility of differentiation in the concepts related to the issue of responsibility is 
suggested by some of the sentences in the border guards trials in Germany, but denied in 
the Hungarian trials, and contested by the critics of the Czech Act on the Illegality of the 
Communist Regime. It can be proven, however, that specific systems, based on different 
structures and operations, might include very different topic-neutral principles than the 
ones attached to the individual person. These principles could well be anchored in the 
same metaphysical ideas of autonomy and rationality of the agents as the criminal law 
ones. This allows one to acknowledge that the responsibility concept might take a 
multitude of forms within, as well as outside, the legal discourse.21 These forms might 
present not only alterations, or even the absence, of one or more of the four moral 
principles mentioned by Moore,22 but also the presence of new features, not identified at
Moore appears to be aware in his theory o f the contingency o f the connection between law and 
morals, acknowledging the possibility for differentiated topic-neutral discourses. Ibid.
21
For an analysis o f the characteristics o f both normative and non-normative concepts o f responsibility 
see Karl Jaspers, “Differentiation o f German Guilt,” in Guilt and Shame, ed. Herbert Morris (Belmont: 
Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1971), pp. 40-53. See also, Ingrid Peterson, Four Theories of  
Responsibility, in Studies in Philosophy 3 (Lund: Lund University Press, 1990).
22Moore, p. 14.
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the individual level. Criminal and moral responsibility are traditionally placed at this 
individual level. Nevertheless, one could claim other emerging levels of these two 
discourses, on which the responsibility of formal organisation could be engendered.
This perspective, suggesting a differentiation of the concept of responsibility is confirmed 
even inside the criminal law discourse. Fletcher, for instance, speaks about “particular 
patterns of liability”23 within the criminal system, and Kelman goes even further, denying 
the existence of any coherent moral and even metaphysical foundations of criminal law.24 
The fact is that there is a possibility that the rationale and “moralities” underlying the 
process through which responsibility is attributed to other different types of agents than 
the individual person, could be based on the same metaphysical assumption of autonomy 
and rationality of the agent. This is why, going from the metaphysics of autonomy and 
rationality, one does not necessarily need to reach Moore’s topic-neutral morality of 
individual responsibility.
Therefore, in trying to forge a new dimension of the concept of responsibility one would 
have to start from the idea of a choice of the path leading from the metaphysics of 
autonomy and rationality to that of accountability and blame. This systemic potential for 
choice and differentiated topic-neutral “moralities” is exactly what constitutes the inner 
source of social expectations for justice which emerged in the societies in transition from
23Fletcher, p. 393.
24Mark Kelman, “Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law,” Stanford Law Review 
33 (1981): 591-673.
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totalitarianism. In the coming pages we shall look into the possibility of a valid path to 
be followed from the collective political bodies of the Communist regimes to the core of 
the concept of agenthood - autonomy and rationality - and therefore responsibility, for the 
systematic human rights violations in the Communist Eastern Europe.25
4.3 Theories on Collective Agency: Implications for the Concept of 
Collective Political Responsibility
Building upon this deconstruction of the foundation of social agenthood, this sections 
will look into the way different theories of collective responsibility have acknowledged 
the collective social agent, and the impact each of the analysed theories could make upon 
the recognition of collective responsibility in a process of political justice.
The sociological expressions of the metaphysical dimensions of autonomy and rationality 
are the concepts of agency, intentionality and action. In the search for an ideal formula 
of distribution of responsibility for the human rights violations, the processes of political 
justice in Eastern Europe have been confronted directly with the questions brought by 
these concepts. The search for a collective political responsibility, which would have the 
potential to be sanctioned by law, would have to answer the basic, but essential questions 
related to these three concepts.
25Such a search is far from being outdated, or merely backward-looking. See for instance the present 
debate taking place in the British society which tries to establish whether British police force should be 
qualified as “institutionally racist.” Guardian. 17 October 1998, p. 1.
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Could a political organisation be considered as a collective agent? What would amount 
to acts performed by this collective agent, and what should be considered as its intention? 
These questions are common to all candidates for the status of a formal organisation, and 
have been addressed most often with respect to corporate organisations. Other types of 
collective entities, such as professional bodies or universities, have also been subject to 
a similar investigation.26 The answer has never been straight forward, however, and in 
the remaining part of this chapter the main milestones of the debate on collective 
responsibility will be outlined. The aim of this analysis will be to identify the sociological 
perspectives from which a process of political justice may include or not, a collective 
dimension of accountability.
4.3.1 Methodological Individualism or the Theory of the Scapegoat
What makes it possible to condemn officers and political figures for crimes against 
humanity and war crimes and, at the same time, to deny implicitly that those systematic 
acts of violence belonged to government policies? Politically, this kind of decision can
16An interesting point o f legal creativity in this respect is represented by a decision taken in February 
1992 by the Italian Corte di Cassazione. Through this decision lawyers have acknowledged Mafia as a 
collective criminal. Hence, individuals have been convicted not for direct involvement in specific crimes, 
but for merely belonging to the informal, and thus invisible for the purpose o f  criminal law, hierarchy of  
Cosa Nostra. La Republica (Italy), 17 February 1992. Also, Gunther Teubner, “The Invisible Cupola: From 
Causal to Collective Attribution in Ecological Liability,” in Environmental Law and Ecological 
Responsibility: The Concept and Practice of Ecological Self-Organization, eds. Gunther Teubner, Lindsay 
Farmer and Declan Murphy (John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 1994), p. 17 ff. Nathalie Boucquey, “Hot Spots in 
the Bubble: Ecological Liability in Markets for Pollution Rights,” in Environmental Law and Ecological 
Responsibility: The Concept and Practice o f Ecological Self-Organization, eds. Gunther Teubner, Lindsay 
Farmer and Declan Murphy (John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 1994), pp. 49-51.
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be justified in various ways. Sociologically and legally though, such a narrow perspective
appears very much as a consequence of reversed anthropocentrism; it is the legal outcome
of applying what in the social theory was coined as methodological individualism.27
The theory of methodological individualism denies formal organisations the quality of 
moral agency. According to this theory, finding a collective organisation of any kind 
responsible for acts or omissions committed by its members, would mean embarking on 
an impossible ontological mission. This would be so because of the impossibility of 
accounting for the qualitative metaphysical differences between humans and 
organisations. The theory of methodological individualism is constructed upon, and 
limited to, the framework used by Moore. It promotes the idea of the impossibility to find 
a topic-neutral normative ground for a plural entity of any kind. This impossibility arises 
merely because organisations do not - according to methodological individualism - 
possess a similar type of autonomy as that of the individual person, and because 
organisations are not “rational” in the same way humans are. By not presenting identical 
forms of autonomy and rationality as a human, a collective body could not be seen as a 
unitary agent, with an existence of its own, distinct from the one of its individual 
members.
This lack of “unity” entails that only individual liabilities of particular members are 
acknowledged by law, liabilities that are based on the members’ direct and intended
27Michael Keeley, “Organisations as Non-Persons,” Journal o f Value Inquiry 15, no. 2 (1981): 149-55. 
Manuel G. Velasquez, Business Ethics: Concepts and Cases (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1982), 
p. 17 ff.
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actions. The individual liabilities, according to this theory, could be aggregated, but this
would not change the individual nature of the ascribed responsibility.28 An example of
this perspective over the concept of social agency, and therefore responsibility, is the
outcome of the first sentence in the border guard trials in Germany, where the Politburo
members directly in charge of the border policy were held responsible for the killings.29
Supporters of methodological individualism find that ascribing responsibility to the group 
as a whole and not to particular individuals based on a fiction creates a confusing and 
dangerous way of proceeding.30 For instance, in the case of the border guard trials, this 
atomising view over the organisational responsibility makes it inappropriate to ascribe 
the responsibility for the border shootings otherwise than by way of individual direct 
liability, and eventually strict liability. The implication of such a perspective is that it 
would be inappropriate to hold the government responsible for disastrous or even 
criminal policies, or for creating and maintaining huge machines of repression.
The reasoning underlying the theory of methodological individualism is rather simple. 
Devoting the concept of responsibility strictly to the notion of causality, this position 
defines moral responsibility as being attached only to those actors in which the action
Larry May, Sharing Responsibility (Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 1992), p. 58.
29See supra Section 2.3.
30Velasquez developed this “fiction theory” with respect to corporations. He also claims its 
applicability to other types o f formal organisations as well. See Manuel G. Velasquez’, ’’Why Corporations 
Are Not Morally Responsible for Anything They Do?” in Collective Responsibility: Five Decades o f  
Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics, eds. Larry May and Stacey Hoffmann (Savage, Md.: Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1991), pp. 111-131.
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originates.31 According to this theory, a homology of nature between the discrete 
individual and the collective organisation is not enough. In order for a collective entity 
to be considered a moral agent,32 an identity o f nature between the discrete individuals 
and the collective organisation would be required. This coincidence of the two entities 
is, of course, difficult to argue for. Thus, in the context of methodological individualism, 
the notion of origination33 conveys the idea of an actor in which the “mental” element 
would achieve unity with the “bodily” element. Formal organisations would, in any 
situation, lack the necessary mens rea and actus reus, elements which are considered the 
core of the philosophical and legal notion of responsibility. For instance, the rationality 
exercised by the board of directors of a corporation could not be identified, it is argued, 
with the rational functions performed by the human brain. As to the actus reus of the 
organisation, both from the perspective of the organisation as a fictitious legal entity and 
from the one of the organisation as a sociological entity (as a real organisation, comprised 
of several members), the performance would belong to the individuals and not to the 
collective entity. The latter would not act, except vicariously, through its members.34
It is from this position of methodological individualism that the Hungarian legislator
”[An] act is intentional only if  it is the carrying out o f an intention formed in the mind o f the agent 
whose bodily movements bring about the act.” Velasquez, “Corporations,” p. 120.
32Again, the term “moral” - far too generalised to replace it - comes often to confuse the issue of 
responsibility, setting confusing anthropomorphic standards. In fact, often by moral agent it should be 
understood any social entity with capacity o f autonomy and rationality.
33Velasquez, “Corporations,” p. 123.
34Velasquez “Corporations,” p. 118.
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chose to respond - through the law modifying the statute of limitations - only to those 
social expectations for justice to which the condition of origination could be met. The 
law refers to the direct perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity, but does 
not mention anything about bringing to justice the political structure which generated 
those crimes. On the other hand, the Hungarian Constitutional Court, while putting its 
seal of approval on the law, removed even the slightest chance for an interpretation of the 
law that would make the Communist governmental bureaucracy accountable. In this 
sense, the Court rejected the amendment of the statute of limitations for crimes of high 
treason. This rejection made it impossible for the legal debate on the responsibility of the 
Hungarian Communist Government to be opened.
The position of both the Hungarian legislative body and the Constitutional Court ignored 
the way in which the “capillary” points of power - as Foucault called the constitutive 
elements of an entity - are invested and annexed by more global phenomena.35 Foucault 
pointed to the subtle fashion in which more general powers or economic interests are able 
to engage with technologies that are at once relatively autonomous of power and act as 
its infinitesimal elements.36 One could rightly ask then whether the responsibility for large 
scale or complex actions such as the repression of a mass movement, the organisation of 
forced labour and extermination camps, or even bringing whole societies to the point of 
economic, political, social and moral bankruptcy, could be ascribed to discrete
Michel Foucault, “Disciplinary Power and Subjection,” in Power, ed. Steven Lukes (Oxford:
Blackwell Publishers, 1992), p. 235.
36Foucault, p. 240.
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individuals, or, whether “fictitious” legal entities could perform, beyond their 
fictitiousness, the role of actor.
According to this perception of the collective organisation as a fictitious legal entity, the 
collective entity is related to its members “as a legal ‘principle’ is related to those ‘agents’ 
who are empowered to act on its behalf and whose acts are conventionally attributed to 
the legal ‘principle.’”37 From here, the methodological individualism conveys the 
conclusion that it could not be the “principle” which is acting, but the “agents.”38 Thus, 
from the individualist point of view, making the Government or any other political 
bureaucracy responsible would actually be a convention, a socio-legal construction meant 
for the pursuit of some goals and based on some broad rules or principles. It is to these 
ideas also that we can trace back the reluctance of the Czech(oslovak) legislator and 
Constitutional Court, of openly promoting what otherwise are conspicuous implications 
of both the Czechoslovak screening law and, especially, the Czech Act on the Illegality 
of the Communist Regime: the collective responsibility of the Communist hierarchy for 
the crimes committed under the Communist regime. As mentioned earlier, the Hungarian 
case appears also dominated by the same unilateral perspective.
Methodological individualism might be right though: the formal organisations can be 
seen as socio-legal constructions tailored to match to a certain degree, the sociological 
reality of corporations, political parties, or other types of collectivities. But, the individual
37Velasquez, “Corporations”, p. 121.
38 Velasquez, “Corporations,” p. 129.
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person39 can be seen in the same way: just another type of legal construction, another type 
of fiction.40 Similarly it appears to be, to some extent, the case of the individual person's 
autonomy, as seen by law. In this sense, Larry May speaks about “pseudo-unities” 
proposed as facts, and which constitute a postmodern challenge for political philosophy.41 
In reality, he argues, these pseudo-unities “set up oppositions that arbitrarily separate 
those who are included and those who are excluded from a shared conceptualisation or 
practice” (emphasis mine).42
If the formal organisation, as well as the discrete individual, are both fictitious (legal) 
entities, one has to consider that the social entity which appears as a result of this type of 
construction represents a complex of structural and operational features which, by the real 
nature of the system they define, would themselves be “fictitious” constructions. What 
this actually means is that the information produced by the system, its needs, its risks as
39It would be interesting to notice here the etymology o f the word “person,” and the significance of this 
etymology in law. In antiquity, the characters in a play used to wear a mask specially designed per sonare 
(lat.), for propagating the voice o f the actor in the whole amphitheatre. The Latin persona  originally 
referred to dramatis personae. Concise Oxford Dictionary, s.v. “person” (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1964), p. 906. A proposed etymology o f the word person claims that the Roman law adopted the 
term to name the actors not in a play but in a legal dispute, that is to express who had, and who had not, 
voice in front o f the law. In this sense see also contemporary legal expressions such as legal personality 
orpersonne juridique, often referring to collective entities. It is also significant that in the Roman law to 
be a human being was not enough in order to be considered a person and to have voice in front o f the law. 
This suggests once more the artificiality o f legal personality as legal construction even when applied to 
human beings.
40Norrie, pp. 685-701. Again, in the Roman legal tradition persons are creations or artifacts o f the law 
itself, and there is no pretence that they would have an existence o f  any kind outside the legal sphere. In 
this sense, the concept o f person is, to a large extent, ignorant o f the biological status o f the entities it is 
attached to.
41May, Sharing Responsibility, p. 171 ff.
42May, Sharing Responsibility, p. 173.
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well as its responsibilities, are all social constructions, dependent upon the system in 
which they emerge. From this perspective there would be no reason to expect the concept 
o f responsibility to take the same form when applied to the collective agent, and the 
collective agent to obey the same rules as (just) another fictitious legal construction such 
as the individual person.43 One might agree that, in order to be responsible, an entity 
should prove a certain degree of autonomy and rationality, but there is no logical 
necessity for accepting a mechanism for the attribution of responsibility which is 
designed specially for the individual person.
Attributing acts and thus responsibilities to collective actors is an attempt to make the 
concept of responsibility match the specificity of an autonomous system44. The view of 
the methodological individualism on the concept of agency and responsibility rightly 
draws our attention towards the role played by the individual members of collective 
bodies. To a certain extent it is true that collective entities act vicariously. They do attain 
their objectives only through acts performed by individual members. The decisions on 
which the violent repression of the 1956 democratic movement in Hungary were based
43Laurence Rosen, “Intentionality and the Concept o f the Person,” in Criminal Justice, eds. J. Roland 
Pennock and John W. Chapman (New York: New York University Press, 1985), p. 252 ff. Peter A. 
French, “The Corporation as a Moral Person,” in Collective Responsibility: Five Decades o f Debate in 
Theoretical and Applied Ethics, eds. Larry May and Stacey Hoffmann (Savage, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 1991), pp. 134-137.
^D e George's position with respect to the deliberate, and thus “conventional,” origins o f  the corporate 
responsibility is relevant in this sense. “There is no one correct way o f legally assigning responsibility with 
respect to corporate activity...The question of how many o f the freedoms o f natural persons corporations 
should enjoy is a question that many recent court decisions have been concerned with. But the answer is 
in part one that must be decided - decided for good reasons, to be sure - but decided... It is not a matter of 
seeing, in some arcane sense o f seeing, which freedoms the corporation really has.” (Emphasis mine). 
Richard T. De George, Moral Responsibility and the Corporation. Paper presented at the 1978 meeting of  
the Society for Value Inquiiy, in conjunction with the American Philosophical Association (27 December 
1978), pp. 19-20.
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were not taken by the Communist party as a whole, nor by the whole government, and the 
actions of repression against peaceful demonstrations were not carried out by either of 
these two groups. The orders were given and the decisions were signed by identifiable 
individuals, members of the Hungarian government and leaders of the Communist party. 
Hence, it appears that governments act vicariously, through their ministers, officials, civil 
servants. Without invalidating this dependence of the organisation upon its members, an 
important question remains still to be answered. If organisations act vicariously through 
their members, it is not less true that the members of a political, or corporate bureaucracy 
act themselves ‘Vicariously,” through the structures to which they belong. Without being 
invested with special powers by the structure in which they function, these individual 
persons would not have the same capacity to harm and to commit “official crimes.”45 To 
whom then, is the responsibility to go for acts committed in such “vicarious 
circumstances”?
It might also be true that the members of a formal organisation do not resemble perfectly, 
and do not act exactly as the limbs of the human body. Nevertheless, relying only on the 
individual autonomy, in an environment designed to subdue this autonomy and suppress 
any values other than the systemic ones, does not seem an appropriate response to the 
sociological reality of organisations46 The legal fiction of collective agency would come
45The official crime is the one imputed to individuals or organisations acting within the scope o f office 
or other (legitimate) authority. Dennis F. Thompson, “Criminal Responsibility in Government,” in 
Criminal Justice. Nomos 27, ed. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (New York and London: New  
York University Press), p. 201.
46Such a pure theory o f the individual autonomy does not exist even in the criminal law where 
mitigating circumstances are often invoked relative to the social background o f the individual actor, as well
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to answer this sociological reality of the collective organisation, and by doing so it 
transcends mere “fiction.”
Some formal organisations can represent a huge power potential, which is matched 
correspondingly by a huge potential for doing harm. Donaldson in fact argues that the 
main source of the organisational power lies in its power to organise.4,1 It is thus 
important to acknowledge this sociological reality and to look beyond the metaphysics 
of the discrete individual members, searching for appropriate deontological, procedural 
principles of collective action. By not doing so, methodological individualism 
overestimates the individual autonomy and underestimates the organisational complexity. 
The individual can be easily swallowed, assimilated and, finally transformed by the 
Gogollian “Moloch.”48 The responsibility of a government bureaucracy would have a
as other factors which might have impaired his or her socially constructed autonomy. Related to this, see 
Norrie, op. cit., p.687 ff  on the decline o f the objective theory o f causation. One should also be aware of 
the reality o f causation, especially o f causation in law. We set about locating the causes o f harm in order 
to make operational the notion o f control, in order to control states o f affairs. Therefore, the causal analysis 
is usually corrupted by the process of control. “We describe as the causes o f an event that practical 
condition by which we hope to control...” R. B. Perry, General Theory o f  Value: Its Meaning and Basic 
Principles Construed in Terms o f Interest (Cambridge. Mass., 1954), p. 418. Also, in the moral domain, 
an ambivalence of the term “responsibility” was pointed out. The term can sometimes be used to highlight 
a causal connection between an agent and an action (the factual perspective), while in other cases the 
expression “responsible for” refers simply to the agent's liability under the rules to be blamed. See H.L.A. 
Hart and A. M. Honors, Causation in the Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), p. 61. On the same line, 
Casey argues that both our judgements o f causal responsibility and our descriptions o f the individual's 
actions are shaped by the expectations society attaches to the agent. John Casey, “Actions and 
Consequences,” in Morality and Moral Reasoning, ed. Casey, John (London: Macmillan, 1971), p. 180.
47Thomas Donaldson, Corporations and Morality (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1982), p. 27 
ff. Related to this, see also Virginia Held’s attribution o f responsibility to random collectivities for “failing 
to organise.” These theoretical arguments seem to support the position taken by the German courts in the 
last sentences passed against the GDR Politburo members. See infra Section 2.3.
48”Organisations are designed and persons within them trained in ways that are intended to lead to 
organisational decisions that realise [these] goals as efficiently and as far as possible.” Susan Wolf, “The 
Legal and Moral Responsibility o f Organizations,” in Criminal Justice, eds. J. Roland Pennock and John 
W. Chapman (New York: New York University Press, 1985), p. 281. Thompson also, acknowledges the
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derivative character only if the actions of the organisation were strictly a function of the 
actions of the individual members. This inference though, is not as obvious as 
methodological individualism would like us to believe. Accepting all the thesis of this 
theory would mean to restrict ourselves to the topic-neutral sources of responsibility as 
conceived by Moore. As I have argued in the previous section though, there is a place, 
and a need for differentiated topic-neutral moralities and thus, responsibilities.
The perspective offered by methodological individualism over the concept of collective 
responsibility presents definite shortcomings for redressing the imbalance of power 
between the individual person (citizen, employee, customer, etc.) and the organisation. 
However, in the specific case of collective political responsibility, methodological 
individualism helps us to a certain extent not to lose sight of the wood for the trees; in 
other words, a political responsibility which would act like an umbrella, encompassing 
without differentiating all the members of a complex political organisation, if used alone 
for answering the social expectations for accountability and justice, would be as 
incomplete and unjust as the “classical” tendency of limiting the whole process of 
ascribing responsibility to the criminal trials of some border guards.
The acknowledgement of one type of responsibility, (in this case the collective 
responsibility of a political body), should not prevent us from considering the use of other
constraints imposed on officials by bureaucratic practices and procedures, constraints which arrive to 
circumscribe an official's range o f choices. These constraints originate both in the hierarchical patterns of 
authority according to which bureaucracies are structured, as well as in the process o f specialisation and 
routinisation. Thompson, pp. 204-6.
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mechanisms of ascribing responsibility, such as criminal or tort law. It should also be 
stressed that, the collective responsibility should by no means exclude the use, where 
applicable, of the individual responsibility. In fact, as some evidence shows in the case 
of the Hungarian law amending the statute of limitation, the process of bringing justice 
through one mechanism only has practically failed because of the lack of a proper 
political environment. This environment, it is argued, could have been enhanced in a way 
which favours the implementation of individual responsibility if a notion of collective 
responsibility would also have been developed.49
Besides being affected by the procedural deficiencies of the law amending the statute of 
limitations (Law No. 53/1993) described in Chapter Two, the few criminal trials 
organised on the basis of this law have failed to reach a proper end also because of 
competing and conflicting political interests. These political interests would need to be 
curtailed prior to the potential criminal prosecutions. As it was argued in the preceding 
Zetenyi-Takacs law which also aimed at amending the statute of limitations, the 
prosecution was to be started, and trials were to be organised for crimes which had not 
been prosecuted for political reasons.™ As it often happens in post-totalitarian or post- 
dictatorial societies, the persons in the position to organise such trials are also the ones 
who, in the previous regime, promoted and even offered the political reasons which 
prevented the prosecution. In conclusion, in order to be consistent, and to respond to the
49Anne Applebaum, “Une memoir en cache une autre” Commentaire. 78 (Summer, 1997). Also 
Revista 22 (Bucharest), 14-28 iulie 1998, p. 9 ff.
50See supra Section 2.2.1.
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complexity of situations in the post-Communist societies, the process of political justice
has to follow different paths of assigning responsibility.
4.3.2 Structural Restraint View or the Theory of the Virtuous Circle
Methodological individualism is not the only theoretical position which denies the 
possibility of making accountable a formal organisation of any kind, and therefore a 
political organisation as well. The anthropocentric limitations of methodological 
individualism are surpassed by a more sophisticated theory coined “structural restraint.” 
The structural restraint theory answered some of the criticism formulated about 
methodological individualism, trying to accommodate better the formal organisation as 
a sociological reality. This is done mainly by acknowledging the fact that a collective 
agent does not have to be defined solely through the inevitably disqualifying comparison 
with the parameters of the individual legal person.51
The structural restraint theory denies the capacity of formal organisations to be “morally” 
responsible. This denial though is based not so much on an analysis of the traditional 
concepts of action and intention, but on an “ontological” perspective of the organisational 
structure.52 This perspective, developed mainly in relation to the role of corporations,
51 Thomas Donaldson and Patricia Werhane, Ethical Issues in Business: A Philosophical Approach 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1979), p. 33-34.
52Donaldson, Corporations and Morality, p. 2. John Ladd, “Morality and the Ideal o f Rationality in 
Formal Organizations,” The Monist. 54 (1970), p. 498.
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claims that corporations are “controlled” by their very structure. Because of this
dominion, organisations would be incapable of exercising moral freedom.53 Government
bureaucracies, as well as corporations, would belong - according to this view - to the
class of “formal organisations.”
By their very nature, formal organisations would be incapable of accommodating moral 
concerns. The theory allows for the perception of formal organisations as rational 
agencies, but with only a limited autonomy, an autonomy dependent upon their 
“specified” or “empirical” set of goals. The difference between the two rationalities - the 
organisational, and the individual one - would be that organisations act rationally, but 
only as a player in a game: the rules are set previously, and cannot be changed; at least 
not without essentially altering the game. Accordingly, formal organisations would not 
possess those qualities which would enable them to change their own goals; they are 
conceived as goal-pursuing machines which are not designed to morally evaluate their 
environment. In other words, they are restrained by their structure. And, it is argued that 
the structure of a formal organisation cannot be made responsible for reproducing itself. 
Or can it ?
In the specific case of political justice, when one is dealing with organisations belonging 
to a totalitarian structure, the structural restraint theory comes short of offering a viable 
perspective. The Communist “reproduction” was ensured through a large encompassing 
structure, designed for the purpose of exercising complete political dominance over all
53Donaldson, Corporations and Morality, p. 23.
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aspects of social life.54 This was the “empirical” set of goals of the Communist regime. 
The aim of total control was reinforced by the fact that the structure through which it 
pursued this goal had as constitutive elements the key positions in all the important social 
organisations of the society. More will be said in the next chapter about this structure. For 
now, one has to retain only that one is dealing with an “umbrella institution” which 
practically encompasses and transcends all other institutions.55
The consequence of this domination was that the Communist regime, through its power 
structures, had the position not of a player in the game, without any possibility of 
changing the rules, but of the ruler of the game, with the possibility of changing the rules 
whenever convenient. Following the structural restraint view, one would have to 
conclude that the structure of the Communist organisations could not prevent the political 
game from being taken over simply because its structure was conceived without any 
meaningful restraints. This reasoning sounds almost like a reductio ad absurdum of the 
structural restraint view. Nevertheless, it is the only logical consequence of the structural 
restraint theory in those cases when the ruler and the player coincide in the same 
structure.56
54Some authors point out the injustice present in the very creation o f such an organisation. Walzer, for 
instance, argues that intra-systemic “monopoly” is the result o f a normal mechanism o f social development, 
while the inter-systemic “dominance” is destined to bring about injustice. Michael Walzer, Spheres of  
Justice: A Defence o f Pluralism and Equality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), pp. 10-13.
550tfried Hbffe, Political Justice: Foundations For a Critical Philosophy o f Law and the State 
(Cambridge, UK; Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 27-28.
56This consequence was plainly revealed by the debate on the Hungarian laws amending the statute o f  
limitations.
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The coincidence between the player and the ruler appears as paramount for the 
understanding of the process of attribution of responsibility to social agents. We generally 
view judgements of causal responsibility as purely factual, but the causal responsibility 
is much more than a mere relationship between cause and effect. It is a relationship 
between an agent and an external state of affairs as prescribed by an adjudicator. 
Overlapping the two roles - the agent and the adjudicator - is always doomed to end in 
a legal vicious circle, and not a virtuous one as the structural restraint might lead us to 
believe.57 The application ad absurdum of the structural restraint theory does not take 
place, of course, for each formal organisation. The organisation is indeed, restrained by 
its structure, but only to the extent to which it does not become the ruler as well as the 
player. A business organisation which is allowed and empowered by its structure to lobby 
the legislative power, is sometimes almost in the same position of “coincidence” as an 
unlimited government.58
57William Blizek, “The Concept o f Social Responsibility,” Southern Journal o f Philosophy 9 (1977): 
7-9.
co
Ball expressed this idea in a rather blunt way: “I see no greater virtue in corporate managements than 
government bureaucracies - in fact, no inherent virtue in either.” George Ball, Global Companies: The 
Political Economy o f World Business (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975), p. 3. A similar 
cynicism surfaces from what Woodhouse characterises as the decline o f  the reputation o f government 
bureaucracy and Parliament in die UK, a decline reflected by changes “in the system,” as well as outside, 
in the social attitude manifested towards these institutions. See Diana Woodhouse, Ministers and 
Parliament: Accountability in the Theory and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 280 
ff. The social mistrust relative even to the supreme representative body is also reflected in the debates 
generating and generated by the Nolan Committee. This debate appears to situate the supreme legislative 
body more on the “managerial chair” than on the charismatic sovereign pedestal. See “A Year o f the Nolan 
Committee's Inquiry,” Independent (London), 6 November 1995, p. 5, and “Public 'Anxiety' Will Force 
MPs to Disclose,” Independent (London! 7 November 1995, p. 4. Tilly also, comes with an original and 
unflattering comparison between the protection rackets as organised crime and the state making processes. 
Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In. eds. 
Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Reuschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 
1985), pp. 169-191.
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This overlapping of roles appears as the logical consequence of the structural restraint 
view if the law embraces this theory and accepts the formal organisation being guided 
only by its immediate, self-centred, specified role, without any reference to the mediate 
role, that is to the social role that a specific organisation is meant to play.59 Political, as 
well as corporate bureaucracies, function in a relatively identical manner, differing only 
in that they use different mechanisms.60 Both have been invested with power for the 
production of intended social goals for which the immediate goals of the organisation are 
only instrumental. Agreeing with the structural part of the theory that the immediate goals 
of an organisation are “structural,”61 the critics argue then that the organisation should 
itself be accountable, in its structure, for the way in which it uses powers conferred 
primarily for the mediate needs of society, in order to attain its own immediate goals.62 
This accountability can have a chance to be truly achieved not by disabling the
59See the social demandingness theory, in Brummer, James J. Brummer, Corporate Responsibility and 
Legitimacy: An Interdisciplinary Analysis (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 165 ff. The German 
Mauershiitzenprozesse implicating persons beyond the GDR’s National Defence Council could be such 
an example of upholding the mediate (social) goal o f an organisation. The distinction between immediate 
and mediate roles o f organisations is rather rough. Nevertheless, it corresponds to a sufficient extent to the 
dichotomy existing between the internal and external interests relative to an organisation. It suggests 
though, an inherent necessity for internalising (alongside the immediate goals) some basic external 
interests. For an analysis o f the internal and external interests relative to an organisation, see James S. 
Coleman, “Responsibility in Corporate Action,” in Corporate Governance and Directors' Liabilities: Legal. 
Economic and Sociological Analyses, eds. Klaus J. Hopt and Gunther Teubner (Berlin, New York: Walter 
de Gruyter, 1985), pp.77-83. See also Steimann's arguments and proposed solutions for providing voice 
in the corporate governance for both internal and external interests. Horst Steimann, “The Enterprise as 
a Political System,” in Corporate Governance and Directors' Liabilities: Legal. Economic and Sociological 
Analyses, eds. Klaus J. Hopt and Gunther Teubner (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1985), pp. 401- 
427
60Thompson, p. 202 ff.
6 T om pson , p. 201. The structural crime appears as the one which is more a product o f organisational 
practices than o f deliberate decision by individuals.
62See Francis T. Cullen, William J. Maakestad, and Gray Cavender, “The Ford Pinto Case and Beyond: 
Corporate Crime, Moral Boundaries, and the Criminal Sanction,” in Corporations as Criminals, ed. Ellen 
Hochstedler (London: Sage Publications, 1984), p. 103-107.
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organisational structure from evaluating the environment and pursuing its own immediate
goal, but by inducing in that structure new evaluative mechanisms.63 These mechanisms
would then incorporate the mediate, socially imposed goals, converting and internalising
them.64
In spite of its failing to acknowledge the collective responsibility, the theory of structural 
restraint has made an important step forward from the atomising perspective of 
methodological individualism. It has moved the analysis of the corporation as moral 
agency from the moral and criminal discourse, with its stress on intentionality, to the 
domain of the ontology of the organisational system. It was this essence of the matter that 
Rawls sought to address when including formal organisations, along with the individual 
persons, on the list of parties qualified for occupying the “original position.”65 According 
to Rawls, from this position a social agent would be able to opt in the best interest of 
society, not blinded by immediate selfish goals. In other writings though, reflecting the 
traditional academic ambiguity about the nature of formal organisations, Rawls 
backtracks on this position, and states a certain “logical priority” of human individuals.66
The same ambiguity of attitude towards organisations appears in Thomas Donaldson’s
63Stone, Christopher D., Where the Law Ends: The Social Control o f Corporate Behaviour flllinois: 
Waveland Press, Inc., 1991), pp. 123-25.
^Stone, Where the Law Ends, pp. 145-49.
65Rawls, A Theory o f Justice, p. 146. See also, Brummer, p. 165 ff.
66John Rawls, “Justice as Reciprocity,” in Utilitarianism, ed. Samuel Gorovitz (Indianapolis: Bobbs- 
Merrill, 1971), pp. 244-45.
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work.67 Donaldson argues that a complex organisation such as the General Motors 
corporation, which is characterised by a very complex structure, could fit under the 
structural restraint theory while others with a very basic structure and leadership could 
not. This would be so, Donaldson argues, because it would be quite easy to trace the 
corporate responsibility down to the individual one. Looking closer at the conceptual 
novelty brought by theories such as the structural restraint, one can notice that 
Donaldson’s critical approach brings the structural restraint theory back to the 
anthropocentrical representations.
Trying to apply the structural restraint theory to the process of justice in the post- 
Communist countries, one can notice that Donaldson’s view creates the situation that for 
structurally simple, or clearer political bodies, actors could be individually tracked down 
and made accountable. To a certain extent this was the case of the border guards in the 
former GDR and of the Czechoslovak collaborators. At the same time, where complex 
political structures are involved, the process of justice would be impossible both at the 
individual and organisational level. First of all, at the individual level, this impossibility 
would be generated by the difficulty of identifying the necessary degree of action and 
intention in easily identifiable persons. This impediment in assigning responsibility 
would come from the structural complexity of the organisation. The structural complexity 
brings into the decision-making process what is known as “the problem of many hands.”68
67Donaldson, Corporations and Morality, p. 25 ff.
68Ellen Hochstedler, “Introduction,” in Corporations as Criminals. Perspectives in Criminal Justice 
Series, no. 6, ed. Ellen Hochstedler (London: Sage Publications, 1984), p. 10.
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This problem occurs when the map of the decision-structure renders it impossible to 
concentrate any legally significant amount of responsibility on any single individual 
person involved in a specific decision-making process. Secondly, at the organisational 
level, the attribution of responsibility would again be impossible if one would be dealing 
with complex structures. The physiology of the complex organisation would again rescue 
it from being made accountable, since the organisation, in its high complexity, would be 
liable only when acting against its specified empirical set of goals. In the case of the 
Communist regime these goals have been too loose and general to be able to offer any 
real and immediate restraint.
However, contrary to Donaldson's point of view, one has to acknowledge the new 
dimension that the structural restraint theory brings to the identity of a collective agent. 
From the structural restraint point of view, the complexity or simplicity of the 
organisational structure should not prevail in the construction of its responsibility, since 
this is a function of the quality of the system and not a quantitative variable. Therefore, 
the formal organisation, whatever its complexity, would be unable to incorporate moral 
views and values. According to the structural restraint theory, this would be so not 
because mechanisms could not be found or invented in order to make the collective 
organisation reason and act as discrete individuals do, but because the organisation is not 
designed or supposed to reason and act as individuals. The dimension of “not being 
supposed to” would now belong organically to its structure.
This being said, the dimension and complexity of the organisation should have no direct
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and immediate relevance upon the question whether the organisation is, or is not a moral
agency and thus, morally responsible. As long as the corporation is supposed only to talk 
the specialised language of its specific goal, searching for the moral responsibility of a 
one-person-run corporation should be just as superfluous as searching for the moral 
responsibility of a highly bureaucratised corporation. If the business corporation, for 
instance, was “invented” for evaluating the environment from the point of view of 
generating economic profit, one could not expect it to evaluate the environment from a 
moral perspective, even if the leadership of that corporation is represented by one single 
person. Therefore, the formal organisation - structurally complex or simple - will 
accommodate moral questions only to the extent to which they are likely to affect 
substantially, in one way or another, the attainment of the immediate goal embedded in 
its structure and pursued through its operations.
As long as those moral questions remain external to the organisation, that is as long as 
they are not recognised as belonging to the topic-neutral moral domain which should 
define the organisation's identity, these questions would be addressed as external 
obstacles, similar to the way that geographic or financial obstacles would be. Mutatis 
mutandis, for a political organisation it becomes necessary to assert the extent to which 
basic human rights can be seen as part of the mediate goals of the political discourse, 
compulsory in a democratic society.69 Even from the static, structural perspective of the 
structural restraint view though, a political organisation should appear as incorporating 
basic human rights standards, maybe even more than an economic organisation should
690rentlicher, pp. 2539-2541.
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incorporate for instance the socially desirable goal of environmental protection.
In spite of its static vision, the structural restraint theory has the quality of allowing one 
to perceive institutional organisations as socially constructed entities which cannot be 
altered directly, simply by imposing upon the organisation some different immediate 
goals other than its own. Once we have depicted this idea though, we leave the structural 
restraint theory to observe the possibility that the “empirical” set of goals accommodate 
the creation of new internal structures. These structures are meant to recognise and to 
“read” the organisation’s topic-neutral moral domain, construing its mediate goals 
according to its social role. The organisation can be expected to evaluate “morally” the 
environment only after developing its own such mechanism, combining its immediate, 
internal criteria of action (be they profit and efficiency, or acquisition and preservation 
of power) with the external, social ones. In this way the external criteria can be 
internalised and assimilated, becoming a part of the internal parameters of the collective 
agent. If this is true for the economic discourse70, as it is actually true for the individual 
moral and criminal discourses,71 then there should be no reasons to believe that the 
political discourse would function any differently. Once the variety of shapes taken by 
social concepts such as person, agency, autonomy and responsibility has been recognised 
as system dependent, one should be able to go farther and deliberate upon the 
mechanisms through which the responsibility of a specific social agent can be spelled out 
most appropriately.
70Stone, Where the Law Ends, pp. 228-29.
71Rosen, pp. 252-53.
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This possibility is denied by both structural restraint and the atomising views of 
methodological individualism. Velasquez’ fiction theory,72 as well as the structural 
restraint view, urges us to believe that the idea of an organisational responsibility based 
on a institutional morality, and satisfying the requisite intentionality for this morality, is 
due only to endanger the rationality of the criminal law. Parisi points out with sadness 
that, in spite of this danger, liability has sometimes been imposed in exceptional 
circumstances. “On occasion, theories of corporate liability, general criminal law 
concepts, and the elements of the crime have been violated, and still the corporation was 
held criminally liable.”73 One could easily guess that the same evaluation would be given 
to a process of political justice which would openly consider collective responsibility as 
one of its viable options. Why would basic principles of criminal law be betrayed in such 
a way? In order to find out the weight of these accusations we shall now have to look to 
some of the theories which argue, directly or indirectly, for the soundness of such 
decisions.
4.3.3 Structural Pragmatism: Taking the Risk
We have looked so far into theories of collective responsibility which deny organisations 
the dimension of agenthood. In a limited way, we could still draw from these theories
72Velasquez, “Corporations,” p. 129. Also, Velasquez, Business Ethics, pp. 19-20.
73Nicollette Parisi, “Theories o f Corporate Liability,” in Corporations as Criminals, ed. Ellen 
Hochstedler, (London: Sage Publications, 1984), pp. 43-44.
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some constructive points in our search for collective political agency. We shall now look 
into theories and ideas which support - in different ways - the idea of collective 
responsibility as fundamentally different from the responsibility of the individuals who 
come together in an organisation.
Although the two lines of thought - methodological individualism and structural restraint 
- analysed so far have highlighted important aspects that societies should take into 
consideration while engaging in a process of political justice, one could also notice that 
they do not offer the proper locus for a solution. Addressing the question of political 
justice from the position of a methodological individualist we can understand the 
necessity of dealing with the “legally traumatic” past at the individual level, on the moral, 
criminal or political ground. Nevertheless, it is obvious that such an approach, though 
necessary to some extent, would take into consideration only one aspect of a collective's 
identity: the dichotomy between the structure and the elements of the collective agent.74 
There are good reasons though to doubt that this dichotomy can and should always 
prevail in selecting and patenting the social agencies. Therefore, a theory which would 
take into consideration not only the anthropomorphic elements of an organisation, but the 
sociological and systemic ones as well, will offer more chances of success in finding a 
suitable mechanism of responsibility which would match better the type of collective 
entity under consideration.
74Fisse, Brent, “The Duality o f Corporate and Individual Criminal Liability,” in Corporations as 
Criminals, ed. Ellen Hochstedler (London: Sage Publications, 1984), pp. 71-72.
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The potential benefit derived from taking into consideration all the dimensions defining 
an organisation is also neglected in ossifying structural approaches, such as the structural 
restraint theory. The combination of the different sources of identity seems attainable 
only by going beyond the structural approach. This is the type of approach which would 
allow one to consider not only the eventual homogeneity and unity of a collective actor, 
but also the operative decision structures and procedures in place at a certain moment in 
time. These structures and procedures would incorporate the apparently segregated 
decisions of the discrete members. This approach is the only one which would allow us 
to put in context acts such as the decision of the German border guards to shoot innocent 
people, the decision of the Hungarian party leader to use the Soviet army against the 
Hungarian population, or the activity of the Secret Police services developed practically 
everywhere in the Communist bloc, including Czechoslovakia. The view that the 
structure and the charter of a formal organisation, along with its policy and organisational 
culture, generate something completely different from what otherwise would be a random 
collective, can put all these decisions into a completely different light.75
According to Wolf for instance, who formulates a vision of structural pragmatism over 
the concept of collective responsibility, formal organisations do have all the necessary 
apparatus for being able to chose their actions and therefore, the actions of their
75Some authors would even disagree with drawing too sharp a distinction between the formal and the 
informal or random collectivities in the debate on the collective responsibility. Virginia Held, “Can a 
Random Collection of Individuals Be Morally Responsible?” In Collective Responsibility, eds. Larry May 
and Stacey Hoffmann (Savage, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.: 1991), pp. 89-100.
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members.76 The Communist political structures, for instance, could have offered to their 
members the choice to take more ethical decisions. Something close to this reasoning was 
implied in the trial of the GDR politburo members. In W olfs opinion, the fact that the 
organisation could have chosen, on moral grounds, to act differently than it actually did, 
causing harm, means that the organisation ought to have so chosen. The distinction 
between the causal (individual) actor and an agent “of a more responsible sort” is 
attenuated by Wolf with the claim that they both have in common the intellectual or 
cognitive capacity to be sensitive and responsive77 to complex reasons for and against 
various actions. This capacity would be a necessary condition for being either morally, 
or practically a responsible agent.78
According to this characterisation, the formal organisation does not appear as a moral 
agent, or at least not in the common sense of the word “moral.”79 Although not 
irreducible moral agents, organisations nevertheless appear as “agents of another sort,” 
as social constructions presenting sufficient distinctive features to make them
7 f%Wolf, pp. 274-279. This theory is referred to by a series o f different other names. Hay and Gray, for 
instance, call it “the quality o f life management theory,” Sethi refers to it as “the social responsibility 
model,” and in Brummer it appears as “the social demandingness theory.” Robert Hay and Ed Gray, 
“Social Responsibilities o f Business Managers,” Academy o f Management Journal. March 1974, pp. 135- 
145. Prakash S. Sethi, “Dimensions o f Corporate Social Performance: An Analytical Framework,” in 
Managing Corporate Social Responsibility, ed. Archie B. Carroll (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
1977), pp. 69-75. Brummer, pp. 165-184.
77This cognitive capacity can be deduced also from Montesquieu’s distinction between moderate and 
immoderate governments. See Montesquieu and Shklar, Chapter Two, note 68.
78Wolf, p. 277.
79John Ladd, “Morality and the Ideal o f Rationality in Formal Organizations,” The Monist 54 (1970), 
pp. 489-490.
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“appropriate bearers of important kinds of legal responsibility.”80 This perspective would 
allow for the political structures of the Communist regimes to appear as “shareholders” 
in both criminal and non-criminal legal responsibility.
Wolf argues for the existence of a different perspective on the meaning of responsibility. 
Besides the causal and the moral sense, a “practical sense” appears as equally important.81 
This meaning, which is not completely unknown in the discourse of liability especially 
outside the criminal law, is used “when our claim that an agent is responsible for an 
action is intended to announce that the agent assumes the risks associated with that 
action,. . .  [that] the agent is considered the appropriate bearer of damages, should they 
result from the action, as well as the appropriate reaper of the action’s possible 
benefits.”82
Constructed in this way, the notion of “practical responsibility” has implications beyond 
the limits of criminal law or morality, and it represents an important step forward in our 
quest for a political responsibility. The important aspect is not that the institutional 
organisation can, or cannot be brought under the criminal law, but that it is brought under 
the law as a collective agent, and not as a mere causal factor. Appearing as a collective 
persona may, in some circumstances, lead to the observance by the collective entity of
on
Wolf, p. 279. Celia Wells, Corporations as Criminals (Oxford: Clarendon Press New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), pp. 39-44.
81Laddp. 511.
82Wolf, p. 276. See also Wells, p. 2 ff.
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some specific systemic “topic-neutral” moral principles. Although emotional capacities 
would lack in organisations, the presence of cognitive capacities would make an 
organisation (be it economic or political), susceptible to an (initially) externally induced 
moral force. Accordingly, the organisations would assume responsibilities which derive 
from the topic-neutral principles of the system. The task of identifying concretely these 
foundational principles belongs to the civil society and to the social science debate. On 
the other hand, according to Wolf, reevaluations can be built into the very structure of an 
organisation83 or, the organisations can be prompted to do it themselves.84
Looking attentively to the way the practical responsibility is formulated, one can identify 
a possible parallel with Moore’s system of moral and metaphysical sources of (criminal) 
responsibility. If in the context of collective responsibility we consider as a systemic 
procedural moral principle the idea, underlined by Wolf, that an agent taking an action 
has also to take the risk associated with that action, (in our case such risk could be 
conceived as the risk of revolution), we soon realise that the metaphysical basis of the 
concept of responsibility established by Moore is in no way contradicted. This leads us 
to the idea of contingency of the relationship between the concept of responsibility and 
a certain form of autonomy and rationality of the agent.
The contingency between the concept of responsibility and its transcendental underlying
83 Wolf, p. 281.
84See Stone, Where the Law Ends, pp. 122-149.
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ideas of autonomy and rationality85 allows us to consider the idea of a political 
responsibility based on other topic-neutral elements than the ones offered by the criminal 
law, and by the concept of individual agenthood. From this position, one might be able 
to re-assess the retroactive ban often invoked as an argument against political justice. 
This ban has roots in the “topic-neutral” moral principles underlined by Moore.86 The 
change in the structures of society brought about by a totalitarian regime, and the 
specificity of the unique powerful political agent, demand a re-assessment of the way the 
ban on retroactivity is applied.87 At the same time, accepting Wolfs suggestion of a 
“practical responsibility” rooted in the risk theory,88 and also accepting the possibility of 
an autonomy and a rationality of a different substance,89 opens up for the process of 
political justice a path which goes beyond Moore’s individual responsibility.
Yet, for the purpose of a process of justice following a repressive regime, one might be 
prompted to prefer a hierarchical model of attribution of responsibility to the collective 
one proposed by Wolf. This would be so because of the sterilisation or blamelessness of
85See supra Moore, Chapter Four, Section 4.2.
86Supra Section 2.2.1.
87The rule o f law, o f which the ban on retroactivity is an important part, is seen as the theoretical 
foundation o f “the legal system o f competitive society.” Cotterrell quoting from Franz Newmann in Roger 
Cotterrell, Law’s Community: Legal Theory in Sociological Perspective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 
166-7). When social conditions change, with other agents coming into the social arena (or new dimensions 
of existing agents are acknowledged), this foundation offered by the rule o f law is naturally reconsidered.
88Robert Baldwin, “Introduction - Risk: The Legal Contribution,” in Law and Uncertainty: Risks and 
Legal Processes, ed. Robert Baldwin and P. Cane (Boston, Mass : Kluwer Law International, 1996), p. 13. 
Also, Francois Ewald, L'etat providence (Paris : Bernard Grasset, 1986), p. 201 ff.
89Moore, pp. 11-14.
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actors and actions implied by this theory of practical responsibility. Assuming that 
responsibility for policy always falls on the official holding the top position in the 
hierarchy neglects, however, the realities of the political bureaucratic decision-making 
process; it neglects the problem of many (invisible) hands, present in this process.90 This 
problem would make the hierarchical attribution of responsibility as depleted of blame 
as the collective attribution appears in W olfs theory.91 The collective model from her 
proposal solves the problem of many hands, although collective accountability remains 
incompatible with the notion of moral blame, or guilt.92
In conclusion, it can be said that the structural pragmatism theory of collective 
responsibility proposed by Wolf fully acknowledges the constraints imposed on officials 
by bureaucratic practices and procedures, and the fact that these constraints circumscribe 
an official’s or civil servant’s range of choice. The theory, however, falls short of 
proposing a model which would acknowledge formal organisations as “moral” agents,
90Leonard H. Leigh, Strict and Vicarious Liability: A Study in Administrative Criminal Law (London: 
Sweet and Maxwell, 1982), p. 18 ff.
91 The contributory fault might appear as equally weakened or eliminated, both hierarchical and 
collective responsibilities appearing as subspecies o f strict liability. See, Joel Feinberg, “Collective 
Responsibility,” in Collective Responsibility: Five Decades o f Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics. 
eds. Larry May and Stacey Hoffinann (Savage, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1991), pp. 53- 
76.
92Wolf s hesitation to qualify organisations as moral agents has deep roots. Usually, the moral guilt has 
been attached to the inner world o f the soul, and moral responsibility was seen only as self-attributable, 
distinct from social blameworthiness. See for instance Karl Jaspers, “Differentiation o f  German Guilt,” 
in Guilt and Shame, ed. Herbert Morris (Belmont: Wadworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1971), p. 45. 
Other authors, however, have chosen to challenge this distinction, characterising the process through which 
blame is ascribed as “a conceptual mechanism for internalising judgements o f social blameworthiness in 
the absence of external authority.” Marion Smiley, Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of 
Community: Power and Accountability from a Pragmatic Point o f View (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), p. 13. See also, Thompson, pp. 201-240.
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brought about in order to fulfil a social role. In an improved theory of collective 
responsibility, what would count as an expression of autonomy and rationality (action and 
intention) should necessarily refer back to the organisational social role, with immediate 
goals, but also internalised social ones. Applied to collectivities, as well as to discrete 
individuals, such a model could be used to explain the relationship between our particular 
ends, social expectations and legal consequences.93
4.3.4 Functional Structuralism: Taking the Blame
It is from this type of functional ground that Peter French goes beyond the morally 
emasculated practical responsibility proposed by Wolf. French argues for what could be 
called a functional structuralist theory which promotes the idea of an organisational 
responsibility functionally distinct from the one of discrete corporate managers or 
associates.94
French drew an essential distinction among different collective entities, separating them 
as aggregate and conglomerate collectivities An aggregate collectivity, according to 
French, is merely a “collection of people.”95 A change in the membership of such a 
collectivity always entails a change in the identity of the collection. The aggregate
93 Smiley, p. 161.
94French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility, pp. 3-14.
95French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility, pp. 5-7.
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collectivity is not compatible with a varying or frequently changing membership. Given 
this dependency upon its membership, the aggregate is largely under the paradigm of 
normative responsibility offered by the methodological individualism. French agrees 
therefore that, with respect to aggregate collectivities, moral responsibility predicates 
cannot be legitimately ascribed to the collective as such.
French constructs quite differently though the conglomerate collective entity and its 
potential for responsibility. In his conception, a conglomerate collectivity is an 
organisation of individuals such that its identity is not exhausted by the conjunction of 
the identities of the persons in the organisation.96 The existence of a conglomerate is 
therefore compatible in his view with a varying membership. The membership in a 
conglomerate is not determined by whether or not associated individuals materially 
contributed to particular untoward events for which the conglomerate might be blamed, 
but is determined according to whether a person has or not the “credentials of 
membership.”97
While French develops his theory around the concept of organisational structure, he also 
underlines its organic qualities. Similar to the structural restraint view, French also 
compares the organisation with the embodiment of the rules of a game. Nevertheless, the 
similarity between the two approaches stops here, as French reaches rather different 
conclusions. The game, he argues, is a language game, or language system provided with
96French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility, p. 13 ff.
97French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility, p. 17.
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an internal “creativity.” The organisational charter of a corporation would represent the
grammar of a corporate decision-making, while the logic of this is given by the internal
recognition rules.98
A further step aside from the sterilised approach of structural restraint is made by 
distinguishing, among the internal recognition rules, between the procedural rules of 
recognition, and the substantive rules of recognition represented by the “basic belief,” or 
the policy of the organisation.99 This two-folded structure, comprising “an organisational 
or responsibility flow chart that delineates stations and levels within the corporate 
structure” and also the “corporate decision recognition rules,” would have a decisive 
impact upon the qualification of the organisation not only as agency but also as moral 
agency.100 Through this construction, French takes into account the element of self- 
determination or internal redefinition of an organisation, stressing its active (autonomous 
and rational) role. In his view, the minimal requirement for this to be true is to have 
determined that it makes sense to redescribe some of the organisational behaviour in a 
way that would make true sentences which say that the collective agent acted 
intentionally.101 From here, French proposes a different “triangle of responsibility.” The 
responsibility constructed upon the idea of action and intention originating in the same
98French, “The Corporation as a Moral Person,” pp. 146-147.
99The procedural rules o f recognition are partially embedded in the organisational charter, telling us 
about the procedural path a decision has to take in order to become an organisational decision. French, 
“The Corporation as a Moral Person,” p. 147.
100French, “The Corporation as a Moral Person,” p. 148.
101French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility, p. 90.
249
Chapter Four: Theories o f  Collective Responsibility 
individual person - as the “classic” formula on responsibility - is homologated or
parallelled by French with the concepts of action and reason for action originating in the
structure.
French’s re-description of the concept of person through a reformulation of the concepts 
of action and intention becomes indispensable in the attempt to surpass those theories of 
responsibility rooted in Moore’s anthropocentric approach. French avoids the 
anthropocentric bias potentially present in the concept of intention, by describing the 
intentionality of a collective agent as something done for a reason.102 Some authors take 
this reasoning even further in the process of making collective entities responsible, 
arguing that not only fault, but also blame can be attributed to groups, when action and 
intention have been attributed to them.103
French does not change radically the concepts of intention and action, he rather redefines 
them, keeping somehow in touch at the same time, with the basic lines offered by Moore. 
His approach avoids the pitfalls of human intentionality, however, by building upon the 
domain of organisational structure. This structure, characterised by homogeneity or not, 
comprises of specific reasons or, as the structural restraint view put it, of “specific goals.” 
For proving these specific reasons - French argues - the organisational internal 
recognition rules should be sufficient.104
102French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility, pp. 39-40.
103Larry Mav. The Morality o f Groups (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987), p. 72.
104French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility, pp. 93-94.
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The importance of the reliance on reasons beyond the organisational charter or the 
constitutive statute, appears even more important while looking to a political collective 
agent rather than to a corporate one. Without letting in, as determinants of identity, the 
“basic beliefs” or the elements of policy which characterise the bureaucratic political 
structures, their agenthood would be negated, and very complex liabilities would have to 
be assigned, inappropriately, to individual members. These members might have had 
limited, or no control at all over the policy which triggered the harm. On the other hand, 
avoiding this unjust - by individual standards - attribution of fault and guilt could very 
easily mean to put aside, one by one as non-liable, all the discrete members of the 
Communist bureaucracy, and to remain only with a set of abstract relations and structural 
schemes written in a dusty charter.
Following French’s approach, the responsibility for the violent repression of a democratic 
movement for instance, could be assigned not only individually, to a few Communist 
high officials, but also to the political structure itself. This combined accountability is 
conceivable even when the collective body is organised hierarchically. This approach is 
consistent even with definitions of official crime formulated by authors who argue against 
a collective responsibility of collective bodies. Thompson, for instance, sees the official 
crime as “conduct authorised or supported by the organisation, either formally, through 
instructions and procedures, or informally through the norms and practices of the 
organisation” (emphasis mine).105
105Thompson, p. 204.
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Though it might appear as an attempt to rescue a non-existent anthropomorphic unity of
the concept of responsibility, the theory of the internal decision structure formulated by
French makes an important step towards re-establishing an equilibrium between different
forms of accountability. This equilibrium is achieved by breaking away from the
anthropomorphic parameters in the process of defining the collective agency, and by
moving from the causal attribution o f liability, with its requirement o f coincidence o f
intention and action in the same body, to a collective attribution which requires a
coincidence o f action and “reasons” for action, in the same structure.
French therefore argues for the capacity of collective “intelligence” and of “actualization 
of the potentiality of purposiveness”106 of organisations as sufficient reason for the 
participation of organisations in the process of distribution of normative social 
responsibility. This shift in the attribution of responsibility opens the possibility to 
integrate in a process of political justice both the prosecution of discrete individuals who 
have directly perpetrated crimes and violations of human rights, and the prosecution of 
the collective actors who might have authorised or supported, formally or informally, 
these acts. This perspective largely confirms the outcome of the trials of the German 
border guards, and the follow-up trials in which the GDR Politburo has been implicated 
beyond the limits of direct individual participation.107 The same theory allows one to put 
into perspective the “political reasons” for which the Hungarian legislator claimed the
1 CUL
Ernest Weinrib, “The Intelligibility o f the Rule of Law”, in The Rule o f Law: Ideal or Ideology, eds., 
Allan Hutchinson and Patrick Monahan (Toronto: Carswell, 1987), p. 82.
107See supra Section 2.3.
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suspension of the statute of limitations.108 The invocation of the “political reasons” 
becomes part of the process of identification of the topic-neutral morality of the political 
discourse which, as the Zetenyi-Takacs law claimed, the Communist regime had 
“knowingly” disregarded.
The distinction between the two types of agencies and responsibilities might seem self- 
evident in the GDR case where the two agents - the discrete individual and the collective 
entity - had no substantial point of coincidence. The same complementarity is true, 
however, in the situation in which the former (the individual agent) is simultaneously a 
constitutive element of the latter (the collective agent), as happened in the Hungarian 
case. In this sense, the functional structuralism perspective would allow the possible 
attribution of criminal responsibility to some of the Communist leaders, as the direct, 
causal actors in the repression of the 1956 events. At the same time, those officials would 
be, along with the Hungarian Communist government, collectively - both politically and 
legally - responsible for the crimes committed in the process of repression.109
This process of differentiation of responsibility brings one major change to a process of 
political justice. If due to some imperative procedural impediments110 the path of criminal
108Ibid.
109Lucas highlighted the distinction between the logic o f responsibility and the one of material objects. 
His distinction supports the idea o f distributiveness o f responsibility without diminishment, as well as the 
complementarity o f the different forms o f responsibility. See J.R. Lucas, Responsibility (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 75.
110For example, an applicable statute o f limitation, insufficient evidence to build a case against a 
specific person, evidence found in documents with regime o f classified information, etc.
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justice cannot be pursued, this should not exclude the political responsibility for those 
crimes to be assigned to the relevant collective agent. In this sense French made the 
distinction that the ascription of responsibility to an individual member of a conglomerate 
cannot be based simply on the justified ascription of responsibility to the conglomerate 
itself, and vice versa, even if that person was a corporate president. In his opinion the two 
types of responsibility are conceptually different matters, and each has to be justified on 
its own merits.111 This clear distinction between the conglomerate responsibility and the 
responsibility of individuals members of the conglomerate comes from the fact that a 
particular person holding a particular position in the conglomerate organisation is a 
contingent property of the organisation as an autonomous entity.112 Differentiated forms 
of autonomous and rational social agencies should allow therefore for differentiated 
forms of enforcing accountability. This is actually the chance for a political justice 
process to be just.
The process of differentiation of responsibilities brings us also to another aspect related 
to the concept of collective responsibility. The difficulty encountered in finding a 
conceptual framework for the collective responsibility has always been accompanied by 
the difficulty in finding a practical and effective punishment to be attached to it, a 
punishment which would act upon the collective agent more directly and more justly than 
via individual members. In spite of adopting a definition of official crime which
acknowledges the formal and informal pressure the organisation puts on its members,
11 French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility, p. 17.
112French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility, p. 28.
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Thompson opposes the idea of a collective political responsibility.113 Thompson’s main 
argument is that a collective political responsibility would distribute punishment beyond 
individual moral responsibility and therefore, would affect innocent officials, civil 
servants, or even blameless citizens. In order to support his argument Thompson uses the 
example of financial punishments of organisations affecting the employees, an example 
borrowed from the world of business corporations. This is a mistaken analogy though, 
based on the idea that if corporate actors have to pay punitive damages for criminal 
wrongdoing so do political organisations. If so, the deterrent effect in the two cases would 
be obviously different, and it would certainly have little chances of influencing the 
actions of a political agent for which economic profit is not the defining goal. Moreover, 
it is most likely that the punitive fine will be re-distributed “fairly” through the tax 
system, to the very citizens who have been wronged.
The mistake in this approach consists in the failure to realise that the difference in nature 
of the two types of collective agency should be matched by a difference in nature of the 
types of punishment applicable to them.114 The punishment should try to take into 
consideration the immediate goal of the agency. Applying punitive damages to business 
corporations is more appropriate, since it addresses their profit seeking goals for which
113Thompson, p. 204 ff.
114 Wells, p. 46. Stone referred to this need o f adaptability o f criminal punishment when he wrote: 
“Suppose we conceive, as an independent basis o f the criminal law’s educative function, the denunciation 
o f wrongful conduct in ceremonies o f state.. .  [assuming that there is no individual agent to denounce], 
it hardly seems pointless to underscore the gravity o f the conduct by denouncing the corporation. Indeed, 
to denounce the corporation, whose name is more likely to be recognized than that o f any o f its employees, 
is a message calculated to travel.” Christopher D. Stone, “A Comment on ‘Criminal Responsibility in 
Government,’” in Criminal Justice, eds. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (New York: New York 
University Press, 1985), pp. 248-249.
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the societal parameters have been trespassed. The immediate goal of the political actor 
though, is not the profit making, but upholding the political power. Therefore, any 
attempt to punish a collective political actor - if meant to be successful, that is if it is 
meant to have as a result some degree of deterrence - should address the organisation’s 
capacity to uphold power. Traditional - democratic, or less democratic - political 
measures, such as elections, administrative discipline, legislative oversight, impeachment, 
ostracism or political exile, have addressed this specificity of the political discourse, 
though usually at the individual level.115 The same is true of the scope of the Lustration 
Law in the Czech Republic, or of similar screening laws in Eastern Europe, with the 
difference that, in cases such as the Lustration Law a collective political responsibility 
emerges from the standards of expected behaviour of political organisations.116
4.4 Preliminary Conclusions
Could one identify in Eastern Europe a viable political agency which could participate, 
alongside the individual actors, in the post-Communist “moral division of labour”? And, 
what would a mechanism of enforcing such a division of responsibility be like? These
115The collective level was difficult to be reached also in the case o f  corporate actors. See Ronald C. 
Kramer, “Corporate Criminality: The Development o f an Idea,” in Corporations as Criminals, ed. Ellen 
Hochstedler (London: Sage Publications, 1984), p. 18. Wolf, p. 268 ff. Donaldson, Corporations and 
Morality, p. 6. Charles B. Schudson, A. P. Onelion, and Ellen Hochstedler, “Nailing an Omelette to the 
Wall: Prosecuting Nursing Home Homicide,” in Corporations as Criminals, ed. Ellen Hochstedler 
(London: Sage Publications, 1984). John Lynxwiller, et al., “Determinants o f  Sanction Severity in a 
Regulatory Bureaucracy,” in Corporations as Criminals, ed. Ellen Hochstedler (London: Sage Publications, 
1984), p. 147-48.
116Lukas, pp. 208-209.
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questions will be answered in detail in Chapter Five, and Chapter Six respectively. For
this purpose, one should carry from the analysis of the concept of collective responsibility
some essential elements.
Firstly, one should retain the potential of the concepts of agency, intentionality and action 
to be differently shaped, though starting from the same metaphysics of autonomy and 
rationality upon which the concept of responsibility - both individual and collective - 
could be based. In this sense, the topic-neutral principles of political action - principles 
which remain to be spelled out mostly in the socio-political debate117 - would serve to 
define the collective political agency as well as the appropriate mechanisms of 
accountability. Secondly, we have also established that, in the debate on collective 
responsibility, a nucleus has been formed around the idea that, for certain categories of 
organisations one can identify homologies of autonomy and rationality. This leaves open 
for the process of political justice the possibility of identifying a collective political actor. 
This collective actor could participate in the distribution of responsibilities for the 
violations of human rights under the Communist regimes. At the same time, from the 
theories opposing the concept of collective responsibility, one should retain the equally 
important responsibility of the discrete individual. Nevertheless, the coincidence of the 
act and intention in the same person should not undermine the importance of the 
cognitive capacity, and practical responsibility belonging to the organisation to which the 
person might have belonged (through membership or “sphere of influence”). The 
potential for the three key concepts of the individual responsibility - action, intention and
117See Connolly, pp. 11-16.
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person - to be homologous with the concepts of action, reason for action and structure 
respectively, should also be acknowledged and preserved.
With the moral and metaphysical parameters insulated from contamination with the topic- 
neutral morality and the metaphysics of the individual responsibility, the collective 
political responsibility for human rights violations would give a new dimension to both 
the political and the criminal law discourse. On the one hand the criminal discourse is 
enhanced beyond the limitations of an anthropomorphic approach, offering a creative 
reading of the relationship between topic-neutral principles of accountability and the 
metaphysics of autonomy and rationality on which these principles are based.118 On the 
other hand, the collective political responsibility for unlawful or unjust acts, if embodied 
in an appropriate mechanism, can induce in the political discourse the creation of an 
internal morality.119 This morality is “internal” because, in order to be meaningful it must
118Similar suggestions to this enhancement can be identified in the definitions o f corporate crime 
proposed by some authors. Sutherland for instance, who was the first one to formulate a definition o f  
corporate crime, suggested that civil and administrative decisions against corporations be used as an 
argument for implying responsibility o f the organisation where criminal acts have been committed. His 
proposal was from the beginning enlarging the traditional definition o f criminal responsibility as identified 
by Moore, arguing indirectly for the contingency o f the traditional elements o f the concept. Edwin H. 
Sutherland, White Collar Crime (New York: Dryden, 1949), p. 27 ff. A similar enhancing definition comes 
from a study by Cleanard and Yeager. “A corporate crime is any act committed by corporations that is 
punished by the state, regardless of whether it is punished under administrative, civil, or criminal law. This 
broadens the definition o f crime beyond the criminal law, which is the only governmental action for 
ordinary offence.” M. Clinard and P. Yeager, Corporate Crime (New York: Free Press, 1980), p. 16. In 
evaluating these definitions it is useful to bear in mind Klockars' position on the definition o f crime. 
According to him, the debate on the definition o f crime is essentially “a territorial dispute over the problem 
of boundaries of the discipline of criminology... As it is with any boundary dispute, political issues are as 
important as scientific ones” K.B. Klockars, “White Collar Crime,” in Deviants: Voluntary Actors in a 
Hostile World. E. Sagarin and F. Montanino (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1977), p. 236.
119An internal morality is, according to Selznick, the set o f standards that must be honoured if  the 
distinctive mission o f an institution or practice is to be achieved. Philip Selznick, “Self-Regulation and the 
Theory o f Institutions,” in Environmental Law and Ecological Responsibility: The Concept and Practice 
of Self-Organization, eds. Gunther Teubner, Lindsay Farmer, and Declan Murphy (Chichester: John Wiley 
and Sons: 1994), pp.396-402.
258
Chapter Four: Theories o f  Collective Responsibility 
b<e built into the social structure of the political organisation, it must be interwoven into 
its elements of identity.120 As to the word “morality,” it suggests the homology with, and 
mot the identity of, the individual standards. It represents the genus proximus which 
remains to be specified into differentiated elements, corresponding to differentiated social 
systems. In this sense, “morality” accounts for the ethos of a specific system, and is 
expressed through a set of rules and principles. These rules and principles fulfil the 
function of enabling the system to reproduce itself, to survive, in its initial social setting. 
Conceived in this way, the morality of a differentiated system has to be internal in order 
to be operational. French’s functional structuralism creates the basis for such an 
assimilation of mediate social values, by taking into account all the dimensions of an 
organisation’s identity: the structural element, the relationship with other systems, as well 
as the role of the organisation as conceived in its initial social setting.
In the process of shaping this “internal morality” specific to the political discourse, it is 
necessary not only to integrate it under the rule of law,121 but also to accept its 
complementarity with other normative systems.122 As mentioned when analysing the
120Speaking about this integration at the corporate level, Selznick writes that “[a] corporate conscience 
consists o f specific arrangements for making accountability an integral part o f corporate decision making.” 
Selznick, p. 398.
121The rule o f law principle understood either in its formal or substantive meaning. For a 
comprehensive analysis o f these aspects see Peter Craig, “Formal and Substantive Conceptions o f the Rule 
o f  Law,” in Diritto Publico (Saggi, 1995), pp. 35-55.
122Different authors underline the fact that society developed, and is simultaneously using, different 
models o f exercising and controlling power. N. Frank and M. Lombness, Controling Corporate Illegality: 
The Regulatory Justice System (Cincinatti: Underson Publishing Co., 1988), p. 5. Celia Wells, 
Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993), p. 147 ff. For an extended sociological approach o f the matter see Stuart Henry, Private Justice 
(London; Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 179 ff.
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methodological individualism, a collective responsibility that would answer the social 
expectations for making a political body accountable, should not exclude, where 
applicable, the use of criminal or tort law, for bringing justice to the victims of the 
Communist regimes. Therefore, the collective responsibility is not to replace either the 
criminal or civil prosecution of discrete individuals, or the individual moral blame.123 
They are all differentiated discourses which address specific aspects of the social 
relations, and each should be a complement to the others for the realisation of social 
justice. It is in this way that the legal acknowledgement of the social role and 
responsibility of political and corporate organisations, besides the one of the discrete 
individual, achieves the moral division of labour. The distinction between the two types 
of agencies - the individual and the collective one - could be then reflected in the 
possibility of using simultaneously, various legal mechanisms of assigning responsibility, 
according to the specificity of each register of agenthood.
123Karl Jaspers, “Differentiation o f German Guilt”, in Guilt and Shame, ed. Herbert Morris (Belmont: 
Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1971), pp. 40-53.
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Chapter Five
NOMENKLATURA AS A POLITICAL AND LEGAL ACTOR
Abstract
After establishing, in Chapter Four the coordinates of the concept of collective responsibility, Chapter Five 
applies this concept to the socio-political realities o f the Eastern European Communist societies. This 
chapter emphasises two aspects. Firstly, that a specific part o f the Eastern European Communist political 
class can be identified and validly proposed as a collective agent, eligible for a process o f accountability 
addressing human rights violations that occurred under the Communist regime. Secondly, it is argued that 
neither the criminal law responsibility o f a few leading officials in the party-state Communist hierarchy, 
nor a blanket moral responsibility o f whole societies in Eastern Europe should replace the collective 
political responsibility o f  the power structures o f the repressive totalitarian system. Proposing a clearly 
defined collective actor - a potential participant in the legal distribution o f responsibility for human rights 
violations - is meant to help in re-defining the process o f political justice based on a complementarity of  
individual and collective responsibilities.
5.1 The Search for a Collective Agent
The analysis of the debate on the concept of collective responsibility allows one to 
isolate, to a certain extent, the socio-legal discourse on collective agency from other 
discourses which can compete in the arena of political justice. As the definition 
elaborated in Chapter One shows, the reality of political justice is much more 
complicated, with both normative and non-normative discourses competing through 
relatively equal legitimate social expectations.1 The isolation of the legal and sociological 
debate on collective agency is not only possible but also necessary. It allows one to
!See supra the discussion on the definition of political justice, Section 1.2.1.
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establish how far social expectations for justice could be answered through law, that is 
how far the legal discourse would go, and from what moment the search for justice would 
reach beyond the realm of legitimate legal answers. This socio-legal perspective 
determines the domestic choice of constitutional principles - made in processes of justice 
such as has been seen in Hungary, or in the Czech (and Czechoslovak) Republic - which 
can be seen as a choice between different theoretical positions within the debate on 
collective agency.
It is a general normative convention that responsibility has as its foundation the origins 
of action and intention within the same actor. The actor is often assumed to be the 
discrete individual. As we have seen from the analysis of the debate on the concept of 
responsibility, the metaphysics of autonomy and rationality of social agency allows for 
another type of triangle of responsibility. This responsibility has been identified in the 
previous chapter in French’s theory of collective responsibility in the format of action and 
reason for action which originates in the same organisational structure. This responsibility 
format was proposed as a complement, rather than a replacement, for the system of 
individual responsibility in which the action and intention originate in the same 
individual person. This perspective of complementing responsibilities allows one to 
approach the issue of political justice with a set of hypotheses with which one can refer 
back to the Eastern European solutions for political justice. It also allows one to look 
forward, using the potential of these hypotheses in order to identify whether a legally 
viable process of political justice is at all possible.
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One idea to take further in our analysis of the role played by the concept of collective 
responsibility, is the possibility that the individual persons accused of crimes and human 
rights violations during the Communist regime in Eastern Europe might not be the only 
actors responsible for those acts. In certain circumstances, it might appear inappropriate 
to attribute the responsibility only to discrete individuals. This type of rigid attribution 
would imply neglecting the role of the institutions to which those individuals belonged, 
or of those organisations which had the capacity to influence their actions in a 
determinant way. Therefore, acknowledging the role of state and party structures of 
power would require acknowledging a necessary complementarity between individual and 
collective responsibility.
A second idea to consider in our analysis is that from this complementarity of 
responsibilities it can be inferred that the responsibility for the systematic violations of 
basic rights of the citizens committed under an identifiable political bureaucracy could 
be placed collectively, with the power structures of the political regime, and not only with 
its members. It should be mentioned here that, the specificity of collective agency - its 
non-identity with the individual actor - invites caution with respect to the application of 
criminal responsibility to a collective body. This would be true especially in 
circumstances where there is a highly politicised context in which the process of justice 
takes place. The need for cautiousness brings us to the third point to be made regarding 
the debate on collective agency. This point also refers back to what we called the need 
for a legal acknowledgment of the right to revolution. This is the need for an 
acknowledgement of the specificity of the historical context in which justice through
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collective political responsibility is to be considered.
The need for cautiousness in applying criminal law to collective actors, together with the 
need for recognition of a right to revolution suggests that the criminal law should not be 
looked at as the only one capable of offering a framework which would ensure 
accountability in cases of radical political transition. When dealing with systematic 
human rights violations, in a complex political context in which the individual 
responsibility is doubled by a collective responsibility, a need for an “in-between” 
mechanism of accountability should be acknowledged. This middle way to accountability 
is to be tailored around the specificity of the collective actor. Therefore, there remains to 
be found a balance between unjustly applying a criminal responsibility for mere 
membership of an organisation and, on the other hand, totally ignoring the determinant 
role the organisation might have had in the serious crimes which are to be punished.
From these ideas, and looking back to the cases of political justice analysed in Chapter 
Two and Chapter Three, it appears that the outcome of the Hungarian debate on the 
statute of limitations, together with the position taken by the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court, are incomplete, and therefore unjust. The legitimate social expectations for justice, 
supported - as it was shown in Chapter Four - by the conceptual possibility of collective 
agenthood, strongly suggests that the responsibility for the violent repression of the 
democratic movement in Hungary would not be assigned only to a handful of officials 
and their subordinates. It is worth mentioning here that the initiators of the statute of 
limitations law - despite the “political reasons” on which the law was initially argued for -
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failed to acknowledge an otherwise strongly suggested dimension of responsibility that 
could have occupied the middle ground between the individually fashioned criminal 
responsibility, and no responsibility at all.
This alternative responsibility of collective agents is necessary not only when dealing 
with specific human rights violations in a repressive regime, but also when addressing 
the ethos of lawlessness which encouraged and systematically left unpunished many 
crimes and injustices. The German debate on the responsibility for the border crimes 
appears more promising in this sense, offering an enhanced understanding of causation 
in law. On the other side of the political justice spectrum, the Czech screening process 
resembles, as far as one can identify the justification for such a law, a process in which 
partially valid measures are taken for the wrong - or at least ambiguous - reasons. In this 
sense, a certain degree of collective accountability, as suggested both through the 
Lustration Law and through the Act on the Illegality of the Communist Regime, is poorly 
supported by the need for protection against sabotage, blackmail and political scandals. 
In the same tradition of ambiguity as the Lustration Law, the Czech Act on the Illegality 
of the Communist Regime, stirred up a constitutional debate in which a constitutionally 
acknowledged illegality and collective responsibility of the Communist regime has been 
denied any practical legal implications.
In spite of the predominantly individual approach to political responsibility for the human 
rights violations of a political regime, several dimensions of collective responsibility have 
been positively identified in the debate on screening, and indirectly in the debate on
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criminal responsibility. Following the debate on collective responsibility from the 
previous chapter, these aspects can now be assessed. The implied “guilt by association” 
of the collaborators and agents of the Secret Police pointed, of course, to a relatively 
easily identifiable group. This group appeared as guilty of not always clear and easily 
identifiable crimes, the violation of the right to privacy being the most evident one. 
Nevertheless, the entire discussion which took place in all the post-Communist Eastern 
European countries around the issues of collaboration and Secret Police activities and 
files shows us that without a coherent internal decision structure the collaborators and 
Secret Police agents could hardly fit in the model of collective agency outlined in Chapter 
Four.
Supposing even that one could construct all the acts of collaborators as the actions of the 
“body of collaborators,” it would still be very difficult to find a reason for action which 
could be attributed to the collective body, and not to the individual members. This 
difficulty does not reside in the fact that each individual collaborator might have had his, 
or her, personal reasons for collaborating - be this blackmail, pecuniary or professional 
interests, or ideological convictions. Reasons of this kind are present in all organisations 
which fulfill their goals through individual actions. Instead, the real difficulty comes from 
the impossibility to identify in the group of collaborators and agents, a decision structure 
coherent enough to generate its own reason for action, as well as the means for achieving 
it. All we have in the specific case of the Secret Police collaborators and agents is only 
a variety of discrete reasons for actions. This multitude of personal interests, and the 
difficulty in finding a structural element which would override them, leaves us with an
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Another dimension of collective responsibility is considered to include those persons 
affiliated with certain levels of the Communist party apparatus. It is obvious that in a 
totalitarian society controlled by a unique party a decision structure in that party would 
not be lacking. Nevertheless, there is still the important question of correctly mapping the 
decision structure, or structures, which would best fit the parameters of a collective agent. 
The complexity of the exercise of totalitarianism determines that some structures of 
power are only apparent, or incomplete, or overstretched, and therefore represent empty 
structures.2 Thus, it is important to analyse in more detail these structures, in order to 
identify the real locus of responsibility. Enumerating top Party positions - as the Czech 
Lustration Law did - should therefore be substituted, or at least backed, by the 
identification and conceptualisation of the decision structure to which they belonged. 
Firstly, this systematic approach will help emphasise the collective dimension of the 
responsibility imposed over the occupiers of certain positions in the structures of power. 
Secondly, to know the structure would help identify whether lists of positions such as the 
one offered by the Czech Lustration Law, or bodies such as the one identified in the 
German border trials, are incomplete, or over-inclusive.
The case studies analysed earlier have also shown that in the process of political justice 
the individual accountability used alone might bring an incomplete justice, and even a
2Carl J. Friedrich, “The Problem o f Totalitarianism - An Introduction,” in Totalitarianism, ed. 
Carl J. Friedrich (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 4 ff.
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certain degree of injustice. On the other hand, in the previous chapter it has been shown 
that collective bodies with strong enough decision structures could participate in the 
division of responsibility entailed by the process of legal justice. Therefore, it is now time 
to place the “residual responsibility” which cannot correctly be placed with the individual 
actor. It is time to ask and answer “the tantalising question”:3 Where should this residual 
responsibility go?
The attempts at re-instating justice analysed in Chapter Two and Chapter Three offered 
some elements to reflect upon. The Hungarian Constitutional Court, while rejecting the 
Zetenyi-Takacs law amending the statute of limitations, stated that it was “the 
responsibility of the former regime” for not having prosecuted certain crimes. At the 
same time, the Czech legislator, confirmed by the Czech Constitutional Court, declared 
the Communist regime, and its active supporters, responsible for countless crimes rooted 
in political motives. Who is then, “the Communist regime,” and where could one find it? 
What are its elements, its structure, its goals? And, more importantly, could one identify 
in it a strong enough decision structure which could give coherence to the triangle of 
collective responsibility?
3See supra McAdams’s analysis o f the German border guards trials, and the questions these trials 
might raise, Section 2.3.
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5.2 A Hybrid: The State - Party Bureaucracy
When asking these questions of agency and responsibility, the government apparatus is 
bound to emerge as a first candidate to be scrutinised, as it is the one in control of the 
State policies. By examining this entity in terms of its structure and its ways of formation 
one can hope to find that structure of power which, following the pattern of a 
conglomerate organisation, can convey responsibility. In the governmental apparatus, as 
in any social institution, one can generally find the place of real power by tracing, along 
the channels of power, those positions which hold - in accordance with the “constitutional 
charter” of the organisation - the right of appointment and removal of different positions 
in the scheme. In this sense, the different positions and offices within the Communist 
government apparatus were categorised very precisely, according to where this power of 
appointment and removal for each position was residing.4
The particularities of the Communist systems of government in Eastern Europe were
4This formal aspect is common to all governmental agencies. The difference between totalitarian 
and democratic structures o f power resides mainly in the fact that the democratic structures o f power, 
unlike the totalitarian ones, are checked and supervised by other social agencies, such as the police, 
revenue control, religious organisations, NGOs, the mass media, etc. Podgorecki puts the essential 
differences between these types o f experts in a more ideological formulation. According to him, (1) the 
totalitarian structures are used for entirely different goals, and (2) the Communist experts are regarded as 
politically loyal and appointed as such. Adam Podgorecki, “Polish Communist and Post-Communist 
Nomenklaturas,” in Totalitarian and Post-Totalitarian Law, eds. Adam Podgorecki and Vittorio Olgiati 
(Dartmouth: Ofiati I.I.S.L., 1996), p. 334. Also, see infra Voslenkyi, note 92.
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designed, and often copied, from the Soviet model.5 The lists of posts were generally 
divided into sections, with each section containing an established number of positions.6 
The number of positions in each section was in its turn divided into categories according 
to the procedure through which the competence of appointment and removal was 
exercised, and according to the agency which held that competence. As a rule, this 
hierarchical system was directed and watched over by a secretary of the Central 
Committee (CC) of the party who was receiving his final orders from the Presidium of 
the CC.7
Inside the Soviet bloc there existed, with almost no variations, two types of government
5F. J. M. Feldbrugge, “The Status of Law Under Communist Party Rule,” in Ruling Communist 
Parties and Their Status Under Law. Law in Eastern Europe series, no. 31, eds. Dietrich A. Loeber, et al. 
(Dordrecht/ Boston/ Lancaster: Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 1986), p.5.
6An example taken from the Soviet model contains fourteen such sections: I. Party Section; II. 
Propaganda and Education Section; III. Trade Union Section; IV. Health and Social Security Section; V. 
Soviet and Administrative Section; VI. Judicial-Punitive Section; VII. Industry and Production Section; 
VIII. Finance Section; IX. Cooperative Section; X. Credit Section; XI. Planning and Regulation Section; 
XII. Commerce Section; XIII. Land Section; XIV. Transport and Communication Section. Within each 
section there are sub-sections detailing the number o f posts for each position, and the part o f the 
Nomenklatura in which the position was included. The Judicial-Punitive Section at the province level for 
instance, contained ten positions: 1. Procurator of the Province; 2. Deputy Procurator; 3. Procurators of  
the Region; 4. President, Provincial Court; 5. Deputy Presidents; 6. Presidents, Regional Courts; 7. 
Plenipotentiary, OGPU (former name o f the Soviet Secret Police during 1923-1934, later KGB) and Head, 
Special Department; 8. Deputy, OGPU and Head, Special Department; 9. Heads, Regional Department, 
OGPU; 10. Head, Provincial Administrative Department. The selection or appointment o f  these positions 
were decided by the Party Committee Bureau o f the province. See “List o f  a Provincial Party Committee 
in the Soviet Union. In Effect in 1929,” Documents reproduced in Dietrich A. Loeber, et al., eds., Ruling 
Communist parties and their status under law. Law in Eastern Europe series, no. 31 (Dordrecht/ Boston/ 
Lancaster: Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 1986), pp. 509-512.
7T. H. Rigby and Bohdan Harasymiw, eds., Leadership Selection and Patron - Client Relations 
in the USSR and Yugoslavia (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), pp. 87-88. Lothar Schultz, “The 
Status o f the Communist Party in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic,” in Ruling Communist Parties and 
Their Status Under Law. Law in Eastern Europe series, no. 31, eds. Dietrich A. Loeber, et al. (Dordrecht/ 
Boston/ Lancaster: Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 1986), p. 259. Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, Stalin 
and the Soviet Communist Partv: A Study in the Technology o f Power (London: Atlantic Books for the 
Institute for the Study o f the USSR, 1959), p. 55. M. Hirszowicz, The Bureaucratic Leviathan: A Study 
in the Sociology o f Communism (New York: New York University Press, 1980), p. 17 ff.
270
Chapter Five: Nomenklatura
positions lists. Firstly, there was the basic list which encompassed all the positions over 
which the Party held exclusive power of appointment or selection.8 Secondly, there was 
the list of positions of “registration and control.” This category included positions that 
could be filled by the government agencies themselves, but only following consultation 
and approval by the Communist party.9 Though apparently having different constitutional 
regimes, with respect to the agency detaining the power of selection, appointment and 
removal, between these two categories of lists of positions there was practically no 
difference. In either case the decision was practically residing within the Party. A formal 
distinction was generally made between the two categories of positions, under the 
terminology of “competence lists” and, “consultation lists” respectively.10 Yet, both lists 
included government positions of leadership and authority.
The competence lists were compiled by the Party leadership, or by the Party apparatus, 
usually under the direction of a Central Committee department. These were government 
positions over which, the top Party authority or the mid- and lower level Party
o
G. Eyal and E. Townsley, “The Social Composition o f the Communist Nomenklatura: A 
Comparison o f Russia, Poland, and Hungary,” Theory and Society 24, no. 5 (October 1995): 723-750. 
Podgorecki, “Polish Nomenklaturas,” p. 336. John P. Bums, “Strengthening Central CCP Control o f  
Leadership Selection: The 1990 Nomenklatura.” China Quarterly 138 (June 1994): 488. Hirszowicz, The 
Bureaucratic Leviathan, p. 24.
9Rigby and Harasymiw, p. 94. Eyal and Townsley, p. 729. Alongside these two categories of lists 
there was also usually a “reserve list” which included candidates for various positions in the first two 
categories. Rudolf H. W. Theen, “Party and Bureaucracy,” in Public Policy and Administration in the 
Soviet Union, ed. Gordon B. Smith (New York: Praeger; Washington: American Society for Public 
Administration, 1980), p. 42.
10Bohdan Harasymiw, Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union (London: Macmillan, 
1984), pp. 167-168. Georg Brunner, “The Legal Status o f the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party,” in 
Ruling Communist Parties and Their Status Under Law. Law in Eastern Europe series, no. 31, eds. Dietrich 
A. Loeber, et al. (Dordrecht/ Boston/ Lancaster: Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 1986), p. 282.
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Committees retained “only” approval power. Though in practice the difference wasn’t 
of any importance, sometimes this approval power was transformed into a straight 
forward decision power. Therefore, the Party was making a personnel decision of its own 
initiative.11 Generally speaking though, there was no need for such actions, since the 
government agencies were hardly taking any decision without first “taking the pulse” of 
the Party with which it was so entangled.12
In the compilation of the consultation lists, the government agencies were supposed to 
display more autonomy. However, this was only apparently the case. After being 
compiled by each particular government agency, the list had to be approved by the 
corresponding Party Committee responsible for “guiding” that agency.13 In the case of 
the consultation lists this approval generally took place at the level of the primary Party 
organisation, and not at the higher Party committee, but this was the only practical 
distinction between the two types of lists. Even in those cases in which the primary 
organisation of the Party had the right only to “listen in” on the process of compilation 
of the consultation lists, the decision allegedly residing within the government agency 
itself, the distinction between the approval and consultation was very much blurred. In 
reality, the right to listen in was often converted into an informal practice of personnel 
decisions taken by the Party organisation itself.
1!Harasymiw, Political Elite Recruitment, p. 68.
12D. N. Nelson, “Charisma, Control, and Coercion: The Dilemma o f Communist Leadership,” 
Comparative Politics 17, no. 1 (October 1984): 2.
13Nelson, “The Dilemma o f Communist Leadership,” p. 4. John P. Bums, ed., The Chinese 
Communist Party’s Nomenklatura System: A Documentary Study o f Party Control o f Leadership 
Selection. 1979-1984 (London: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1989), p. xv.
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This informal practice was basically a consequence of a total lack of “constitutional self- 
confidence” of the governmental agencies. The lack of autonomy of the state apparatus 
was very much due to its structure. This structure appeared undermined by the not always 
perfectly constitutional interferences by the Communist party. Though the practices of 
the Party were most often based upon informal rules, in certain Communist systems, such 
as Hungary, this practice was actually institutionalised. The right to listen in was 
converted into a right to veto the eventually unwise choice of a government agency. This 
gave the primary Party organisation the right to appeal against the government agency’s 
choice and take it to the next higher Party organ. In the meantime, while the dispute was 
solved at the higher Party level, the governmental agency was, from a practical point of 
view, unable to take any further step to pursue its decision regarding its own personnel. 
Thus, coming through practice or through statutory changes, these measures virtually 
eliminated the difference between the competence and the consultation lists, and between 
State controlled and Party controlled positions and offices.
Another relevant aspect in this respect, is to see how the power of selection and de­
selection of officials was exercised relative to the modality of filling in the posts: through 
election or appointment. The central and local government included both elected and 
appointed officials. In the case of elected officials the candidates were usually 
recommended by the competent Party organ. Though it was only a “recommendation,” 
the will of the Party was normally binding.14 As to the appointments, they could be
14Teresa Pusylewitsch, “The Position of the Polish United Workers’ Party in the Legal System 
of the People’s Republic o f Poland,” in Ruling Communist Parties and Their Status Under Law. Law in 
Eastern Europe series, no. 31, eds. Dietrich A. Loeber, et al. (Dordrecht/ Boston/ Lancaster: Kluwer
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initiated yet again, by the competent Party authority. This initiation was done either as a 
formal practice or as an informal one. The informal practices were easily 
“institutionalised” through the stronghold the Party authorities had over the government 
agencies.15
The difficulty in separating the government structures from the ones of the unique 
political organisation in society, and the impossibility of pointing out those government 
agencies representing the “ultimate” power structure of the regime goes even further. 
Besides the decisive role played by the Party in the election or appointment of the 
government officials, even after the moment of appointment or election, State officials - 
and through them the entire State agencies - failed to increase their autonomy. The Party 
apparatus continued to exercise its “guiding role” even after the moment of nomination 
or confirmation.
The leading role of the Party was brought to bear upon the government officials first of 
all in a direct way, through the loyalty that each official owned as a Party member. This 
membership was not supposed to end once the appointment was made, for any of the 
government positions. In fact, it was the main source of accountability and obedience of 
the State officials towards the Party structures. The fact that all the positions of leadership 
and authority were under the control of the Communist party does not imply necessarily 
that all persons filling those positions were occupying important positions within the
Academic Publishers Group, 1986), pp. 323-324.
15For surviving practices in this sense see Bums, “Leadership Selection,” pp. 458-491.
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Party, or even that they were Party members, though Party membership was generally the 
rule rather than the exception.16 Nevertheless, the expected obedience towards the Party 
was still received even in the case of a non-Party nomination. This was usually achieved 
through the mechanism of de-selection and dismissal.17 This mechanism usually included 
the same decision stations as the nomination procedures, with the Party having the last, 
or only word.
The dual role of the majority, if not all, of the government officials as Party members, and 
the informal practical position of subordination towards the Party in which even the non- 
Party members were placed once included in “the list,” put all of them either in a formal, 
or in a practical, situation of double subordination: towards the Party and towards the 
government.18 In fact, this subordination gave the Party a direct stronghold over the entire 
government structure. The creation of a “system of continual reporting” by the 
government officials placed in a position of double subordination, to the Party structures, 
had undoubtedly become the means of acquiring information and maintaining control by 
an organisation with a unique position in society. This power structure cannot be 
considered a stranger to any of the major or minor policies implemented in the society. 
Through the mechanism of double subordination the Communist bureaucracy acquired
1 k e lso n , “The Dilemma o f Communist Leadership,” p. 3.
1?Harasymiw, “Political Elite Recruitment,” pp. 70-71.
18Hirszowicz, The Bureaucratic Leviathan, p. 37 ff. Gordon B. Smith, “Guidance by the 
Communist Party o f State Administrative Agencies in the USSR,” in Ruling Communist Parties and Their 
Status Under Law. Law in Eastern Europe series, no. 31, eds. Dietrich A. Loeber, et al. (Dordrecht/ 
Boston/ Lancaster: Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 1986), pp. 179-180. M. Rybicki, “Le 
gouvemement et sa position dans le systeme politique de la Republique Populaire de Pologne (1970- 
1980),” Revue d’Etudes Comparatives Est-West 14, no. 4 (December 1983): 112-13.
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the possibility to express and impose its point of view on practically any issue.19
This double subordination was extended even more through the application of a concept 
of “mutual representation” between Party and government apparatus. The result of the 
application of this concept was an extended overlap of personnel,20 and an even greater 
institutional confusion.21 This organisational chemistry was presented by some of the 
Communist parties in Eastern Europe as an administrative and political innovation.22 In 
fact, there was nothing new, everything having been done before... in the USSR.23
As we shall see later in more detail, the concept of mutual representation did not function 
in one direction only, with the Party members taking office in the administrative agencies.
19A s a rule, the government functionaries tended to follow the Party “recommendations,” not least 
because any eventual conflict would be resolved on the next-higher Party level. Brunner, “Hungarian 
Socialist Workers’ Party,” pp. 283-287.
20”Party guidance o f Soviet state administration at all levels is facilitated by the multiple roles 
played by party and state officials. For instance, in 1980 79.3 percent o f the Central Committee members, 
63.9 percent o f candidate members, all members of the Central Committee’s Secretariat, and 34. 6 percent 
o f the Central Auditing Commission were deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet.” Ronald J. Hill and Peter 
Frank, The Soviet Communist Party (Boston; London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), p. 115. See also Smith on 
“interlocking directorates” o f the Communist system. Smith, “Guidance by the Communist Party,” pp. 183- 
84.
21 Avtorkhanov, The Technology of Power, p. 62. Brunner, “Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party,”
p. 273.
22D. N. Nelson, “On Political Participation in Communist Systems,” East European Quarterly 14, 
no. 1 (Spring 1980): 110.
23Eyal and Townsley, p. 728. “[All] the interlocking procedures are either precursors of, or 
correspond to, earlier or present constitutional forms in the USSR and other Eastern Bloc countries. This 
is particularly true for the principle o f the rotation o f specialist management. . .  for the mixed party and 
state bodies. . .  and also for the practice of appointing local party secretaries as heads o f the corresponding 
administrative units.” Gunther H. Tontsch, “The Romanian Communist Party in the Romanian Legal 
System,” in Ruling Communist Parties and Their Status Under Law. Law in Eastern Europe series, no. 31, 
eds. Dietrich A. Loeber, et al. (Dordrecht/ Boston/ Lancaster: Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 1986), 
p. 253.
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The movement in search of authority and power took place in the opposite direction as 
well. This was achieved in the same way in which Party members occupied leading 
positions in the government structures, that is to say by creating systematic parallel 
movements designed to integrate the leading government office-holders into 
corresponding Party organs.24 The substantial overlap in party organs and state 
administrative bodies at all levels conveys the view of the Party and the State as a single 
unit.25 The interlocking mechanism brought by the application of this concept had a very 
important outcome: it first created, and then shortened the channels for transforming 
Party acts of will into technically binding legal behaviour.26
5.3 Beyond the List: The Communist Nomenklatura
From the elements outlined so far, it becomes clear that the Party influence over the 
government apparatus makes the identification of the latter with “the regime” 
problematic. Therefore, the question which arises next is whether “the regime” could be 
identified with the Communist party which appears to play all the leading parts. It would 
be difficult to concede a definite, unqualified answer to that question. The answer
24A Council Chairman, who, as a Chairman o f the Council Executive Committee, was the head 
o f his governmental territorial entity, was usually a member o f the Executive Committee o f the Party 
Committee o f  the same hierarchical level. Bums, “Leadership Selection,” p. 463. Also, Brunner, 
“Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party,” p. 283.
Mary McAuley, Politics and the Soviet Union (Harmondsworth : Penguin, 1977), p. 186.
26Avtorkhanov, The Technology o f Power, p. 23. Smith, “Guidance by the Communist Party.” 
Tontsch, p. 254.
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depends upon what one understands by the Communist party in the specific constitutional 
arrangements of the Communist regime. Some argue, for instance, against the idea that 
the party was actually a party. As a unique political organisation, allegedly representing 
all the citizens, the Communist party could not be a “part” of anything else.27 From this 
perspective, one would find it difficult to isolate the unique party from its environment. 
This difficulty comes from an “ideologized” definition of the Party as institution, a 
definition which incorporates under the same label everything the Party claimed to be 
standing for. This definition, however, ignores the reality of the totalitarian power.
On the other hand, down-sizing the Party from this enlarged ideologized definition to the 
sum of its enlisted members, presents almost the same difficulty as identifying the Secret 
Police collaborators and agents with the structures of power of the Communist regime. 
Both these latter categories lacked the necessary structures for ensuring their autonomy, 
and for generating basic beliefs and initiating actions in accordance with these beliefs. In 
fact, the “foot soldiers” of any Communist party in the Soviet bloc appear to be just as 
underprivileged and deprived of real power as the non-party members.28 Therefore, the 
power structure one should look for cannot be identified with the Communist party when 
understood in this sense. Nevertheless, it has become clear so far that the structure of 
power we should be looking for includes centres of power from the Party as well as from
27Dietrich A. Loeber, et al., eds., Ruling Communist Parties and Their Status Under Law, in Law 
in Eastern Europe series, no. 31 (Dordrecht/ Boston/ Lancaster: Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 
1986), p. xvii-xx. Adam Podgorecki, “Totalitarian Law: Basic Concepts and Issues,” in Totalitarian and 
Post-Totalitarian Law, eds. Adam Podgorecki and Vittorio Olgiati (Dartmouth: Ofiati I.I.S.L., 1996), p. 
13 ff.
28D. Barry, George Ginsburgs, and Peter B. Maggs, eds., Soviet Law After Stalin: The Citizen 
and the State in Contemporary Soviet Law. Law in Eastern Europe Series, no. 20 (Leyden: Sijthoff, 1977).
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This special political entanglement and constitutional confusion of the state with a unique 
political organisation represents the starting point in the identification of the real structure 
of power of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. This is only the starting point 
though. It is still necessary to establish sufficient elements which will prove this structure 
of power as an eligible agent for legal responsibility. In 1966, Abdurakhman 
Avtorkhanov defined this hybrid constitutional arrangement by the term partocracy.30 
According to his definition, partocracy is a system of absolute political, economic and 
ideological power, the “rule of a party within the party” (emphasis mine) under which 
legislative, judicial controlling and distributive proprietary functions are merged together 
and are concentrated in the central apparatus of the Party.
As for the ruling and distributive organs, according to Avtorkhanov they are “dualistic:” 
the ruling organs are located in the hierarchy of the party apparatus, while the executive 
ones - in the hierarchy of the state apparatus. However, this does not mean - as it was 
shown above in the analysis of the structures of power of the Communist state apparatus - 
that the administrative functions were any less subordinated to the Party control. 
Avtorkhanov sees the partocracy also as an absolute dictatorship with a narrow, 
oligarchic leadership on top and a closed, vertically hierarchical party apparatus. The
29Hirszowicz, The Bureaucratic Leviathan, p. 159.
Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, The Communist Party Apparatus (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1966), p. 39.
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foundation of this pyramid of power is constituted by a multi-million base of “party 
spongers”31 who do not participate in the exercise of power. The very important aspect 
here is that Avtorkhanov finds the partocracy, as a political system, a unique phenomenon 
not only in its class organisation, but also in “the depth and width of its influence and 
control over the whole population and each individual.” It is the implications of this all- 
embracing control of the “party within the party” that interests us.
When analysing the power structures of this institutional party-state hybrid in the 
Communist Eastern Europe, the political scientist is bound to come across the term 
Nomenklatura. Common dictionaries and encyclopaedias do not present any such entry 
in their texts. Nevertheless, dictionaries show that there is a botanical nomenclature, as 
well as a chemical one, and that the word itself denominates “a system of naming 
things.”32 One would thus expect the word nomenklatura, which is - not surprisingly - of 
Russian origin, to refer to flowers and mushrooms, moss and conifers. And it might very 
well have been so. For the people living in the Communist Eastern Europe though, the 
word acquired a new meaning. It came to signify the Communist political bureaucracy 
which was filling both party and state positions linked to each other by an entangled web 
of power relations.
31Avtorkhanov, Communist Party Apparatus, p. 42.
32Longman: Dictionary o f Contemporary English, s.v. “nomenclature” (The Bath Press, Avon,
1987).
280
Chapter Five: Nomenklatura
The basis of the formation of the Nomenklatura was laid by Lenin.33 It represented a new 
privileged layer in the party and the state apparatus. Its gradual expansion and isolation 
from society, and from the Communist party itself, finally resulted in the establishment 
in Russia first, and then in all the countries from the Communist block, of a state system 
referred to by analysts as partocracy,34 “Inside the house” though, this power system was 
referred to as “Nomenklatura.”35 Thus, the Nomenklatura is first of all a political concept. 
Similarly to the nomenclature in other domains of life, the Nomenklatura designates a 
list, not of plants or chemical elements but of positions arranged in order of seniority, and 
including a description of the duties of each office. Its political importance comes from 
the fact that the Communist Nomenklatura, and it alone, contained the most important 
leading positions in all the organised activities of social life, in both party and state 
apparatus.36
Starting from this aspect of political and constitutional organisation, one faces the 
challenge of reconstructing the Nomenklatura not only as a list of political and
33Vladimir Ilici Lenin, The Re-Organisation o f the Party. Party Organisation and Party Literature 
(London, 1971).
34Michael Voslensky, “Nomenklatura: Anatomy o f the Soviet Ruling Class” (London: The Bodley 
Head Ltd., 1984), p. 56.
35Alexander Korchak, Contemporary Totalitarianism: A Systems Approach. East European 
Monographs (Boulder. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 39.
Bohdan Harasymiw, “Nomenklatura: The Soviet Communist Party’s Leadership Recruitment 
System,” Canadian Journal o f Political Science 2, no. 4 (December 1969): 494. Also, Rigby and 
Harasymiw, p. 87. Takayuki Ito, “Controversy over Nomenklatura in Poland: Twilight o f a Monopolistic 
Instrument for Social Control,” in Acta Slavonica Iaponica 1 (1983): 57-103. Thomas Lowit, “Y a-t'il des 
etats en Europe de l'Est?” Revue Francaise de Sociology 20 (1979): 431-66. Harasymiw, Political Elite 
Recruitment, pp. 163-5. Albert L. Weeks, ed., The Soviet Nomenklatura: A Comprehensive Roster of  
Soviet Civilian and Military Officials (Washington D.C.: Washington Institute Press, 1987), p. 6.
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government positions, but as a coherent organisation. As such, the Nomenklatura had a 
powerful decision structure and specific goals. At first glance, these features should 
propose the Nomenklatura as an organisation capable of sharing in law the responsibility 
for the violations of the basic rights of the citizens in Eastern Europe. Therefore, one has 
to establish whether the Nomenklatura represents the organisational manifestation of the 
Communist regime in an entity coherent and monolithic enough to be legally assessed in 
a process of political justice.
The Nomenklatura system was used, in approximately the same format, by all 
Communist governments in Eastern Europe, and it is still functioning in countries such 
as China.37 It is interesting to note that one of the most comprehensive pre-1989 
monographic approaches to the issues of the relationship between the Eastern European 
Communist parties and their states, classifies these relationships in two categories:”the 
Soviet model,” and “imitations and variations of the Soviet model.”38 The complex 
hierarchy of ranks was used by the Communist parties as a major instrument of control. 
This was true not only of political life, but also of economic, social and cultural 
institutions.
Through these lists of offices and positions the party ensured that the different institutions 
would not deviate from its imposed line, and that they would exercise only the autonomy
37Bums, “The Chinese Nomenklatura System.” p. 69.
38Loeber, et al., Ruling Communist Parties, p. v-vi.
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granted to them by the party.39 Having total control over the appointment, dismissal or 
replacement of any person in a key position, the autonomy of any of the local or national 
institutions was an ad-hoc one, ready to be withdrawn at the slightest sign of non­
conformity with the party line.40 The job title lists representing the Nomenklatura show 
the party control as much wider than generally imagined41 The decision structures of ‘the 
regime” we were looking for emerged from all these power stations in society. This 
structure was formed mainly by parasitising (and finally suffocating) all the State 
structures with Party default functions, and by entangling the State and Party apparatus 
into almost complete confusion.
Despite the general Party control, commencing the Nomenklatura's reconstruction from 
a list of positions, is bound to be problematic, especially when the aim is to demonstrate 
the Nomenklatura's quality as an autonomous social agent. On the one hand there is the
39Referring to the structure of power in the Communist regimes, Nelson writes that “local power 
accretion is not likely to go unrecognised in Communist states for Leninist parties are certain to guard 
against challenges to ‘democratic centralism’. One can, therefore, expect such regimes to use every 
available means to impose national or federal supremacy.” Nelson, “Political Participation,” p. 33. Also, 
“there are consistent efforts to rotate (reassign) cadres to avoid local identification, to disrupt localism with 
territorial-administrative ‘reforms,’ to allocate resources selectively to mitigate unrest, and to avoid 
participatory involvement for any but the most trusted segments o f society.” Nelson, “Political 
Participation,” p. 159.
40It is significant that Mikhail Gorbachev, trying to create the conditions for some basic economic 
reforms, sought in October 1988 to bring some structural changes at the highest levels o f the Soviet 
Nomenklatura, changes which were bound to weaken its total control. Anders Aslund, Gorbachev’s 
Struggle for Economic Reforms: The Soviet Reform Process. 1985-1988 (London: Pinter, 1989), p. 37 ff. 
Also, Bohdan Harasymiw, “Political Patronage and Perestroika - Changes in Communist Party Leadership 
in Ukraine under Gorbachev and Shcherbytsky,” in Echoes o f Glasnost in Soviet Ukraine, ed. Romana M. 
Bahry (North York, Ontario: Captus University Publications, 1990), pp. 28-39.
4'Besides the lists o f high and low profile positions, the party was also keeping a tight control 
over the personnel files o f renowned scientists, artists, writers and athletes, though they did not belong to 
the Nomenklatura. See Bums, The Chinese Nomenklatura System, p. xi. Nelson, “Political Participation,” 
p. 56. Hirszowicz, The Bureaucratic Leviathan. Smith, “Guidance by the Communist Party.”
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problem of referring the question of responsibility back to the Party itself, that is back to 
the sum of the Party members. This would be counterproductive and especially 
inaccurate, given the Party-State entanglement. On the other hand, there is also the risk 
of placing an important part of responsibility in an empty list of office schemes, a list 
which was the expression of this party-state hybridisation. This, again would be far from 
the ideal solution since we are looking for the solid structure of a social actor and not for 
a list of positions, even when these positions share between themselves all, or almost all, 
the real political power existing in a society.
It becomes therefore necessary to go beyond the understanding of the Nomenklatura as 
a mere list of positions on an office scheme. In this process we are bound to face at least 
one major difficulty though: the a-constitutional nature of the Nomenklatura's identity. 
In other words, one is facing the informality of the Nomenklatura's institutional 
existence. This informality makes very difficult the Nomenklatura's presentation as a 
classical example of a conglomerate organisation, and therefore as a coherent collective 
agent.
According to numerous studies, this Party, or rather following Avtorkhanov’s definition, 
the “party within the party” enjoyed a status within the legal system which was not 
comparable to any other formal institution within or outside the Communist bloc. The 
Party always operated as a regnum inter regnum, with a sui generis status within the
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legal system.42 Surprisingly, many of the Communist constitutions hardly specified a 
constitutional role for the Party, stating only its vaguely defined “guiding” role with 
respect to the government agencies.43 This allows the Party organs to be, in many cases, 
outside or above the law.44 Very often, the Party’s acts of will fell within “constitutional 
gaps,” where the Party then created informal institutional structures. A good example of 
this is the expanding powers of nomination and consultation of the Party, which were 
mentioned earlier. As it could be expected, in the exercise of an unchecked political 
power, these informal structures go, sooner or later, from being a-constitutional, to 
unconstitutional ,45
To give only one example of such a stretch of constitutional authority, it could be 
mentioned that many actions by Party organisations which directly affected the legal 
process, and as such could be construed as influencing legal relationships, were not 
regulated by the norms of the Constitution, or in fact by rules of any other branch of 
law.46 Referring to the Soviet Communist party, Christopher Osakwe writes, for example,
42See in William B. Simons, and Stephen White, eds., The Party Statutes o f the Communist 
World. Law in Eastern Europe Series, no. 27 (Dordrecht, Boston MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984).
43Ibid.
44F. J. M. Feldbrugge, ed., The Distinctiveness o f Soviet Law. Law in Eastern Europe Series, no. 
34 (Dordrecht; Boston MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988), pp. 5-6.
45The Communist bureaucracy brought in this way entire societies under discretionary political 
ruling and outside the shield o f law. Daniel N. Nelson, Elite - Mass Relations in Communist Systems
(London: Macmillan, 1988), pp. 78. Also, Hannah Arendt, The Origins o f Totalitarianism (Cleveland: 
Meridian, 1958), pp. 46-465. Vaclav Havel and John Keane, eds., The Power o f the Powerless: Citizens 
Against the State in Central-Eastern Europe (London: Hutchinson, 1985), p. 52. Daniel Lefort, Un homme 
en trop: Reflexions sur “l’Archipel du Goulag” (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1986), p. 25.
46Avtorkhanov, 1959, p. 68.
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that when Party groups met to nominate persons for appointive offices within the state 
system under the Nomenklatura system they (the Party groups) were acting outside the 
law. When Party groups in effect vetoed the dismissal of a Nomenklatura appointee 
within the state system the Party groups were acting above the law. Each time Party 
caucuses manipulated legitimate governmental processes from behind the scene (for 
example, when the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party met in advance of the 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR to make decisions on legislative bills which would later be 
presented to the parliament for its ex post facto ratification) the Party groups were acting 
both outside as well as above the law “because such Party activities [converted] the 
legislative process into a sham.”47
In another example, this time taken from an analysis of the Polish Communist realities, 
we find out that the guiding role of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP) with 
respect to Government had been interpreted very broadly and that this relationship has 
never been closely defined insofar as institutional forms and methods of its realisation 
were concerned.48 This institutional ambiguity facilitated the growing role of the Party, 
with the Nomenklatura becoming a kind of “super-government.”49 The lack of rules in 
this respect led to a situation in which legal and constitutional relationships were shaped
47Christopher Osakwe, “The Status of the CPSU Under Soviet Civil Law and o f its Members 
Under Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure,” in Ruling Communist Parties and Their Status Under Law. 
Law in Eastern Europe series, no. 31, eds. Dietrich A. Loeber, et al. (Dordrecht/ Boston/ Lancaster: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 1986), p. 150. Pusylewitsch, p. 319. Feldbrugge, “Status o f Law,” 
p. 14. Friedrich, p. 7.
48Pusylewitsch, p. 322.
49Korchak, p. 70. Hirszowicz, The Bureaucratic Leviathan, p. 173-174. Friedrich, p. 5.
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over the course of many years by arbitrariness and an ever-increasing control and even 
omnipotence exercised by the party factor.50
That the power structure to which one could assign responsibility is called “Party 
groups,” or “party within party,” or indeed “Nomenklatura,” is of less importance. What 
becomes evident is the fact that the differentiated decision structure we were searching 
for would function at the state level, but at the same time outside the state, outside the 
constitutional framework of a state. Therefore, the actions of the Nomenklatura as a 
party-state hybrid appear more as a matter of practices, introduced through different 
mechanisms, (political more than legal), rather than as a matter of constitutional 
arrangements. This state of affairs, together with the fact that the Party has always 
avoided becoming a legal persona (a fact which could have entailed legal accountability 
for its actions) determines that from a legal institutional perspective the Nomenklatura 
be declared a non-existent organisation.
5.4 The Nomenklatura's Sources of Collective Identity
The semi-vicarious exercise of power by the Nomenklatura, although practically all- 
encompassing, served as a justification for the latter to decline to carry both political and 
legal responsibility. The negligible formal detachment of the Party from the
50John LOvenhardt, “Nomenklatura and the Soviet Constitution,” Review o f Socialist Law 10 
(1984): 35-55. Rybicki, p. 109-110.
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administrative matters of the government was always used by the Party as its alibi.51 This 
alibi offered the Party an easy defence against any accusation of having taken wrong 
decisions, or of having given wrong orders. In time though, the Party’s need for total 
control over all the state mechanisms - in the absence of other less intrusive tools of 
legitimation - proved to be stronger than its need for this out of date alibi of an alleged 
institutional separation of party and state power structures.52 Nevertheless, the Party never 
gave up the pretence of being beyond all the administrative, economic, social chaos it 
created. In practice, this “beyond” meant not only beyond the state, but beyond the law 
as well.
Undoubtedly a proof of this position with respect to the law is the fact that, over half a 
century or more of Communist history, the Party has never acquired, in any country of 
the Soviet bloc, the quality of a fully-fledged legal person53 Of course, all kinds of legal 
artifices have been used in order for the Party to be able to enter all sorts of normal civil 
law relationships in which any institution is bound to enter in the real world. 
Nevertheless, the Party did not go as far as to allow, at any point and in any country, to 
be sued as an organisation, either on civil or on criminal grounds.54 This “irrelevance” in 
law of the Party, together with the informality of the Nomenklatura's institutional 
existence, challenge the attempt of presenting the Communist bureaucracy as a
51Smith, “Guidance by the Communist Party,” p. 183-184. Pusylewitsch, p. 327.
52Tontsch, p. 253.
53Barry, Ginsburgs, and Maggs, p. VIII.
54Hirszowicz, The Bureaucratic Leviathan, p. 146. Barry, Ginsburgs, and Maggs, p. ix.
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conglomerate organisation. Therefore, it appears that acknowledging the Nomenklatura 
as a true self-reproducing institution requires a look into all elements which could shape 
its identity. It is not only the formal constitutional elements that need to be looked at.
Generally speaking, in the case of self-organised bodies, the documents of the 
organisation should spell out the essential elements about the way in which the power can 
be exercised in that specific area. The internal decision structure of the Nomenklatura 
though, cannot be analysed only by looking into its documents of organisation and 
making abstraction of its specificity as a collective body.55 The difficulty with the analysis 
of the decision structures of the Communist Nomenklatura comes from the fact that this 
structure details the way in which the Nomenklatura detains the monopoly of power in 
the realm of power, therefore in a domain in which the Nomenklatura is both the player 
and the ruler of the game. It is important to retain this point in mind both when inquiring 
into the way the Nomenklatura delimitates itself from its environment, and when 
establishing which should be the internalised limitations of this power, and the standards 
against which its responsibility is to be measured.
The reality of the Nomenklatura - as the Marxist manifestation of a socio-political 
phenomenon and not as a mere “list of positions on an office scheme” - has been 
documented and researched almost from its emergence. It is only its legal status that
55In practice, formal and informal elements can be intertwined. Stuart Henry analysed in this sense 
the formal and informal structures o f justice in the working place. However, generally in the working place 
the informal structures do not take over the formal structures, but complement them. The same cannot be 
said about the Communist Nomenklatura system. See Henry, supra note 13, in Chapter Four.
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needs more clarification. Given the informality of the Nomenklatura as a structure of 
power, this legal status is inevitably based more upon a sociological analysis of this 
political entity than upon legal constitutional provisions.
The attempt to prove the sociological existence of an organised oppressive entity in a 
society allegedly built following the Marxist model, that is to say in a classless society, 
was approached by Donald C. Hodges from a rather unexpected perspective: the Marxist 
theory. In a way, it is possible to say that his explanation was based on a somewhat inner 
perspective, Marxism being the theoretical basis of the so-called post-capitalist, or 
Communist, ideologies. Applying to Communist societies the concepts used by the 
Marxist political economy in analysing capitalism allowed Hodges first of all to 
acknowledge and then to attempt an explanation of the social conflicts in this society.56 
Expanding the Marxist theory, Hodges’ explanation was based on the identification of 
a new factor of production which he called organisation.
This identification proves rather valuable for our re-construction of the Nomenklatura. 
The implication of the expanded Marxist theory was the logical imposition of the idea of 
emergence, “from the rabble of capitalism,” of a class defined by the ownership o f 
expertise. This expertise was to be derived from the direct contact with the domain of 
management and leadership. Spelling out Marxism to its full implications, Hodges 
concluded that this class was bound to become the source of the social conflict and
56Hodges adopted this unusual perspective because, according to him, it was the only way in 
which the conflicts o f the post-capitalist society could be explained. Donald C. Hodges, The 
Bureaucratisation o f Socialism (Amherst. Mass.: University o f Massachusetts Press, 1981), p. 17 ff.
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Should one then speak about making a social class accountable? One cannot deny that 
similar such conclusions were offered as justification for the “classicid” committed by 
practically all Communist governments in the Soviet bloc.57 However, accountability for 
class action is not what we are looking for. Without denying the Nomenklatura's 
importance, some authors disagreed with presenting it as a social class. The disagreement 
wasn’t always sparked by the intention to deny the Nomenklatura's dominance in society. 
The Nomenklatura was less, and at the same time more than a social class.
In another definition for instance, the Nomenklatura was defined as “the ruling 
bureaucratic estate”5* suggesting precisely the fact that the Communist bureaucracy was 
not a class. The suggestion was made based especially on the fact that the Nomenklatura 
ruled over a social formation that had not yet attained the status of a class society. Even 
more important than these sociological distinctions, however, is the fact that, through the 
term “estate” the definition captures the Nomenklatura's isolation from a “disorganised 
and ineffectual civil society” in which the Nomenklatura existed as an organisation59 
Given the need for constructing the Nomenklatura as legal entity from sources beyond 
the constitutional framework, acknowledging this gap between the bureaucratic elite and
57Orascu, Serban “[On Communism and Its Victims]” Revista 22. Bucharest, 23-29 September 
1997, p .l.
58Konrad, George and Ivan Szelenyi, The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power (Brighton: 
Harvester Press, 1979), pp. 184-219.
59Eyal and Townsley, p. 726.
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the rest of society is important for the full understanding of the Nomenklatura as a 
structure of power.
The analysis of the complex stratification of ranks, status and prestige of an organisation 
has to be accompanied by an inspection of the organisation as a self-reproducing 
institution, by an analysis of its relationship with its environment, and of their view of 
each other and of themselves.60 In this sense, an important source for understanding the 
Nomenklatura's identity is the relationship between this informal organisation and the 
outside world. Speaking about the mechanism through which collective action can be 
ascribed to an unorganised group Sartre, for instance, underlines the importance of the 
way in which the group is acknowledged by the outside world.61 The group can come to 
have an identity through the way the collection of people is treated by other groups in a 
given society62 Of course, this identity is not enough to confer on a group the quality of 
legal agent. Nevertheless, it is an significant aspect.
The fact that the Nomenklatura as a political organism would go beyond this informal 
identity, acquiring - through the law or through other normative structures - a formal 
status, does not mean that the social dimension ceases to play an important role in its 
institutional definition. An example in this sense would be the blending of the formal
60Doak A. Barnett, “Social Stratification and Aspects o f Personnel Management in the Chinese 
Communist Bureaucracy.” China Quarterly 28 (October-December 1966), pp. 8-39.
61Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique o f Dialectical Reason (London: Verso, 1982), p. 353 ff.
Larry May, The Morality o f Groups: Collective Responsibility. Group-Based Harm, and 
Corporate Rights (Notre Dame, Indiana: University o f Notre Dame Press, 1987), p. 35.
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legal identity of an agent with its informal “sociological” identity as illustrated by the use 
in courts of the concept of apparent authority .63 The recognition of this concept plays an 
important role for instance, in ascribing responsibility to professional associations which, 
though without being formally invested with authority in their domain, enjoy and make 
use of an informal authority. This authority is not created through the constitutive acts of 
the agent, and is not matched by a formal mechanism of accountability.
The concept of apparent authority - which in the specific case of the Nomenklatura could 
be seen as “practical authority” backed up by the threat of force - is an important aspect 
for distinguishing between the responsibility of individual persons and the one of 
conglomerate collectivities such as the Nomenklatura. The pressure under which 
members of an organisation commit crimes or injustices often comes from the informal 
authority of the organisation. It is therefore, important to acknowledge both dimensions 
of power: on the one hand the formal power which was defined by law and, on the other 
hand the practical power, which was derived from the special position occupied by a 
specific political body in society.64
The environment though is not the only element which contributes to shaping the image 
of a certain ambiguous and formally undefined organisation. The identity of a political
Larry May broadly defines the concept o f “apparent authority” as referring to an authority that 
has not been earned through the normal process o f explicit assent on the part o f the individuals who 
compose a given group. May, The Morality o f Groups, p. 48 ff.
64Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World’s Political-Economic Systems (New 
York: Basic Books, 1977), p. 197.
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agency is also tailored by the image the formal organisation creates of itself. This does 
not necessarily mean that each member of the Nomenklatura had to have a self-declared 
awareness that he or she belonged organically to a formal organisation called 
“Nomenklatura .” Though this aspect can be important from the sociological point of view 
and, to some extent, even from the legal one, it is not this individual perception that 
constitutes the internal source of collective identity. The more important aspect is the way 
in which the collective agent perceives itself and defines itself in relation to the Other, 
in relation to everything which is not itself: the outside world.
The self-consciousness with which the Nomenklatura perceived itself can be illustrated 
with many practical examples. In this sense, the Hungarian debate on the statute of 
limitations offers a relevant aspect. As it was shown at the time, the justification for the 
Zetenyi-Takacs law was based exactly on elements of the Nomenklatura's self­
perception. The segregation of the Hungarian Communist Nomenklatura from “the 
Other” - which in this case meant from the rest of the society - was mirrored by the Party 
directives instructing all public prosecutors to seek the Party’s permission prior to any 
criminal investigation or prosecution of any member of its Nomenklatura65 A similar 
example of organisational segregation can be identified in the Czech argumentation of 
the Lustration Law.66 In this sense the Czech Constitutional Court referred to the State
65See supra Podgorecki, and also Pataki, in Chapter Two, note 28, and discussion.
66Czech and Slovak Federal Republic: Constitutional Court Decision on the Screening Law, no. 
PI. US 1/92 (26 November 1992).
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Security directives67 (issued only days after the beginning of the “Velvet Revolution”) 
aiming to preserve to a maximum extent the mutually integrated Party-state apparatus in 
order to influence the democratic development and eventually to overthrow it. In both 
these cases, the Communist partocracy - using its privileged position within the social 
complex - placed itself against the society, and placed its members outside the reach of 
law by conceiving itself as an entity above society and above the law itself.68
5.5 The Conglomerate Identity: The Knots and Bolts of Real Power
The fact that the Nomenklatura had very few external limitations in its way of exercising 
power brings a third contributive source as to its identity into the discussion. This element 
refers not to the perception of itself or of the environment, but to the structural reality of 
the Nomenklatura as political agent, and to the implications this structure might have 
over its own existence and its legal persona. Analysing the political entity from this
67See supra Chapter Three, note 127 and discussion. Also, Directive No. CB-002040/03-89 
(November 28,1989) quoted in Laws. Rulings, and Reports, vol. 3 o f Transitional Justice: How Emerging 
Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, ed. Neil Kritz (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of 
Peace Press, 1995), p. 349.
r o
It is not necessary to embrace a specific ideology in order to share this opinion. The relationship 
between the political bureaucracy and the law follows, to some extent, the same pattern proposed by some 
theories on corporate responsibility: the system (corporate or political) conforms to signals from the 
environment (e.g. the law) only to the extent to which the answer can be accommodated within the internal, 
pre-established set o f organisational goals: profit making, in the case o f a corporate business, or power 
preservation, in the case o f a political agent. Otherwise, the system tends to expand its dominance as far 
as its internal limitations (its specific set o f goals) and external ones (temporal, geographical, legal, o f  
resources, etc. - depending upon the nature o f the system) allow for it. An important aspect here though, 
is the fact that a totalitarian political bureaucracy - unlike an economic one for instance, has very few such 
limitations to take into consideration. See Dietrich A. Loeber, “Legal Rules ‘For Internal Use Only,’” 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 19 (1970), p. 70.
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structural perspective Hoffe defined it as a union o f persons with elements of cooperation 
and conflict.69 The members of this type of union generally belong to several generations, 
its social network is a community o f generations and its internal structure is the one of a 
social institution. A political entity appears to be a “second order” social institution,70 a 
kind of umbrella institution which encompasses and transcends other formal 
organisations. This could be another way of explaining the informality of a political 
organisation such as the Nomenklatura: its identity was largely occulted by the more 
clearly defined formality of the incorporated institutions.71 Having taken over all the 
structures of the society, the a-constitutional nature of the Communist bureaucracy still 
prompts one to wonder whether the Nomenklatura had a strong enough conglomerate 
structure for part of the responsibility for the violations of basic rights to be attributed to 
it.
Hoffe’s definition is to a large extent echoing the distinction between aggregate and 
conglomerate collectivities identified in the previous chapter.72 Having underlined its 
complex sources of identity, the complex power structure which existed in Eastern 
Europe under the name of Nomenklatura has now to be measured against the parameters
69Otffied Hoffe, Political Justice: Foundations for a Critical Philosophy o f Law and the State 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 35.
70Hoffe, p. 38.
71As we have seen when discussing the a-constitutional character o f the Nomenklatura, the Party 
played upon this ambiguity, avoiding a clear legal standing o f its own and in this way avoiding also 
political accountability for policies it has imposed.
72For the distinction between aggregate and conglomerate collectivities, see supra the discussion 
in Section 4.3.3.
296
that define a conglomerate collectivity.73
Chapter Five: Nomenklatura
From Peter French’s theory on collective agency analysed in Chapter Four, we remember 
that a conglomerate organisation was one which was construed on the basis of an 
organisational charter, and on its procedural as well as substantive internal recognition 
rules. It has already been shown how, given the nature of the Nomenklatura, the place of 
its organisational charter is substituted by a set of complex factors. From a sociological, 
though not a constitutional, point of view these factors come to supplement the lack of 
formal (legal) basis of the Communist bureaucratic organs.
The difficulty in analysing the Nomenklatura as a political phenomenon which emerged 
from a unique and relatively static set of documents derives also from the fact that the 
Nomenklatura was the result of a historical evolution. During this evolution it underwent 
periodical spouts of redefinition and restructuring, reinforcing continuously its strong 
power position over society. This evolution was also to a large extent informal, a matter 
of entrenched practices more than of constitutional development.74 Thus, through the 
organisational charter one should understand a complex of both constitutional but mostly
n 'l
French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility, pp. 5-13. Also, May, Morality o f Groups, pp.
21-24.
740 f  course, in the case o f Nomenklatura another aspect is that in this case one is dealing with 
a political and social phenomena which was present in all the countries o f the Soviet bloc, each one - 
though essentially the same - with its own evolution. The lack o f systematic complementary data on each 
of the domestic embodiments o f the Communist Nomenklatura influenced the choice rather for an 
impressionistic account than for a statistical one. The Soviet Nomenklatura will often be referred to, as 
the one which has, not only for chronological reasons, the prototype the other socialist countries have 
endeavoured to duplicate. Maria Hirtszowicz, Coercion and Control in Communist Society: The Visible 
Hand o f Bureaucracy (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1986), p. 79. Friedrich, pp. 3-14.
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non-constitutional acts of power which constituted the mile-stones of the Communist 
bureaucratisation process. As we have seen, these acts were complemented by other 
sources of institutional identity. These are sources which play a role in the definition of 
almost any organisation, although maybe not to such an extent as in the case of the 
Communist bureaucracy.
Related to the same practice-based, informal, nature of the Nomenklatura, there are also 
difficulties in identifying the rules of recognition, that is in mapping those rules which 
are to be followed in order for the decisions to be considered as belonging to the 
collective agent. Elements of ideology and policy, more than statutory rules come into 
play. Ideology offered the Nomenklatura an important set of procedural criteria which 
guided all selection and promotion within its ranks. The procedural rules of recognition 
were laid on the basis of ideology, everything being organised and decided by 
“borrowing” from its authority.75
While it is an undeniable fact that ideology cemented the organisational and functional 
structures of the ruling class, the relationship between the Nomenklatura as a 
conglomerate organisation and its procedural rules of recognition is often misunderstood. 
The importance given to ideology in the analysis of a totalitarian regime risks obscuring 
the fact that ideology, as source of recognition rules, has often been placed “secondary”
7^Antonio La Spina, “Modes o f Legal Intervention and Totalitarian Effectiveness,” in Totalitarian 
and Post-Totalitarian Law, eds. Adam Podgorecki, and Vittorio Olgiati (Dartmouth: Ofiati I.I.S.L., 1996), 
esp. p. 45.
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to the organisation.76 Though ideology played an important role in the definition of the 
procedural rules of recognition, and in structuring the different centres of power, in the 
Communist bureaucratic context ideology always meant what the Nomenklatura needed 
it to mean.77 Besides, the procedural rules of recognition are not always the formal, 
constitutional or ideological ones. In the case of the Nomenklatura one often deals with 
informal practices which have been institutionalized through the different points of 
pressure and conflict within the political discourse. Needless to say, one of these points 
of pressure was the use of force, or the manipulation of the potential of using force by the 
Communist regime.78
From the reality of ideology as source of institutional parameters of action it is possible 
to derive two points. Firstly, the Nomenklatura was characterised by a “fluidity” of its
76For a particularly interesting insight into the “ideological make-up” o f the Communist regimes 
see Alex Inkeles, “The Totalitarian Mystique: Some Impressions o f the Dynamics o f Totalitarian Society,” 
in Totalitarianism, ed. Carl J. Friedrich (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954), esp. pp. 88-89. 
For the profound similarities of nature between the Nazism and Communism - in spite o f overemphasised 
ideological differences - see Waldemar Gurian, “Totalitarianism as Political Religion,” in Totalitarianism. 
ed. Carl J. Friedrich (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 119-129, p. 122. Guarian sees 
both Nazism and the Soviet-style Communism as “politico-social secularized religions,” characteristic o f  
our epoch. Also, Courtois, pp. 27-28. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 463.
7 7 Apart from the meaning o f a set o f ideas and beliefs forming the basis o f an economic or 
political system, a second meaning o f the word “ideology” seems also appropriate here: the one o f  
“unproductive thought.” Oxford Dictionary. London: Oxford University Press, 1963. The relevance o f this 
definition for the totalitarian ideologies is revealed in Hannah Arendt who comments: “In the totalitarian 
use o f these ideologies, a peculiar shift o f emphasis took place. Ideologies became strictly the logic o f  an 
idea: the idea was no longer applied to a given reality, but a logical process was developed from the chief 
“idea,” which became a kind of logical premise. This premise, to be sure, was not self-evident; but 
totalitarianism in power could change reality to such an extent that the premise could practically achieve 
the dignity o f the self-evident. Hitler’s ice-cold reasoning, Stalin’s strictly logical argumentation, became 
more important than the original content [...] There is no longer any rule o f an “idea,” no matter how 
perverted it may be, but o f the logical process itself which is deduced from the “idea” as its logical 
premise.” Hannah Arendt, [Contribution to the conference held at the American Academy o f Arts and 
Sciences, March 1953], in Totalitarianism, ed. Carl J. Friedrich (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1954), pp. 133-134.
78Hirtszowicz, Coercion and Control, p. 23.
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procedural rules of recognition.79 The direct cause of this fluidity was, yet again, the 
relatively informal and a-constitutional character of the Nomenklatura as political 
organisation. The Nomenklatura had at its disposal practically unlimited power, 
unchallengeable by any other state or civil society institution. Secondly, given the nature 
of ideology, the procedural rules of recognition inspired from ideological sources were, 
as a rule, overridden by the Nomenklatura's substantive recognition rules. This set of 
rules was generally to be found by looking into the policy of the organisation.
The prevalence of the substantive rules of recognition over the procedural ones, of policy 
over ideology, actually confirms French’s emphasis on the rationality of the organisation. 
According to him, the basis of the substantive rules of recognition, e.g. the rules 
expressed through the policy of the Communist bureaucracy, emerged from the specific 
reasons for action of the organisation. As argued by French, these reasons for action come 
to homologate inside the triangle of collective responsibility the concept of intentionality 
which is assumed when speaking about individual responsibility.
In the case of the Communist Nomenklatura, given its nature as a “total” political body, 
aspiring (or conspiring) to the domination of the entire society, these reasons for action 
were undeniably the pursuit of unlimited political power.80 The pressure created on the 
specific functions and operations of the organisation by the pursuit of these goals ended
79Korchak, p. 116.
80Friedrich, p. 7. Nelson, “Dilemma o f Communist Leadership,” p. 8. Hirszowicz, The
Bureaucratic Leviathan.
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by inducing changes within the substantive rules of recognition (as the most easy to 
manipulate). These changes inevitably antagonised the ideological basis (the procedural 
rules of recognition) of the organisation.81 When such changes occur, an organisation’s 
unity and survival risks to be threatened. The threat is posed by the external pressures put 
on the organisation to comply with its socially accepted (or simply “acceptable”) 
procedural rules of recognition and internal decision structure as a whole.82 Under threat, 
the organisation is likely to do two things.83 Firstly, it is likely to override at least partially 
the ideological foundation of its procedural rules of recognition. Secondly, if possible, 
it will retain these same overridden rules at the forefront, as a procedural facade. This was 
exactly what happened in the case of the Communist Nomenklatura.84 For this reason, 
when analysing its structure one has to give particular attention to the practices and 
policies of the organisation more than to the ideological fafade.
This dominant role of the substantive rules of recognition corresponds to French’s idea 
that the “basic belief’ of the organisation is based in these rules. Therefore, the “basic 
belief’ is identified with the policy lead by the Nomenklatura, rather than with its 
ideology. The policy does not always coincide or agree with the ideological reasoning,
81Nelson, “Dilemma o f Communist Leadership,” p. 9.
82Nelson, “Dilemma o f Communist Leadership,” p. 11.
83Nelson, “Dilemma o f Communist Leadership,” p. 10.
84Korchak, p. 94. Olgiati, Vittorio, “Law As an Instrument o f “Organizational Totalitarianism”: 
Fascist Rule over Italian Lawyers,” in Totalitarian and Post-Totalitarian Law, eds. Adam Podgorecki and 
Vittorio Olgiati (Dartmouth: Ofiati I.I.S.L., 1996), pp. 123-124.
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not even when this reasoning itself becomes adaptable.85 The subordinate position of the 
ideologically inspired rules of recognition spares the social scientist the task of attempting 
a non-ideological analysis of the Communist ideology. This analysis is left to the 
political scientists. This split between ideology and policy, between an important part of 
its internal rules of recognition and its basic belief, was possible because the 
Nomenklatura had no agreed and functional mechanism of external control, and because 
the repressive policy it led prevented the inducement, under some kind of social 
incentive (pressure), of structures of self-control.86
For the purpose of this thesis it is necessary to trace the systematic crimes and 
violations of human rights back to the Nomenklatura's internal decision structure. 
Hence, is necessary to demonstrate that in these crimes and systematic human rights 
violations the policies led by the Nomenklatura - as an expression of the 
Nomenklatura's “basic beliefs” - represented a major defining element. Assigning 
collective responsibility for those crimes and violations starts therefore not from a
85Stalin’s dogmatic interpretation o f Lenin’s ideas, and its implication that Marxism speaks 
through the Leader’s mouth. Johannes Witt-Hansen, “Marxism, Leninism, Maoism,” in Politiske ideologier 
fra Platon til Mao. Politikens Forlag (Copenhagen, 1972), pp. 214-215. Korchak, p. 225. “The totalitarian 
movements and their power replace God and religious institutions such as the Church; the leaders are 
deified; the public mass-meetings are regarded and celebrated as sacred actions; the history o f the 
movement becomes a holy history o f the advance o f salvation, which the enemies and betrayers try to 
prevent in the same way as the devil tries to undermine and destroy the work o f  those who are in the 
service o f the City o f God. There are not only sacred formulas and rituals, there are also dogmatic beliefs, 
claims to absolute obedience and damnation o f heretics in the name o f absolute truth which is 
authoritatively determined by those leading the movement. The doctrine may impose certain slogans and 
formulas - racism for the Nazis; class war, anti-capitalism fo r  the Bolsheviks - but ju st the unlimited and 
uncontrollable right o f  interpretation and re-interpretation by the leadership gives to totalitarian politics 
its flexibility’ (emphasis mine.). Gurian, pp. 122-23.
86Korchak, p. 174. This is an expression o f the constitutional paradox o f the watchman. In this 
case, the paradox occurs because in the larger social system there are no other structures o f power which 
could exercise constitutional authority and impose a mechanism o f control over the Nomenklatura.
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case, the paradox occurs because in the larger social system there are no other structures o f power which 
could exercise constitutional authority and impose a mechanism o f control over the Nomenklatura.
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critique of the Nomenklatura's ideology,87 but from an analysis of its policy,88 concen­
trating not on alleged goals,89 but on concrete means which are easily identifiable in legal 
terms.90
The predominant role of the Nomenklatura's rules of recognition is further enhanced by 
the way in which its internal decision structure was generated. The internal decision 
structure is the one which in the end offers the complete decision procedures to be 
followed in order for a course of action to be considered as belonging to the organisation. 
However, it appears from the analysis above that the Nomenklatura's decision structure 
consisted mostly of informal (non/a-constitutional and non-statutory) sources, dominated 
all by discretionary rules of recognition reflected in the policy. An important aspect to be 
mentioned here is that the standards of conduct derived from this decision structure and
87The Nomenklatura's use o f ideology is seen by many analysts as a mere facade. In Korchak’s 
view the Communist bureaucracy - significantly and severely characterized as being a “gangocracy” - does 
not appear as a real party, that is as a party based on an ideology with pretences o f representing a certain 
group o f the population. The Nomenklatura in his view does not represent anybody apart from itself, and 
it represents nobody’s interests apart from its own; it exists by itself separately from the society, 
“parasitising” it. Korchak, p. 103.
88Korchak, for instance, considers it a mistaken approach to analyse the ideology in isolation from 
other facets o f the Communist regime, such as its organisation, strategy, and tactics. “Without taking all 
this into account ideology will appear as meaningless, disorderly pile o f laws, orders, dogmas, and 
consequences.” Many o f them, he says, are constantly changed and often contradict each other. “Due to 
the ambiguity o f terminology one constantly encounters double meanings...Further, if  we accept ideology 
as a dominant factor o f totalitarianism, then how can an evident similarity between the “practices” of  
Hitlerism and Stalinism be explained, in spite of their very different ideologies.” Korchak, p. 112.
89Even at the level o f ideology it becomes difficult to argue for the Nomenklatura's candour. 
Monica Lovinescu, commenting on Stephane Courtois’ Livre noir du communism, argues for instance, that 
the Marxist ideology has never been a generous one. Lovinescu, Monica, [’’Forgetfulness and the Illnesses 
o f Transition”], Revista 22. Bucharest, 24-30 March 1998, pp. 8-9. See also Anne Applebaum, “Une 
m6moir en cache une autre,” Commentaire 78 (Et6 1997).
90For such an attempted identification, see the discussion on the Czech Act on the Illegality of 
the Communist Regime, supra Section 3.5.
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expected from the members of the Nomenklatura, were different from the ones governing 
the party membership. Also, these standards were (self-) imposed in a more fundamental 
way than in the larger group of the Party membership and State agencies.91
The predominantly informal nature of this decision structure did not prevent the “knots” 
of this structure to be formed at all levels: State, Party and civil society. The 
Nomenklatura caught in its structure the leadership positions of all key party and state 
institutions, and, when not annihilated completely, it “colonised” the top positions of all 
the remaining bodies of the civil society. In other constitutional arrangements this 
network of top positions would mean no more than an “Institute of Directors,” or “The 
Royal Association of Homoeopaths:” collective bodies established in order to ensure 
certain concerted policies, and a medium for dissemination of information for the 
members. For a system based on partocracy, however, the segregation of such a slice of 
the political elite had deep implications with respect to the constitution and role of such 
an organisation, and implicitly with respect to the society in which such an organisation 
emerges.
The implications of this structure appear as relevant basically because of two reasons. 
First of all, its members possessed among themselves all the active political power in the 
society. Secondly, through the type of institution into which their positions (if not 
themselves) were incorporated, all the power and control the members’ positions might 
entail over their particular domains were practically passed over to the incorporating
91Harasymiw, Political Elite Recruitment, p. 46. Bums, The Chinese Nomenklatura System, p xii.
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In this context, the Nomenklatura acted both as a filter and a catalyst. On the one hand 
it provided the internal criteria for the selection of its positions - the knots of power - as 
well as its members - the candidates filling those positions - controlling access into its 
own ranks from the outside.93 On the other hand, the Nomenklatura also generated all the 
channels of power, organising these centres of power into an original structure. This 
structure allowed the Nomenklatura to exercise its control over all the domains it has 
depleted of the real power by depleting top positions of these domains of their relative 
independence.94 The power exercised in this way by the Nomenklatura was not a 
constitutionally delegated power, but an auto-generated power. By practically 
emasculating all State and civil society organisations of their real power, the 
Nomenklatura became a network of channels through which its acts of will were 
converted into technically binding legal behaviour.95
92Comparing the Nomenklatura to the power structures o f a democratic country Voslensky writes: 
“Officially there is no such thing as a civil service in the socialist countries, but the nomenklatura would 
very much like outside observers to take it for a civil service. It carefully camouflages itself as an 
administrative machine and accepts being regarded as such - the vital objective being never to let it be seen 
to be a class. Actually, the nomenklatura has nothing in common with a civil service. A civil service carries 
out government orders, while the nomenklatura gives the orders, in the form o f resolutions, 
recommendations, or advice by leading echelons o f the party. Civil servants are privileged servants o f the 
state; nomenklaturists are masters.” Voslensky, p. 81. See also Podgorecki, supra note 4.
93Eyal and Townsley, pp. 723-750. From Digby Baltzell’s Philadelphia Gentlemen one can 
deduce two dimensions o f group-formation which could be applicable to Nomenklatura: firstly, its 
monopoly or near monopoly over the access into elite positions; secondly, the practice o f closure is based 
on social network ties. This includes the so-called “social capital” - bureaucratic patronage, friendship ties, 
as well as family and marriage ties - and excludes “impersonal” forms o f  closure, such as those based on 
credentialism or the market (emphasis mine). See Digby Baltzell, The Philadelphia Gentlemen: The 
Making o f a National Upper Class (New York: The Free Press, 1958), pp. 63.
94Korchak, p. 44 and 39.
95Tontsch, p. 253.
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This actual technical structure was only partly a formal structure. Its formality was based 
mainly upon generalised recognition within the organisation itself, and upon the duress 
exercised over its disorganised social environment96. As for the rest, the Nomenklatura 
was largely an informal organisation. As it was mentioned earlier in this chapter, the all­
enhancing power structure of the Communist bureaucracy hardly had any type of 
constitutional basis. This lack of legal acknowledgement was largely the cause of the 
Nomenklatura's mistaken characterisation as a mere list of positions on an office scheme.
In reality, due to its composition and powerful though informal structure, it was from the 
Nomenklatura that the channels of power were derived, that the major goals were 
established, and that the connections between constituent organs were established.97 
Studies of the totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe show in this respect that, ironically, 
in the republics of people the direct representatives of the people had no real power, that 
in the Soviet Union the Soviets had only formal, but no real power.98 At the same time, 
though the concept had been coined by Lenin99 no Communist constitution has ever 
instituted a formal organisation with a structure resembling the one of the Nomenklatura. 
In spite of this lack of constitutional basis, the self-organising hybrid structure of
96This type o f “recognition,” o f course, could hardly be considered a “valid domination,” or a 
“rightful possession o f power.” Max Weber, “The Types o f Legitimate Domination” in Economy and 
Society vol. 1 (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), p. 212 ff. Also, Peter Berger, “New Attack on the 
Legitimacy o f Business,” Harvard Business Review 54 (1976), pp. 82-89.
97Smith, “Guidance by the Communist Party,” p. 182.
98M. Ferro, Des soviets au communism bureaucratique: les mecanismes d’une subversion (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1980), p. 24. Also, B. Finger, “Was Russia a Workers’ State?” New Politics 4. no. 2 (Winter 
1995): 168-179.
"Vladimir Ilici Lenin, On the Soviet State Apparatus: Articles and Speeches, compiled by L. A. 
Kashnitskaya and N. N. Surovtseva (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 185 ff.
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partocracy guaranteed that the real power resided within this bureaucratic body.
The predominantly informal nature of the Nomenklatura is related to another 
characteristic of the Communist bureaucracy. Being formed mainly outside the legal 
discourse, its decision structure was the result of an equilibrium formed between “the 
elements of collaboration and conflict”100 of its constituent organs. This power-bargaining 
determined that in partocracy, there was no definite localised ruling body. Neither the 
Government, nor the Central Committee, nor indeed any other kind of “directive organs,” 
were prevailing. The ruling body was constituted from the whole “technical structure” of 
the party and state apparatus, rather than a person or a group. This technical structure, 
filtered and organised by the party ideology but based on its own idiosyncratic policy, was 
the place of the real power, the place from where the real decisions flowed. Its policy was 
minimally dependent upon the discrete individuals filling the centres of power of this 
bureaucratic conglomerate. This prevalence of the organisation over the individual 
members remained true even with respect to the highest positions within this power 
structure.101 Of course, for the substantiation of this state of (political) affairs one would 
have again to resort to informal, non-constitutional, yet irrefutable evidence provided 
abundantly by constitutional and social analysts.102
100H6ffe, pp. 34-37.
101Korchak, p. 112. Voslensky, pp. 249-250.
102Nelson puts forward arguments related to the formalism o f the debates in the elected bodies, 
the unanimity o f the votes, the elimination of any sign o f  dissent, etc. Nelson, “Political Participation,” p. 
114. R. Taras, ed., Handbook of Political Science Research on the USSR and Eastern Europe: Trends from 
the 1950 to the 1990 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1992), p. iv.
307
Chapter Five: Nomenklatura
To a rigid constitutional analysis, this distribution of the real power among all the state 
agencies might appear - from a strictly formal point of view - democratic. This appears 
so only because of the obscured, non-constitutional nature of the Nomenklatura which 
makes the analysis more difficult. This non-constitutional nature hinders the 
acknowledgement in the legal debate of the Nomenklatura as a structure of power. 
Nevertheless, the systemic analysis of the real power in action, together with an inquiry 
into the substantive rules of recognition of this idiosyncratic social agent, reveals its 
unique key role in the monopoly-like management of power in all areas of social life.
The appearance a of democratic distribution of power derives also from the impression 
that a Communist partocracy had no one location for the exercise of the real power, that 
the real power was spread throughout the whole party organisation. The reality though, 
was quite the opposite. The organisation itself was very limited and exclusive, and it 
encompassed only a small proportion not only of the population, but of the Communist 
party itself. Accordingly, the distribution of power in society was extremely uneven, 
being concentrated in the Nomenklatura. In reality the Communist bureaucracy was the 
Party. Once emerged from the Party, the Nomenklatura became its own source, its own 
creation and reason of being.103 This could seem a paradox if a closer analysis would not 
reveal it as just the result of the totalitarian demagogy. The claims of a democratic 
distribution of power, and of the homogeneity of the Party and society are easily 
discarded when they are faced with the Communist reality. Therefore, they cannot be 
used in order to call for a wider distribution of responsibility among all the party
103Avtorkhanov, The Technology o f Power, p. 35.
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members, or even society. The well known claim “we are all guilty” is unsustainable on 
legal grounds, and difficult to defend when faced with a rigorous normative assessment 
within the moral discourse.
It is important to point out that these elements of the relationship of the Nomenklatura 
with the rest of the society are relevant in the context of this thesis not by the fact that 
they would ideologically underline the lack of democracy in the totalitarian Communist 
societies (indeed, this is not the objective of this thesis) but that they would make evident 
the total control which was a characteristic of the Communist rule.
If this was the Nomenklatura's relationship with “the Other,” that is with its social 
environment, one might wonder what might be its relationship with itself. As any social 
system, the Nomenklatura had a temporal existence. This temporal dimension brings in 
the question whether, when trying to assign collective responsibility, one should 
distinguish between the different generations of the Nomenklatura membership. Different 
generations inhabited the Nomenklatura structure in epochs characterised by different 
degrees of repression and anti-democratic behaviour, and differentiating among them 
might seem natural. This distinction though stops being “natural” if one looks upon the 
Nomenklatura as a unitary, autonomous entity, and not as a collection of its individual 
members.
According to French, the members of a conglomerate organisation for instance, fill 
differing defined roles or stations by virtue of which they exercise certain powers over
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other members. A varying membership, that is a change in the identity of the persons 
filling those roles, does not necessarily entail a change in the identity of the collectivity.104 
Unlike an aggregate collectivity, the existence of which depends on the stability of its 
membership, the political entity, as an amalgam of persons and institutions, takes the 
format of a self-reproducing mereological sum.105 According to Copp, this sum is a sum 
not of its persons, but of stages of persons. And, indeed, the Nomenklatura's identity was 
not affected by changes in the persons associated with it, its existence of conglomerate 
organisation being compatible with a varying membership even at its highest level.106
Accordingly, by the Nomenklatura one does not understand the persons in the 
governmental offices and occupying the Communist party hierarchy at the time when, for 
instance, the Gulag was set up in the Soviet Union, or the Soviet army occupied 
Czechoslovakia, or Romania went through an extremely damaging austerity period. All 
these, though moments of sad importance in the history of the Communist oppression, 
are only snapshots of the activity of an organisation whose continuity is derived neither 
from its membership nor from its leadership. Rather, its continuity comes from the 
identity of its internal recognition rules and its structure at any given time of its existence, 
from its “basic belief’ reflected through its policies, and from the way in which all these 
elements are creatively interacting. Thus, since the identity of a conglomerate agent is not
104French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility, p. 13. May, The Morality o f Groups, pp. 41-
43.
105Copp defines the formal organisation as a “mereological sum,” as a sum not o f  its persons but 
o f stages o f persons. David Copp, “What Collectives Are: Agency, Individualism and Legal Theory,” 
Dialogue 23 (1984): 253 and 258.
106Voslensky, p. 249 ff.
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exhausted by the conjunction of the identities of its individual members, one could 
possibly argue that, in spite of the changes in the Nomenklatura's membership, in each 
of the Communist countries we deal with one and only Nomenklatura, with one and only 
structure of power, from the beginning of the Communist regime to the end.
Although this element from its temporal identity makes the task of identifying the social 
agent relatively easier, it also has certain inherent limitations. These limitations derive 
from the necessity to distinguish between, on the one hand the individual criminal 
responsibility and, on the other hand the collective political responsibility for criminal 
and human rights violations. From the statement that a conglomerate collectivity is 
responsible for a certain act one could not infer for instance, that each individual who 
belongs or belonged to that organisation is personally responsible for that act. As we shall 
see in more detail in the last chapter, collective political responsibility allows for certain 
types of attribution of responsibility and punishment but not for others. Thus, the 
organisational responsibility for the Communist oppression cannot be distributed among 
the members of the Communist hierarchy, it can only be shared,107 and the proportion of 
each share can only be estimated roughly and unofficially. Accordingly, these estimates 
have no implication at the level of punishment. This feature of non-distributiveness108 of 
responsibility of the conglomerate agency implicitly limits the choice of punishment
107May, The Morality o f Groups, p. 17. In a thorough analysis o f the concept o f collective 
responsibility, Feinberg defines group responsibility as “distributive” when it “is simply the sum o f all the 
individual responsibility,” and “non-distributive” when it “is more than the sum o f the responsibility o f  
its members.” See Joel Finberg, “Collective Responsibility,” in Doing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1970), p. 243 and 248 respectively. Also, May, The Morality o f  Groups, p. 17.
108French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility, p. 10 ff.
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The difficulty in applying a (traditional) criminal punishment to a collective criminal 
relates to another inference one can make from the “perpetuity” of the conglomerate 
Nomenklatura. The organisation might be legitimately found responsible for an act which 
some of its members had nothing to do with in the material way in which the criminal law 
requires. This doesn’t make them less part of the collectivity which is responsible, as long 
as they had, or have, the “credentials of membership.”109 The non-distributiveness of the 
collective responsibility does not mean that the question of individual responsibility for 
the same actions should be excluded.110 Nevertheless, this is a different matter which, 
from the legal perspective, has to be dealt with separately. From the case-studies in 
Chapter Two and Chapter Three though, we have seen the importance and necessity of 
adopting a comprehensive approach to the subject of responsibility for the crimes of a 
totalitarian system. This approach should create space for complementary concepts of 
responsibility in the legal discourse, and therefore for complementary types of 
punishment.
109Related to these credentials, Held writes that the non-distributive responsibility is to the 
individuals constituting the group, not for acts they perform in their group roles, but for their acts of  
choosing to become members or to remain members once they become fully aware o f the group’s 
objectives. Held, p. 93.
110”Although a group’s responsibility for an occurrence may not be ‘distributive’ to each o f its 
members for their actions in bringing about that occurrence, it does not follow that responsibility for that 
occurrence is not assignable to particular individuals, including members o f the group.” Stephen J. Massey, 
“Individual Responsibility for Assisting the Nazis in Persecuting Civilians,” Minnesota Law Review 71 
(1986): 139. French also, writes that “a finding o f non-distributive collective responsibility for an 
occurrence does not exonerate all the individuals in the collective o f responsibility for their actions in 
bringing about the occurrence.” French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility, pp. 112-113.
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5.6 Preliminary Conclusions: Structure, Control, and Responsibility
The role played by the Communist bureaucracy was often argued from the position that 
the Nomenklatura represented a tool for implementing the Party’s policy111, that it simply 
offered the means the Party needed in order to fulfill its supervisory function112, or, that 
it represented a super-agency of the State.113 In reality, it appears that the Nomenklatura 
was the Party, and that the Nomenklatura practically owned the State. From this 
perspective one can see, beyond the “mere” list of positions and functions in the party and 
state agencies - a social entity with all the characteristics of a conglomerate 
organisation,114 and with both reasons for action and the capacity for action residing in 
its structure. Based on this, a legal approach to political justice can develop an operational 
concept of collective responsibility for the serious human rights violations that occurred 
under the Communist regimes. As unusual as it might seem at the beginning, it is exactly 
in the list of positions and functions that the cohesion laid, since the list was not a list of 
names, and only apparently was a mere list of positions. In fact the Nomenklatura 
represented a shortcut leading to an important web of relationships among all the centres
11 Brunner, Georg - “The Essence o f Stalinism.” Problems o f Communism 30, no. 3 (May - June 
1981), pp. 87-90.
112Pusylewitsch, p. 325.
113John N. Hazard, “The Status of Communist Parties under Law: Uniformity and Diversity,” m 
Ruling Communist Parties and Their Status Under Law. Law in Eastern Europe series, no. 31, eds. Dietrich 
A. Loeber, et al. (Dordrecht/ Boston/ Lancaster: Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 1986), pp. 483-497.
114See supra Chapter Three, note the discussion on French’s distinction between conglomerate 
and aggregate collectivities.
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of real power.
Speaking about the relationship between the structure and the discrete individuals 
belonging to it, some remarks should be made. Firstly, this structure of power resembles 
an oligarchy in many substantial ways, oligarchy being defined as the control of 
government by a faction that acts in its own interest to the exclusion of the welfare of the 
people it is governing.115 The difference between oligarchy and partocracy would be that 
in the case of the Nomenklatura we are dealing with a list of key offices and functions 
from all areas of life, all placed under the control of one single structure. The power in 
the Nomenklatura's case was vested in offices, not in persons as it would be in an 
oligarchic system where the responsibility would perhaps be easier to divide into 
individual shares.
The second remark regards the possibility that the real power was detained in the hands 
of one single person - the Secretary General of the Communist Party. This oft-used 
argument against collective responsibility is refutable in front of the extent and 
complexity of the domination. No single person could gather and exercise so much power 
without the continuous tacit consent and active collaboration of a whole apparatus of 
power. The concept of dictatorship otherwise cannot explain the fact that the most 
important features of the Communist policy have remained unchanged in spite of the 
changes in leadership. On the contrary, it is often argued that the Secretary General was
115Microsoft Encarta 97 Encyclopaedia, s.v. “oligarchy.”
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only one of the wheels of the machinery and not always the main one.116 This position 
makes irrelevant another extremist attitude in this debate. This attitude does not spread 
the blame over whole societies, as we saw that some argue, but rather piles all 
responsibility on the person who happened to be in the apparently highest position, e.g. 
the President.
Thirdly, the elected representative bodies have been depleted of the real power, the 
Nomenklatura having direct control over the apparently “democratic process of selection 
of the candidates.” This fact transformed them into mere machines of voting decisions 
already formulated in the more occult structures of real power. Although it is not 
mentioned by the Constitution, the real government are the “directing organs,” the 
Nomenklatura stations of power.117 Last but not least, the lower boundary of the real 
power did not coincide with the lower level of the Communist party. In practice, the 
Communist party members were just as far from the exercise of the real power as the 
non-member citizens.
All these aspects of the m-division of power among the social agencies of the Communist
116”They [the Soviet Secretary Generals] unquestionably exercised paternal authority over a ruling 
class that was not yet firmly in the saddle, but...at the same time they were dependent on it. On the other 
hand, Khrushchev and, to an even greater extent, Brezhnev and Andropov, were never anything else but 
supreme executants o f the nomenklatura will. . .He [the Secretary General] is the head both o f the 
Politburo and o f the Secretariat, but his relations with the directive organs o f the nomenklaturist class are 
not those of a commander and his subordinates.” And again, put in an ideological political terminology but 
based on sociological systemic evidence: “The dictatorship of the Secretary-General is the dictatorship not 
o f an individual but o f a class that needs consensus at the top level. The collective dictatorship o f the 
Politburo and the Secretariat and the apparently personal dictatorship o f the Secretary-General are merely 
two faces o f  the dictatorship o f  the nomenklatura” (emphasis mine). Voslensky, p. 249, and p. 261.
117Voslensky, p. 247-248.
315
Chapter Five: Nomenklatura
societies, together with the analysis of the Nomenklatura’s structure, functions and 
operation, convey the idea that the Communist bureaucracy attained its practical goal of 
controlling all important (and even unimportant) aspects of social life. This control was 
possible because of its highly structured organisation, characterised by a pervasive esprit 
de corp118, and by the (practical more than constitutional) potential of converting its acts 
of will into normative parameters. The Nomenklatura’s reason for action was therefore 
matched with practically unlimited capacity for action. This monopoly of power was 
based as much on informal rules internally institutionalised, as on selectively and 
creatively interpreted constitutional ones. Together, they formed the core of the internal 
rules of recognition.
On the basis of this power structure and internal rules of recognition it can be identified 
whether decisions resulting in violations of basic rights derived or not from the place 
where the real power was vested, i.e. from the Nomenklatura. Given the Nomenklatura’s 
quality of collective agent, its capacity of acting “knowingly,” tracing these crimes and 
violations back to it inevitably entails its participation in the distribution of responsibility 
implied by a process of political justice.
This attribution of responsibility should be understood not only in terms of “practical
118Speaking about group-making practices, Eyal and Townsley argue that the representation o f  
the Communist bureaucracy as a “non-group” is precisely the sort o f “ideological call” that could produce 
a “practical group,” whose esprit de corps is constituted by recognition o f the ideological call. Eyal and 
Townsley, p. 726. Related to the idea o f a “practical group,” see also supra the discussion on the 
Nomenklatura's a-constitutional character, Section 5.3.
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responsibility” as we have seen in Wolf,119 but also in terms of a normative responsibility, 
based on the autonomy and rationality of the Communist bureaucracy as collective social 
agent. Posing over the “logic of the game,” as Peter French calls the substantive rules of 
recognition of a conglomerate organisation, one can identify the same two elements of 
practical and “socially induced” normative responsibility as recognised at the individual 
level. The practical responsibility of the Nomenklatura, resulting from a scrutiny of its 
policy, would have to do with a widespread and long term systematic infringement of 
basic human rights. Its policy though, as part of its substantive rules of recognition, may 
reveal also a deeper meaning of responsibility, an organisational “moral” responsibility, 
homologous, though not identical to the individual one. This dimension of the 
organisational responsibility would be (just as the individual one) socially defined, and 
would derive from the capacity of the collective actor to act “knowingly.”
119See supra the discussion on the idea o f the practical responsibility o f  organisations, Section
4.3.3.
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Chapter Six
COLLECTIVE POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY: QUO VADIS?
Abstract
In the previous chapters the conceptual possibility o f a collective social agent was established. In addition, 
the Communist regime was identified as being that part o f the party-state bureaucracy which during the 
Communist regime was referred to as the Nomenklatura. Should these findings have any practical legal 
implications for a process o f political justice? This final chapter will give an affirmative answer to this 
question, by pointing out some o f the doors to political justice opened by the acknowledgement of 
collective responsibility. Firstly, based on the specificity o f the social actors involved, and o f the historical 
circumstances to which the process o f justice refers, the chapter argues for a differentiated application of  
the principles o f the rule o f law. Secondly, the same elements give weight to those quasi-legal actions - 
such as the establishment o f a commission o f truth and the constitutional endorsement o f the report 
following the function o f such a commission - which specifically address the human rights violations as 
actions o f the Communist regime itself. Finally, the chapter also underlines the necessity o f making this 
acknowledgement o f the major role o f the structures o f power in the violations o f human rights the starting 
point and the foundation for all other legal measures aiming to restore and maintain justice after a 
repressive regime. All these elements offer a clearer perspective over the different approaches to political 
justice which were introduced in Chapter Two and Chapter Three. The perspective proposed in this final 
chapter will help avoid some o f the shortcomings encountered in these latter approaches. The chapter 
underlines that, to a large extent, these shortcomings spring from a mistaken or incoherent perspective 
over the concepts o f collective agency and collective responsibility, and that legally acknowledging these 
concepts should not prevent the preservation at the same time o f the fundamental dimensions o f the rule 
of law.
6.1 Acknowledging the Nomenklatura
After reconstructing the Nomenklatura as an autonomous social agent, and as the 
repository of the most important share of power in the Communist societies, it seems that 
in post-Communist Eastern Europe a process of political justice would require not so 
much a process of decommunisation, but rather one of de-nomenklaturisation. Such a
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process would imply ensuring that the most important structures of the emerging 
democratic societies do not inherit elements, and with them practices, of the criminal 
structures of the totalitarian regime.
The analysis of the structures of power in the Communist societies underlined the need 
for acknowledging the Communist “regime” as a coherent collective agent. Becoming 
aware of the Nomenklatura's collective “intelligence,” and of its “actualization of the 
potentiality of purposiveness,”1 changes the perspective over the process of political 
justice in Eastern Europe. Emphasising the amount of power it maintained over society, 
the Nomenklatura was presented as a self-reproducing organisation. Its embedded 
qualities as a social agent, and its actual power capacity, suggested that the Nomenklatura 
should occupy an important place on the map of responsibilities relative to the human 
rights violations which took place during the Communist regimes.
To a process of screening such as the Czech one, for example, the reconstruction of 
Nomenklatura as a coherent legal actor could offer a systematic definition of the 
“Communist regime” as a structure of power. As it was pointed out at the time, the Czech 
Act on the Illegality of the Communist Regime left the “regime” as an undefined concept. 
This fact made the Act on the Illegality of the Communist Regime merely a vague and 
confusing declaration.2
1 Weinrib, p. 82. See also supra Section 4.3.4 and 5.5.
2See supra the discussion on this law, Section 3.5.
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Defining the Communist regime through the parameters of the Nomenklatura could also 
bring coherence to the selection of the categories of offices and positions to be screened. 
In this way, the inconsistency of the different screening measures with respect to the 
categories included in the process of screening could be avoided. Moreover, the 
construction of the Nomenklatura as a legal actor could offer the Czechoslovak 
“lustration” the chance for a coherent justification of the measures taken against the 
Communist officials, StB collaborators and agents. As detailed in Chapter Three, the 
justifications given by both the supporters of the Lustration Law and by the Constitutional 
Court were rather contradictory. Besides, none of the justifications offered could account 
for the extent of the restrictions the Lustration Law imposed.
These contradictions stemmed to a large extent from the hesitation in addressing the 
Communist regime in its collective expression. As it was shown in Chapter Four, this 
hesitation resides within the position of the legal discourse itself with respect to the 
concept of collective agency and responsibility. Reconstructing the Nomenklatura as a 
social actor helps therefore in challenging the hesitation of the legal discourse with 
respect to the potential role played by the collective structures of power in the violations 
of human rights. Addressing the issue of collective agency and responsibility contributes 
to the prevention of an over-inclusive screening law such as was the case with the 
Lustration Law. At the same time, it can help the screening process gain an overall 
coherence when it is undertaken either as a protective measure (against sabotage or
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blackmail), or as a normative measure, and forms part of a process of deterrence3 from 
systematic human rights violations.
Introducing the Nomenklatura as a coherent agent in the debate on political justice goes 
beyond implicating it only in measures of “preventive screening.” The introduction of the 
“triangle” of collective responsibility - with action and reasons for action residing within 
the same organisational structure - alongside the triangle of individual responsibility, 
underlines the necessity to go beyond the punctilious procedural perspective which was 
designed to fit primarily the individual actor. Taking into consideration the 
Nomenklatura's qualities of conglomerate organisation, and the immense practical power 
it detained, the question of responsibility for human rights violations will obviously not 
be satisfactorily answered only by selectively prosecuting a few soldiers and even fewer 
officials. Therefore, proposing the Nomenklatura as a collective social agent implies also 
proposing it as candidate to the moral and legal division of responsibility for the human 
rights violations. Otherwise, addressing the crimes of the Communist regime solely 
through individual accountability, and ignoring the issues of collective responsibility, 
would mean trying to find answers to questions of responsibility that one does not dare 
ask.
By introducing the Nomenklatura into the discourse of political justice, McAdams’
3I.e. the deterrent function of punishment. See M. Clinard and P. Yeager, Corporate Crime. (New 
York: Free Press), p. 8.
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“tantalising question”4 regarding the substantive “residual responsibility”5 gets a chance 
not only to be asked, but also to receive an answer. If individual responsibility on its own 
does not satisfy the sense of moral and legal justice, then acknowledging the concept of 
collective social agency appears to advance a viable candidate for this residual 
responsibility. Evidently, acknowledging the concept of collective agency is not enough 
for solving the problems of legal responsibility. The unsatisfactory unilateral approach 
through individual responsibility, and the need to allocate the residual responsibility, 
brings with it the challenge of matching the sociological concept of collective agency (as 
developed in Chapter Four, and substantiated in Chapter Five) with compatible legal 
concepts and positive legal rules that can contribute to a fairer distribution of 
responsibility.
As the Hungarian statute of limitations case shows, the criminal law discourse alone is 
not functional in the case of a revolution; the criminality of a totalitarian regime cannot 
be addressed only through the criminal law.6 Collective criminal responsibility of certain 
carefully identified agencies of the Communist regime cannot be totally excluded. 
Nevertheless, given the specificity of the Communist power structures,7 a collective 
political responsibility for crimes constituting gross human rights violations should be
4See supra McAdams’ comments on the German border trials, Section 2.3.
5This would be the responsibility remained unassigned after the allocation o f  individual 
responsibility for govemmentally induced human rights violations. See also, supra Section 2.3.
6Nino, “When Just Punishment is Impossible,” pp. 71-72.
7See supra the discussion on the Nomenklatura's complex and predominantly informal structure, 
Section 5.2 and 5.3.
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legally acknowledged as more appropriate for this particular type of social actor. Through 
this collective political responsibility for human rights violations, a minimal but 
necessary legal accountability of the Communist regime for instituting and promoting a 
climate of crime and lawlessness can take shape. At the same time, as part of a process 
of political justice, this type of responsibility would be an acknowledgement of the 
legitimate implications of the right to revolution, and of the shortcomings of the rule of 
law when faced with the totalitarian state.
The reconstruction of the Communist regime as a coherent, relatively easily identifiable, 
collective agent also highlights the path of political justice beyond administrative 
screening and criminal prosecution; it helps to create a more solid foundation for the 
process of political justice in all its dimensions. This foundation is laid by allowing for 
a possible legal statement to be issued about the Communist regime as a whole, defining 
it in an unambiguous way, and making clear who “the regime” was. As it has been 
pointed out in Chapter Three, in some cases the insufficiency of the criminal law in 
dealing with the legitimate expectations of a revolution has been addressed by issuing 
such an unambiguous statement about the nature of the Communist regime.
This was the case of the Czech Act on the Illegality of the Communist Regime (Act No. 
198/1993). The Act No. 198/1993 included important declarations about the illegal and 
criminal nature of the Czechoslovak Communist regime. Though not openly suggested, 
the Act appeared to re-enforce the arguments supporting the screening measures, and 
especially the Lustration Law; it retroactively justified imposing screening measures to
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protect the newly emerging democracy, or even to punish gross abuses of human rights. 
At the same time, the officially declared criminal nature of the Czechoslovak Communist 
regime appeared to offer the justification for the selective retroactive changes in the 
statute of limitations for crimes committed under the Communist regime. These changes 
were brought by the same Act No. 198/1993. Had this Act identified more precisely the 
Communist regime, its statement about the regime would have avoided an otherwise 
inevitable vagueness brought about by the use of the undefined expression “Communist 
regime.” A more precise identification of the regime would have increased the impact of 
the Act No. 198/1993 upon the process of justice after Communism. It would also have 
offered a clearer ground for the criminal law implications (the retroactive suspension of 
the statute of limitations) brought by the same Act.
The importance of a legal act acknowledging the Nomenklatura among the viable 
candidates for the attribution of responsibility for human rights violations, makes it 
desirable to substantiate the authority of such a legal acknowledgement with the authority 
of a non-ideological cognitive account of the regime. Such an account is necessary since 
to acknowledge the illegality of a past regime directly by the new legislator is not 
sufficient to ensure the authority needed by a declarative legal act with such important 
potential legal implications. As democratic as the majority rule might appear to be most 
of the time for a democratic legislative process, in some situations it can only express the 
despotism of the majority.8 The controversial nature of the position of the government
O
Jon Elster, “On Majoritarianism and Rights,” East European Constitutional Review 1. no. 3 (Fall 
1992): 19-20.
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and other political agencies among the legal actors of a process of political justice, 
requires the issues of the collective agenthood of the Nomenklatura, and of its legal and 
political responsibility, to be addressed in a more systematic and impartial manner than 
through an immediate act of the legislative body.
A cognitive approach, relative to the repressive regime, coming from outside the legal 
discourse might seem superfluous. Nevertheless, in the context of an inherently 
controversial political justice process, the backup received from an as apolitical as 
possible environment is essential. This cognitive backup will strengthen the authority of 
the declarative act assessing the Communist regime, and the authority of its eventual 
further legal implications. Therefore, the reconstruction of a more coherent and better 
defined process of political justice should start from this type of evaluation of the 
Communist regime. An official evaluation would come to identify the regime within its 
most representative agency, e.g. the Nomenklatura, granting the latter the status of 
collective actor, and facilitating its acknowledgement through a legal formula.
Given the importance of this quasi-legal cognitive process for all the aspects of political 
justice, it becomes important to try to identify at the end of this thesis the concrete 
mechanisms through which this process takes place and through which its outcome can 
acquire legal relevance. The main result of such a cognitive process is the eventual 
identification of the Communist regime with its structures of real power, and the legal 
implications of this identification is the recognition of these structures as a potential 
collective actor responsible for human rights violations. This outcome would ultimately
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have to come under the scrutiny of the rule of law. Given this scrutiny, the rapport 
between the mechanisms of political justice and the fundamental principles of the rule 
of law is essential. Hence, in the next pages we shall first look into the true values behind 
the principles of the rule of law, and the way they could support the search for a coherent 
process of political justice. Only then, will the possible mechanisms of political justice 
and collective political responsibility become clear.
6.2 The Rule of Law in Post-Communist Eastern European Context
There is no dispute that the demands put by the process of political justice in Eastern 
Europe upon the principle of the rule of law are predominantly substantive demands; the 
(legitimate) expectations for political justice often go against the formal legal parameters 
usually associated with this principle. Consequently, looking into the relationship 
between the parameters of the rule of law and the demands of political justice requires 
an approach which would emphasise the possible coincidence of these demands with the 
ultimate values embedded in the rule of law. For this purpose, the first part of this section 
will identify the values residing behind the formal parameters of the rule of law; it will 
underline the conflicts which exist within the rule of law with respect to the realisation 
of these values, and the limited efficacy - especially in the context of a totalitarian regime 
- of the formal concept of the rule of law in defending these values. Then, in the second 
part of the section, it will be shown how the approach taken by the critics of the process 
of political justice and collective political responsibility of the Communist structures of
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power (an approach usually based upon the strictly formal parameters of the rule of law), 
goes against a true realisation of these values. In this discussion, the specificity of one of 
the social actors involved in the process of political justice in Eastern Europe - the 
Nomenklatura, the political agency identified in Chapter Five as representing the 
Communist regime - will play a predominant role.
At the beginning of the thesis it was argued that, if it is to be properly recognised, the 
right to revolution of the Eastern European countries implies a necessarily retroactive 
assessment of the Communist regime, and therefore of the political agencies which stood 
for that regime.9 The nature of this inference, as well as - following the findings from 
Chapter Four - the nature of the Nomenklatura's position in the society it ruled, reveals 
the process of political justice to be one of those “points of tension” within the rule of 
law where substantive claims demand to be acknowledged within the formal procedural 
framework of this principle. On the other hand, the analysis of the Nomenklatura in the 
previous chapter has shown that it is exactly within the specificity of the revolutionary 
process, and within the specificity of the collective political agent, that the release of 
tension in these points lies. Both practical solutions to expectations of post-revolutionary 
justice, and the answers to related theoretical issues (such as the conformity to the 
parameters set by the rule of law principle), depend upon the realisation that in the 
Eastern European processes of political justice one is dealing with a totalitarian collective 
actor.
9See supra the discussion on the right to revolution and its implications for a process o f political 
justice, Section 1.5.
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By taking into consideration this specificity of the revolutionary process, and the 
specificity of the collective actor (as analysed in Chapter Four) a complex and dynamic 
legal discourse could offer a procedurally enriched principle of the rule of law. Such a 
principle could help in the process of translating the revolutionary demands into 
normative statements. At the same time though, one has to keep in mind that an important 
part of the objections to political justice were built - as seen in the case studies from 
Chapter Two and Chapter Three - upon the very concept of the rule of law. Therefore, in 
order to translate coherently the revolutionary demands into legal sentences, one has to 
identify and confront the ultimate values pursued by those who, on the ground of the 
principles of the rule of law, reject the idea of political justice, and especially the idea of 
political justice incorporating a dimension of collective political responsibility of the 
Communist hierarchy.
6.2.1 The Nomenklatura, Collective Responsibility, 
and the Values of the Rule of Law
When one is concerned with the preservation of the rule of law one is not ultimately 
concerned with fixed and previously announced rules, with general and universal norms, 
or with procedurally bound justice courts.10 What one is ultimately concerned with is a
10 Hayek wrote that “stripped off o f all technicalities [the rule o f law] means that government in 
all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand - rules which make it possible to foresee 
with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances, and to plan one’s 
individual affairs on the basis o f this knowledge.” Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: 
University o f  Chicago Press, 1944), p. 54.
328
Chapter Six: Quo Vadis?
set of transcendental values for which the universality and generality of norms, their 
prospectiveness and consistency, etc., are only means of achieving these values. The real 
concern of those, such as the critics of political justice and collective responsibility, 
preoccupied with the preservation of the rule of law (be it in its formal or substantive 
conception)11 are the values of equality, individual autonomy and security. 12 The 
preservation of these three values must therefore^be also the ultimate concern of those 
critics who - invoking the parameters of the rule of law - reject the idea of assessing the 
Nomenklatura's responsibility for the human rights violations associated with the 
Communist regime.
The best way to achieve these values is through generality, universality, prospectiveness, 
etc.,13 of norms. But this way does not say everything about the protection of these 
values.14 What remains unsaid is the very important fact that generality, universality, 
prospectiveness etc., are not absolute and unique ways of achieving equality, autonomy
n Craig, pp. 35-37.
12Cotterrell, “The Rule o f Law in Transition,” p. 459 ff. Also, Sunstein, “Problems with Rules,” 
p. 978 ff. Sunstein, for instance, characterises Hayek’s position towards the rule o f  law as an example of  
“extravagant enthusiasm for rules and an extravagantly rule-bound conception o f the rule o f law.” 
Sunstein, “Problems with Rules,” p. 957.
11A more detailed list o f principles included in the rule o f law is given by Sunstein inspired by 
Fuller and Raz: “A system committed to the rule o f  law seems to require (1) clear, general, publicly
accessible rules laid down in advance; (2) prospectivity and a ban on retroactivity; (3) a measure o f
conformity between law in the books and law in the world; (4) hearing rights and availability o f review 
by independent adjudicative officials; (5) separation between law-making and law-implementation; (6) no 
rapid changes in the content o f law; and (7) no contradictions or inconsistency in the law. These are the 
customary characteristics of a system committed to the rule o f law. O f course, no legal system is likely to 
comply with these seven goals; failures o f  the rule o f  law, understood in such terms, are commonplace” 
(emphasis mine). Sunstein, “Problems with Rules,” pp. 956-957.
14Sunstein, “Problems with Rules,” pp. 956-968.
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and security. Though generally valid, exceptionally we might decide that these procedural 
parameters of the rule of law can be legitimately amended in the pursuit of these desired 
values. This position towards the rule of law, demanding a place in the legal discourse 
for “legitimate rule revision,”15 conveys the ultimate claim made in the Eastern European 
processes of political justice. As one could see in Chapter Two and Chapter Three, in the 
Hungarian debate on the statute of limitations, or in the Czechoslovak screening laws, 
this claim was sometimes spelt out, and other times was only suggested. The right to 
revolution also boils down to the same claim for recognising exceptional circumstances 
beyond the limits of a formal conception of the rule of law, and for the possibility to 
assess legally Nomenklatura's role in the Communist history.16
Acknowledging “exceptional circumstances” within a legal system based upon the rule 
of law is often claimed to undermine the whole coherence of a legal system.17 
Nevertheless, an acknowledgement of exceptional circumstances does not mean that the 
gates must be left wide opened to substantive evaluations, without any procedural control 
over the latter. It would be a legally counterproductive and even paralysing conclusion 
to consider that “all the horses are now Trojan.” In many domains, the regulator has long
15Sunstein, “Problems with Rules,” pp. 1008-1012.
16See supra the discussion on the right to revolution, Section 1.5.
17Stephen Holmes, “Precommitment and the Paradox o f Democracy,” in Constitutionalism and 
Democracy, eds. John Elster and Rune Slagstad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 195 
ff. Richard H. Piles and Cass R. Sunstein, “Reinventing the Regulatory State,” University o f Chicago Law 
Review 1 (1995): 66-71. Raz also, writes that, “[more] importantly, the practice [of proceedings through 
law] allows the creation o f a pluralistic culture. For it enables people to unite in support o f some ‘low or 
medium level’ generalizations despite profound disagreements concerning their ultimate foundations, 
which some seek in religion, others in Marxism or Liberalism, etc.” Joseph Raz, The Morality o f Freedom 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), p. 58.
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Legitimate acknowledgement of exceptional circumstances, derived from the nature of 
the Nomenklatura as collective agent, is not a process impossible to conceive. It can take 
place by carefully isolating those situations in which the principle of the rule of law in its 
formal conception does not fulfil its reason of being - it does not serve the values of 
equality, autonomy and security - and by proposing alternative mechanisms to fulfil those 
values. It is from this perspective of rationally differentiated application of the legal 
principles that one should assess the right to revolution and the legitimacy of the 
expectations for political justice. This right and these expectations include both a 
dimension of collective responsibility, and a dimension of retroactive assessment of the 
Communist regime. It is exactly by not including these dimensions, and by rejecting 
under all circumstances any process of justice which is not based on all the formal 
parameters of the rule of law, that the long lasting damage to the underlying values of 
equality, autonomy and security is done.
This relativisation of the rule of law with respect to its capacity to protect citizens, is not 
something unheard of in the legal debate. The Hungarian proposals on the statute of 
limitations are not the only ones invoking “exceptional circumstances” against the 
principle of absolute security, and the Czechoslovak screening processes are not the only 
ones circumstantiating the principle of individual autonomy and equality. The difficulty
18Morton J. Horowitz, “The Rule o f Law: An Unqualified Human Good?” Yale Law Journal 86 
(1977): 563. Sunstein, “Problems with Rules,” p. 981 ff. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Constitution o f Liberty 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960), pp. 220-233.
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to safeguard the three transcendent values does not belong only to the domain of radical 
political changes. Proposed generally as a “procedural kit,” the rule of law often revealed 
itself inadequate as a safeguard for the citizens against arbitrary power.19
One line of defeat in the preservation of the three values, for example, is a persistent 
neglect of the problems brought by the emergence of the private power.20 The rule of law 
ignores to a considerable extent the fact that the power of the corporate capital over the 
lives of the individual consumers or employees, just like the power of the government 
over its citizens, can fundamentally and negatively affect the realisation of the three 
transcendent values entrenched in the rule of law.21 In a similar theoretical confrontation - 
albeit full of practical consequences - between individual and collective agency, a 
formalistic perspective over the rule of law fails to ensure the protection of the citizens 
in those rare, but very important, moments of radical re-negotiation of the social 
contract.22 These moments include the revolutionary periods, and, most importantly, those
19Speaking about the hold that rule-formalism has on the public imagination, Hutchinson 
comments that this hold “is not only a feature o f the legal mentality.” Allan C. Hutchinson, Dwelling on 
the Threshold: Critical Essavs in Modem Legal Thought (London: Sweet & Maxwell Limited, 1988), p. 
23. On the same line see also Judith N. Shklar, Legalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), p, 37 
ff. Also Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Law in Modem Society: Toward a Criticism o f Social Theory (New 
York: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan, 1977), pp. 176-181. See also supra Cotterrell, Chapter Two, 
note 68.
20"Individual life is dominated and permeated by large and complex bureaucracies, principally 
the state and the business corporation... Yet, while bureaucracy represents one o f the greatest threats to 
genuine democratic values, there is little reason to suppose that the Rule o f Law offers any refuge from 
the dangers o f unbridled bureaucracy.” Allan C. Hutchinson and Patrick Monahan, “Democracy and the 
Rule o f Law,” in The Rule o f Law: Ideal or Ideology, eds. Allan Hutchinson and Patrick Monahan 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1987), p. 115. Also Unger, pp. 192-223.
21Hutchinson and Monahan, pp. 119-120.
22G. Werle, “‘We asked for Justice and Got the Rule o f Law:’ German Courts and the Totalitarian 
Past,” South African Journal on Human Rights 11. no. 1 (1995): 70-83.
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very difficult times preceding and leading to a revolution.
Emphasising the incapacity of the principle of the rule of law to protect the individual in 
these circumstances is not meant to deny the importance of the rule of law, and its 
usefulness in imposing limits on a government’s power, especially with respect to 
controversial issues. Montesquieu underlined, in this sense, the value of a formal 
principle of the rule of law as the only principle capable to protect the ruled against the 
aggression of the rulers.23 Moreover, one should note here the importance of the rule of 
law in limiting the powers of the rulers not only before, but also after a revolution. 
Embracing all people, the principle fulfils, according to Montesquieu, only one 
fundamental aim: the protection of the citizens from the discretionary exercise of power.24 
Though this position has its uncontested value for the protection of collaborators, border 
guards, etc., from being transformed into political scapegoats, contemporary legal 
scholars have also pointed out undesirable consequences of the formal concept of the rule 
of law.
Hutchinson and Monahan, for instance, argue that the individual life is dominated and 
permeated by large and complex bureaucracies, principally the state and the business
23Montesquieu. The Spirit o f Laws (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), Book Two, 
p. 253. Also, Shklar, Montesquieu, p. 15.
24”Montesquieu’s [concept of the rule o f law] really has only one aim, to protect the ruled against 
the aggression o f those who rule. While it embraces all people, it fulfils only one fundamental aim, 
freedom from fear, which, to be sure was for Montesquieu supremely important.” Shklar, Montesquieu. 
p. 4.
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corporation.25 According to them, while bureaucracy represents one of the greatest threats 
to genuine democratic values, there is little reason to suppose that the rule of law offers 
any refuge from “the dangers of unbridled bureaucracy.’*26 Hence, according to this view, 
the rule of law in its formal conception presents limited efficacy in defending the values 
of the autonomy, equality and security of the citizens not only in the case of an unlimited 
totalitarian government, but also in the conditions of a more limited, democratic, 
government.
Let us see more concretely what the result of the confrontation between citizens devoid - 
as shown in the previous chapter - of any practical power, and the Communist totalitarian 
regime would be when this confrontation is assessed through a rigid approach to the rule 
of law and to the realisation of its intrinsic values of equality, autonomy and security. In 
the case of the Communist bureaucracy the generality of rules designed to promote the 
protection of the value of equality, creates not fairness but unfairness and harm. This 
takes place by actually “discriminating” against that part of the population which 
presented a very general but distinct characteristic: it was totally excluded from the 
exercise of power of the Communist Nomenklatura.
Ignoring the distinction between the individual citizen and the “unbridled bureaucracy”
25Hutchinson and Monahan, p. 115. Also, Unger, p. 192 ff.
Hutchinson and Monahan, pp. 115-117.
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would result otherwise in an undeclared bias27 towards repressive totalitarian methods of 
government. These methods were characterised exactly by a notorious lack of equality. 
Hence, by promoting generality, and by applying to a powerful organisation, such as the 
Communist partocracy, the same parameters set for the individual person, one inevitably 
becomes biased towards social contexts generating inequality. The conclusion would be 
that, in the particular case of justice after a totalitarian rule, the principle of generality of 
legal rules generates inequality. The implicit result of this approach is that, when 
promoting a rigid principle of generality, the rule of law actually protects less the citizens 
against oppression, than it protects the oppressive Communist bureaucracy against the 
consequences of the revolution.
A good example of bias towards a rigid understanding of the value of equality is the 
decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court to reject the argument that the statute of 
limitations should be selectively suspended based on the compelling political 
circumstances in which the country was for almost half a centuiy. In rejecting these 
exceptional circumstances the Court relied upon the general rules governing the activity 
of the laws in Hungary. Nevertheless, by doing so the Court, far from strengthening the 
value of equality, produced inequality. This inequality derived from the fact that the 
Constitutional Court did not allow for the legal acknowledgement of relevant 
differences28 which existed between the citizens and the wwlimited government of the
27About bias as “solution” to the dilemma faced when choosing between the duty to obey and the
right to civil disobedience see supra Section 1.5.
28Sunstein, “Problems with Rules,” p. 994.
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The same lack of distinction in the application of the rule of law principle accounts for 
the hesitations to accommodate the collective organisation as an autonomous actor, as 
opposed, or complementary, to the individual autonomous actor. In its anthropomorphic 
formulation, the principle of (individual) autonomy refers to the treatment of the 
individual person as an independent, freely reasoning being, responsible personally for, 
but only for, his or her own chosen actions and inactions.30 It is in this particular 
formulation of the concept of autonomy that the idea of normative responsibility is 
overwhelmingly based. This way of defining autonomy, however, ignores the potential 
of the concepts of agency, intentionality and action - and therefore autonomy - to be 
differently shaped. No wonder then that one finds it difficult to accommodate a 
conglomerate organisation, such as the Nomenklatura, as an autonomous agent which is 
collectively responsible.
The value of autonomy suffered in two ways because of this permanent measuring of the 
collective agency against the standards devised for the individual agency. On the one 
hand, there is the obvious inadequacy of fitting a collective organisation, such as the 
Nomenklatura, under the same definition of an autonomous legal agent as the individual
29These differences were proven, among others, by documents designed to place the Hungarian 
Communist partocracy beyond the reach o f the law. See supra Podgorecki, and also Pataki, in Chapter 
Two, note 28 and discussion.
30Davis, Michael, “How To Make the Punishment Fit the Crime,” in Criminal Justice, eds. J. 
Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (New York and London: New York University Press, 1985), p.
119 ff. Edmund L. Pincoffs, The Rationale of Legal Punishment (New York: Humanities Press, 1966), pp. 
2-16.
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person.31 On the other hand, ironically, difficulties surface also from the fact that, in many 
respects, the collective agent has mistakenly been assimilated in many respects with the 
individual agent.32 The legal status of the collective organisation has been assimilated to 
a great extent to the one of the individual citizen. This extension of the legal 
individualism to accommodate the economic importance of the business corporation (or 
indeed the political weight of the government bureaucracies), has gradually undermined 
the legal significance of the autonomy of the individual citizen, and turned this value 
against itself.33
These aspects of the “physiology” of the value of autonomy have as consequence the 
tendency towards discarding the legal implications of accountability for the collective 
agent almost whenever it is impossible to make the latter emulate the individual actor.34 
One could say therefore that the ethos of the legal discourse allows that, under the 
condonation of the rule of law, the individual autonomy carries with it two problems. 
Firstly, not recognising the qualitative differences between the individual and the 
collective agency leaves the individual person in a disadvantaged power position, as 
compared to the collective agency. This is true with respect to the relationship between 
the individual person and the corporate organisation, but it becomes even more evident -
31Donaldson and Werhane, p. 24.
' i 'y
Even at the individual level, the value o f (individual) autonomy as a legally promoted value 
proves to be “elusive.” Cotterrell, “The Rule o f Law in Transition,” p. 462.
33Cotterrell, “The Rule o f Law in Transition,” p. 461. Also, Roger Cotterrell, The Sociology of 
Law: An Introduction. 2nd edition (London: Butterworth, 1992), pp. 123-130.
34See supra Donaldson’s position on the concept o f collective responsibility, Section 4.3.2.
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as emphasised in the previous chapter through the analysis of the Nomenklatura - with 
respect to the relationship between citizens and their government. Secondly, not 
conferring the collective organisations the status of a fully-fledged autonomous agent in 
its own right unwisely excludes (totally, or partially) the collective agent from the 
division of legal responsibility. Both these shortcomings of the value of autonomy as 
protected by the rule of law stem from the theoretical position analysed in Chapter Four 
under the name of methodological individualism. In the concrete case of the processes 
of political justice in Eastern Europe, these shortcomings have as result a large 
discrepancy between the responsibility to be assigned for the human rights violations, and 
the actual potential of accountability -as perceived by the law - of the different social 
(individual and collective) agents.
Among the three values inherent in the principle of the rule of law, the most problematic 
for a process of political justice appears to be the value of security. Professing a rigid 
principle of security seems to protect the “unreasonable and unresponsive government” 
against the legitimate expectations for justice of the society,35 more than it usually 
protects the citizens against the rather common ex post facto judgment pronounced by the 
courts,36 or against the “multiform tactics” usually used by governments in order to assure 
the flexibility of certain domains of law.37 In the specific case of the post-Communist
35See supra Cotterrell and also Montesquieu, Chapter Two, note 68 and discussion.
36Sunstein, Problems with Rules, p. 998 ff. Also Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 3-10.
37Foucault, “Govemmentality,” quoted by Cotterrell, in Cotterrell, “The Rule o f Law Transition,”
p. 462.
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processes of political justice, the prospective dimension of the rule of law is, of course, 
a logical impossibility. This impossibility is due to the theoretical and practical confusion, 
identified in the previous chapter, between the ruler and the player of the constitutional 
and legal game. This fundamental confusion of roles makes it impossible to assess the 
Communist regime using rules which have been carefully crafted by the latter exactly 
with the aim of not being assessed and made accountable, and with the aim of exercising 
unlimited power over all domains of the social life. In this kind of situations, although 
not only, the citizens remain unprotected by the principle of the rule of law.
It appears therefore, that pursuing the transcendent value of security would require 
differentiating between domains of social action in order to avoid this type of gap in 
which the individual person remains unprotected.38 Among these domains, the 
revolutionary action is definitely a special breed which is very difficult to pin-point 
constitutionally with respect to the principle of legal security.39 From this point of view, 
any revolution brings with it a certain degree of “ex post facto”
Not any ex post facto, however, should be considered at odds with the hard core of the 
principle of security. Differentiating, for instance, between the various domains of the 
legal discourse one finds that the imperative ban on ex post facto legislation, as a basic
38The most painful sacrifice that formal law has to make at the altar o f responsiveness, argues 
Gunther Teubner, is “the diminution o f internal consistency.” According to Teubner, modem responsive 
law “develops legal categories in dealing ad hoc with the various social subspheres. And these, o f their 
nature, can no longer claim universal legal consistency.” Gunther Teubner, Law as Autopoietic System 
(London: Blackwells, 1992), p. 147. Also, Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick, Law and Society in 
Transition:Toward Responsive Law (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 112.
39Eekelaar, pp. 22-24. Finnis, pp. 44-46. Kelsen, Problems o f Legal Theory.
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expression of the value of security, is an absolute dimension of only the substantive 
criminal law domain.40 Certainly, this does not mean that the other domains of law are 
free of such restrictions on retroactivity; it only means that the ban does not have the 
same imperative character which makes it impossible to override regardless 
circumstances. As shown when discussing Nomenklatura as an organisation, with its 
idiosyncratic exercise of power, the confusion of roles between the ruler and the player 
in the legal constitutional game makes a rather compelling argument against a rigid use 
of the principle of legal security. Nevertheless, the argument was not considered 
compelling by the Hungarian Constitutional Court who rejected the Zetenyi-Takacs 
which tried to amend retroactively the statute of limitations. On the other hand, the Czech 
Act on the Illegality of the Communist Regime made another, more successful, 
application of the same argument.41
The potential of differentiation within the legal discourse between the various domains 
of legal action entice to a reconsideration of the way in which the value of security is 
pursued through the basic principles of the rule of law. Rigidly rejecting the idea of such 
a reconsideration would mean giving the wrong signal to all present or future oppressive 
regimes. It has been said that the value of equality should be re-defined when dealing
40Related to this, Shklar characterised the whole concept o f  the rule o f law in its formal spelling 
given by Montesquieu as being “not the reign of reason, but... the spirit o f the criminal law o f a free 
people...[Montesquieu’s] view of limited government could be called the rule to control criminal law.”
Shklar, Montesquieu, p. 2.
41 See supra Chapter Two, notes 79 and 80, and discussion.
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within the dichotomy of corporate and individual actor.42 This redefinition is proposed 
specifically for the protection of a substantive dimension of the value of equality. 
Likewise, inspired by the political and especially legal reality of an oppressive regime, 
one can argue that, when dealing within the dichotomy of citizen and (totalitarian) state, 
the value of security should also be re-assessed. This re-assessment should aim, in this 
case, towards a substantive dimension of the value of security. This new dimension 
would have to offer better prospects for the protection of citizens faced with unresponsive 
and irresponsible governments. For the re-assessment of the value of security though, the 
acknowledgement of the difference of nature of the two types of agency - the individual 
and the collective governmental one - becomes essential.
One question, of course, would be to identify those elements which “make a difference,” 
and which therefore justify a re-assessment of a formal legal principle such as the one of 
security. The potential of the legal discourse for accommodating the re-assessment of the 
value of security can be identified by considering the context in which a certain law is 
promoted. A useful argument in this sense can be deduced from Raz’s analysis of the 
functions of law.43 Raz argued that the central normative function of the law is 
determined by its normative nature, and it is represented by the fact that laws are designed 
to guide human behaviour. According to Raz, the law also fulfils a subsidiary, but 
independent normative function. This function is the one of providing “a standard for
42Cotterrell, “The Rule o f Law in Transition,” pp. 460-461, and 465-466. Also, Ellen Hochstedler, 
“Corporations: The Twentieth-Century Criminal - Introduction,” p. 9 ff.
43 Joseph Raz, “On the Functions of Law,” in Oxford Essavs in Jurisprudence. Second Series, ed. 
A. W. B. Simpson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978).
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evaluating human behaviour.” A retroactive law only evaluates the behaviour, it does not 
guide it.44 In the case of retroactive laws, this subsidiary function becomes the central, 
if not the only function. Unless it is deduced from some factors which count as elements 
of indeterminate guidance, it cannot be said that a retroactive law can actually guide 
behaviour.
The value of security is meant to be ensured exactly through the guiding dimension of 
law. Nevertheless, this guidance should not be seen rigidly, as being offered exclusively 
through a normative act. The enactment of a retroactive law cannot be analysed in a 
temporal vacuum, without taking into consideration those factors which, though not 
legally sanctioned, may preempt the normative function of guiding human behaviour. 
Raz’s analysis of the functions of law goes along this idea when arguing that the 
retroactive law does not conflict with the rule of law if it is known for certain that such 
a law will be enacted.45 In this case, the rule of law’s demand for a “fair notice” to the 
citizens about the norms introduced would be fulfilled, according to Raz. Of course, it 
is debatable as to what one should understand by “fair notice,” and what could make up 
for the lack of formal legal warning.46
Notwithstanding this uncertainty, there is no doubt that the Communist bureaucracy was
44Raz, “On the Functions o f Law,” p. 281.
45Joseph Raz, “The Rule o f Law and Its Virtue,” The Law Quarterly Review 93 (April 1977),
p. 198.
46Richardson and Mandell, pp. 11-15. Teitel, “Dilemmas o f Justice,” p. 19.
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more than aware of the extent to which its legitimacy was contested, and its restrictions 
on civil and political liberties resented by the society it ruled. Obviously, one cannot 
speak here about an awareness that a very precise law, suspending the statute of 
limitations, for instance, would be passed. Such a more specific warning, however, has 
missed only because of an impediment created by the regime itself: an elaborated 
repressive machine using violent means in order to prevent the social disapproval to 
surface into potential legal forms. This is an aspect which “makes a difference” in the 
process of the realisation of justice. Accordingly, it should be considered as a sound 
argument in the debate over the weight of the formal principle of security.
The presence of an extra-legal “fair notice” is not the only aspect which, in a process of 
transition, might soften the mutual exclusiveness of retroactivity and the principle of 
security embedded in the rule of law. In some cases, retroactivity might surface from the 
courts rather than from the legislator. A court’s perception of a certain normative act can 
change in time, and this change does not always give a fair warning. In spite of this, a 
fairly innovative application of a law is not always seen as incompatible with the rule of 
law. Hart, for instance, suggested that what the population in general and the law- 
enforcing officials in particular take the intention of the law to be should be taken into 
account.47 Raz also regards as convenient to refer to the “intention of the law” as “a 
theoretical construct logically connected to the attitudes of the population and particularly 
of the law-making and law-applying organs as expressed in the legislature and its
47Hart, The Concept o f Law, p. 39.
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After looking into each of the three transcendental values of equality, autonomy and 
security, it can be argued that none of them can find a devoted guarantor in the formal 
principle of the rule of law generally, and especially not in the context of a totalitarian 
regime and its aftermath. Challenging this principle - at least under certain aspects - 
becomes inevitable in the process of re-instating justice after a totalitarian regime. It 
should be emphasised, however, that challenging the formal interpretation of the rule of 
law for a more substantive realisation of values which are underlying, yet beyond, the 
legal discourse, is far from being the monopoly of the revolutionary contexts. The need 
to ensure fairness or operational flexibility of the law creates permanent points of 
pressure within the rule of law, and in different legal domains. The formal performance 
of this principle is faced more often than ever with substantive goals.49 This tension 
brought by the social expectations from the discourse of law is explained by the ever 
growing complexity and dynamism of social life.
Of course, the complexity and dynamism of social life have not brought the same 
extended changes to the demands of political justice as they have brought to the demands 
addressing other domains of law. However, two more notable aspects could be mentioned 
with respect to the conditions for the realisation of the demands for justice for past human 
rights violations. Firstly, with the development of the principle of legality, the way of
48 Raz, “On the Functions o f Law,” p. 285.
49Frederick Schauer, Plaving bv the Rules (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 196-206.
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answering these expectations for justice has concentrated predominantly on deterrence, 
excluding revenge, and accepting the idea of retribution only as a means to deter. This 
was a move destined to ensure an easier integration within the legal discourse of the 
demands for justice. Secondly, the development of the doctrine of human rights has to 
a certain extent energised the legitimate expectations for political justice, based on the 
violations of the basic rights of the citizens by their governments.
The Hungarian final version of the act amending the statute of limitations is a good 
example of bringing international law into the debate on political justice. As detailed in 
Chapter Two, this integration was done by using international treaties as legal foundation 
for domestic normative acts. Nevertheless, here it should not be assumed that similar 
expectations for retrospective justice were less legitimate prior to the Geneva 
Conventions; or that suspending retroactively the statute of limitations for very serious 
crimes was less of a legitimate expectation before the New York Convention established 
the non-applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
The right to revolution, and thus to political justice, goes, for the time being, beyond the 
international conventions protecting basic human rights. As Kirchheimer put it, it 
originates in the popular consciousness.50 This does not mean though that the 
expectations answered by a process of political justice are not legitimate; they are only 
“politically inconvenient.” Besides, it has to be acknowledged that even if sometimes 
domestic legislation does not protect against state-sponsored human rights violations, 
these acts, making the object of a process of political justice, are recognised as crimes by
50Kirchheimer, “Legality and Legitimacy,” p. 143.
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A step forward in the theory of political accountability and justice, and therefore, an 
improved protection of the individual and of the values of equality, autonomy and 
security, could be achieved by legally acknowledging sociological realities such as the 
Nomenklatura within the framework of the rule of law. It is very important, however, that 
this acknowledgement negotiates its way through the Scylla and Charybdis of the rule of 
law. It is from this negotiation that the necessary “safety structures” - for the protection 
of the individual members of organisations, and of the organisations themselves - of the 
mechanisms of collective political accountability emerge. At the same time, internally 
generated procedural standards - a result of the “negotiation” between the expectations 
for justice and the parameters of the rule of law - are indispensable for achieving the aim 
of the process of political justice: the protection of citizens against state-sponsored human 
rights violations.
It has become clear by now that not only reparation of past injustice, but also deterrence 
from future human rights violations, is not achieved by following the Helsinki 
Committee’s advice to reject any idea of political justice implying collective 
responsibility of the regime.51 On the contrary, justice should be achieved by using and 
procedurally taming this idea. This would mean operating an opening of the rule of law 
to the substantive demands of the revolution, while at the same time enclosing the legal
51 See supra the discussion on the Helsinki Proposal for a process o f screening, Chapter Three, 
Section 3.4.3.
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potential to answer these demands into adequate safety structures or “procedural shells.” 
Acknowledging the right to revolution under the rule of law is meant to induce within the 
legal discourse the creation of those structures which will be activated in exceptional 
circumstances, when the advantages brought in by the procedural dimension of the rule 
of law are outweighed by the disadvantages.52 These safety structures are therefore to 
come into action when the rule of law transforms into a legal tool which reminds one 
more of an armour protecting “the power that is” than of a shield protecting - such as 
Montesquieu wished - the individual citizen.53
6.3 Justice by Truth: The Truth Commission and the Acknowledgement of 
Collective Responsibility
At the beginning of this thesis it was shown that the recognition of the right to revolution, 
with its implied dimension of collective political responsibility, belongs to those means 
of inducing accountability into the most discretionary, unreasonable and unresponsive 
structures of power. In the remaining part of the thesis we shall identify those legal 
parameters within which the expectations for political justice, derived from this right to
52Lawrence Lessing, “The Path of Ciberlaw,” Yale Law Journal 104 (1995): 1743.
53The relative nature of the rule o f law seems, again, implied in Raz’s vision o f this principle. Raz 
sees the rule o f law as a concept internally generated by the law as a solution to the evil brought by the law 
itself. This ontology o f the rule o f law underlines the important aspect that the rule o f law is part o f the 
legal system and therefore part of the problem. This means that the rule o f  law potentially generates some 
evil itself, as a specialised part o f the legal discourse. Therefore, it is just normal for the legal discourse, 
yet again, to try to accommodate expectations that the evil generated by this principle will be addressed. 
Raz, “The Rule o f Law and Its Virtue,” pp. 209-211.
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In spelling out these structures for integrating the Nomenklatura's responsibility within 
the legal discourse, its specificity, such as it was presented in the previous chapter, plays 
an important role. First of all, there should be identified ways of acknowledging the 
collective actor as opposed to the individual one. This will be realised here by 
emphasising one particular path to be taken. This path, which is an expression of a legal 
hybrid, will later prove to have a direct impact on all the other aspects of the integration 
of collective responsibility under the rule of law. Secondly, we shall look into the 
possibilities for legally acknowledging the Nomenklatura's central place in the 
Communist regime and therefore, its responsibility for the human rights violations and 
the repression of democratic structures. Thirdly, the aspects of the legal 
acknowledgement of Nomenklatura will inevitably bring up the question of implementing 
the Nomenklatura’'s responsibility, and making it accountable. We shall therefore finally 
look into the legal possibilities opened up for implementing this responsibility.
The first element on the road to integrating the Nomenklatura's nature and responsibility 
into the process of political justice is actually represented by a legal hybrid; a mechanism 
which begins as a cognitive process outside the legal discourse but which can become a 
legislative landmark. This mechanism needs the legislative input in order to become part 
of the legal debate on political justice. At the same time, it lends the process of legal 
justice undertaken in times of transition almost all the authority this process of justice can 
ever hope to get; it lends the process of political justice the authoritative truth it produces.
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In chapter one, political justice was defined as an attempt to offer an authoritative 
interpretation of the past. This definition can be perceived as derisive, the imposed 
interpretation always being the victors’ version.54 However, the actual nature of the 
process depends upon the way the object of the process of political justice was 
established. Although falsifying the truth in such an inherently controversial process is 
not impossible, taking the gross violations of rights which occurred under the Communist 
regime as object of the process of political justice should protect the process against blunt 
ideologisation.55 As emphasised in the first chapter, the protection against accusations of 
using the law for persecuting the political foes can be ensured by addressing those crimes 
only which could not be justified by the pursuit of any ideology, however altruistic that 
ideology might appear to be.56
The concept of political justice - with its competing discourses - is a sword with two 
edges, it can be both used and abused. It is understood that a government engaging in a 
process of political justice is inevitably assuming the “historical risk” of being proven 
wrong, of being proven itself an abuser of justice and law.57 Therefore, the “victors” 
should not worry about being victors, but about getting their justice right so that history
54Kirchheimer, Political Justice, p. 17.
55R. J. Holt, “The Grammar o f Human Rights: A Wittgensteinian Analysis,” Ph.D. thesis, London 
School o f Economics, 1994, p. 5 ff.
56Appelbaum.
57See supra Kirchheimer, Chapter One, note 74, and discussion.
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does not judge them too severely.58 Taken as the object of the process of political justice, 
the systematic state-sponsored violations of human rights cannot be seen as unrelated 
individual violations, which do not entail the responsibility of the Communist hierarchy.59 
Besides, no valid justification can be offered for the practically total suppression of 
fundamental rights and freedoms of entire populations. On the other hand, handled 
carefully, a process of political justice including the Nomenklatura among the 
accountable actors for the crimes of the regime has all the chances to withstand the test 
of history.
From the debate surrounding the different approaches to political justice in Eastern 
Europe it became obvious that one of the main difficulties with this process relates to the 
fact that neither legal, nor political discourses have a fixed point of reference regarding 
the interpretation of the past.60 What for one side means systematic violence, for the other 
side means unavoidable political lapses of the emerging Communist societies; what for 
one side represents state-sponsored violations of fundamental human rights, for the other 
side represents isolated individual instances of “mistakes.” It becomes therefore 
unavoidable to try to address the issue of the truth about the Communist regime, and the 
mechanism available for establishing an authoritative truth which could help the
58See Richard Wasserstrom, “The Relevance of Nuremberg,” Philosophy and Public Affairs I. 
no. 1 (1971): 27. Though very critical towards the use o f courts for upholding other values than the one 
of strict legality, even Kirchheimer agreed with the inherent justice o f  the Nuremberg trials. Kirchheimer, 
Political Justice, p. 423.
59See supra the discussion m Chapter One, Section 1.4.
60Andr£ Du Toit, “Introduction” to Towards Democracy: Building a Culture o f Accountability 
in South Africa, ed. Andre Du Toit (Cape Town: IDASA, 1991), p. 9.
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Finding and exposing the truth about the past belongs to the nature of any process of 
justice, and the process of political justice is no different in this respect. Accordingly, the 
legal discourse is bound to face expectations for accommodating an official, 
“authoritative” attitude towards the past.61 The fact that, as shown in the previous chapter, 
the Communist regime can be pinned down to the collective body of the Communist 
Nomenklatura undoubtedly adds both substance and suspense to such an enterprise. At 
the same time, as we shall see later on, the idiosyncrasy of the political actor itself adds 
specific features to the legal cognitive process through which Nomenklatura's 
responsibility could be acknowledged and assessed.
A cognitive process which upgrades the truth about the Communist regime from 
individual level to system dependent phenomena, and which leads in this way to a 
complex social agent such as the Nomenklatura, is inevitably surrounded by a certain 
ambiguity as to the social discourse (political and/or legal) this process will inform. This 
ambiguity is especially encouraged by the a-typical character of the Nomenklatura as a 
formal organisation.62 The ambiguity and a-constitutionalism of Nomenklatura's formal 
structure, its “undercover” competencies, the length of time over which its activity 
expanded, add to the difficulty of the cognitive exercise taking place both within and 
outside the legal discourse relative to the Nomenklatura. From this point of view, finding
61H. Adam, “Trading Justice for Truth,” World Today 54, no. 1 (1998): 11-13.
62See supra the discussion on the a-constitutional character o f the Nomenklatura, Section 5.3.
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and telling the truth functions much more easily when dealing with a military dictatorship 
where, after a relatively short undemocratic period, a relatively restrained and easily 
identifiable military elite is made accountable.63
The specificity of the Nomenklatura, with its hidden structures of power and its vicarious 
existence, is not the only aspect which hinders the cognitive exercise for the purpose of 
a process of political justice. As revealed by the analysis of the debate on collective 
responsibility, the ambiguity of the legal discourse towards the concept of collective 
agency is definitely one other reason why there have been so few comprehensive attempts 
in Eastern Europe to present an authoritative perspective over the Communist regime.64 
With one exception only,65 the truth about the collective dimension of the human rights 
violations under the Communist regime has been left more or less to itself.
In acknowledging the collective responsibility of the Nomenklatura as a collective social 
actor, it is important to choose carefully the concrete way in which this acknowledgement 
is practically taking place. One such strategy has been already discussed when addressing
63L uc  Huyse, “Justice after Transition: On the Choices Successor Elites Make in Dealing with 
the Past,” Law and Social Inquiry 20, no. 1 (Winter 1995), reproduced in Transitional Justice: How 
Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, vol. 1. General Considerations, ed. Neil J. Kritz 
(Washington D.C.: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 1995), p. 105. Also, Albon, “Justice in Times 
of Transition,” p. 50.
64Huyse, “Justice after Transition,” p. 338.
65In May 1992, the German Bundestag passed the “Law Creating the Commission o f Inquiry on 
‘Working through the History and the Consequences o f the SED Dictatorship’.” Act No. 12/2597 (May 
14, 1992), reproduced in Laws. Rulings, and Reports, vol. 3 o f Transitional Justice: How Emerging 
Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, ed. Neil J. Kritz (Washington D.C.: United States Institute 
o f Peace Press, 1995), pp. 216-219. See also James A. McAdams, “The Honecker Trial: The East German 
Past and the German Future.” The Review o f Politics 58. no. 1 (Winter 1996): 53.
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the Czech approach to political justice. This approach took the form of the Act 
proclaiming the illegality of the Czechoslovak Communist regime (Act No. 198/1993). 
As it was pointed out at the time, the Act No. 198/1993 offered a rather unambiguous 
statement about Czechoslovakia’s Communist past.66 The Act declared the Communist 
regime and its active supporters fully responsible for systematic violations of human 
rights through murder, illegal imprisonment and torture, disregard for the freedom of 
movement, etc.67 In spite of this legally and politically courageous statement which was 
bound to create controversy, it was recognised that the authoritativeness of the Act No. 
198/1993 relied more on the political authority of the legislative body than upon authority 
of impartial knowledge resulting from a fact-finding process.68
The law was also shown to be too schematic, and even vague, with respect to key 
concepts requiring a far more precise delimitation; the law used terms such as 
“Communist regime” and “responsibility” without defining these terms, and therefore 
without precising the discourse - legal or non-legal - in which these terms should be 
understood.69 Hence, it would be difficult for the legal process of political justice to draw 
its legitimacy from this type of legislative statement acknowledging the responsibility of
66See supra Chapter Three, note 137, 139, and 142, and discussion.
See supra Chapter Three, note 142, and discussion.
’’Czech Republic: Constitutional Court Decision on the Act on the Illegality o f the Communist 
Regime,” 12 December 1993, reproduced in Laws. Rulings, and Reports, vol. 3 o f  Transitional Justice: 
How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, ed. Neil J. Kritz (Washington D.C.: United 
States Institute o f Peace Press, 1995), pp. 369-374. Also, Siklova, pp. 59-60.
69See supra Article 1 and Article 2 of the Czech Act on the Illegality o f the Communist Regime, 
Chapter Three, note 137 and 139.
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some undefined structures of the Communist power.
The Czech Act No. 198/1993 has indeed its own merits since it tried to address the 
Communist regime as a whole, making an open statement about the repressive nature and 
the responsibility of the regime. This statement, however, was made in an incomplete and 
unilateral manner, mainly due to the fact that the Czech parliament did not base the Act 
upon a document with a clearer formal basis of impartiality. An act declaring the 
illegality of the Communist regime cannot be based exclusively upon a common 
perception of the nature of the regime. For a legitimating acknowledgement of the real 
nature of the regime the legislator should rely not upon mere social perception, but upon 
objective social knowledge.70 This objective knowledge can be sanctioned by the 
legislator, but it cannot originate in the legislator’s will. In other words, that dimension 
of political justice which concentrates on revealing the truth about the past regime as a 
whole has to combine the authority of the law with the one derived from an impartial 
approach to history.71
Answering this need for an impartial authoritative account of a regime, the practice of 
transition from undemocratic regimes has developed a hybrid institution which could be 
seen as essential in integrating the collective responsibility of political bodies in a legal
70G. Simpson and P. Vanzyl, “La commission pour la veritd et la reconciliation sera-t-elle le 
meilleur desinfectant?” Temps modemes 50, no. 585 (September-December 1995): 394.
71Carlos S. Nino, “When Just Punishment is Impossible,” in Truth and Justice: The Delicate 
Balance. Central European University, Institute for Constitutional and Legislative Policy, Working Paper 
no.l (1993), p. 67 ff. Teitel, “Truth and Justice,” pp. 5-6.
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approach to political justice.72 In this sense, it has become common practice to provide 
the official truth about a government or a political regime through a “truth commission.” 
Such a commission is supposed to embody the highest possible degree of impartiality.73 
In this sense, it is considered of the essence of a “truth commission” to address the nature 
of a political regime with respect to the gross violations of rights which occurred under 
that regime’s sponsorship.
The nature of the Nomenklatura as political agent representative of the Communist 
regime, the time span over which this regime stretched, the seriousness and complexity 
of the crimes to be unravelled, all make necessary this meta-legal foundational stage of 
a process of political justice. The core of this analysis becomes therefore to underline the 
role and importance a truth commission can play in integrating the concept of collective 
responsibility and the Nomenklatura in the process of political justice.
The function fulfilled by a commission of truth belongs to the foundations of a process 
of political justice, in the sense that, as we shall see in more detail later, all other 
measures of political justice such as screening laws, changes in the application of the 
statute of limitations, redefining the concept of legal agency, etc., should all be grounded 
in the truth-finding process initiated by a truth commission.74 Since it attempts to build
72Margaret Popkin and Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “Truth As Justice: Investigatory Commissions in 
Latin America,” Law & Social Inquiry 20, no. 1 (Winter 1995), reproduced in Transitional Justice: How 
Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, vol. 1. General Considerations, ed. Neil J. Kritz 
(Washington D.C.: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 1995), pp. 262-263.
73Ibid.
74Du Toit, p. 7.
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a bridge between society’s substantive expectations for justice, and the aspirations of the 
same society for the rule of law, this process is also “meta-legal.”
How could a truth commission help in the specific task of integrating the Communist 
Nomenklatura, as totalitarian political body, in the process of political justice? And how 
could it bring the collective responsibility, as an expression of the Nomenklatura" s 
attribute of autonomous social actor, under the law? To answer these questions one would 
have to look into the functions and goals of a truth commission, and into its potential 
implications for both criminal law, as well as non-criminal law approaches to political 
justice. For these implications, both the mandate and the setting up formula of the truth 
commission will also have to be looked into.
6.3.1 Collective Responsibility and the Functions of the Truth Commission
A truth commission shares with a process of political justice the same object, e.g. the 
gross violations of human rights by an oppressive regime. Its functions are therefore 
shaped with a view to addressing this object.75 This fact makes a truth commission from 
the start an appropriate tool for initiating a process of political justice. The primary 
function of a truth commission is to establish an accurate record of a country’s violent
75Priscilla B. Hayner, “Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study,” 
Human Rights Quarterly 16, no. 4 (1994): 599.
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past.76 The ultimate goal pursued through this function of exposing the truth is to 
contribute to a clear signal that, during a democratic transition, past human rights 
violations cannot go ignored, and unaccounted for.77 Therefore, a process of establishing 
an accurate record of a regime through a truth commission has to offer the ground for an 
official and legal statement about the repressive past.78 This process of revealing the truth, 
together with the work put into embedding the democratic principles into the weakened 
civil societies, can play an important role in diminishing the likelihood of human rights 
violations in the future.79
As it was shown in Chapter Four and Chapter Five, the acts of a regime can be something 
more than the mere sum of the individual acts and crimes committed by the discrete 
individuals with or without the “credentials of membership.” In this respect, establishing 
the systematic nature of the crimes and the link between these crimes and the political 
regime which committed them belongs intimately to the main function of a truth
76Popkin and Roht-Arriaza p. 287. The fact that through its activity the commission would help 
in providing a fair record of the country’s history, preventing it from being lost or re-written (with all the 
preventive aspects o f this preservation), belongs to the secondary or mediate functions o f the commission. 
Eisenberg, p. 148 ff. The German Commission o f Inquiry on “Working through the History and the 
Consequences of the SED Dictatorship,” was assigned, as part o f its mandate, to make contributions to 
political-historical analysis and to political-moral assessment (Article II), without at the same time aiming 
to forestall or replace the necessary historical research (Article I). Germany: Law Creating the Commission 
of Inquiry on “Working Through the History and the Consequences o f the SED Dictatorship,” Act No. 
12/2597 (14 May 1992), reproduced in Laws. Rulings, and Reports, vol. 3 o f Transitional Justice: How 
Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, ed. Neil J. Kritz (Washington D.C.: United States 
Institute o f Peace Press, 1995), pp. 216-219.
770rentlicher, “Settling Accounts,” pp. 2613-2615.
78Hayner, p. 604.
79The healthy re-building o f civil society itself relies to a large extent upon the acknowledgement 
of truth. Assuming the past creates a more knowledgeable citizemy, capable o f recognising and resisting 
any sign o f return to a repressive regime. Orentlicher, pp. 2610-2614.
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commission.80 This dimension of a truth commission’s activity proves its important 
implication in the integration of a collective responsibility dimension in the political 
justice debate. In this sense, the truth commission is expected to present an evaluation not 
of certain crimes or individuals, but of a government or political regime as a whole. 
Establishing and disclosing the truth about the systematic human rights violations 
committed under the Communist regime’s sponsorship, for example, would entail an 
acknowledgement of the role played by the Communist structures of power in committing 
those crimes.81 Hence, the fact-finding function of a truth commission acquires a very 
important, even essential, declarative nature. This function goes beyond the declarative 
dimension of the Czechoslovak Lustration Law, or even of the Czech Act on the Illegality 
of the Communist Regime. The formal recognition of the responsibility of the 
Communist structures of power coming through a truth commission is expected to be 
clearer and more openly stated than the Lustration Law was, and to have more authority 
in expressing the nature of the Communist regime than the law declaring the regime’s 
illegality.
Speaking about the fact-finding function of a truth commission it should be noted that the 
complex nature of a totalitarian regime make this function go beyond merely “finding”
80Nino, “When Just Punishment is Impossible,” p. 73.
81’’The Commission believes that it must state clearly its opinion on the individual and 
institutional responsibility that may stem from the human rights violations it has had to examine. More 
explicitly it must state what responsibility - if any - shouldfall on the armedforces and security forces for  
human rights violations committed by individuals on active duty in their respective institutions” (emphasis 
mine). Chile. Comisidn Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliacidn, Report o f the Chilean National Commission 
on Truth and Reconciliation, trans. Phillip E. Berryman, vol. 1 (Notre Dame: University o f Notre Dame 
Press, 1993), p. 115.
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the truth. It is unlikely that a truth commission would be expected to “discover” essential 
elements which are not already, at least potentially, within the public domain.82 In the 
Eastern European societies there is practically very little unknown about the crimes of the 
Communist regime, as well as about who was behind those crimes.83 Therefore, for the 
truth commission, the “fact-finding” process becomes in fact a process of decantation of 
the essential facts, of the “representative” aspects which would have to be included in the 
final report of the commission. These essential facts will refer mainly to the political 
body which exercised the power, rather than to particular individuals and crimes. The 
truth commission will therefore be expected to acknowledge rather than to discover the 
state sponsored human rights violations, and to present coherently those essential 
elements of the Communist structure of power which makes it eligible for the moral and 
legal division of responsibility.
If the truth is already known, the inevitable question to answer at this point would then 
be whether the post-Communist societies still need commissions of truth. The answer to 
this question relates to the fact that we live in a culture profoundly marked by the legal 
discourse, a discourse often radiating beyond its own declared boundaries. Accordingly, 
societies expect an official legal statement about the injustice of a regime, even when this
82  •Richard D. Ralston, “Apartheid, South Africa’s ‘Peculiar Institution’: Law Versus Justice in
a Repressive Society,” in Totalitarian and Post-Totalitarian Law, eds. Adam Podgorecki, and Vittorio 
Olgiati (Dartmouth: Oflati I.I.S.L., 1996), p. 215 ff.
Appelbaum. In this respect, the commission would be informed by agencies placed outside both 
legal and political discourse. These agencies are part o f the civil society implicated in the process o f  
keeping the history records o f that society. Among these agencies represented by historians, sociologists, 
lawyers, etc., Nino includes the artists whose contribution to the presentation o f the account o f the 
oppressive regime can, he argues, be just as important as the one o f a truth commission. Nino, “When Just 
Punishment is Impossible,” p. 74.
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injustice - formally speaking - might have been “legal.” It was to this need for official 
recognition of the crimes and perpetrators that Juan E. Mendez, the Director of Americas 
Watch, referred to when arguing that knowledge which is officially sanctioned, and 
thereby made “part of the public cognitive scene” acquires a mysterious quality that is not 
there when it is “merely truth.”84 The primary function of a truth commission would 
therefore be not so much the “fact-finding” but the acknowledgement of truth.85
The reason why the truth revealed by the commission can have more authority, and a 
greater impact upon the acknowledgement of collective responsibility in the process of 
political justice, is a combination of the elements of the commission’s mandate, and of 
the commission’s setting up details.
6.3.2 Collective Responsibility and the Mandate of the Truth Commission
The mandate which the society is ready to give to the truth commission plays an 
important role in the acknowledgement of truth about the past regime, and hence in the 
integration of collective responsibility of the structures of power in a legal process of
84Juan E. Mendez, Review o f A Miracle. A Universe, by Lawrence Wechsler, New York Law 
School Journal o f Human Rights 577 (1991): 583.
85Hayner, p. 607. Jorge S. Correa, “Dealing with Past Human Rights Violations: The Chilean 
Case After Dictatorship.” Notre Dame Law Review 67. Issue 5 (1992), pp. 1457-1485.
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political justice.86 In this respect, the non-European “truth experiences” can help one in 
identifying the essential parameters of a truth commission’s mandate.87 In principle, there 
is a set of elements always present in the process of truth finding by such a commission 
which should be reflected in the mandate received. In the mandate, the goals of the 
investigation, as well as the investigative powers which the commission is invested with 
in order to achieve its goals, should be described.88 The way in which these goals and 
powers are described can generate significant limitations for the process of truth finding, 
or it can empower the commission with invaluable tools. Ideally, in order to be able to 
disentangle the web of the power structures responsible for the human rights violations 
of a regime, a commission of truth should be given as wide a mandate as possible.89
The commission’s mandate usually follows from a revolution, but it can also spring from a 
“change o f heart,” or nature, at the government level. This mandate is usually given by the body which 
initiates the whole process: the administrative power, the representative body o f the country, etc. For the 
different ways of organising a commission o f truth see Hayner, p. 599 ff. Also Neil J. Kritz, ed., Laws. 
Rulings, and Reports, vol. 3 o f Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former 
Regimes (Washington D.C.: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 1995), pp. 1-225.
87Hayner, pp. 598-599.
88See the Preamble and Article 1, and Article 2 and Article 4 respectively, from the Decree 
Establishing the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation. Chile: Comisidn Nacional de Verdad 
y Reconciliacidn, pp. 5-9. Also, The Mexico Peace Agreements: Provisions Creating the Commission on 
Truth (UN Doc. S/25500 (April 1, 1993), in Laws. Rulings, and Reports, vol. 3 o f Transitional Justice: 
How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, ed. Neil J. Kritz (Washington D.C.: United 
States Institute o f Peace Press, 1995), pp. 174-176.
89Mary Albon, “Truth and Justice: The Delicate Balance - Documentation o f Prior Regimes and 
Individual Rights,” The Charter Seventy-Seven Foundation, New York (30 October - 1 November 1992), 
pp. 15-18. The mandate o f the German commission o f inquiry oscillates between the ambiguous task of  
“confronting the past” and the redundant one o f “assessing personal responsibility” (Article I). This 
redundance appears not only from the fact that the legal discourse is the one primarily in charge of 
assessing personal (legal) responsibility, but also because o f the actual provisions o f the act establishing 
the German commission. These provisions are far too “global,” conveying more obviously the predominant 
assessment o f the SED regime, rather than of individual responsibility. The German commission, for 
instance, was asked to address the decision processes o f the SED; the relation o f the SED and the 
government apparatus, particularly the relation between the various levels o f the SED and the Ministry for 
State Security; the structure and mode o f operation o f national security, the police and the justice system; 
etc. (Article II). Also, the commission was asked to contribute to the clarification o f the matter of 
government criminality in the GDR (Article IV). Germany : Law Creating the Commission o f Inquiry on
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Two elements of the mandate would be particularly important for the role of the 
commission in acknowledging the responsibility of the Communist partocracy. Firstly, 
the mandate would have to establish those acts characteristic to the Communist 
oppressive regime and which will constitute the object of the inquiry, acts such as illegal 
imprisonment, unlawful executions, repression of democratic movements and persecution 
of dissidents, etc.90 The commission would have to select those events most evocative for 
the nature of the regime and, where necessary, support its generalisations with statistical 
data.91
Secondly, trying to identify and to build upon the potential for action and intention of the 
Nomenklatura, the mandate of the investigative commission would also have to identify 
those elements which will make a bridge between the acts of the regime and that part of 
the Communist bureaucracy which practically embodies the regime. Therefore, it will be 
for the commission to elaborate on the role of the Nomenklatura in conferring a 
systematic character to the individual crimes and violations of human rights committed 
during the Communist regime. The reflection of these two elements in the mandate of an 
investigative commission is crucial for the degree of acceptance of the truth proposed by
“Working Through the History and the Consequences o f the SED Dictatorship,” Act No. 12/2597 (May 
14, 1992). In Laws. Rulings, and Reports, vol. 3 o f Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies 
Reckon with Former Regimes, ed. Neil J. Kritz (Washington D.C.: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 
1995), pp. 216-219.
90Human Rights Watch, Special Issue: Accountability for Past Human Rights Abuses 4 (New
York: Human Rights Watch, December 1989), p. 1.
91Popkin and Roht-Arriaza, p. 269.
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the commission.92
In order to convey authoritativeness, the mandate should be broad enough to cover the 
main categories of violations and abuses committed by the Communist regime. It should 
also allow the commission to be detailed enough in its report so that the facts described 
are convincing and do not appear too general. The report should include, for example, an 
in depth investigation into some cases illustrative of the regime’s modus operands and 
summary statistics referring to the other cases.93 At the same time, in order to establish 
the link between individual crimes and the Nomenklatura as the embodiment of the 
Communist regime, it is very important for the truth commission to have the freedom to 
establish overall patterns and explanations.94
In order to unravel the truth about the gross human rights violations which took place, the 
commission needs to be vested with some sort of authority. This authority derives from 
the authority of the truth commission’s sponsor, usually the new government.95 The 
authority given to the commission must allow greater access to information sources, such 
as the Secret Police archives, greater security or protection to inquire into sensitive issues,
92Nino, “When Just Punishment is Impossible,” p. 73.
93Hayner, p. 635 ff. Also, Jose Zallaquett, “Introduction” to the Report o f the Chilean National 
Commission on Truth and Reconciliation. Comision Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliacidn, trans. Phillip 
E. Berryman, 2 vol. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993, p. 15-16.
94Hayner, p. 601.
95Popkin and Roht-Arriaza, pp. 265.
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and a greater impact with the final report written by the commission.96 Last but not least, 
a post-Communist truth commission will have to adopt its own specific way of looking 
into the past, reconstructing it from the perspective of an assessment of the regime as a 
whole. This function will imply considering a dimension of responsibility which goes 
beyond the individual one. In this sense, as a rule, a truth commission will be looking for 
the “binder” that holds together the abuses and violations of the regime, and it will be 
looking for those essential elements which make those violations part of the same unique 
policy of the same unique structure of power.
All these aspects of the mandate have a direct impact upon the acknowledgement of the 
responsibility of the Communist regime, and it is because of this impact that a truth 
commission becomes indispensable to a coherent process of dealing with the human 
rights violations of the past. Attempting to present the global truth rather than the 
particular one, a truth commission will concentrate on the essential, presenting the overall 
picture of the political violence during a specified period.97 These generalisations can 
shape the historical account towards an acknowledgement of the Nomenklatura's 
responsibility for the repressive regime. This cognitive process will concentrate on those 
gross violations of human rights which have been established as the main object of a 
process of political justice.
96The greater impact o f the report can be achieved through publication and dissemination o f the 
report, but also through the government’s pledge to follow the recommendations included in the report. 
Popkin and Roht-Arriaza, pp. 286-287. Zallaquett, p. 11. Shirley Williams, “Democratic Accountability 
and Popular Empowerment,” Contribution in Towards Democracy: Building a Culture o f Accountability 
in South Africa, ed. Andr6 du Toit (Cape Town: IDASA, 1991), p. 46.
97Hayner, p. 607.
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Focussing on the collective dimension of accountability for human rights violations does 
not mean that the individual responsibility should not figure among the goals of the 
investigation undertaken by a truth commission. The individual and collective 
responsibility should rather complement each other and the investigation should 
emphasise this complementarity. Nevertheless, as it was mentioned earlier, a truth 
commission should evaluate a government or political regime, and therefore the role of 
the latter’s leading agencies are bound to predominate in the commission’s enquiry.
It is in this dimension of the commission’s mandate that the importance of the truth 
commission for the acknowledgement of a collective responsibility resides. It is mainly 
this aspect of addressing “the regime” which needs official acknowledgement. Therefore, 
more often than not, and the Eastern European countries would be no exception, the 
commission’s investigations would start with individual violations of rights which, to a 
certain extent, are already in the public domain. The commission would then gather them 
into a coherent construction emphasising not the individuality of each crime or violation 
but their common elements; those elements which link the crimes to a collective political 
body as much as to the individual perpetrator.
Another important aspect which can have an impact upon the eventual collective agency 
(agencies) assessed in the process, is the temporal dimension of the commission’s 
mandate.98 Of course, a truth commission always focuses on the past. The mandate
98The majority o f the truth commissions have also been characterised by a geographic dimension 
which was included in the mandate. The analysis o f the responsibility for the violations committed has 
been limited to the national bodies only, ignoring completely the important role sometimes played by
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though will have to include a delimited time span to which the investigative powers 
should apply. This delimitation is more difficult in Eastern Europe than in most other 
cases of transition to democracy, given the unusual length of the Communist regime. The 
succession of several generations of the Nomenklatura and of several Communist 
governments which adopted varying degrees of repression of their citizens, might prompt 
a post-Communist government to establish only the most violent instances of the 
Communist rule as the object of the commission’s inquiry. This rather artificial isolation 
which contradicts the reality of the Communist Nomenklatura as conglomerate political 
body," could be prevented by bringing the Nomenklatura, and not the mere Communist 
government of a specific period, to the centre of the inquiry. Addressing the Communist 
regime as a whole would be in this sense the appropriate approach. There could, of 
course, be a more limited object of the commission’s inquiry, e.g. an inquiry into human 
rights violations related to the events of the 1956 repression in Hungary, or of the 1968 
events in Czechoslovakia. In both global or particularistic approaches, however, the 
violent events are to be assessed against the regime in order to establish its role.
foreign governmental or non-governmental organisations. Hayner, p. 635. In the case o f the Communist 
rule the picture would hardly be complete without taking into account the role played by the Soviet Union 
in establishing and maintaining those regimes. Without exonerating the domestic Communist partocracy, 
comments on this aspects included in the final report could put the Communist history as a whole in the 
right perspective. This perspective - for which the political and legal discourse might not yet be ready - 
would enlarge the span o f responsibility towards a cupola to which the domestic Communist bureaucracies 
belonged. Courtois, pp. 13 and 27-28. With respect to this issue, the German commission o f inquiry was 
given the mandate to judge the significance o f the international framework conditions, particularly the 
influence o f Soviet politics in the former GDR (Article II, 6). Germany: Law Creating the Commission 
of Inquiry on “Working Through the History and the Consequences o f the SED Dictatorship,” Act No. 
12/2597 (May 14, 1992). In Laws. Rulings, and Reports, vol. 3 o f Transitional Justice: How Emerging 
Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, ed. Neil J. Kritz (Washington D.C.: United States Institute 
of Peace Press, 1995), pp. 216-219.
99See supra the discussion on the Nomenklatura as a conglomerate organisation, Section 5.5.
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A truth commission’s activity ends with the submission and publication of a report 
including its findings and recommendations which should reflect an assessment of the 
past regime.100 For the commission’s effectiveness, and for the impact of its report, it is 
important to trace through the mandate rather precise tasks for the commission, and to 
give it a precise deadline for the presentation of the report. This does not mean that a truth 
commission has to be established at a precise time after the transition to a democratic 
regime has started. The complexity of the reality in the Eastern European countries shows 
that not all the countries are ready at the same time for this cathartic enterprise.101 It 
should be recognised that for a process of political justice addressing the human rights 
violations, there is a need for a favourable political context, and for some countries this 
favourable context might be later than for others.102
However, once a favourable context has been created and the process of justice has been 
started by instituting a truth commission, the political momentum and the social 
motivation for such an enterprise should not be wasted; a precise deadline for the 
submission of the report should be included in the commission’s mandate so that the 
commission delivers in the shortest time possible the results of its assessment. The 
inquiry into the complexity of the Communist past might sometimes be frustrated by this
100A second type o f time limitation refers to the fact that the commission usually exists 
temporarily, for a pre-defined period o f time. Hayner, p. 640.
101Huyse, “Justice after Transition.”
102See Human Rights Watch, “Special Report,” p. 2.
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type of time limitation; however, the alternative of an endless inquiry can be worse.103 
This suggested rather dynamic, storming approach to the inquiry corresponds in a way 
with the need to concentrate on the generalities of the repressive regime, illustrated only 
with a limited but well documented number of particular cases.104
6.3.3 The Commission and the Commissioners:
Setting Up a Truth Commission
The commission’s agenda, focusing on the state-sponsored human rights violations, and 
on the identification of the structures of power, brings in the question of the setting up 
of a truth commission,105 the question of who could be up to the task of assessing the 
Communist regime, and who could be invested with the mandate and authority to do it. 
The Czech Act on the Illegality of the Communist Regime (Act No. 198/1993) addressed 
exactly this need for official acknowledgement of the past, offering an authoritative 
official statement about the Communist regime. Although having the legislature’s 
endorsement, the Act No. 198/1993 was very different in substance from what a truth 
commission’s report would be, lacking many of the latter’s potential qualities.
103The German commission o f inquiry, for instance, was not provided with a firm deadline for 
the presentation o f its final report. This fact determined several postponements o f the date when the report 
should have been made public. Hayner, p. 627.
,04Popkin and Roht-Arriaza, pp. 264-269.
105Zallaquett, “Introduction,” pp. 8-9.
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In its haste to answer to the social expectations for political justice, the Czech legislative 
power dispensed with the need for an independent commission of inquiry. Based upon 
the activity of such a commission, the parliament could have legislated later, 
acknowledging its findings. Instead, the Czech legislature took itself the place of the 
“fact-finding body.” However, in a process of political justice, this dispensation can bring 
important disadvantages. The potential of “justice by truth” relies upon the independent 
nature of the commission itself, and upon its potential of objectivity. In the complex 
context of political justice, the issue of establishing the authoritative truth about a 
repressive regime is not an issue which can be decided exclusively through the majority 
vote. Such a vote would not convey sufficient authority.106
While the authority of the legislative body originates in legitimating democratic elections, 
the authority of the commission is secured primarily through its scope and method of 
investigation.107 These are outlined in the mandate, and reflected in its composition. The 
composition of the commission can have a considerable impact upon the public 
perception of the commission’s report, and also upon the authority of eventual legal acts - 
screening laws, acts addressing statutes of limitations or establishing the status of the 
Secret Police archives, etc. - based upon this report.108 This does not mean that the whole 
process of truth-acknowledging would not have to gain an important dimension from a
106Speaking about the despotism of the majority, Elster writes that today, as in the 18th century, 
“constitutions must protect individual rights from the excesses o f democracy.” Elster, “On Majoritarianism 
and Rights,” p. 19.
107Zallaquett, “Introduction,” p. 21 ff.
108Popkin and Roht-Arriaza. Also, Alejandro M. Garro and Henry Dahl, “Legal Accountability 
for Human Rights Violations in Argentina,” Human Rights Law Journal 8 (1987): 299- 337.
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legislative endorsement of the commission’s report. It only means that the legislature 
should not come into the process at a too early stage, when the legislative authority might 
not be sufficient.
The fulfilment of the functions of a truth commission are decisively dependent upon the 
commission’s capacity for impartiality regarding the central point of the inquiry, which 
is the past government and its role in the human rights violations which have occurred.109 
The acknowledgement of the decisive role played by the structures of the Communist 
power in the oppressive regime depends not only upon the mandate received by the 
commission, but also upon the irrefutable authority and credibility of the commission. It 
is through its authority and credibility that a truth commission can succeed in offering not 
only the truth, but also an “authoritative truth” about the nature of the human rights 
violations which have occurred under the Communist regime. The “cathartic” function 
the acknowledgement of truth is supposed to have in society, the function of purification 
through truth, also depends more than anything upon the credibility of the commission. 
It is only by trusting the commission that the society will acknowledge its past of human 
rights violations in the way it might be exposed in the commission’s report.110 This trust 
is built upon the fact that its members have not been part of the repressive regime, and 
the fact the commissioners are tuned into the realities of the society.
109Juan E. Mendez, “Acknowledgement, Truth, and Justice - Argentina,” in Dealing with the Past: 
Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa, eds. Alex Boraine, Janet Levy, and Ronel Scheffer (Cape Town: 
IDASA, 1994), pp. 39-40.
110Besides these limitations usually embedded in the mandate o f the commission, there are a series 
of “external” limitations belonging to the social realities: pure political constraints, the difficulty in having 
unrestricted access to the necessary information (see the discussion about the Secret Police archives in 
Chapter Three), the lack o f necessary resources for pursuing the inquiries, etc. Hayner, pp. 644-651.
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It is essential for a truth commission to be independent from all the actors in the contested 
history. This attribute of independence cannot be covered by a representative political 
body alone; a non-political body is therefore required at the foundation of the process of 
political justice. The members of such an investigative body should have an undisputed 
moral authority to examine and evaluate impartially the Communist regime.111 This 
impartiality might appear difficult to achieve, given the stronghold that the Nomenklatura 
had for a long time over society. A weakened civil society inherited from the Communist 
regime is also increasing the practical difficulties in establishing a truth commission with 
sufficient authority and detachment from the Communist regime. Only such a 
commission would be able to offer the objective and authoritative truth about the 
Communist regime and its crimes.
The experiences of the non-European processes of transition to democracy vary with 
respect to the source of independence and moral authority of the investigatory 
commissions involved in the process. Some tried to balance political figures from across 
the political spectrum,112 while others tried to achieve the same goals of impartiality and 
moral authority through the appointment of foreign dignitaries as commissioners.113 For
n iM6ndez, “Acknowledgement, Truth, and Justice,” p. 38. Correa, p. 145 ff.
112A commission with this type of structure was set up in Chile, following the end o f the military 
dictatorship. To a certain extent, this system worked. Correa, pp. 1479-1480. The democratically elected 
President Patricion Aylwin established in 1990 a well balanced commission including persons from the 
various political sectors o f  Chile. Hayner, pp. 621-623.
113This was the case, for instance, in El Salvador. The United Nations “Commission on the Truth 
for El Salvador” was created through the peace accords between the Salvadoran government and the 
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in April, 1991. The commissioners were appointed 
by the Secretary-General o f the United Nations with agreement by the two parties to the accords. The 
commissioners were highly respected international figures. Also, due to neutrality concerns, the staff o f
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the Eastern European political and historical realities, each of the two approaches can 
present both advantages and disadvantages.
One advantage of a commission composed of representatives of all political groups in 
society would be the fact that, when part of the process of truth revealing, the different 
groups in society will be less likely to disagree with, and challenge the factual basis of 
the report. This might widen the acknowledgement of the violent Communist past, 
especially in the conditions in which, as shown in Chapter Two and Chapter Three, the 
political spectrum is highly divided as to the nature of the Communist past, and the 
necessity of a process of political justice.
However, a commission made up of representatives of different political groups can be 
accompanied by certain drawbacks to which Eastern European societies would be 
susceptible. In this respect, human rights activists have noted the “timidity” of the report 
of such a mixed commission.114 This timidity was explained largely by the commission’s 
effort to be “balanced,” and especially by the need to maintain consensus among 
commissioners with all too different agendas. For the Eastern European countries this 
type of commission might bring even more difficulties, given the rather scrambled 
political spectrum which was formed after half a century of Communist rule. In fact,
the commission - fifteen professional staff and several administrators - included no Salvadorans. Hayner, 
pp. 627-628.
ll4David Weissbrodt and Paul W. Fraser, review o f The Report o f the Chilean Commission on 
Truth and Reconciliation, published by Comisidn Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliacidn, Human Rights 
Quarterly Review 14, no. 4 (November 1992): 620.
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almost the same argument used against adopting a declaration by mere majority vote (as 
it was done in the Czech Republic) can be validly used against a balanced but politicised 
commission. The difference between the two is that in the case of the commission one 
deals with a kind of sized-down politically polarised body reflecting, to a large extent, the 
political spectrum of the parliament.
These disadvantages would be to a large extent absent from the second type of 
commission. Appointing well-respected foreign dignitaries as commissioners ensures a 
necessary distance of the commission from political fights.115 A commission of foreign 
dignitaries can also prevent, to a large extent, the use of the commission’s activity for 
increasing the political capital of one party or another. Such a commission can be credited 
with greater objectivity and disinterestedness, and it can increase the chances that the 
report summing up its activity will be widely publicised and will have its 
recommendations implemented through international pressure.
In spite of all these advantages, the very distance from the political scene of the eventual 
international commissioners can prove problematic.116 The resulting report can be seen 
as “a merely UN document” which gives an outside vision of a historical period.117 This 
perception makes more likely that the conclusions of the report, instead of being publicly
115Hayner, p. 628.
116Popkin and Roht-Arriaza, p. 269.
117Hayner, pp. 635-651.
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assumed, will be discounted at least by some part of the political class and society.118 In 
the case of the Eastern European post-Communist countries, besides this domestic 
drawback there is also a global ideological aspect which might hinder the 
acknowledgement of the report. This aspect refers to the fact that the Communist 
partocracy has put an ideological barrier not only, as shown in the previous chapter, 
between its apparatus and the rest of the society, but also between itself and the rest of 
the non-Communist world.
The selection of an international team could prove difficult, although not impossible, and 
it would be likely for such a commission to be met with contestations which would 
weaken its authority.119 An international commission could give the impression that the 
“victors’ ideology” would again be imposed. When setting up the commission it should 
also be considered the desirable goal (to which we shall come back later), that the 
commission’s report is sanctioned by the legislative power. Having this goal in mind, one 
should consider that a final report written by an international team might appear more 
difficult to be sanctioned by the legislature. These difficulties can be procedural, as well 
as political.120 The incorporation into the domestic law of what might be perceived as a 
foreign document can be procedurally more demanding than the sanctioning of a 
domestic report. Also, as suggested earlier, the political reaction to a report written by a 
“foreign” commission might not be the desired one.
118Huyse, p. 105 ff. Also, Buergenthal, pp. 497-499.
119Buergenthal, p. 500.
120Hayner, pp. 641-643. Also, Huyse, p. 123.
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Taking into consideration the drawbacks of both types of commission, and also the nature 
of the Communist regime one might find it desirable to avoid both the overt politicisation 
of the commission (as it appears in the case of a commission composed of representatives 
of all political forces in society), and the international formula of the commission. A 
possible alternative would be to look outside both the political and the international 
arena. This implies the search for those exponents of the emerging post-Communist civil 
societies who can be credited with a strong commitment to democracy and impartiality. 
Although it is not impossible, this task in itself is not easy.121 The legacy of the total 
control of the Communist bureaucracy over the entire social life leaves the emerging 
post-totalitarian civil societies, from where the commissioners should be selected, weak 
and sometimes only in an incipient form. An unavoidable difficulty in selecting the 
commissioners is also the fact that the exponents of the civil society could themselves be 
part of the old dissidence and victims of the Communist regime. This fact might not make 
those persons the most evident choice of candidates when searching for impartiality.
In spite of the difficulties we have just seen, the complexity of the transition from 
Communism makes choosing the commissioners from within the civil society a better 
choice than choosing them from within the political or international circles. This formula 
is preferable for avoiding both politicisation and exaggerated distance from the needs and 
reality of the post-Communist societies.122 In the debates on other controversial issues,
121 See Vaclav Havel, Vaclav Klaus, and Petr Pithart, “Civil Society After Communism: Rival 
Visions.” Journal o f  Democracy 7. no. 1 (January 1996): 11-23.
122Huyse, “Justice after Transition,” p. 105.
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such as the use of Secret Police archives, anti-agent legislation, etc., it has been proven 
that, in spite of being themselves victims of the Communist regime, many of the 
dissidents would possess the necessary degree of impartiality which would ensure both 
truth and the protection of the democratic principles.123 It must be recognised though that 
in the case of the post-Communist societies it will be difficult to find anybody who has 
not been - actively or passively - “on the other side” of the wall put up by the 
Nomenklatura.124
Setting up a commission of inquiry into the activities of a repressive regime will always 
face difficulties. Often, extended negotiations have to take place between the different 
political forces in order to agree on the format, the functions, and the mandate of the 
commission.125 Since the legitimacy of the post-Communist political arrangement is 
generally built upon the exposure and distancing from the totalitarian past, the 
implication of all the political forces in the truth-finding process is inevitable. However, 
the activity of the commission is important, not only for re-enforcing the legitimacy of 
the new government, but also for offering a more solid ground and coherence to political
123Jan Urban, “Keeping Silent about Silence,” in Truth and Justice: The Delicate Balance. Central 
European University, Institute for Constitutional and Legislative Policy, Working Paper no.l (1993), pp. 
85-95.
124This argument might appear as the opposite extreme from Urban’s idea that in the Communist
societies everybody was dirtied by complicity and compliance (See supra Chapter Three, note 47. Also, 
Urban, p. 86). What is meant in fact by being “on the other side” is not that everybody who was not part 
o f the Nomenklatura was a dissident, but that the Nomenklatura put a wall between itself and the rest o f  
society. This situation can render it difficult to find those necessary commissioners by following “formal 
standards o f impartiality.” This sharp gap between the structures o f power and the persons they rule is not, 
however, a characteristic only o f a Communist regime. See Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, A 
Nation o f Enemies: Chile under Pinochet (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991).
125Zallaquett, p. 17. Simpson and Vanzyl, pp. 403-404.
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justice actions. This is the “foundational” element of a truth commission’s activity which 
is provided by the fact that the commission goes further than mere rhetorical exposing 
and distancing of the totalitarian past.126 This “foundation” is missing, or compromised, 
when the legislator acts directly, enacting laws on the illegality of a previous regime.
Although the legislative power should not replace the truth commission, the legislative 
sanctioning of the commission’s report is important for the commission’s findings to take 
effect within a legal process of political justice. In this way only it will be made clear that 
the systematic human rights violations exposed, and the responsible agencies pointed at, 
in the report are acknowledged as real crimes and real legal actors respectively. The legal 
sanctioning of the report, through existent constitutional routes, represents an essential 
stage in the acknowledgement of the crimes of the Communist regime. It is at this stage 
that “declarative acts,” such as the Czech Act on the Illegality of the Communist Regime, 
can intervene. The difference would be that being based on an non-partisan report which 
documents both crimes and criminals, the declarative act would have a better chance of 
making an impact on the legal dimensions of political justice. Although other 
constitutional formulas could be found for the official endorsement of the report, passing 
a legislative act which would confirm the commissions’ report by direct incorporation of 
its conclusions or, resuming the report in a declarative legislative statement and offering 
the report as an annex to the declarative act itself, can serve as suggestions.127
126Popkin and Roht-Arriaza, pp. 280-283.
127Juan E. Mendez, “In Defence o f Transitional Justice,” in Transitional Justice and the Rule of 
Law in New Democracies, ed. James A. McAdams (Notre Dame & London: University o f Notre Dame 
Press, 1997), p. 21-22.
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6.4 Building on the Truth: Prosecuting and Screening Revisited
It was said earlier that a truth commission should be the foundation of a process of 
political justice. What would grow on this foundation? What would be the outcome of 
a truth commission in the context of a post-Communist society? And especially, what 
would be the place of a truth commission’s report in the legal acknowledgement of the 
collective responsibility? These are legitimate questions the answers to which shall be 
outlined in the remaining pages.
The report of a truth commission can have important consequences for a process of 
political justice, addressing different levels of legal agenthood and responsibility, and 
different domains of the legal discourse. Firstly, the report written by the investigative 
commission could have implications for both individual and collective legal 
responsibility. As an important aspect of the commission’s activity, for instance, the 
mandate received by the commission can and should include the power to make 
recommendations according to the findings of the inquiry.128 Through recommendations 
the commission provides “pressure points” around which civil society and the 
international community can formulate their demands for democratisation of the state
128The Chilean Report, for instance, contains an extensive part with recommendations to be 
followed by various social agencies. See, Chile. Comisidn Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliacidn, Report 
of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation. The same power o f making 
recommendations was established through the mandate given to the El Salvador truth commission. Thomas 
Buergenthal, “The United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador,” Vanderbilt Journal o f  
Transnational Law 27 (1994), p. 497.
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apparatus.
The implication of these recommendations could be both legal and non-legal.129 The 
commission could, for example, demand the new government to take specific legislative 
measures for the democratisation of the state apparatus. As a result of the 
acknowledgement of the role of the Communist Nomenklatura in systematic human 
rights violations, the truth commission could also recommend concrete measures 
necessary for the dismantling of the repressive machine. In this way, the report can offer 
coherent arguments in favour of passing screening or “de-nomenklaturisation” laws and, 
eventually, anti-agent legislation; it could also suggest the extent to which the post- 
Communist government could open the Secret Police archives - for the purpose of 
screening or for other reasons - without violating specific human rights.130 Also, the 
report might, as a non-legal implication, include recommendations referring to the pursuit 
of further lines of inquiry into the activities of the regime. Although these inquiries might 
not have an immediate legal impact, their outcome could well open up new lines of legal 
action.
As to the individual legal responsibility, a very important potential consequence of the
129Among others, the German commission o f inquiry had the mandate to make recommendations 
to the Bundestag with respect to legislative measures and other political initiatives. The commission was 
also asked for suggestions o f how to come to terms with the East German past in pedagogical and 
psychological terms (Article IV). Germany: Law Creating the Commission o f  Inquiry on “Working 
Through the History and the Consequences o f the SED Dictatorship,” Act No. 12/2597 (May 14, 1992). 
In Laws. Rulings, and Reports, vol. 3 o f Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with 
Former Regimes, ed. Neil J. Kritz (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), p. 218.
130Lakos, pp. 75-77. Also, Klingsberg, pp. 10-11.
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commission’s activity can be provided by incorporating into the constitutive mandate the 
power of “naming names” in its final report.131 The commission should be allowed to 
name not only the collective agency which is identified with the Communist regime, but 
also those individual actors who played an important active role in violations of human 
rights, and who “distinguished” themselves in this way.132 This can be seen as just a part 
of the process of “punishing by truth,” but it can also bring a certain amount of pressure 
to bear on the criminal prosecution of notorious perpetrators of human rights violations.
Including in a truth commission’s mandate the power of naming names is bound to 
expand the legal implications of the commission’s report. However, providing names for 
the prosecution of the Communist crimes should not represent the main, or direct, 
objective of a truth commission.133 Generally speaking, there is no legal need for a truth 
commission to be established in order to start the prosecution of individual perpetrators 
of human rights violations. As it was said earlier, the identity of the perpetrators and the 
extent of the violations are widely known, or easily available for the prosecution. Besides, 
although the truth commission will inquire into serious crimes of the regime, and will 
refer to those crimes as such, the truth commission should make clear that the conclusions 
of its report do not carry the same legal weight as a court’s ruling.
131Hayner, p. 647. Also Zallaquett, pp. 9-10. Buergenthal, p. 535.
1320 n  the importance o f this part o f the Truth Commission’s mandate see Buergenthal, p. 519- 
521. Also Douglass W. Cassel Jr., “International Truth Commissions and Justice,” The Aspen Institute 
Quarterly 5, no. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 81-82.
133If the activity o f a truth commission does not automatically lead to the prosecution o f individual 
perpetrators, it does not mean that the opposition to the formation o f such commissions is not strong. One 
of the explanations can be the fact that the truth can be perceived as a real alternative to punishment. Also, 
truth can be a liability from which prosecution may spring at any time.
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With respect to the relationship between prosecution and the report of the truth 
commission, it should also be said that the latter should not amount to a de facto 
amnesty134 unless, of course, the political context offers no choice. The publication of the 
report should not be conditioned by an amnesty, and the commission should pass on to 
the prosecution any new relevant information. In principle, for the integrity of the law, 
the decision to prosecute or not to prosecute should not be a political one.135 Nor should 
the report replace the indictment of the prosecution; the report may inform the 
prosecution, but it may not replace it.136 In this sense, in as many cases as possible, 
prosecutions based on, or related to, issues raised by the truth commission’s report, 
should follow. These prosecutions are necessary not only for bringing punishment, but 
also for reinforcing the authoritative perspective offered in the truth commission’s report 
over the human rights violations of the past regime. On the other hand, not taking up such 
prosecutions would either undermine the credibility of the report or, if the report is 
largely acknowledged in the society, it would weaken the authority of the judicial system.
However, it should be mentioned that prosecution of acts emphasised in the
134H. Adam, “Trading Justice for Truth.” World Today 54. no. 1 (1998): 11-13.
135It is sometimes argued that investigating the past may endanger the future, especially in a 
politically fragile environment such as any society in transition is. Nevertheless, from the analysis o f the 
activity o f the different truth commissions which have functioned, it appears that no truth commission to 
date has caused a situation to become worse. Hayner, p. 610. “Human Rights Watch recognizes the 
difficulty that some governments may face in holding members o f their own armed forces accountable for 
their gross abuses o f human rights... We do not believe that these difficulties justify disregard for the 
principle o f accountability. We consider that accountability for gross violations o f human rights should 
remain a goal o f a government that seeks to promote respect for human rights.” Human Rights Watch, 
Accountability for Past Human Rights Abuses, p. 1.
136See the recent Pinochet case in Great Britain which tries to take the findings o f the Chilean 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission further, to its logical criminal conclusions. Guardian. 26 November 
1998, p. 1.
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commission’s report, as well as the recommendations made by the commission for 
dealing with certain aspects of the totalitarian legacy, are only by-products of a truth 
inquiry. Beyond these “by-product” implications of a truth inquiry, the greatest impact 
of the commission’s report will be with respect to the acknowledgement of collective 
responsibility for the gross human rights violations which took place under the 
Communist regime. Telling the truth about the regime is a primary function of the 
commission.137 This central function derives from the commission’s general mandate to 
address and establish the “global truth” rather than the particular events. To fulfil its 
mandate, the commission of truth has to identify and delimitate the power structures 
which stood for the Communist regime. With respect to this identification and 
delimitation of the Communist regime, one can presume that the analysis undertaken by 
the commission would not differ essentially from the one proposed in these pages. The 
identification of the potential for action and reason for action within the informal 
structures of the Communist Nomenklatura, would most likely lead a truth commission 
to identify these structures with the Communist regime.
The importance of the acknowledgement of the truth about a regime lies in the fact that, 
given the authority the report should enjoy, the commission’s inquiry offers a platform 
for a legal acknowledgement of the repressive nature of the Communist regime.138 It is 
on this kind of inquiry that legislative initiatives such as the Czech Act on the Illegality
137Adam, p. 11.
I On the consequences o f a lack o f such legal acknowledgement, see Helen Suzman, “The 
Erosion o f Accountability,” in Towards Democracy: Building a Culture o f Accountability in South Africa. 
ed. Andr6 du Toit (Cape Town: IDASA, 1991), p. 44.
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of the Communist Regime could be grounded. The reason why this kind of initiative 
should not come without a proper “truth inquiry” is of a political rather than legal nature. 
The type of legislative declaration such as the Czech Act on the Illegality of the 
Communist Regime is based solely upon the authority of the legislature.
Although such a legislative declaration confirms elements which are already in the public 
domain, the highly politicised context which the declaration addresses makes the 
legislative act become easily controversial when it is implemented by mere majority vote. 
The issue of political justice does not benefit from building exclusively upon the will of 
the majority; a dimension of democracy which has its own limitations.139 Besides, such 
pure legislative declarations expose the post-Communist government to the accusation 
of trying to gain legitimacy cheaply by putting an unsubstantiated label on the Communist 
regime. Though the distinction might not seem so important, the situation improves 
radically if the legislative declaration is based upon the findings of an impartial body, not 
implicated in the political fight.140 In this last case, the authority of law is essentially 
assisted by the authority of an objective and impartial truth-finding commission.
Since the purpose of such a declaration is exactly to emphasise the nature of the past 
regime, a truth commission can serve this purpose in several ways. Firstly, as mentioned 
before, it helps delimiting and identifying the power structures of the Communist regime.
139Jon Elster, “On Doing What One Can: An Argument Against Post-Communist Restitution and
Retribution,” East European Constitutional Review 1, no. 2, (1992): 24.
140Hayner, p. 598.
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Secondly, it can establish and formulate a link between numerous human rights violations 
and the Communist regime. Thirdly, the commission also helps a declarative act to avoid, 
or to give substance to vague and apparently empty terms such as “the regime,” “the 
supporters.”141 This comes as a consequence of identifying the Communist regime within 
conglomerate bureaucratic power structures, and of establishing a clear link between 
these structures and specific human rights violations.
Issuing mere moral statements through the legislative power - such as it was claimed with 
respect to the Czech Act on the Illegality of the Communist Regime - is also bound to 
confuse the issue at stake in the Eastern European process of political justice. This issue 
is the legal acknowledgement of the human rights violations, and the affirmation of the 
principle of legal accountability of the social agents involved in these violations.142 An 
act in which a vaguely defined collectivity is associated with the words “illegal” and 
“criminal,” and which it claims to bring no legal implications while changing the statute 
of limitations for certain serious crimes, is bound to create confusion and 
misunderstanding. Accordingly, this type of declaration should be very precise, clearly 
defining in its text the terminology that is being used.
The possibility - opened through the commission’s inquiry - of a coherent identification 
of the Communist regime with a specific political agency offers in fact for the first time
141For an example o f such a use o f vague terms, see supra the discussion on the Czech Act on the
Illegality o f the Communist Czechoslovakia, Chapter Three, Section 3.5.
1420rentlicher, pp. 2539-2541. Suzman, pp. 497-498.
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a potential legal agent which can participate in the process of distribution of legal 
responsibility. The debate on collective agency has shown that a formal organisation can 
be seen as something more than just a sociological entity, that it can be regarded as a legal 
actor as well. In the Nomenklatura's case, as in the case of any other conglomerate 
organisation, the “ontological” move from the individual members to the organisational 
structure creates also a legal dimension, fulfilling the move from individual to collective 
responsibility. This move, from individual to collective, can be emphasised in the 
commission’s report, acknowledging the last without denying the former. The 
commission will therefore be able, based on its mandate, to illustrate the correspondence 
established in the earlier chapters between the individual and the collective triangles of 
responsibility.
The report of the commission should also be able to offer a basis for excluding - at least 
from the domain of collective political responsibility for the human rights violations - 
certain categories of actors which, as it was argued in Chapter Five do not belong to the 
structure of power embodied by the Nomenklatura, and do not carry the same degree of 
responsibility for the human rights violations.143
143See supra the discussion on Secret Police agents and collaborators, Section 3.3.
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6.5 Conclusions: Beyond the Truth Commission’s Report
According to what was said so far in this chapter, it appears that, if properly set up, a truth 
commission, by its very existence and activity, can have a major impact upon the process 
of political justice, and especially upon the acknowledgement of the collective dimension 
of the responsibility for the human rights violations. “Justice by truth” is an important 
dimension of justice, especially following a regime based on censorship and repression. 
Making recommendations and “naming names” can bring an often needed extra pressure 
on the new governments to answer the call for justice. Moreover, identifying “the regime” 
and offering in this way a basis for the legal acknowledgement of the Communist 
bureaucracy’s role in the human rights violations helps to establish a balance between the 
responsibility of individual and collective actors.
However, finding the truth and declaring it, making recommendations and “naming 
names,” identifying crimes and culprits, are not the only important aspects derived from 
a truth commission’s activity. Of course, all these are important, first of all in themselves, 
through the cathartic function of the acknowledgement of truth, and secondly, through 
the possibilities the authoritative truth opens for other measures of justice. Both the 
dimension of “finding” as well as the one of legally “declaring” the truth address the 
collective dimension of a process of political justice dealing with the Communist regime. 
Nevertheless, as important as the aspect of knowledge might always be, justice is not only 
about knowledge; justice is about government and political agency accountability, about
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These aspects of justice are all important aspects in the approach to any crime; they 
become even more essential, however, when they refer to serious human rights violations. 
In this sense, it is argued that under certain conditions, the use of judicial means to 
address human rights violations is the most appropriate approach for the successful 
consolidation of a constitutional regime.144 Therefore, one should be entitled to hope that 
something more than truth-acknowledgement can be achieved.
As Chapter Four and Chapter Five indicated, there is potential for an acknowledgement 
of legal agenthood and therefore legal responsibility of the collective agent identified in 
the Communist Nomenklatura. This acknowledgement could be promoted, or rather 
induced, through elements identified in the final report of a truth commission. Based on 
this acknowledgement of the report, one can try to take the process of political justice 
beyond mere recognition and acknowledgement of the truth about the Communist 
violations of human rights, fully into the legal domain. Yet, the importance of the 
functions fulfilled by a truth commission in this respect cannot be stressed enough. As 
Juan E. Mendez has put it, the primary task in a process of political justice is to recognise 
that there is a past to be reckoned with.145 The tasks of justice, however, should not end
144Carlos H. Acufia and Catalina Smulovitz, “Guarding the Guardians in Argentina: Some
Lessons about the Risks and Benefits o f Empowering the Courts,” in Transitional Justice and the Rule of 
Law in New Democracies, ed. James A. McAdams (Notre Dame & London: University o f Notre Dame 
Press, 1997), p. 95.
145M£ndez, “In Defence o f Transitional Justice,” p. 3.
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The Hungarian and Czech (initially Czechoslovak) legal measures analysed in Chapter 
Two and Chapter Three have given the impression that not much is possible in order to 
make the Communist partocracy legally accountable for human rights violations. 
Notorious crimes and injustices appeared impossible to prosecute because of their expired 
period of limitation; the responsibility for deliberately allowing the period of limitation 
to expire became a residuum of history for which nobody was to be held accountable; the 
same fate appeared to have befallen the question of leadership responsibility for the 
systematic policies of human rights violations sponsored by the party-state apparatus in 
Eastern Europe.
As was said earlier, a truth commission’s report, which has eventually been incorporated 
in a legal act acknowledging the commission’s findings, can offer the foundation for 
addressing at least those shortcomings of legal justice related to the role of the 
Communist structures of power in the human rights violations which have occurred under 
the Communist regime. There are basically three dimensions along which the law could 
make use of the truth commission’s report. Firstly, in the truth commission’s report could 
be found, systematically presented and argued, arguments for a legitimate rule revision 
(i). Secondly, an acknowledged authoritative truth about the Communist regime can 
induce into the legal discourse a more differentiated legal approach to the distribution of 
responsibility for human rights violations among the different social (individual and 
collective) actors (11). Thirdly, the truth commission’s report can contribute to more
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favourable conditions for the prosecution of both individuals and specific governmental 
agencies (/ii).
(i) Speaking about legitimate rule revision, Chapter One established that a “procedurally 
tamed” recognition of the right to revolution is a sine qua non condition for the true 
protection of the citizens against the abuse of power.146 This protection would include the 
right to retroactively evaluate and hold accountable the structures of power for human 
rights violations. It is for allowing this evaluation (based upon the specificity of the 
Communist rule), that the retroactive revision of certain rules, and especially a 
differentiation in the application of the principles of the rule of law, is necessary. 
However, revising retroactively the parameters of the rule of law and applying them in 
a more differentiated manner needs solid legitimising arguments.147
By concentrating upon the specificity of the Communist rule and of the Communist 
structures of power, the report of a truth commission offers exactly these type of 
arguments. In the first part of this chapter it was established that the recognition of 
powerful collective social agents represents one aspect which should invite cautiousness 
in applying the principles of the rule of law in an undifferentiated way. For a real 
protection of the rule of law’s underlying values of equality, autonomy and security it is 
evident that there is a need for differentiated legal parameters.
146Sunstein, “Problems with Rules,” pp. 1008-1012.
147Kis, “What Shall We Do?” p. 11.
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One of the main parameters which seem under pressure when facing a totalitarian 
structure of power, is the legal security. The wider the discretion of the structure of 
power, the lesser this structure can expect to be protected by the principle of legal 
security; an agent which does not allow assessment while in the process of exercising its 
power, should expect some kind of assessment when going out of power.148 By 
documenting this discretionary exercise of power of the Communist regime, and by 
identifying the structure(s) of power which stood for that regime, the commission of truth 
fulfils an indispensable role: it offers authoritative arguments for a “procedurally tamed” 
revision of the way in which the principle of legal security is applied in the process of 
political justice.
Consequently, by concentrating on the collective dimension of the human rights 
violations which occurred under the Communist regime, the truth commission sets the 
standard for how the issue of post-totalitarian justice should be addressed. Spelling out 
the essence of the role of the internal decision structure of the Communist power, the 
institution of the truth commission actually holds the key to the legitimate revision of 
those rules governing the attribution of responsibility.149 Through its activity, the 
commission helps to identify those “pressure points” in the concept of the rule of law 
where the conflict between the legitimate social expectations for justice and the rigours
148Schulhofer, pp. 27-29.
149Sunstein, p. 1008 ff.
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(ii) A second dimension in which the legal discourse could capitalise on the authoritative 
report which addresses the Communist regime as a whole, is assuming a differentiated 
approach to the distribution of responsibility for human rights violations. The fact that 
an arborescent social agent such as the Nomenklatura cannot be practically brought in 
front of a criminal court should not mean that nothing can be done to acknowledge in 
law its role in the repression of basic human rights. Acknowledgement, and especially 
legal acknowledgement can be matched by properly designed measures of enforcing 
collective accountability.151 Screening measures therefore should not be discarded 
altogether, regardless of their justification.
How exactly could a truth commission’s activity help in assessing the legitimacy of 
screening measures applied as a specific way of enforcing collective accountability? 
Firstly, this is achieved by establishing as unique object of both the truth commission’s 
activity, and of the screening measures, the human rights violations committed under the 
Communist regime. Screening for purely protective (preventive) reasons, equality of 
opportunity, or other legitimate reasons, should not be dismissed from the start. However, 
the meaning of a truth commission’s activity is to emphasise the collective political 
responsibility of the Communist regime for systematic human rights violations. By
150B. S. Lyons, “Between Nuremberg and Amnesia: The Truth and Reconciliation Commissions 
in South Africa.” Monthly Review 49. no. 4 (1997): 19.
151Frank, p. 93 ff. French, “Collective and Corporate Responsibility,” p. 182 ff.
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dealing with state-sponsored human rights violations brought to light by a truth 
commission, the inconsistencies in justification of a screening law can be prevented: the 
Communist bureaucracy could be up for screening not because of an alleged weakness 
to blackmail, or danger of sabotage, as it was claimed during the debate on the Lustration 
Law, but because of having actively instituted and maintained a repressive regime in 
which systematic violations of human rights took place.152
Secondly, by offering strict criteria for identifying what should be understood by “the 
regime,” a truth commission’s report can contribute both to the legitimation and to the 
consistency of legal measures of screening. These criteria would help avoid both over­
inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness in the definition of the collective political actor 
implicitly generated by a screening act. Both mistakes featured in the Czechoslovak, as 
well as in other screening laws;153 collaborators of the Secret Police have been 
collectively assimilated with “the regime” in its institutional meaning, while leaving out 
other more important categories of officials who established, perfected and benefited 
from the state built upon the Secret Police.154
A legally incorporated truth report brings authoritative clarity instead of legislative 
confusion to a process of screening, making it obvious and somehow indispensable. 
Screening for the right motives - the systematic violations of human rights that occurred
152Massey, p. 207 ff.
153Huyse, “A Devil's Choice,” p. 129 ff.
154Arthur Bemey, “A Critique o f Lustration,” p. 138-140.
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under a certain structure of power - would not bring confusion, such as it happened with 
the Lustration Law, but clarity. A legally sanctioned report offers to a process of 
screening a coherent basis. It can offer well defined political actors the (collective) 
responsibility of which can be acknowledged. It would bring a viable differentiation in 
the concept of legal responsibility. This differentiation makes possible that the criminal 
responsibility (individual and, where appropriate, collective) is complemented in this way 
with a very important dimension of collective political responsibility. The core of this 
collective responsibility will refer to extended human rights violations which resulted in 
an inhuman and illegal regime.
Bringing under the spotlight, through the report of a truth commission and its legislative 
acknowledgement, the Communist Nomenklatura, is the first step in reestablishing the 
balance of responsibilities for the human rights violations which occurred under the 
Communist regime. The further steps though have to be conceived with even greater care. 
We spoke in Chapter Four and Chapter Five about a homology between the individual 
responsibility, with action and intention originating in the same individual person, and 
the collective responsibility, with action and reason for action originating in the same 
structure. Because this is a homology, and not an identity, one has to take into 
consideration the practical difficulties related to thinking about collective accountability 
in criminal terms, and finding the appropriate means for holding accountable a collective 
actor involved in organised political crime. In this context, banning an entire structure
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from power, such as the Czechoslovak Lustration Law attempted,155 might appear as a 
minimal but necessary measure for reaffirming justice for the human rights violations 
related to the Communist regime.
(///) As to the third line of influence of the truth commission into the legal approach to 
political justice, one could say that to a certain extent a legally sanctioned authoritative 
position towards the Communist crimes can encourage or generate dimensions of 
criminal prosecution which otherwise might be ignored or side-lined. This influence of 
the truth commission takes place even though, generally speaking, the prosecution does 
not need to be offered by outside (non-legal) agents such as the truth commission, ready­
made justifications for indicting individual suspects of human rights violations.
Earlier, when speaking about the different dimensions of the truth commission’s report, 
the eventual mandate to “naming names” directly associated with human rights violations 
was mentioned. This way of inducing prosecution however was presented as a “by­
product” of the commission’s activity. This is so because the main function of a truth 
commission is to assess the regime, and not to take over the prosecutorial functions of 
inquiry into individual crimes. There is, however, another way in which the commission’s 
mandate to assess the Communist regime can influence the way prosecution proceeds. 
This way, just like the initiation of normative screening measures based upon the
155The Lustration Law was characterised, however, by both over-inclusiveness with respect to 
the “inferior” categories, such as collaborators and informers, and under-inclusiveness with respect to the 
“superior” categories, such as some o f  the higher positions o f the Nomenklatura structure. See supra 
Chapter Three, especially in sections 3.4.4 and 3.4.6.
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commission’s report, is dependent upon the viability and success of the arguments 
brought by the commission of truth for the (retroactive) legitimate rule revision.
For instance, accepting arguments for the revision of specific procedural rules can 
influence the range of crimes to be accounted for, as well as the type of social actors to 
be brought to justice in the process of distribution of criminal responsibility. Given the 
totalitarian nature of the Communist partocracy, which would be addressed by the truth 
commission, the revision of the statute of limitations in the way the Hungarian Zetenyi- 
Takacs law attempted, could appear as legitimate. A legally sanctioned truth report can 
help in opening up the principle of the rule of law towards acknowledging the exceptional 
(legal) circumstances created by the Communist regime. These circumstances - advanced, 
as it was seen in Chapter Two, in the Zetenyi-Takacs law in Hungary - referred to the 
practically unlimited power the Communist power structures possessed over the society, 
and to the comparatively long period over which the Communist rule extended. 
Acknowledging the nature of the regime, through its representative body, and amending 
the statute of limitations, would re-open for prosecution those crimes concealed and 
protected by the Communist structure of power.
On the other hand, the report can stimulate a fairer distribution of responsibility between 
the various social actors. For instance, a report emphasising the importance of the 
structures of power in the systematic violations of human rights can offer a quasi-legal 
but important support to controversial judicial decisions such as the ones taken in the
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German border guard trials.156 This support is beneficial both with respect to the 
suspension of the sentences of the individual border guards, as well as with respect to the 
sentencing of those Politburo members who had no immediate influence over the border 
regime of the former GDR.
Besides this direct impact over the criminal law approach, it can be said that the truth 
about the involvement of the Communist elite in systematic policies of human rights 
violations and cover up of these violations, might steer the debate on political justice 
towards screening as a precondition for the successful prosecution of individual 
perpetrators. In other words, enforcing accountability even at the individual level might 
prove unachievable if the law enforcement agencies, and other influential government 
institutions, are filled with representatives of the old power-structures. These structures 
of power, now becoming occult interest groups, could still hamper the realisation of 
justice even at the individual criminal level by interfering with the process of justice.157 
It should be said though, that however important the prevention of this type of 
interference would be, screening measures should be argued for primarily from the 
perspective of a need for legal accountability of the collective political actors.
* * *
156See supra the discussion on the border guards trials, Section 2.3.
1S7The result o f the Hungarian criminal trials related to the 1956 repression is a good example in 
this sense. Similar examples though are to be found all over the Soviet bloc. See supra Halmai and 
Schepelle, Chapter Two, note 123, and discussion.
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Is collective responsibility a part of a spectrum of responsibilities assessed in a process 
of justice following a repressive regime? Should this issue be addressed before addressing 
other issues of justice such as what to do with the grudge informers of the Communist 
regime, or the collaborators of the StB, or indeed with the German border guards? I 
believe that for the ultimate protection of the citizens against “unbridled bureaucracies,” 
the answer to these questions should be “yes.” I believe that there is enough evidence for 
giving collective responsibility an important place on the map of legal responsibilities 
assessed when addressing the state-sponsored human rights violations.
In Chapter Two and Chapter Three we have seen in detail two different approaches to 
political justice. They both illustrated the difficulties which sprang up in a process of 
political justice which lacks a coherent concept of collective agency and collective 
responsibility. These concepts appear as necessary to complement the individual agent 
and individual responsibility. The Hungarian approach through criminal law, analysed 
in Chapter Two, emphasised the hesitations of the criminal law to accommodate 
“exceptional circumstances,” or “political reasons.” These “exceptional circumstances” 
referred exactly to the nature of the Communist regime; they referred to the fact that an 
apparently functional legal system can be incapacitated by a structure of power. Ignoring 
this reality appeared to undermine the idea of justice and therefore to undermine the 
authority of the legal discourse itself.
Although the Communist structure of power was not acknowledged as such, one could 
still identify in the Hungarian debate on political justice half-spoken statements proving
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the need for a concept of collective responsibility: the repealed Zetenyi-Takacs law spoke 
about acknowledging “political reasons” which prevented the prosecution of Communist 
crimes, and the Hungarian Constitutional Court, while still rejecting these reasons, 
acknowledged the responsibility of the “previous regime” for not having prosecuted those 
crimes.
Even clearer allusions for complementing individual and collective responsibility for the 
human rights violations associated with the Communist regime came from the trials of 
the border guards in Germany; sentenced border guards have been pardoned because of 
“circumstances” and “special conditions” related to the Communist regime. Also, related 
to the same border crimes, Politburo members, some of whom had no direct 
responsibility over the border regime, have been convicted for collective manslaughter, 
and for collectively “failing to set up a more humane border policy.”
The Zetenyi-Takacs law and the decisions of the Hungarian Constitutional Court on the 
suspension of the statute of limitations, as well as the criminal sentences in the border 
guard trials, suggested the need for an assessment of the Communist regime as a whole, 
undertaken within the criminal law discourse. In both cases, however, the legal discourse 
obviously struggled to accommodate and “tame” the concept of collective legal 
responsibility.
The same impression was given by the second type of approach to political justice; the 
approach through “administrative” measures of screening. The Czechoslovak Lustration
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Law, and all its preceding acts analysed in Chapter Three, offered in this sense a good 
example of the hesitations in acknowledging collective responsibility even when this 
responsibility appears as the only coherent explanation to a legislative act. The analysis 
of the inconsistencies of the screening law showed that, in spite of contrary claims, the 
law does convey both criminal responsibility and collective blame.
The collective and criminal law dimension of the Lustration Law became even more 
obvious once the Czech parliament issued the Act on the Illegality of the Communist 
Regime. Speaking about responsibility of “the regime” for clearly definable crimes, and 
waving the statute of limitations for serious crimes committed under the same regime, 
this law established an undeniable link between “the regime” and serious human rights 
violations. Yet, the legislator and the Czech Constitutional Court denied any direct 
implication of this law for the distribution of legal responsibility between the individual 
and the collective actors implicated in the human rights violations.
Trying to find both an explanation and a solution to the inconsistencies of the approach 
to collective agency and responsibility, Chapter Four established two important aspects. 
Firstly, it established that the hesitations in acknowledging collective responsibility are 
rooted in issues found beyond the legal discourse, in the metaphysical ideas of autonomy 
and rationality of the social actors. Secondly, Chapter Four argued for the potential of 
homologous - individual and collective - concepts of intention, action and actor, based 
on the same idea of autonomy and rationality. Looking through the various theories on 
collective responsibility, we arrived at identifying a viable complementing triangle of
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responsibility, similar but not identical to the individual triangle of responsibility. As 
opposed to this triangle of the individual responsibility, the collective responsibility 
proposed is based on action and reason for action originating in the same collective 
structure. The potential for this type of collective responsibility is characteristic of self­
organised collectivities possessing a coherent internal decision structure.
By establishing this homology of elements of responsibility a new perspective became 
possible over the issue of political justice in Eastern Europe; both the criminal law 
approach and the administrative procedures could gain coherence and substance through 
the application of such a concept of collective agency and responsibility. That is to say, 
if one could only identify a viable organisation with a strong enough internal decision 
structure to convert apparently individual acts and particular reasons in organisational 
actions performed for organisational reasons.
For the identification of such an organisation we started from quasi-legal statements taken 
from the case studies analysed in Chapter Two and Chapter Three. These statements 
indicated, somehow vaguely, that “the regime” was the one primarily responsible for the 
human rights violations in Eastern Europe, and for the lack of protection given to these 
rights. These statements however appear unable to convey legal responsibility: “the 
regime” appeared as being everything and nothing, an amorphous mass of political gossip 
and self-censorship, of ignorant leaders and over-zealous subordinates, of apparent 
altruistic goals and evident criminal means. Looking for an “internal decision structure” 
into this amorphous mass appeared hopeless, the definition of “the regime” oscillating
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between identifying the regime solely with the Secretary General of the Party, or 
expanding it to contain all the more or less willing party members, Secret Police 
collaborators and informers, etc. Neither of these two extremes seem to offer a viable 
alternative to responsibility. A much more credible formula, however, appeared: the 
apparently insignificant, “made-for-administrative-purposes” list of offices and positions 
called Nomenklatura. An a-constitutional party-state hybrid, the Nomenklatura appeared 
as a highly structured organisation whose internal decision structure was highly efficient 
in converting the organisational acts of will into normative parameters in all domains of 
social life.
Isolating this a-typical social actor from all the “noise” referring to the Communist 
regime, opened for a process of political justice the option of identifying whether the 
decisions resulting in violations of basic human rights derived from the place where the 
real power was vested, that is to say from the Nomenklatura. Without attempting to go 
into the procedural details of such a process, for the discussion of which an entire thesis 
would have been needed (discussion eventually anchored in a specific domestic legal 
system) Chapter Six looked at the potential impact the isolation of an identifiable 
structure of power and collective actor can have for the process of justice after a 
totalitarian regime. Firstly, it is argued that the specificity of the collective actor, the 
Nomenklatura, calls for a differentiated reading into the requirements of the principles 
of the rule of law. This differentiation is helped, it was argued, by arguments brought by 
a commission of truth instituted to assess the Communist regime as such. An a-typical 
quasi-legal or hybrid institution designed to match the a-typical nature of the agent it
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assesses, the commission of truth appeared also as the foundation of any other measure 
of political justice. Its major contribution, however, takes place in the domain of 
collective accountability for human rights violations.
In this sense, by addressing the issue of collective political accountability, the 
commission’s report was shown to play a major role in systematically constructing the 
arguments for the legitimate rule revision and for the differentiated application of the 
principles of the rule of law to the specific measures of political justice. Based upon this 
foundation, it appears that measures of screening should not be ruled out as a way of 
enforcing collective accountability of the structures of power. At the same time, 
prosecution of individual perpetrators appears to be influenced both by the legitimate 
revision of rules, such as the rules governing the statute of limitations, and, more 
importantly, by the prosecution becoming part of a more coherent approach to justice. In 
this approach the individual criminal accountability is complemented, largely through 
measures of screening, by elements of collective political accountability for the same 
violations of human rights.
Enforcing collective, as well as individual, accountability for the same violations of 
human rights is an expression of the interdependence between the individual 
responsibility and the responsibility of the structures of power, for crimes such as the 
systematic violations of fundamental human rights. It is in the interest of justice that - if 
political circumstances allow it - both individual and collective responsibility receive 
equal attention. Though we have dealt here mainly with the concept of collective
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responsibility within the process of political justice, the emphasis upon the collective 
dimension of this process should not mean the neglect of the individual responsibility. 
The emphasis upon the collective responsibility comes from the very specificity of the 
process of political justice itself. The acknowledgement of this concept in law is meant 
to strengthen and not to weaken the deterrence from criminal acts committed by 
individual persons for political reasons, or facilitated, incited or tolerated by the political 
context. Accordingly, the proposed collective political responsibility of the Communist 
Nomenklatura for an illegal and criminal regime comes to complement the individual 
criminal responsibility for human rights violations committed under that rule.
Of course that, to a certain limited extent, the post-totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe 
do not have to screen the state apparatus of elements of the Communist structure of 
power. As mentioned in the opening chapter, the international law practice, as well as the 
good sense of political transition, allow for a certain margin of appreciation and balancing 
between the need for justice and the need for social reconciliation and peace. Other 
reasons than justice, however, should prevail only in very special imperative 
circumstances. And, even in those circumstances it is important to establish in the legal, 
if not the political and legislative debate the fact that, should it so choose, a post- 
Communist society could decide to screen the old structure of power from office.
In the end, the idea should be reinforced that the whole process of political justice must 
be very carefully conceived and balanced procedurally. Special care should be taken to 
avoid a “normative contamination” between different dimensions of responsibility and
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their enforcing mechanisms. Using traditional procedural criminal law rules for non­
criminal law legislation, such as screening, must be avoided. At the same time, controlled 
procedural flexibility should be allowed in order to be able to address the exceptional 
circumstances which lead to a revolution. And, speaking about the care with which the 
whole process of political justice should be dealt with in Eastern Europe, it should be 
remembered by both the supporters and the critics of political justice, that revolutions, 
like trees, are judged by the fruit they bear.
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